which control and interpret penal statutes.173 The validity of the ordinance considered in respect to its form may depend upon its place in one or the other of the classifications noted above. It is scarcely necessary to say that penal statutes or laws are construed strictly and every intendment is taken against them.174 On the other hand, ordinances involving contract relations and pertaining to the general administrative affairs of the city are construed liberally and given force when not in violation of some express law or principle of the law.175 The rule of strict construction also applies to all ordinances relating to the collection of revenues and the making of public improvements for, through the enforcement of such ordinances, the wrongful taking of private property may be accomplished.170

It is not necessary to recite in the ordinance either the authority for its passage,177 or, where the council is acting upon discretionary matters, the reason for its basis of action.178

173 Donovan v. City of Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 247; Ex parte Neill, 32

Tex. Cr. R. 275.

174 Ex parte Sims, 40 Fla. 432; City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90; Krickle v. Com., 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 361; City of St. Louis v. Goebel, 32 Mo. 295; Town of Pacific v. Seifert, 79 Mo. 210; State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512; City of St Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 42 L. R. A. 686; McConvill v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. Law, 38; People v. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y. 110, 20 L. R. A. 81.

Fowler v. City of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 228. The rules or canons of construction as applied to penal statutes are not ordinarily applied as rigidly to municipal ordinances. See, also, First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann. 335, in which the courts say the by-laws of very few of its corporations could stand such a test; they should receive a reasonable construction and their terms should not be strictly scrutinized for the purpose of making

them void.

Abb. Corp. Vol. II-23.

If no par

175 Whitlock v. West, 26 Conn. 406; Swift v. City of Topeka, 43 Kan. 671, 8 L. R. A. 772; First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann. 335; Merriam v. City of New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 318; Com. v. Robertson, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 438; Rounds v. Munford, 2 R. I. 154.

176 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 76 Ill. 447; State v.. Morris, 47 La. Ann. 1660; Fowler v. City of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 228; River Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91; Davenport v. City of Richmond, 81 Va. 636, 59 Am. Rep. 694.. 177 Methodist Church v. City of Baltimore, 6 Gill (Md.) 391; City of Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 43; Com. v. Fahey, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 408; City of Ogdensburgh v. Lyon, 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 215.

178 Young v. City of St. Louis, 47 Mo. 492. A declaration of the necessity for the passage of an ordinance held not necessary. Kansas City v. Mastin, 169 Mo. 80, 68 S. W. 1037; Stuyvesant v. City of New York, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 588; Kiley v. Forsee,

ticular form is prescribed by the charter or general law in which the ordinance shall be engrossed, any arrangement of words is sufficient to constitute a by-law or ordinance provided, however, that it contains the essentials of a law and that enough is recited to clearly and definitely indicate the will of the council and the terms and objects to which it applies.179

§ 523. Title.

An ordinary constitutional provision in respect to legislation passed by state legislative bodies is that no law or statute shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in the title; such a requirement is for the purpose of preventing legislation as introduced from passing upon more than one subject while the title refers to one alone,180_ -a serious reflection certainly upon the care and attention which legislators give to those matters upon which their action is expected.

It also has for its purpose the simplification of legislation by preventing incongruous and many subjects to be regulated or dealt with in the same bill and it also operates in preventing the people and legislators from being misled upon reading the title.181 This same restriction is frequently found applying to the legislative action of municipal councils.182 In the absence of a statute

57 Mo. 390; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318.

179 Lisbon v. Clark, 18 N. H. 234; City of San Antonio v. Micklejohn, 89 Tex. 79.

180 The Borrowdale, 39 Fed. 376; Beard v. Wilson, 52 Ark. 290; Baird v. State, 52 Ark. 326. But, "The Drag-net proviso" SO called, of March 26th, 1883, held not in contravention of Const. of Ark. 1874, art. 5, § 23.

Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412, 32 L. R. A. 527; Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 Ill. 229, 21 N. E. 1; Village of Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 Ill. 312; Bush v. City of Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 476; Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; In re Thomas, 53 Kan. 659; City of Topeka v. Raynor, 60 Kan. 860; El

liott v. City of Louisville, 101 Ky. 262; Callaghan v. Town of Alexandria, 52 La. Ann. 1013; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 4 L. R. A. 751; Town of Ocean Springs v. Green, 77 Miss. 472; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1; Neuendorff v. Duryea, 6 Daly (N. Y.), 276.

181 Senn v. Southern R. Co., 124 Mo. 621; Morrow County v. Village of Mt. Gilead, 8 Ohio N. P. 669; Harrisburg v. Eby, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 124; City of Chester v. Bullock, 187 Pa. 544; Yesler v. City of Seattle, 1 Wash. St. 308.

182 Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412, 32 L. R. A. 527; Hanson v. Hunter, 86 Iowa, 722, 53 N. W. 84, affirmed in 48 N. W. 1005; Stebbins v. Mayer, 38 Kan. 573, 16 Pac. 745; City of Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan. 249;

making such a constitutional provision applicable to city ordinances, it is generally held that it only applies to state laws.183 It follows that where such a provision exists, a violation of its terms will render invalid the ordinance defective in this respect or inoperative except as to the subject expressed.18 The courts have held that such a requirement, however, does not call for more than a reference to the general subject covered by the ordinance. 185 It is not necessary that the title should specify in de

Callaghan v. Town of Alexandria, 52 La. Ann. 1013. It is not necessary that the title of an ordinance should be expressed with the same formality as that required for public statutes. People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 13 L. R. A. 286; City of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; Yesler v. City of Seattle, 1 Wash. St. 308. Such a charter provision may be suspended by the subsequent passage of a general law.

183 Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412, 32 L. R. A. 527; Green v. City of Indianapolis, 25 Ind. 490; City of Topeka v. Raynor, 60 Kan. 860; Id., 61 Kan. 10. Kan. Const. art. 2, § 16, prohibiting any bill from containing more than one subject and which shall be expressed in the title in the absence of express provision does not apply to city ordinances. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 4 L. R. A. 751; People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 13 L. R. A. 286; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1. The Const. provision that "No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in the title," in the absence of a statute making it expressly apply to city ordinances is not applicable to them. State v. Gibbes, 60 S. C. 500. 184 Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 Pac. 665. An ordinance, the title of which is in the alternative, it is here held, is not subject to such a provision.

Walker v. People, 170 Ill. 410. An ordinance which provides for a connected system of sewers and drains for the entire city is not defective. It is not necessary to pass a separate ordinance providing for each street alone. Village of Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 Ill. 312. It is not necessary to state the purpose of the ordinance as a part of its title.

Thompson v. City of Highland Park, 187 Ill. 265; Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. City of Wyandotte, 44 Kan. 32; Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App. 601; State v. City of St. Louis, 161 Mo. 371; Town of Ocean Springs v. Green, 77 Miss. 472. The following title "An ordinance to prevent the carrying or exhibiting of a deadly weapon," held not in violation of such a provision. But see Bergman v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 88 Mo. 678, which holds that an ordinance entitled "An act to regulate the speed within the city limits of cars and locomotives," a section was invalid providing for the giving of danger signals and for the equipment of railroad cars.

185 Hanson v. City of Hunter, 86 Iowa, 722; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. City of Wyandotte, 44 Kan. 32; City of Des Moines v. Keller, 116 Iowa, 648, 88 N. W. 827, 57 L. R. A. 243; In re Thomas, 53 Kan. 659; Lowry v. City of Lexington, 113 Ky. 763, 68 S. W. 1109; Elliott v.

tail all the sections or provisions,186 but it should contain sufficient to comply with the rule above noted.

An ordinance may violate in part such a restrictive clause while other portions comply with the requirements and in these cases it is commonly held that the invalid may be separated from the valid portions of the ordinance and the latter enforced.187

An ordinance or resolution, since it is a local law, must be passed by a legal legislative body acting in such capacity18s at a meeting where that action can be legally taken and by the requisite number of votes.189 The subject of a quorum has been considered in a preceding section 190 to which reference is made.

In considering the latter question, a provision frequently found in city charters is to the effect that in case of a tie the mayor of the city or the presiding office of the council shall have the power of casting the deciding vote.191 This right is limited, however,

strictly to these occasions and its existence does not make that officer a member of the council. A charter may also require a specified vote, usually larger, for the passage of ordinances involving the expenditure of money or the consideration of questions regarded as important while for those of less importance, or those not involving the disbursement of moneys, a smaller vote is necessary to legal action.192 In determining the question of a legal quorum, the right of a member to vote and act as a member of a council may be restricted by charter or statutory provisions that forbid members from voting or participating in proceedings where they are directly or indirectly interested in the subject under discussion and which is to be acted upon.193 In these cases the principle applies that where the vote of a member thus interested is included and is necessary for the passage of the legislation, such action will not be considered valid."

525. Mode of passage.

194

A provision of frequent occurrence in city charters is that which requires that on the passage or adoption of every ordinance or resolution, the yeas and nays shall be called and a record made

gill & Hill Mill. Co., 156 Mo. 620; Brown v. Lutz, 36 Neb. 527; Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 Neb. 843, 9 L. R. A. 786; Outwater v. Borough of Carlstadt, 66 N. J. Law, 510, 49 Atl. 533; Mueller v. Egg Harbor City, 55 N. J. Law, 245; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. City of Dunkirk, 65 Hun, 494, 20 N. Y. Supp. 596; People v. Bresler, 171 N. Y. 302; Campbell v. City of Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St. 463; State v. Mott, 111 Wis. 19, 86 N. W. 569.

192 Clarke v. Jennings (Cal.), 32 Pac. 909; McDonald v. Dodge, 97 Cal. 112; Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich. 328, 48 N. W. 577; City of Cincinnati v. Bickett, 26 Ohio St. 49; Hall v. City of Racine, 81

Wis. 72.

198 Smith v. Los Angeles I. & L. Co-operative Ass'n, 78 Cal. 289, 12 Am. St. Rep. 53; State v. Porter,

113 Ind. 79; Dorchester v. Youngman, 60 N. H. 385. But a resident of a town interested in a suit is not disqualified from voting at a town meeting in respect to the subjectmatter of the suit. Van Hook v. Somerville Mfg. Co., 5 N. J. Eq. (1 Halst.) 139.

194 City of San Diego v. San Diego & L. A. R. Co., 44 Cal. 106; State v. Pinkerman, 63 Conn. 176, 22 L. R. A. 653; Buffington Wheel Co. v. Burnham, 60 Iowa, 493. But see City of Topeka v. Huntoon, 46 Kan. 634, where it is held that because an alderman owns property within the limits of a proposed sewer district he is not thereby disqualified from acting. See, also, Goff v. Nolan, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 323, where the fact that an alderman will be benefited by the proposed widening of a street is held not to