.252

regulation, except where it is existence in the individual is at a place or under circumstances or conditions when it annoys or disturbs others. And so it would appear that any sweeping regulation interdicting, under penalty, drunkenness generally, or in cases other than those specified in the exception just stated, would be an invasion of the 'inalienable rights of the citlzen.'" But see the later case of Gallatin v. Tarwater, below. Village of Green City v. Holsinger, 76 Mo. App. 567; City of Gallatin v. Tarwater, 143 Mo. 40.

U. S. Const. amend. art. XIV; In re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. 481; Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 431 (Gil. 387); State V. Graves, 19 Md. 351. "The mayor and city council (of Baltimore) are but trustees of the public, the tenure of their office impresses their ordinances with liability to change; they could not, if they would, pass an irrevocable ordinance; the corporation cannot abridge its own legislative powers."

Rutgers College Athletic Ass'n V. City of New Bunswick, 55 N. J. Law, 279, 26 Atl. 87; Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 324; Ex parte City of Albany, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 277; Pesterfield v. Vickers, 43

Tenn. (3 Cold.) 205; City of Memphis V. Winfield, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 707; Joske V. Irvine (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 278; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863. See, also, c. V, ante, especially §§ 116 and 117 relating to the police power and its exercise.

251 U. S. Const. amend. art. I.

252 U. S. Const. amend. arts. I and II; ex parte Cheney, 90 Cal. 617; Collins v. Hall, 92 Ga. 411, 17 S. E. 622; McGregor v. Village of Lovington, 48 Ill. App. 211; City or Cottonwood Falls v. Smith, 36 Kan. 401; Board of Police v. Giron, 46 La. Ann. 1364; City of St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo. 204; Ex parte Caldwell, 138 Mo. 233. But see Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368.

253 U. S. Const. amend. arts. IV and VIII; Carey v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375; Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524; People v. Noelke, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 461.

254 U. S. Const. amend art. V; State v. Adams, 14 Ala. 486; State v. Flint, 63 Conn. 248; Williams v. Com., 78 Ky. 97; Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 522; State v. Shirer, 20 S. C. 404. But see McInerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516.

255 U. S. Const. amend. art. VI; Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Stimson, Am. St. Law, §§ 130 et seq.

256 U. S. Const. amend. art. V; Wilson v. Baltimore & P. R. R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 524; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 76 Ill. 447; Symonds v. City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio, 173. See Lewis, Em. Dom. (2d Ed.) §§ 110-125 and 155 et seq. See, also, Chapter V, ante, on the police power, especially sections 117 et seq.; section 460 par. a; section 474, section 537 ante, and the sections, post, relating to the use of public streets and highways for various public utilities

It has been held that the right to contract and the right to labor are property and many ordinances prohibiting or limiting these rights have been held void because considered a taking of property without due process of law or without the payment of just compensation. It is impossible even to cite the many cases bearing upon these subjects as well as the other constitutional provisions referred to in the preceding paragraphs and sections. The reader will find the questions thoroughly considered in works on Constitutional Law: Lewis, Em. Dom.; McQuillin, Mun. Ord.; Horr. & Bemis, Mun. Ord. and Tiedeman, State & Fed. Control of Persons & Prop. See, also, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. "As already stated, the present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the power of eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be taken for public use without com

pensation. A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the state that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. Nor can legislation of that character come within the Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process of law. The power which the states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals or the safety of the public, is notand, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be burdened with the condition that the state must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community. The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particu

is property, and the laborer has the same right to sell his labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as has any other property owner.

* The right to acquire, possess and protect property includes the right to make reasonable contracts, and when an owner is deprived of one of the attributes of property, like the right to make contracts, he is deprived of his property within the meaning of the constitution." People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330.

257 Holt v. City of Birmingham, 111 Ala. 369, 19 So. 735. Hewlett v. Camp, 115 Ala. 499. Pool selling. Ex parte Hong Shen, 98 Cal. 681. Retailing opium, ordinance not held void. Foster v. Police Com'rs of City & County of San Francisco, 102 Cal. 483. Additional requirements for obtaining a license to sell liquor in addition to those fixed by the state law will not render an ordinance containing them invalid.

McInerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516. Where the ordinance is identical with the statutes of the state applying to the same act, an offender may be proceeded against under either or both. State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; State v. Flint, 63 Conn. 248;

State v. Dillon, 42 Fla. 95, 28 So. 78; Haywood v. City of Savannah, 12 Ga. 404; City of Savannah v. Hussey, 21 Ga. 80; Jenkins V. Town of Thomasville, 35 Ga. 145; Kassell v. City of Savannah, 109 Ga. 491, 35 S. E. 147; Rothschild v. City of Darien, 69 Ga. 503; Strauss v. City of Waycross, 97 Ga. 475. The power of a municipal corporation to make a given act an offence may be subsequently taken away by the passage of a state law dealing with the same matter.

In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho, 371, 49 Pac. 12; Walker v. City of Aurora, 140 Ill. 402, 29 N. E. 741; Duggan v. Peoria D. & E. R. Co., 42 Ill. App. 536; Clevenger v. Town of Rushville, 90 Ind. 258; City of Indianapolis v. Huegele, 115 Ind. 581; City of Indianapolis v. Higgins, 141 Ind. 1; City of Centerville v. Miller, 57 Iowa, 56; City of Kansas City v. Grubel, 57 Kan. 436; March v. Com., 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 25; Taylor v. City of Owensboro, 98 Ky. 271; State v. Caldwell, 3 La. Ann. 435 (gambling); Jefferson Police Jury v. Arleans, 34 La. Ann. 646; State v. Labatut, 39 La. Ann. 516; State v. Callac, 45 La. Ann. 27; Crawshaw v. City of Roxbury, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 374; People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 9 L. R. A. 722; City of St. Louis v. Kaime, 2 Mo. App. 66; Riley v. City of Trenton, 51 N. J. Law, 498, 18 Atl. 116, 5 L. R. A. 352; Mulcahy v. City of Newark, 57 N. J. Law, 513, 31 Atl. 226; Bowyer v. City of Camden, 50 N.

259

J. Law, 87; Landis v. Borough of Vineland, 54 N. J. Law, 75; State v. McCoy, 116 N. C. 1059, 21 S. E. 690; Town of Washington v. Hammond, 76 N. C. 33; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 574; State v. McCormack, 116 N. C. 1033; State v. Sherrard, 117 N. C. 716; Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Or. 139; Walsh v. City of Union, 13 Or. 589.

Borough of Norristown v. Citizens' Pass. R. Co., 148 Pa. 87, 23 Atl. 1062. An ordinance which violates a constitutional provision against the passage of local or special laws relating to the affairs of boroughs or providing for changing methods for the collection of debts is void although third parties may have accepted and acted upon the ordin

ance.

Schroder v. City of Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 533; Robinson v. Town of Franklin, 20 Tenn. (1 Humph.) 156; Smith v. City of Knoxville, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 245; Bordages v. Higgins, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 43; Bohmy v. State, 21 Tex. App. 597.

Lynn v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 153, 25 S. W. 779. An ordinance is invalid which requires in its enforcement the doing of an act prohibited by the state laws. Ballard v. City of Dallas (Tex. Cr. R.) 44 S. W. 864; Ex parte Wickson (Tex. Cr. R. 47 S. W. 643; Ex parte Ogden,

259 Norris V. Staps, Hob. 210; Phillips v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. 179; City of Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399; State v. Burns, 45 La. Ann. 34; Simrall v. City of Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 9 L. R. A. 556;

42 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 66 S. W. 1100; Village of St. Johnsbury v. Thompson (Vt.) 9 Atl. 571; Behan v. City of New Orleans, 34 La. Ann. 128 (fees or salaries of officers); Wood v. Kansas City, 162 Mo. 303; Jarvis v. City of New York, 49 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 354. See, also, cases fully collected in McQuillin, Mun. Ord. p. 24, note 23.

258 Thomas v. City of Richmond, 72 U. S. (12 Wall.) 349; Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. (U. S.) 422; City of Placerville v. Wilcox, 35 Cal. 21; Pollok v. City of San Diego, 118 Cal. 593, 50 Pac. 769; Haywood v. City of Savannah, 12 Ga. 404; Brown v. Atlanta R. & P. Co., 113 Ga. 462, 39 S. E. 71. The limitation does not apply, however, to ordinances which conflict merely with some prior ordinance. But see the case of City of St. Louis v. Sanguinet, 49 Mo. 581, which holds that an ordinance which conflicts with an ordinance of a prior date shall be valid until the express repeal of the former.

People v. Mount, 186 Ill. 569; Andrews v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 37 Me. 256; Stadler v. City of Detroit, 13 Mich. 346; City of St. Paul v. Laidler, 2 Minn. 190 (Gil. 159); Kemp v. City of Monett, 95 Mo. App. 452, 69 S. W. 31; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 468; State V. Johnson, 123 Mo. 43: Treasurer of City of Elizabeth v. Dunning, 58 N. J. Law, 554, 34 Atl.

Kennebec & P. R. Co. v. Kendall, 31 Me. 470; City of Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; Pesterfield v. Vickers, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 205; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307.

§ 537. General characteristics.

752. A charter provision may be superseded by a general statute passed by the state legislature.

Leland v. Long Branch Com'rs, 42 N. J. Law, 375; Horan v. Lane, 53 N. J. Law, 275; City of New York V. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 122; Cowen v. Village of West Troy, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; In re Bayard, 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 294; Com. v. Crogan, 155 Pa. 448; State v. City of Nashville, 83 Tenn. 697; Hadlan v. City of Olympia, 2 Wash. T. 340; Wood v. City of Seattle, 23 Wash. 1, 62 Pac. 135, 52 L. R. A. 369. The presumption, however, exists, that the city ordinance is not in conflict with the provisions of its charter.

260 Town of Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 14 S. W. 38; State v. Flint, 63 Conn. 248; Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 26 L. R. A. 234; Chambers v. Town of Barnsville, 89 Ga. 739; State v. Preston, 4 Idaho, 215, 38 Pac. 694; State v. Quong, 8 Idaho, 191, 67 Pac. 491; Town of Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 III. 205; City of Chicago v. Brownell, 41 Ill. App. 70; City of Spring Valley v. Spring Valley Coal Co.,

71 Ill. App. 432; City of Indianapolis v. Higgins, 141 Ind. 1, 40 N. E. 671; Beiling v. City of Evansville, 144 Ind. 644, 35 L. R. A. 272; In re Thomas, 53 Kan. 659; In re Jahn, 55 Kan. 694; City of Monroe v. Hardy, 46 La. Ann. 1232, 15 So. 696; State v. Fourcade, 45 La. Ann. 717; Board of Police v. Giron, 46 La. Ann. 1364; City of St. Louis V. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 8 S. W. 791; City of De Soto v. Brown, 44 Mo. App. 148; City of Plattsburg v. Trimble, 46 Mo. App. 459; Kansas City v. Neal, 49 Mo. App. 72; Kansas City v. Hallett, 59 Mo. App. 160; City of St. Joseph v. Vesper, 59 Mo. App. 459; Riley v. City of Trenton, 51 N. J. Law, 498, 5 L. R. A. 352; Mulcahy v. City of Newark, 57 N. J. Law, 513; Ayres v. City of Dallas, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 603, 25 S. W. 631; Ex parte Abram, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 10; Ex parte Freeland, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 321, 42 S. W. 295; City of Seattle v. Chin Let, 19 Wash. 38, 52 Pac. 324; State v. Newman, 96 Wis. 258 71 N. W. 438; State v. City of La Crosse, 107 Wis. 654, 84 N. W. 242.