261 Ex parte McKenna, 126 Cal. 429. Trading stamp ordinance. In re Lowe, 54 Kan. 757, 27 L. R. A. 545. An ordinance which provides that the mayor and council may grant the exclusive privilege of removing garbage from private premises, as well as public, is an attempt to create a monopoly and is void.

City of St. Paul v. Laidler, 2 Minn. 190 (Gil. 159); Paterson Chronicle Co. v. City of Paterson, 66 N. J. Law, 121, 48 Atl. 589; People v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N. Y. 529, 27 L. R. A. 718; Borough of Warren v. Lewis, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 176.

Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307. An ordinance which prohibits the sale without a license at temporary stands of lemonade, fruits, cakes and ice cream, is an unreasonable restraint of trade and, therefore, void. See, also, § 254, ante.

262 McInerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516; City of Clinton v. Phillips, 58 Ill. 102. An ordinance exacting quarterly reports of sales of liquor is oppressive and unreasonable. The court say "This section is in violation of the sanctity of private business and ought not to be tolerated."

McFarlane v. City of Chicago, 185 Ill. 242. An ordinance levying a local improvement tax for paving a street which is already paved with cedar blocks in good condition is void. Pittsburg C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Town of Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421, 45 N. E. 587, 35 L. R. A. 684; Hughes v. Recorder's Ct., 75 Mich. 574, 4 L. R. A. 863; People v. Keir, 78 Mich. 98;

City of St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, 31 S. W. 915. An ordinance which makes it a penal offense for any one to associate with persons having the reputation of being thieves is invalid and void as being oppressive and restrictive of personal liberty; the mere intention to do evil unaccompanied by any overt act cannot be considered by the courts as the commission of an offense. The further principle also is applied or may be applied in connection with this line of cases that the mere ability or capacity to commit an offense or crime cannot be regarded as the equivalent of an overt act or demonstration against the law.

City of Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 507; State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 60 L. R. A. 634; Long v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 134; City of Memphis V. Winfield, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 707. An ordinance providing for the arrest of negroes found on the street after ten o'clock at night, held "high handed and oppressive."

263 Foster v. Police Com'rs of City & County of San Francisco, 102 Cal. 483; Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 Ill. 405. An ordinance which permits one to engage in a business in a certain locality and prohibits another from carrying on the same business in the same locality is void because of a discrimination.

City of Carthage v. Carlton, 99 Ill. App. 338. An ordinance which affects all persons equally coming within the same class is not void because discriminative. City of Des

Moines v. Keller, 116 Iowa, 648, 88 N. W. 827, 57 L. R. A. 243; DeBen v. Gerard, 4 La. Ann. 30; State v. Mahner, 43 La. Ann. 496, 9 So. 480; City of Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. 671. An ordinance of the city council granting a privilege to one sect which it denies to another is unconstitutional and therefore void.

State v. Kuntz, 47 La. Ann. 106; Com. v. Goodrich, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 546. But the validity of the municipal regulation may not be affected by the fact that it is made with special reference to a particular person. Kansas City v. Sutton, 52 Mo. App. 398; City of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 261; City of Buffalo v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 6 Misc. 630, 27 N. Y. Supp. 297. An ordinance is not discriminating in its character which applies to but one road when phrased in general terms. Borough of Norristown v. Norristown Pass. R. Co., 148 Pa. 87; City of Chattanooga v. Norman, 92 Tenn. 73, 20 S. W. 417.

264 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Shelton v. City of Mobile, 30 Ala. 540; Thomas v. City of Hot Springs, 34 Ark. 553; Hayden V. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391. A town bylaw is void and is in contravention of a common right which prohibits all persons except its own inhabitants from fishing in a navigable river within the town limits. City of Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36 S. E. 932, 51 L. R. A. 335; Stack v. City of East St. Louis, 85 Ill. 377;

266 McMillan V. Portage La Prairie, 11 Manitoba, 216; Austin v. Murray, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.)

Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139; De Ben v. Gerard, 4 La. Ann. 30; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 25 S. W. 202. An ordinance which prohibits the playing of billiard games in billiard halls after nine o'clock P. M. is not yoid as being oppressive, discriminating and inderogation of common right. Hil v. Thompson, 48 N. Y. Super. Ct. (16 J. & S.) 481; Kurtz v. Clausen, 38 Misc. 105, 77 N. Y. Supp. 97. The grant of an exclusive privilege for maintaining and renting chairs in public parks is illegal and in derogation of common right. State v. Hill, 126 N. C. 1139, 50 L.. R. A. 473; City Council of Charleston v. Ahrens, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 241; Milliken v. City Council of Weath-erford, 54 Tex. 388.

265 Moore v. District of Columbia, 12 App. D. C. 537; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Beroujohn v. City of Mobile, 27 Ala. 58. An ordinance which requires the city sexton to expend from his fees sufficient to bury paupers free of charge is unreasonable, unjust and void where it is the duty of the municipal corporation to maintain burial grounds and bury paupers.

City of Denver v. Girard, 21 Colo. 447, 42 Pac. 662. The improper enforcement of an ordinance relative to the display of merchandise on sidewalks does not make it discriminative.

City of Chicago v. Brownell, 146 Ill. 64; Champer v. City of Greencastle, 138 Ind. 339, 35 N. E. 14,. 24 L. R. A. 768; Com. v. Wilkins,. 121; State v. Cincinnati Gaslight & Coke Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Kirk-ham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956.

121 Mass. 356; City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; City of Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & B. G. R. Co., 95 Mich. 456, 29 L. R. A. 79; City of St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 20 L. R. A. 721; Trenton Horse R. Co. v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 53 N. J. Law, 132, 20 Atl. 1076, 11 L. R. A. 410; Read v. City of Camden, 54 N. J. Law, 347, 24 Atl. 549; State v. Richards, 74 Conn. 57, 49 Atl. 858. Refusal to repair sidewalks. Rahway Gaslight Co. v. City of Rahway, 58 N. J. Law, 510, 34 Atl. 3. An ordinance which affects a single corporation may still not be unreasonable in its requirements. Long v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, 348; State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 60 L. R. A. 634; Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956; Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis. 141.

Ordinances imposing restraints on certain occupations, either as to manner, time and place of its exercise if enacted in good faith and applying to all as a class, are not usually held invalid because unreasonable. See the following cases: Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal. 326, 38 L. R. A. 640. Operating carpet beating machine. City of Chicago v. Stratton, 58 Ill. App. 539. Keeping of a livery stable. State v. Taft, 118 N. C. 1190, 23 S. E. 970, 32 L. R. A. 122.

267 Town of Huntsville v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55. An ordinance is not void for uncertainty because the penalty imposed for its violation is left to the municipal court to be imposed within fixed limits. San Francisco Pioneer Woolen Factory v. Brickwedel, 60 Cal. 166; State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97; Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla. 281, 8 So. 429,

10 L. R. A. 158; Webber v. City of

313, 36 N. E. 70; R. Co. v. Beaver,

Chicago, 148 Ill. Chicago & E. I. 96 Ill. App. 558; City of Shreveport v. Roos, 35 La. Ann. 1010; Com. v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 52, 29 N. E. 1146; Com. v. Goodnow, 117 Mass. 114; Com. v. Roy, 140 Mass. 432; State v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. Law, 262; McConvill v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. Law, 38. "It has been well said that a by-law ought to be expressed in such a manner as that its meaning may be unambiguous and in such language as may be readily understood by those upon whom it is to operate." State v. Rice, 97 N. C. 421, 2 S. E. 180; Louisburg Com'rs v. Harris, 52 N. C. (7 Jones) 281; State v. Higgs, 126 N. C. 1014, 48 L. R. A. 446. An ordinance giving the mayor the discretionary power to impose a fine or imprisonment within fixed limits as a penalty for its violation is not indefinite and uncertain.

Ex parte Bell, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 308, 22 S. W. 1040. An ordinance is too indefinite to support a conviction where it provides for the punishment of the keeper of a variety show which it defines as "any place or institution known or recognized as a variety show." Seymour v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138, 32 Pac. 1077.

Ordinances relating to local improvements. See citations under § 355, par. b; Mills v. City of Chicago, 182 Ill. 249, 54 N. E. 987; Hynes v. City of Chicago, 175 Ill. 56; Lusk v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 207; Cramer v. City of Charleston, 176 Ill. 507; Jarrett v. City of Chicago, 181 Ill. 242; Cruickshank v. City of Chicago, 181 Ill. 415; Vil

lage of Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 Ill. 312; Sawyer v. City of Chicago, 183 Ill. 57; Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 184 I. 154; Essroger v. City of Chicago, 185 Ill. 420; Mead v. City of Chicago, 186 Ill. 54; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Town of Crown Point, 150 Ind. 536; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Hezel, 155 Mo. 39, 48 L. R. A. 285; City of Waco v. Chamberlain, 92 Tex. 207, 47 S. W. 527; Kearney v. Andrews, 10 N. J. Eq. (2 Stock.) 70.

In North Carolina it is generally held that ordinances providing a maximum penalty for their violation are void for vagueness and uncertainty. State V Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877; State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883; State v. Worth, 95 N. C. 615; State v. Rice, 97 N. C. 421; State v. Irvin, 126 N. C. 989.

268 In re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 27 L. R. A. 529; Harrison, De Haven and Fitzgerald, J. J. dissenting. Walsh v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. App. 407, 53 Pac. 458; City of Tampa v. Salomonson, 35 Fla. 446, 17 So. 581; Collins v. Hall, 92 Ga. 411; Webber v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 313, 36 N. E. 70; McGregor V. Village of Lovington, 48 ill. App. 211; City of Cairo v. Coleman, 53 Ill. App. 680; Foss v. City of Chicago, 56 Ill. 354.

City of Chicago v. Stratton, 58 Jll.

App. 539. An ordinance which attempts to delegate the power to property owners to control the location of livery stables is void. City of Plymouth v. Schultheis, 135 Ind. 339, 35 N. E. 12; City of Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 598; City of St. Louis v. Howard, 119 Mo. 41, 24 S. W. 770, and City of St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 20 L. R. A. 721; Gallaher v. Smith, 55 Mo. App. 116; City of St. Louis v. Howard, 119 Mo. 41; City of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045; Bowyer v. City of Camden, 50 N. J. Law, 87, 11 Atl. 137; Borough of Madison v. Morristown Gaslight Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 120, 52 Atl. 158; Bassett v. City of El Paso (Tex. Civ. App.) 28 S. W. 554; City of Eureka v. Wilson, 15 Utah, 53; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 19 L. R. A. 858.

269 Ex parte Delaney, 43 Cal. 478; A Coal Float v. City of Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15. "The power of a court to declare an ordinance unreasonable, and therefore void, is practically restricted to cases in which the legislature has enacted nothing on the subject-matter of the ordinance, and consequently to cases in which the ordinance was passed under the supposed incldental power of the corporation merely." Cleveland, C., C. & I. R. Co. v. Harrington, 131 Ind. 426, fol