206 to fill vacancies, the official holds as a general rule only for the unexpired term of the officer whom he succeeds or until the next general or special election as may be provided by law. 207 other appointee, until, as a result of a lawful election and qualification, a successor appears, or until some legal disability as to the incumbent occurs." People v. Page, 6 Utah, 353; People v. Hardy, 8 Utah, 68. But see Verner v. Seibels, 60 S. C. 572, 39 S. E. 274. 206 Carson v. State, 145 Ind. 348, 44 N. E. 360, construing Rev. St. 1894, 7583; Parmater v. State, 102 Ind. 90; Parcel v. State, 110 Ind. 122; Hale v. Bischoff, 53 Kan. 301, 36 Pac. 752; Hoke v. Richie, 100 Ky. 66, 37 S. W. 266; Id., 38 S. W. 132; Pence v. City of Frankfort, 101 Ky. 534, 41 S. W. 1011; French v. Cowan, 79 Me. 426, 10 Atl. 335; Opinion of the Justices, 50 Me. 607; State v. Pearcy, 44 Mo. 159; State v. Stonestreet, 99 Mo. 361, 12 S. W. 895; State v. Moores, 56 Neb. 1, 76 N. W. 503; State v. Muskingum County Com'rs, 7 Ohio St. 125; State v. Speidel, 62 Ohio St. 156; People v. Hardy, 8 Utah, 68, 29 Pac. 1118. In case of a failure to elect a successor at the time required, one holding the appointment will hold over for the succeeding term. But see People v. Townsend, 102 N. Y. 430. 207 State v. Cook, 78 Tex. 406, 14 S. W. 996. "It is unquestionably the duty of the legislature to look to the object and purpose of the different sections of the constitution, which relate to the matter under consideration, when called to legislate thereon, and when a strict and literal construction of its several provisions would lead to an apparent conflict, which might be obvi ated by interpreting them in accordance with the object and spirit of their enactment, it is obviously its duty to pursue the latter course. * * * Doing this in reference to the matter before us, we think it is obvious that the two main purposes shown in the constitution, in regard to the office of justices of the peace, are general uniformity of time at which it is to be filled throughout the state, and general uniformity of four years for its tenure. Neither can be strictly and literally observed in creating new counties, if this is done at any other time than that fixed by law for holding general elections. The power and duty to establish new counties, when required by public convenience, cannot, however, be doubted or denied. But, in providing for the organization of such new counties, regard should be had to those general objects and purposes, and conformity to them should be secured to as great an extent and at as early a time as practicable. And, although it cannot be said, strictly speaking, that the officers first elected in such newly organized county are elected to fill vacancies, we think the analogy may be held to apply to them, and that the legislature very prop erly provided that the county officers which are authorized to be elected by the law creating said county of Waller, should only hold office until the next general election for county officers, and until their successors should be elected and qualified." § 633. Resignation. A term of office or official life is necessarily terminated by the death or permanent insanity of the incumbent 208 and also by vol untary action on his part. It is the theory in the United States, unquestionably wrong, 209 but warranted by such long continued practice as to make it effectual as a rule that a public officer may decline to continue the performance of his public duties at any time.210 A resignation may be made by parol 211 in the absence 208 State v. Pidgeon, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 132; State v. Hunt, 54 N. H. 431; State v. Speidel, 62 Ohio St. 156, 56 N. E. 871. Defendant claimed the office of sheriff because his opponent Buvinger, although receiving more votes, died suddenly at the close of election day. The court said: "The claim of Cover that he has the right to be inducted into the office of sheriff of Clermont county, has no foundation. Whether Buvinger, the deceased candidate, was elected or not, Cover was not elected. No process or reasoning can make 3,802 votes to be more than 4,369 votes. Not merely a plurality but a majority of all the votes cast for sheriff on that election day, were cast against Cover; and it does not avail him that the majority of votes were cast, in good faith, for a man who had died during the election. The majority was not for Cover, and that is all he can make of it." 209 Edwards v. United States, 103 U. S. 471. 210 United States v. Wright, 1 McLean, 509, Fed. Cas. No. 16,775; Price's Case, 4 Ct. Cl. 164; Miller Cal. 93. One cannot resign before the time designated by law. People v. Gillespie, 1 Idaho, 52; Pariseau v. Board of Education, 96 Mich. 302, 55 N. W. 799. Resignation becomes effective after it is tendered and cannot be subsequently withdrawn. State v. Dart, 57 Minn. 261, 59 N. W. 190; State v. Augustine, 113 Mo. 21. Distinguishing State v. Boecker, 56 Mo. 17. A resignation though tendered to the wrong authority, after acceptance, is conclusive and cannot be then withdrawn. Reiter v. State, 51 Ohio St. 74, 36 N. E. 943, 23 L. R. A. 681; McGhee v. Dickey, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 104, 23 S. W. 404; State v. Brinkerhoff, 66 Tex. 45, 17 S. W. 109. But see Badger v. United States, 93 U. S. 599, which holds that although an official resignation is tendered to and accepted by the proper authority, the official continues in office and is not relieved from his duties and responsibilities until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. United States v. Green, 53 Fed. 769; State v. Clayton, 27 Kan. 442; State v. Boecker, 56 Mo. 17. A res parol, express or even by implica tion, so that there be an intent to resign on one side and an acceptance on the other." of a statute law requiring it to be in writing 212 and may be either express or implied,213 and, generally, the principle applies that when once made and presented to the authorities it cannot be subsequently withdrawn or lose its operative effect.214 Abandonment of an office. Official life may be also terminated by voluntary action on the part of the incumbent consisting of at refusal to qualify 215 or to further perform the duties of an of ignation is not complete until it is tendered and has been accepted by the governor with the knowledge and consent of the resigning incumbent under Mo. Const. art. 5, § 8. Reeves v. Ferguson, 31 N. J. Law, 107; Gorgas v. Blackburn, 14 Ohio, 252. Officers upon whom is imposed the duty of levying and collecting taxes and paying the debts of the town can, by resignation, avoid the performance of this duty. 212 Davis v. Connor, 21 Ky. L. R. 658, 52 S. W. 945; Davis v. Humphrey, 21 Ky. 660, 52 S. W. 946; Justices Opinions, 70 Me. 570; Lewis v. Oliver, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 121. 213 Barbour v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 149; People v. Hanifan, 6 Ill. App. 158. 214 Mimmack v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl. 584; McElrath v. United States, 12 Ct. Cl. 201; State v. Fitts, 49 Ala. 402; People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 27; Griffing v. Danbury, 41 Conn. 96; In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 31 Fla. 1, 12 So. 114, 18 L. R. A. 594; Pace v. People, 50 Ill. 432; State v. Hauss, 43 Ind. 105; Parcel v. State, 110 Ind. 122, 11 N. E. 4; Gates v. Delaware County, 12 Iowa, 405; Bond v. White, 8 Kan. 333; Johnson v. Wilson, 15 Ky. L. R. 852, 25 S. W. 1057; State v. Foster, 36 Kan. 504, 13 Pac. 841; Killion v. Herman, 43 Kan. 37, 22 Pac. 1026; Jones v. Wilson, 95 Ky. 415, 33 S. W. 199; Davidson v. Bryce, 91 Md. 681. 48 Atl. 52; Pari seau v. Board of Education, 96 Mich. 302, 55 N. W. 799; State v. Conrades, 45 Mo. 45; State v. Augustine, 113 Mo. 21, 20 S. W. 651; State v. City Council of Lincoln, 4 Neb. 260; Wheeler v. State, 32 Neb. 472, 49 N. W. 442, following State v. Fields, 26 Neb. 393, 41 N. W. 988; State v. Beck, 24 Nev. 92, 49 Pac. 1035. A conditional resignation will not become operative except upon the happening of the conditions specified. Hawkins V. Cook, 62 N. J. Law, 84, 40 Atl. 781; Hutchinson v. Borough of Belmar, 62 N. J. Law, 450, 45 Atl. 1092; People v. Fitchie, 76 Hun, 80, 28 N. Y. Supp. 600; People v. Wende, 25 Misc. 330, 53 N. Y. Supp. 1039; People v. Scheu, 167 N. Y. 292, 60 N. E. 650, affirming 60 App. Div. 592, 69 N. Y. Supp. 597; People v. Hardy, 8 Utah, 68. But see Rogers v. Slonaker, 32 Kan. 191; Clark v. Board of Education of Detroit, 112 Mich. 656, 71 N. W. 177; Vaughn v. School Dist. No. 31, 27 Or. 57, 39 Pac. 393. A resignation to be effective must be made to the one authorized by law to receive and accept it. Bunting v. Willis, 27 Grat. (Va.) 144. 215 Carpenter v. Titus, 33 Kan. 7; State v. Peck, 30 La. Ann. 280. No presumption of abandonment of an office will arise from a failure of the elected person to qualify with in thirty days of the date of his commission. fice 218 effecting, what the law considers, an abandonment of the office. An office may also be abandoned by a removal of the incumbent from the state 217 or from the district for which he performs public duties where the law requires an official to reside within its limits.21 § 634. Holding an incompatible office. The principle has already been suggested in a preceding section that a person may become ineligible for the holding of an office by reason of holding or of being elected to what is termed an incompatible office. This principle is further emphasized by the rule that official life may be terminated through voluntary action of an incumbent by his acceptance of or the performance of the duties of an incompatible office which action it is held is equivalent to a resignation or an abandonment of that other office.219 It is a diffi 216 Barbour v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 149; Harrison v. People, 36 Ill. App. 319. The failure to perform the duties of an office must be so long continued as to justify the presumption that it has been abandoned. De Canio v. City of New York, 15 Misc. 38, 36 N. Y. Supp. 423; Wardlaw v. City of New York, 137 N. Y. 194, 33 N. E. 140; Ward v. Elizabeth City, 121 N. C. 1, 27 S. E. 993. 217 State v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516; Yonkey v. State, 27 Ind. 237; Relender v. State, 149 Ind. 283, 49 N. E. 30. "Members of a board of commissioners are certainly county officers, and, by the positive command of the constitution they are required to reside within the county where they serve as such officers, and perform such duties as the law may direct. The provision of our fundamental law which restricts the evidence of a county officer to his county must be construed as requiring him to be a resident thereof,-not in the general sense of that term, but he is required to actually reside therein during the time he is an incumbent of the office. * That the title of a public officer may be terminated and his office vacated by abandonment is a rule of the law, settled beyond controversy. As the constitution exacts of a county officer the duty to actually reside in the county in which he holds his office, if he violates this provision of the law, by voluntarily ceasing to reside therein, during his term, it will operate as an abandonment of the office and ipso facto a surrender of all his right and title to the office." Gosman v. State, 106 Ind. 203. 218 Relender v. State, 149 Ind. 283, 49 N. E. 30; Osborne v. State, 128 Ind. 129; Matter of Bagley, 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 151; State v. Walker, 17 Ohio, 135. Such a removal may be effected by a rearrangement of county lines. 219 In the following cases, the of fices have been considered incompatible and not capable of being held by the same person at the same time: United States v. Saunders, 120 cult question at times to determine when, as between two offices, an U. S. 126, 7 Sup. Ct. 467; State v. Hutt, 2 Ark. 282. Alderman and city marshal. State Bank v. Curran, 10 Ark. 142. Justice of the peace and sheriff. People v. Saunderson, 30 Cal. 160; Magie v. Stoddard, 25 Conn. 565. Constable and justice of the peace. Attorney General v. Connors, 27 Fla. 329, 9 So. 7. Fla. Const. 1885, art. 16, § 15, does not prohibit the performance by a sheriff of the duties of city marshal, the latter not being a state office within the meaning of the provision stated. Crovatt v. Mason, 101 Ga. 246, 28 S. E. 891; Jones v. McCaskill, 112 Ga. 453, 37 S. E. 724; Kerr v. Jones, 19 Ind. 351. Colonel of militia and reporter of supreme court. Mehringer v. State, 20 Ind. 103; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 111; Foltz v. Kerlin, 105 Ind. 221. Township trustee and postmaster. Ferguson v. True, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 255. Teacher and school trustee. Hoglan v. Carpenter, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 89. Judge of county court and postmaster. Stubbs v. Lee, 64 Me. 195. Justice of the peace and coroner. Woodside v. Wagg, 71 Me. 207. Member of legislature and judge. Pooler v. Reed, 73 Me. 129. Constable and justice of the peace. Ellis v. Lennon, 86 Mich. 468, 49 N. W. 308; Attorney General v. Common Council of Detroit, 112 Mich. 145, 70 N. W. 450, 37 L. R. A. 211. Office of mayor and governor. Richards v. Town of Columbia, 55 N. H. 96; Cotton v. Phillips, 56 N. H. 220. Office of prudential committee and auditor of school district. Doyle v. Board of Education of City of Bayonne, 54 N. J. Law, 313, 23 Atl. 670; People v. Abb. Corp. Vol. II-37. Thomas, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 287; People v. Common Council of Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. 503; State v. Thompson, 122 N. C. 493, 29 S. E. 720; State v. Taylor, 12 Ohio St. 130; State v. Hoyt, 2 Or. 246. Alderman and city marshal. State v. Goff, 15 R. I. 505, 9 Atl. 226. Justice of district court and deputy sheriff. State v. Buttz, 9 S. C. 157. Representative in congress and solicitor for judicial district. State v. Brink. erhoff, 66 Tex. 45, 17 S. W. 109. City recorder and clerk. Shell v. Cousins, 77 Va. 328. But see, Ryan v. City of Lewiston, 86 Me. 125, 29 Atl. 955; State v. Porterfield, 47 S. C. 75, 25 S. E. 39. Offices held not incompatible: Collins v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 22. Retired army officer and office in executive department. Crosthwaite v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 300. Examiner in department of justice and special assistant attorney. Preston v. United States, 37 Fed. 417. Crier and messenger in U. S. courts. State v. Clendenin, 24 Ark. 78. Secretary of state and state senator. State v. Feibleman, 28 Ark. 424. County superintendent and circuit clerk. Lewis v. Wall, 70 Ga. 646. Town marshal and bailiff. Mohan v. Jackson, 52 Ind. 599. City clerk and justice of the peace. Answer of Justices, 68 Mo. 594. Justice and register of deeds. Kenney v. Goergen, 36 Minn. 190. County supervisor, district court clerk. State v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636, 33 L. R. A. 616. Deputy sheriff and school director. State V. Lusk, 48 Mo. 242. County clerk and circuit clerk. People v. Green, 58 N. Y. 295. Deputy clerk and mem |