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public.165 A recent text book 166 states, "prescription refers the right to the highway to the presumption that it was originally established pursuant to law by the proper authority, while a dedication refers it to a contract either express or implied. Dedication implies a conveyance and an acceptance, while prescription requires an unbroken possession or user under claim of right." In the case of a way by prescription, the presumption exists that it was at some anterior period laid out and established by competent authority. "The true basis of the claim is not a grant, but a record presumed to have been made according to law."

740. Prescription; what necessary.

User is the essential element in the acquirement of a prescriptive right and questions naturally follow with respect to its length and character. The length of time necessary for the possession and use may be determined either by the general statutes of limitation respecting actions concerning real property,167 or spe

165 Western R. of Ala. v. Alabama G. T. R. Co., 96 Ala. 272, 17 L. R. A. 474. See § 723 et seq., ante.

166 Elliott, Roads & Streets (2d Ed.) § 172.

167 Whaley v. Wilson, 120 Ala. 502; Howard v. State, 47 Ark. 431, 2 S. W. 331; Patton v. State, 50 Ark. 53, 6 S. W. 227; Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 Pac. 448. Thirty years. Starr v. People, 17 Colo. 458; Black v. O'Hara, 54 Conn. 17. Fifteen years. Shugart v. Halliday, 2 Ill. App. 45. Twenty years. Toof v. City of Decatur, 19 Ill. App. 204. Twenty-six years. City of Chicago v. Town of Wright, 69 Ill. 318. Twenty years. Hays v. State, 8 Ind. 425. Fifteen years. Hart v. Bloomfield Tp. Trustees, 15 Ind. 226. Twenty years. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Etzler, 3 Ind. App. 562, 30 N. E. 32; Blumenthal v. State, 21 Ind. App. 665, 51 N. E. 496. Twenty years. Cromer v. State, 21 Ind. App. 502, 52 N. E. 239. Twenty years. Waltman

v. Rund, 109 Ind. 366. Twenty years. Bales v. Pidgeon, 129 Ind. 548, 29 N. E. 34. Fifty years. Keyes v. Tait, 19 Iowa, 123. Ten years. Casey v. Tama County, 75 Iowa, 655, 37 N. W. 138; McAllister v. Pickup, 84 Iowa, 65, 50 N. W. 556. Forty years. If a highway has been used under the proper conditions for a term equal to the period prescribed by the statute of limitations, a prescriptive right is acquired although the commencement of such use may have been permissive.

Oliphant V. Atchison County Com'rs, 18 Kan. 386. Five years. City of Topeka v. Cowee, 48 Kan. 345; Wickliffe v. Magruder, 12 Ky. L. R. 24, 13 S. W. 523; Witt v. Hughes, 23 Ky. L. R. 1836, 66 S. W. 281. Twenty years. State v. Bigelow, 34 Me. 243. Thirty years. Brock v. Chase, 39 Mo. 300. Thirty years. Hinks v. Hinks, 46 Me. 423. Forty years. Plumer v. Brown, 49 Mass. (8 Metc.) 578; White v. Inhabitants of Foxborough, 151 Mass.

cial and local statutes of limitations such as are found in Illinois, 168 Indiana,169 Missouri, 170 Michigan, 171 California,172 Minnesota,173 New York, 174 North Dakota,175 and Rhode Island,176 which provide for the acquirement of a prescriptive right in a highway under the conditions named in some cases in less time than that which applies generally to actions in respect to real estate.

177

Though in Michigan it is held that user for ten years will not of itself make a road a public highway if proceedings have not been. taken to establish it as such, the statute does not make a user for that length of time sufficient unless a road has been laid out.1 (a) Character of the use and possession. The character of the use or possession must be adverse and exclusive; that is, known to the owner and against his interest.178 Prescriptive rights can never

V.

28, 23 N. E. 652; Campau v. City of Detroit, 104 Mich. 560; McLemore v. Neley, 56 Mo. App. 556; Hill v. City of Sedalia, 64 Mo. App. 494; Longworth v. Sedevic, 165 Mo. 221, 65 S. W. 260. Fourteen years. State v. Wells, 70 Mo. 635. Ten years adverse occupancy of a road acquiesced in by the owner of the land vested in the public to an easement therein for highway purposes. State v. Proctor, 90 Mo. 334; Schaffer v. Stull, 32 Neb. 94; Langdon v. State, 23 Neb. 509, 37 N. W. 79. Ten years. City of Beatrice Black, 28 Neb. 263, 44 N. W. 189. Ten years. Lydick v. State, 61 Neb. 309, 85 N. W. 70; Haywood v. Charlestown, 34 N. H. 23. Twenty years. Campton's Petition, 41 N. H. 197. Twenty years. Ward v. Folly, 5 N. J. Law, 554. Forty years. Colden V. Thurbar, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 424; Iselin v. Starin, 71 Hun, 164, 24 N. Y. Supp. 748. Fifty years. Devenpeck v. Lambert, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 596. Twenty years. State v. Marble, 26 N. C. (4) Ired. Law) 318; State v. Wolf, 112 N. C. 889, 17 S. E. 528. A road is not made a public highway by mere user for the period of twenty years.

Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance County, 52 Ohio St. 262; Com. v. Marshall, 137 Pa. 170, 20 Atl. 580. Forty years. Com. v. Cole, 26 Pa. 187. Thirty years. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Greensburg, J. & P. St. R. Co., 176 Pa. 559, 36 L. R. A. 839; Rusterholtz v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 191 Pa. 390, 43 Atl. 208; Heyward v. Chisolm, 11 Rich. Law (S. C.) 253; Hutto v. Tindall, 6 Rich. Law (S. C.) 396. Twenty years. Kirby v. Southern R. Co., 63 S. C. 494, 41 S. E. 765; Woolard v. Clymer (Tenn. Ch. App.) 35 S. W. 1086. Fifty years. Wilson v. Acree, 97 Tenn. 378, 37 S. W. 90; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Baudat, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 236, 51 S. W. 541. Forty years. Ward v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 435, 60 S. W. 757. Fifteen years. Race v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 438, 66 S. W. 560; Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah, 90, 24 Pac. 799. Eighteen years. Smith v. Cornelius, 41 W. Va. 59, 23 S. E. 599, 30 L. R. A. 747. One hundred and nineteen years. Sturmer v. Randolph County Court, 42 W. Va. 724, 26 S. E. 523, 36 L. R. A. 300. Eighty years. City of Chippewa Falls v. Hopkins, 109 Wis. 611, 85 N. W. 553.

168 Town of Canoe Creek v. McEniry, 23 Ill. App. 227. Twenty years. Elmira Highways Com'rs v. Osceola Highway Com'rs, 74 Ill. App. 185; Madison Tp. v. Gallagher, 159 Ill. 105, 42 N. E. 316. Twenty years.

169 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Etzler, 3 Ind. App. 562, 30 N. E. 32; Brown v. Hines, 16 Ind. 1, 44 N. E. 655. Twenty years. Strong v. Makeever, 102 Ind. 578. Twenty years. Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 5053; Burns' Rev. St. Ind. 1894, § 6762.

170 State v. Scott, 27 Mo. App. 541. Ten years. State v. Davis, 27 Mo. App. 624. Ten years. State v. Bradley, 31 Mo. App. 308; State v. Warner, 51 Mo. App. 174. Ten years. State v. Wells, 70 Mo. 635; State v. Macy, 72 Mo. App. 427. Ten years. Zimmerman v. Snowden, 88 Mo. 218.

171 Ellsworth v. Grand Rapids, 27 Mich. 250. Ten years. Village of Grandville v. Jenison, 86 Mich. 567, 49 N. W. 544, affirming 84 Mich. 54, 47 N. W. 600. Ten years. Campau v. City of Detroit, 104 Mich. 560, 62 N. W. 718; Alton v. Meenwenberg, 108 Mich. 629, 66 N. W. 571.

172 Bequette v. Patterson, 104 Cal. 455, 37 Pac. 917; Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250. Five years. Patterson v. Munyan, 93 Cal. 128, 29 Pac. 250; Plummer v. Sheldon, 94 Cal. 533, 29 Pac. 947; Freshour v. Hihn, 99 Cal. 443, 34 Pac. 87; Cooper v. Monterey County, 104 Cal. 437, 38 Pac. 106. The act of March 30, 1874, repealed political code, § 2619, providing that all roads used as such for a period of five years became public high

ways.

173 Elfelt v. Stillwater St. R. Co., 53 Minn. 68, 55 N. W. 116. Six years. Rogers v. Town of Aitkin, 77 Minn. 539, 80 N. W. 702. Laws of 1891, c. 21, p. 98, provide that user of the right of way of a railroad

company of a highway shall not be lawfully constituted as such. Hansen v. Town of Verdi, 83 Minn. 44, 85 N. W. 906. Six years.

174 Corbett v. City of Troy, 53 Hun, 228, 6 N. Y. Supp. 381; Alpaugh v. Bennett, 59 Hun, 45, 12 N. Y. Supp. 398; Zwack v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 8 App. Div. 483, 40 N. Y. Supp. 821; James v. Sammis, 132 N. Y. 239, 30 N. E. 502, affirming 56 Hun, 647, 10 N. Y. Supp. 143.

175 Walcott Tp. v. Skauge, 6 N. D. 382, 71 N. W. 544.

176 Simmons V. City of Providence, 12 R. I. 8.

177 Potter v. Safford, 50 Mich. 46. 178 Waring v. City of Little Rock, 62 Ark. 408, 36 S. W. 24; Cooper v. Monterey County, 104 Cal. 437, 38 Pac. 106. Evidence of user alone will not justify a finding of a highway by prescription since such use may have been permissive. Green v. Stevens, 49 Ill. App. 24; Landers v. Town of Whitefield, 154 Ill. 630, 39 N. E. 656; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Miller, 12 Ind. App. 414, 40 N. E. 539; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. City of Seymour, 154 Ind. 17, 55 N. E. 953; Daniels v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 35 Iowa, 129; State v. Mitchell, 58 Iowa, 567. A landowner, under the Iowa statute relative to adverse possession, must have express notice of the adverse use and this is not established by user alone.

State v. Teeters, 97 Iowa, 458, 66 N. W. 754. The fact that an owner of land lived thereon while a road was being used for thirteen years by the public and that he himself traveled the road is sufficient to prove knowledge on his part to warrant the establishment of a highway by prescription. Gray v. Haas, 98 Iowa, 502, 67 N. W. 394;

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be acquired through what may be termed permissive use.179 The authorities quite generally hold, and with reason, that ways by prescription cannot be acquired over wild or uncultivated land.

Zigefoose v. Zigefoose, 69 Iowa, 391; Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. City of Columbus Junction, 104 Iowa, 110, 73 N. W. 501; Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. City of Paris, 95 Ky. 627; State V. Kent County Com'rs, 83 Md. 377, 35 Atl. 62, 41 L. R. A. 268; Slater v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 49 N. E. 1017, 33 L. R. A. 291. One hundred years. Bassett v. Inhabitants of Harwich, 180 Mass. 585, 63 N. E. 974; Hall v. City of St. Paul, 56 Minn. 428; Engle v. Hunt, 50 Neb. 35 69 N. W. 970; Hill v. McGinnis, 64 Neb. 187, 89 N. W. 783; Barker v. Clark, 4 N. H. 380; Boyden v. Achenbach, 86 N. C. 397; Stewart v. Frink, 94 N. C. 487; Moore v. City of Waco, 85 Tex. 206, 20 S. W. 61; City of San Antonio v. Sullivan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 451, 23 S. W. 307; Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Dyson (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S. W. 61; State v. Joyce, 19 Wis. 90.

179 District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U. S. 92. "The use must be adverse to the owner of the fee. The rule is correctly stated in 2 Greenleaf on Evidence. The learned author, after defining prescription and the period of possession which constituted it, and explaining the modern practice which has introduced 'a new kind of title, namely, the presumption of a grant, made and lost in modern times, which the jury are advised or directed to find, upon evidence of enjoyment for sufficient length of time,' says, 'in the United States grants have been very freely presumed, upon proof of an adverse, exclusive and uninterrupted enjoy

ment for twenty years.' And after stating the quality of presumption which arises, he continues: 'In order, however, that the enjoyment of an easement in another's land may be conclusive of the right, it must have been adverse, that is, under a claim of title, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the land, and uninterrupted; and the burden of proving this is on the party claiming the easement. If he leaves it doubtful, whether the enjoyment was adverse, known to the owner, and uninterrupted, it is not conclusive in his favor.' Under a different rule licenses would grow into grants of the fee and permissive occupations of land become conveyances of it. 'It would shock that sense of right," Chief Justice Marshall said in Kirk v. Smith, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 286, 6Law Ed. 91, 'which must be felt equally by legislators and judges, if a possession which was permissive, and entirely consistent with the title of another, should silently bar that title." " Jones v. Phillips, 59 Ark. 35, 26 S. W. 386; Huffman v. Hall, 102 Cal. 26, 36 Pac. 417; Green v. Bethea, 30 Ga. 896; City of Chicago v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 152 Ill. 561, 38 N. E. 768; City of Chicago v. Borden, 190 Ill. 430, 60° N. E. 915; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. City of Seymour, 154 Ind. 17, 55 N. W. 953; Breneman v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 92 Iowa, 755; Sprow v. Boston & A. R. Co., 163 Mass. 330, 39 N. E. 1024; McCearley v. Lemennier, 40 La. Ann. 253, 3 So. 649. Thirty years. Cox v. Forrest, 60 Md. 74. The burden of proving:

where the owner or those representing him are absent.180 Occasional travel on a way which has never been laid out, recorded or worked as a public road, will not constitute it a public highway by prescription.181

(b) User must be continuous. The user or the possession must also be continuous for the length of time required either by gen

a permissive use is on the owner of the land asserting permission. State v. Kent County Com'rs, 83 Md. 377, 33 L. R. A. 291; Durgin v. City of Lowell, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 398. 'Twenty years. Fall River Print Works v. City of Fall River, 110 Mass. 428. Twenty years. Inhabitants of Deerfield V. Connecticut River R., 144 Mass. 325; Moffatt v. Kenny, 174 Mass. 311, 54 N. E. 850; Homer Highway Com'rs v. Riker, 79 Mich. 551, 44 N. W. 955; Leonard v. City of Detroit, 108 Mich. 599, 66 N. W. 488; Wood v. Hurd, 34 N. J. Law, 87. Twenty years. Riley v. Brodie, 22 Misc. 374, 50 N. Y. Supp. 347; Hamilton v. Village of Owego, 42 App. Div. 312, 59 N. Y. Supp. 103; State v. Gross, 119 N. C. 868, 26 S. E. 91; Walcott Tp. V. Skague, 6 N. D. 382; Lewis v. City of Portland, 25 Or. 133, 35 Pac. 256, 22 L. R. A. 736; Ferdinando v. City of Scranton, 190 Pa. 321, 42 Atl. 692; Miles v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 55 S. C. 403, 33 S. E. 493; Whitesides v. Earles (Tenn Ch. App.) 61 S. W. 1038; Cunningham v. San Saba County, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 557; Worthington v. Wade, 82 Tex. 26, 17 S. W. 520; Smith v. State (Tex. Cr. R.) 40 S. W. 736; Megrath v. Nickerson, 24 Wash. 235, 64 Pac. 163; Shaver v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 502, 37 S. E. 664; Dicken v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Co., 41 W. Va. 511; Frye v. Village of Highland, 109 Wis. 292, 85 N. W. 351.

180 Friel v. People, 4 Colo. App. 259, 35 Pac. 676; Duncombe v. Pow

ers, 75 Iowa, 185, 39 N. W. 261; State v. Horn, 35 Kan. 717, 12 Pac. 148; Graham v. Hartnett, 10 Neb. 517, 7 N. W. 280; Rathman v. Norenberg, 21 Neb. 467, 32 N. W. 305; Shaffer v. Stull, 32 Neb. 94, 48 N. W. 882; Engle v. Hunt, 50 Neb. 358, 69 N. W. 970; Harriman v. Howe, 78 Hun, 280, 28 N. Y. Supp. 858; People v. Osborn, 84 Hun, 441, 32 N. Y. Supp. 358; State v. Floyd, 39 S. C. 23, 17 S. E. 505; Cunningham v. San Saba County, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 480, 20 S. W. 941; Raven v. Travis County (Tex. Civ. App.) 53 S. W. 355. But the rule will not apply where the road is fenced on both sides.

Marshfield Land & Lumber Co. v. John Week Lumber Co., 108 Wis. 268, 84 N. W. 434. But see Kirby v. Southern R. Co., 63 S. C. 494, 41 S. E. 765; Hall v. City of Austin, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 59, 48 S. W. 53.

181 Coburn v. San Mateo County, 75 Fed. 520; Sutton v. Nicolaisen (Cal.) 44 Pac. 805; Breneman v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 92 Iowa, 775, 60 N. W. 176; Fairchild v. Stewart, 117 Iowa, 734, 89 N. W. 1075; Schroeder v. Village of Onekama, 95 Mich. 25, 54 N. W. 642; State v. Auchard, 22 Mont. 14, 55 Pac. 361. Evidence that one person had traveled a road "off and on for several years" is not sufficient proof for the acquirement of a prescriptive right. But see Warren County Sup'rs v. Mastronardi, 76 Miss. 273, 24 So. 199. Ten years.

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