and maintain canals,302 bridges 303 and ferries; 304 and although the use of these may depend upon the payment of tolls, yet, their character is regarded as public, their use a public one, and the exercise of eminent domain will be justified if found necessary Berkshire County Com'rs, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 278. 302 Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C. C. 599, Fed. Cas. No. 2,649; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254. "No question is made of the power of the State to construct or authorize the construction of tuis improvement, and to devote to it the proceeds of the land grant of the United States. The improvement of the navigation of a river is a public purpose, and the sequestration or appropriation of land or other property, therefore, for such purpose, is doubtless a proper exercise of the authority of the State under its power of eminent domain. Upon the other hand, it is probably true that it is beyond the competency of the State to appropriate to itself the property of individuals for the sole purpose of creating a water power to be leased for manufacturing purposes. This would be a case of taking the property of one man for the benefit of another, which is not a constitutional exercise of the right of eminent domain. But if, in the erection of a public dam for a recog nized public purpose, there is necessarily produced a surplus of water, which may properly be used for manufacturing purposes, there is no sound reason why the state may not retain to itself the power of controlling or disposing of such water as an incident of its right to make such improvement. Indeed, it might become very necessary to retain the disposition of it in its own hands, in order to preserve at all times a sufficient supply for the purposes of navigation. If the riparian owners were allowed to tap the pond at different places, and draw off the water for their own use, serious consequences might arise, not only in connection with the public demand for the purposes of navigation, but between the riparian owners themselves as to the proper proportion each was entitled to draw-controversies which could only be avoided by the State reserving to itself the immediate supervision of the entire supply. As there is no need of the surplus running to waste, there was nothing objectionable in permitting the State to let out the use of it to private parties, and thus reimburse itself for the expenses of the improvement." Denslow v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 16 Conn. 98; Nelson v. Fleming, 56 Ind. 310; Kough v. Darcey, 11 N. J. Law, 237; Van Schoick v. Deleware & R. Canal Co., 20 N. J. Law, 249; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 65; Selden v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 29 N. Y. 634; Matter of Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171; Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio, 288; Carpenter v. State, 12 Ohio St. 457; Little Miami Elec. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 629; Dalles Lumbering Co. v. Urquhart, 16 Or 67, 19 Pac. 78; Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v. Hoye, 2 Grat. (Va.) 511. See, also, § 430. 303 See §§ 431 et seq. 304 Bowman V. Wathen, 2 McLean, 376, Fed. Cas. No. 1,740; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 for their construction or completion.305 Property necessary for the improvement of navigation either in the construction of dams or locks or otherwise can be appropriated by the same means. § 762. Public buildings. 306 Real property appropriated by municipal or other public corporations for use as sites in the construction or establishment of public buildings is taken for a public use. Court houses,307 jails,308 school houses,309 city halls,310 public markets,311 alms houses,312 and others of a similar character,313 are familiar examples. In this class may also be included the taking of property by the Federal or a state government for the construction of forts or fortifications,314 postoffices, 315 navy or dock yards,316 court houses,317 U. S. 525; Piatt v. Covington & C. Bridge Co., 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 31; Day v. Stetson, 8 Me. 365; Crosby v. Hanover, 36 N. H. 404; Barrington v. Neuse River Ferry Co., 69 N. C. 165; In re Towanda Bridge Co., 91 Pa. 216; Drake v. Clay, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 139. But see Sandford v. Martin, 31 Iowa, 67. 305 Arnold V. Covington & C. Bridge Co., 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 372; Young v. Buckingham, 5 Ohio, 485. But see International Bridge & Tramway Co. v. McLane, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 665, 28 S. W. 454. 306 Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254; Avery v. Fox, Fed. Cas. No. 674; Hazen v. Essex County, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 475; Pearson v. Johnson, 54 Miss. 259; Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 667; Matter of Petition of United States, 96 N. Y. 227; Attorney General v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400; State v. City of Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533. 307 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; Jockheck V. Shawnee County Com'rs, 53 Kan. 780; Shan316 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367. felter v. City of Baltimore, 80 Md. 483, 31 Atl. 439, 27 L. R. A. 72. 308 See $420. 309 Reed v. Inhabitants of Acton, 117 Mass. 384; Township Board of Education v. Hackmann, 48 Mo. 243; Appeal of Rees (Pa.) 12 Atl. 427; Long v. Fuller, 68 Pa. 170; Peckham v. School Dist. No. 7, 7 R. I. 545; Williams v. School Dist. No. 6, 33 Vt. 271. See, also, Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 124 U. S. 197. 310 Cincinnati, S. & C. R. Co. v. Village of Belle Centre, 48 Ohio St. 273, 27 N. E. 464. 311 Henkel v. City of Detroit, 49 Mich. 249; Matter of Application of Cooper, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 515. 312 Heyward v. City of New York, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 486. 313 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 546. 814 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; In re League Island, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 524. 315 United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. 317 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367. military camps or barracks,318 light houses,319 hospitals,320 custom houses,321 armories, arsenals, 322 or the use of property by such a government for miscellaneous purposes.323 Municipal improvements. It has been already stated that the preservation and improvement of the health of the people is a duty resting upon every public corporation and especially a municipal organization. The convenience of the people in matters closely allied with the public health or the protection of their property is also considered a public duty and the use of property by a public corporation of any grade for such purposes will be considered a public one for which the power may be exercised if granted. The condemnation of property will be warranted in the construction or maintenance of a system of public sewers or one for furnishing a supply of water 325 or light.320 § 763. Works for irrigation and drainage purposes. 324 The use of property for purposes of irrigation has been held as a public one especially in those sections where the rainfall is uncertain or confined to limited periods of time.327 The taking of property for the construction of a system of drainage is considered proper under this power 328 although some cases have re Lowe, 114 U. S. 525. The court in referring to the opinion rendered in Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, said: "All the judges of the court agreed in the possession by the general government of this right, although there was a difference of opinion whether provision for the exercise of the right had been made in that case. The court, after observing that lands in the states are needed for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy yards and light houses, for custom houses and court houses, and for other public uses, said: 'If the right to acquire property for such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property holders to sell, or by the action of a state prohibiting a sale to the Federal government, the constitutional grants Abb. Corp. Vol. II — 55. of power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence upon the will of a state, or even upon that of a private citizen.'" Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356; Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382. 318 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; Morris v. Heppenheimer, 54 N. J. Law, 268; In re Military Parade Ground, 60 N. Y. 319. 319 United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315; Chappel v. United States, 160 U. S. 499; United States v. Rauers, 70 Fed. 748; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; People v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471. 320 United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315. 321 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367. 322 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525. 323 Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590. But see People v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471. 324 City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604; Cone v. City of Hartford, 28 Conn. 363; McDaniel v. City of Columbus, 91 Ga. 462, 17 S. E. 1011; Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. 372; Hildreth v. City of Lowell, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 345; City of Boston v. Richardson, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 146; Warren v. City of Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24; Joplin Consol. Min. Co. v. City of Joplin, 124 Mo. 129; White v. Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357; Glasby v. Morris, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 72; City of Hoboken v. Chamberlain, 37 N. J. Law, 51; Herbert v. City of Bayonne, 63 N. J. Law, 532, 42 Atl. 833; Village of South Orange v. Whittingham, 58 N. J. Law, 655, 35 Atl. 407; City of Cincinnati v. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499. But see Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 438, construing Ind. Act 1867 for the incorporation of cities and holding that it does not confer power upon them to take lands for the construction of sewers. See, also, §§ 437 et seq. 825 Burden v. Stein, 25 Ala. 455; St. Helena Water Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182; People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209; Spring Valley Water Works v. San Mateo Water Works, 64 Cal. 123; McCrary v. Beaudry, 67 Cal. 120; Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 Pac. 681; Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 75 Me. 91; Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Kane v. City of Balti more, 15 Md. 240; Lumbard v. Stearns, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 60; Ipswich Mills v. Essex County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 363; City of Duluth v. Duluth Gas & Water Co., 45 Minn. 210, 47 N. W. 781; Thorn v. Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251; Olmsted v. Proprietors of Morris Aqueduct, 46 N. J. Law, 495, affirmed 47 N. J. Law, 311; Slingerland v. City of Newark, 54 N. J. Law, 62, 23 Atl. 129; In re Malone Water Works Co., 15 N. Y. Supp. 649; In re New Rochelle Water Co., 46 Hun (N. Y.) 525; Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246; Fleming's Appeal, 65 Pa. 444; State v. City of Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533. See, also, §§ 463 et seq. 326 Bloomfield & R. Natural Gaslight Co. v. Richardson, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 437; State v. City of Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 26 N. E. 1061, 11 L. R. A. 729; Appeal of Johnston (Pa.) 7 Atl. 167. See, also, § 459. 327 Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 Pac. 376; Directors of Alfalfa Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 64 N. W. 1086. But see Bradley v. Fallbrook Irr. Dist., 68 Fed. 948. 328 Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380. "In the present case, the statute vests the title in the city of Boston from, at least, the time it filed in the office of the registry of deeds a description of the lands taken by it describing them with as much certainty as is required in a common conveyance of lands, and stating that the same were taken pursuant to the provisions of the statute. As soon as they were so taken, the city-invested from that time with the title-had the right forthwith to raise the grade, and could not throw the property back upon the former owner, or compel him to pay the cost of raising the grade; garded the establishment of such works, especially where designed for the drainage of low and flooded lands, as authorized under an exercise of the police power rather than that of eminent domain. 329 The authorities cited in the notes will be found to cover the ground fully. The construction of works to prevent the overflow of agricultural or timber lands is for a public purpose and the power of eminent domain may be properly exercised in connection with it.330 and the owner became from the moment the property was taken absolutely entitled to reasonable compensation, the amount to be ascertained without undue delay, in the mode prescribed, and its payment to be assured, if necessary, by decree against the city, which could be effectively enforced. We are of opinion that, upon both principle and authority, it was competent for the legislature, in the exercise of the police powers of the commonwealth, and of its power to appropriate private property for public uses, to authorize the city to take the fee in the lands described in the statute, prior to making compensation, and that the provision made for compensating the owner was certain and 'adequate." Heick v. Voight, 110 Ind. 279, 11 N. E. 306; Duke v. O'Bryan, 100 Ky. 710; Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438; Kinnie v. Bare, 68 Mich. 625, 36 N. W. 672; People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y. 306; Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70 N. C. 634, holding constitutional N. C. Rev. St. c. 40, permitting land to be condemned for drains. Brown v. Keener, 74 N. C. 714; Askam v. King County, 9 Wash. 1, 36 Pac. 1097; Lewis County v. Gordon, 20 Wash. 80, 54 Pac. 779; Pettigrew v. Village of Evansville, 25 Wis. 223; Smeaton v. Martin, 57 Wis. 364, 15 N. W. 403; In re Theresa Drainage Dist., 90 Wis. 301, 63 N. W. 288. But see Poundstone v. Baldwin, 145 Ind. 139, 44 N. E. 191; Jenal v. Green Island Draining Co., 12 Neb. 163, 10 N. W. 547; McQuillen v. Hatton, 42 Ohio St. 202. See, also, the subject fully considered with many authorities cited in Lewis, Em. Dom. (2d Ed.) §§ 185-199 inclusive. 329 Murphy v. City of Wilmington, 6 Houst. (Del.) 108; Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 782; Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 54; Pool v. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297; Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461. 330 Coster v. Tidewater Co., 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 54. “The purpose contemplated is to reclaim and bring into use a tract of land covering about one fourth of the county of Hudson and several thousand acres in the county of Union. This large district is now comparatively useless. In its present condition it impairs very materially the benefits which naturally belong to the adjacency of the territory of the state to its navigable waters. It is difficult, from the great expense of such works, to build roads across it, and consequently it has heretofore interposed a barrier to anything like easy access, except by means of railroads, from one |