§ 802. Delegation of power to public and quasi public corpora tions. The creation of public subordinate agencies of government involves the principle that, of necessity, they differ in character, extent of powers granted and functions for which organized. Public quasi corporations are to be found as a class of agencies to which the legislative power of control and regulation of property has been delegated.541 Counties,542 townships,543 road and school districts, are familiar illustrations. These possess the power of regulation and control in a less degree than municipal corporations proper because the public needs that lead to their establishment are different and less complex in character. The power to control and regulate public property, therefore, by public officials of the organizations named is, as compared with the authorities of cities and towns, less both in degree and extent. Their corporate officials in acting are limited by the restricted powers of the principal. § 803. The extent of powers granted to delegated agencies. The fact that the legislature has deemed it advisable to delegate the exercise of certain sovereign powers to subordinate agencies should not lead to the conclusion that, through the grant, an exclusive power of control and regulation is given. The state retains, at all times, in respect to powers granted its subordinate ough of Brigantine v. Holland Trust Co. (N. J. Eq.) 35 Atl. 344; Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. Law, 303; Domestic Telegraph & Tel. Co. v. City of Newark, 49 N. J. Law, 344; Electric Const. Co. v. Heffernan, 58 Hun, 605, 12 N. Y. Supp. 336; Village of Hempstead v. Ball Electric Light Co., 9 App. Div. 48, 41 N. Y. Supp. 124; Tuttle v. Brush Elec. Illuminating Co., 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. (18 J. & S.) 464; City of Allentown v. W. U. Tel. Co., 148 Pa. 117; Schenck v. Olyphant Borough, 181 Pa. 191, 37 Atl. 258; Seitzinger v. Borough of Tamaqua, 187 Pa. 539, 41 Atl. 454; Commonwealth v. Warwick, 185 Pa. 623, 40 Atl. 93; Columbia Elec. St. R., Light & Power Co. v. Sloan, 48 S. 541 See § 8, ante 542 State v. Voorhies, 50 La. Ann. 671, 23 So. 871; Lewis v. Chosen Freeholders of Cumberland, 56 N. J. Law, 416; Green v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 54 N. J. Law, 92; City of Bayonne v. Lord, 61 N. J. Law, 136, 38 Atl. 752. 543 Bradley v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 66 Conn. 559, 34 Atl. 499, 32 L. R. A. 280; Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75; Suburban Light & Power Co. v. Aldermen of agencies and where the rights of third parties have not intervened, its full power to deal with the questions embraced in the grants named; it can legislate under the conditions given with respect to the regulation and control of public property including the useof highways as freely as before the subordinate corporation was entrusted with a portion of these powers.544 The delegation of a governmental power to a subordinate agent is revokable at pleasure and does not partake of the nature of a contract.545 The particular application of the principle lies in the fact that the legislature may give directly to individuals or corporations the right to use the streets of a municipal corporation without their first securing the grant of the right from the municipal corporation.546 Steam and street railways, telephone and telegraph companies, or those organized for the purpose of supplying light, may derive their legal right to use for their purposes, the public highways: directly from the legislature and not from the authorities of a subordinate public corporation within whose limits they may be included. The legislature exercises, however, its supreme control subject to the constitutional provision, which so universally obtains, that private property cannot be taken for a public use without the payment of just compensation.548 § 804. Extent of power granted; implied powers. It has been already stated that a public corporation can exerciseonly those powers directly granted, implied because necessary to Boston, 153 Mass. 200, 10 L. R. A. 497; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Montgomery County Pass. R. Co. 167 Pa. 62, 27, L. R. A. 766; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bullard, 65 Vt. 634; Rugg v. Commercial Union Tel. Co., 66 Vt. 208. 544 Barnes v. Dist. of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; Transportation Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U. S. 635; Grand Rapids Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Grand Rapids, Edison Elec. Light & Fuel Gas Co., 33 Fed. 659; Abbott v. City of Duluth, 104 Fed. 833; Savannah & T. R. Co. v. City of Savannah, 45 Ga. 602; Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & O. Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399; State v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10, 5 Am. Electrical Cas. 78, 31 L. R. A. 798; Lahr v. Metropolitan El. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528; American Rapid Tel. Co. v. Hess, 125 N. Y. 641, 26 N. E. 919, 13 L. R. A. 454; O'Connor v. City of Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 189;; James River & Kanawha Co. v. Anderson, 12 Leigh (Va.) 286. 545 Thomas v. City of Richmond, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 356; Indianapolis, D. & W. R. Co. v. Center Tp., 143 Ind. 63, 40 N. E. 134; See §§ 82: et seq., ante. 546 See §§ 840, 854, post. corporate life or implied because absolutely necessary to carry into effect some power expressly granted.549 In the grant of powers to subordinate corporations in respect to the control and the use of public property, the grantee of the power, by the weight of authority, is given, impliedly, use of such agencies or means as will enable it to carry into effect the powers granted. A municipal or quasi public corporation is organized for the purpose of performing some special and local governmental duty or power. It is proper, therefore, that it should be permitted to carry out the purpose of its creation. This principle applies to specific grants of power. The corporation can lawfully avail itself of usual and reasonable agencies in order that a specially granted power may be carried into effect.550 § 805. Same subject; fundamental legislative limitations. The power of the legislature to act in a given instance is restricted by its character as the law-making branch of the government and also by constitutional provisions existing in either or both Federal and state constitutions. As the law-making body, it is legally incapable of performing functions judicial or executive in their character.551 It enactments may be also illegal because violating some constitutional provision. It is clear that if the legislature, because of these reasons, cannot act upon a particular subject-matter, that it cannot, by any enactment, grant 549 See §§ 108 et seq., ante. 550 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. (U. S.) 435; Grand Rapids Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Grand Rapids Edison Electric Light & Fuel Gas Co., 33 Fed. 659; Levis v. City of Newton, 75 Fed. 884; Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Atlanta, 83 Fed. 39; Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Ocala St. & S. R. Co., 39 Fla. 306, 22 So. '692; McManus v. Hornaday, 99 Iowa, 507, 68 N. W. 812; State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, 6 Am. Electrical Cas., 83. City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 2 L. R. A. 278; State v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10, 31 L. R. A. 798; White v. McKeesport, 101 Pa. 394; Germania Sav. Bank v. Town of Darlington, 50 S. C. 337, 27 S. E. 846; ShortConrad Co. v. School Dist., 94 Wis. 535, 69 N. W. 337. 551 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Smith v. Strother, 68 Cal. 194; State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; Appeal of Norwalk St. R. Co., 69 Conn. 576, 37 Atl. 1080, 38 Atl. 708, 39 L. R. A. 794; Ex parte Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 3 L. R. A. 398; McLean County Precinct v. Deposit Bank of Owensboro, 81 Ky. 254; Case of Supervisors of Election, 114 Mass. 247; State v. Young, 29 Minn. 474; Shephard v. City of Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635. See §§ 496 et seq., ante. to a subordinate agency the right to exercise a power touching the same question.552 (a) Contract obligation. By the Federal constitution, a state is prohibited from passing any law impairing the obligation of a contract, and a state legislature, therefore, cannot grant to a subordinate public corporation or quasi corporation the right to act in such manner as will violate this provision. Attempted regulations, therefore, of public property, which impair the obligation of a contract, if one exists, will be void. (b) Special and uniform legislation. In many states will be found constitutional prohibitions upon the passage of legislation which is special in its character or which operates with a lack of uniformity. It is true in this respect that subordinate corporations or even the state itself cannot authorize the use of public property or attempt to control it in the manner through legislative enactments that will bring its action within the prohibitive principle of these clauses.553 (c) Due process and the equal protection of the law. The constitutional restrictions relative to the passage of legislation which denies the equal protection of the law or which prohibits the taking of life, property or liberty without due process of law, are familiar to all. In a grant of power to a subordinate public agency relative to the use and control of public property, the state is lim 552 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago. 166 U. S. 226; State v. Holden, 14 Utah, 71, 46 Pac. 756, 37 L. R. A. 103. 553 Robert J. Boyd P. & C. Co. v. Ward, 85 Fed. 27; Mattox v. Knox, 96 Ga. 403, 23 S. E. 307; People v. Martin, 178 Ill. 611, 53 N. E. 309; In re Hegne-Hendrum Ditch Co., 80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094; Hannibal v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App. 23; State v. Griffin, 69 N. H. 1, 39 Atl. 260, 41 L. R. A. 177; Matter of Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, 50 N. E. 61, 42 L. R. A. 132; State v. Commissioners, 54 Ohio St. 333, 43 N. E. 587; In re Pittsburgh's Petition, 138 Pa. 401; Sanders v. Venning, 38 S. C. 502, 17 S. E. 134. Law relative to cattle running at large. But see Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Oswego Tp., 55 Fed. 361; In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272, 675, 14 L. R. A. 755; Vernon School Dist. v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 125 Cal. 593, 58 Pac. 175; Gilson v. Rush County Com'rs, 128 Ind. 65, 27 N. E. 235, 11 L. R. A. 835; Lancaster County v. Trimble, 33 Neb. 121, 49 N. W. 938; In re Sewer Assessment, 54 N. J. Law, 156, 23 Atl. 517; Road Commission v. Haring, 55 N. J. Law, 327, 26 Atl. 915; Ladd v. Gambell, 35 Or. 393, 59 Pac. 113; In re Wyoming St., 137 Pa. 494; City of Erie v. Griswold, 184 Pa. 435, 39 Atl. 231. ited unquestionably by these provisions, and all acts by the state or its governmental agencies violating these principles are of no force or effect.554 § 806. Extent of power limited by character of property. The extent of the legislative power in dealing with public property in the first instance or through subordinate public corporations is limited also by the purpose for which it is secured and the use for which it is held. The property acquired under proper authority by any public corporation in this capacity is held by it as a trustee for the public for the particular uses and purposes of its acquisition.555 It is impossible, therefore, for a public corporation to dispossess itself, transfer to or permit the use of public property by private persons or for private purposes and the legality of acts of public authorities can be always tested by this wellknown principle as well as those mentioned in the preceding section,550 554 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 166 U. S. 557; Law v. Johnston, 118 Ind. 261; Richman v. Muscatine County Sup'rs, 77 Iowa, 513; Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492; State v. Weyerhauser, 68 Minn. 353, 71 N. W. 265; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pinner, 43 N. J. Eq. (16 Stew.) 52; Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400. But see Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32. An ordinance prohibiting the moving of any building upon streets without the original permission of the mayor, not invalid. Callen v. Junction City, 43 Kan. 627, 23 Pac. 652, 7 L. R. A. 736. Legislation providing for the extension of municipal boundaries without notice is not in violation of the constitutional provisions requiring due process of law. Fourth Street Union Depot Co. v. State Railroad Crossing Board, 81 Mich. 248, 45 N. W. 937. 555 See authorities cited under §§ 718, et seq. and 796. 556 Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Ocala, St. & S. R. Co., 39 Fla. 306, 22 So. 692; State ex rel. St. Louis Service Co., (Mo.) 6 Am. Elec. Cas. 73; Jaynes v. Omaha St. R. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74, N. W. 67, 39 L. R. A. 751; Metropolitan Telephone and Tel Co. v. Colwell Lead Co., 67 How, Pr. (N. Y.) 365; Fobes v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 505, 8 L. R. A. 453; Kane v. New York El. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 L. R. A. 640; American Rapid Tel. Co. v. Hess, 125 N. Y. 641, 26, N. E. 919, 13 L. R. A. 454; East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Knoxville St. R. Co. (Tenn.) 3 Am. Electrical Cas. 406; San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229, 38 S. W. 829. |