752. Other concrete illustrations of a taking. 753. Annexation of land to a municipality not regarded as a taking. 792. Measure of damages when a part only is taken. (a) The measure of damages when property is injuriously af (b) Special damages only considered. Delegation of power to public and quasi public corporations. 803. The extent of powers granted to delegated agencies. 804. Extent of power granted; implied powers. (b) Special and uniform legislation. (c) Due process and the equal protection of the law Extent of power limited by character of property. Actual damages caused by a change of grade. Diversion from a public or specific use. 816. Control of property acquired by gift. 817. Rights of abutting owners. 818. Legislative control as modified by the abutter's rights. Extent of control a varying one. 819. Abutter's special rights; lateral support. 820. Same subject continued; abutter's right to light, air and access. Right of abutting owners to use own property. 823. Abutter's rights as dependent upon the passing of a fee or an III. ITS DISPOSITION. (For complete analysis of this subdivision see Vol. III.) CHAPTER X. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. CHAPTER VI (Cont'd). PUBLIC REVENUES; THEIR COLLECTION AND DISBURSEMENT. I. TAXATION. (For Complete Analysis of this Subdivision see Vol. I, p. 670.) II. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS. (For Complete Analysis of this Subdivision see Vol. I, p. 773.), III. LICENSE FEES AND POLL TAXES. IV. THE DISBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC REVENUES. § 398. 399. (For Complete Analysis see page 1020.) III. LICENSE FEES AND POLL TAXES. Power to impose. As based upon power of taxation. 400. Limitations upon the power. 401. Delegation of the power for exercise by municipal corpo rations. 402. By what body exercised. 403. 404. The power to license the sale of intoxicating liquors. 405. License fee; when recovered. 406. License fee; how payable and use of moneys. 407. Specific illustrations of the imposition of license fees. § 398. Power to impose. The state may either, as an exercise of the power of taxation 11 or of its police power, 12 impose a license fee upon those carrying on or engaging in certain specified trades, occupations or profes 611 Goldthwaite v. City of Montgomery, 50 Ala. 486; Osborne v. City of Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 Utah, 66; Cache County v. Jensen, 21 Utah, 207; Erie R. Co. v. State, 31 N. J. Law, 531, 86 Am. Dec. 226; Cousins Abb. Corp. Vol. II—1. v. State, 50 Ala. 113, 20 Am. Rep. 290, 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 776, and cases cited; State v. Hammond Package Co., 110 La. 180, 34 So. 368. "The idea that the state lends its countenance to any particular traf sions, the payment of which and the securing of the license. will be necessary to the right to engage in such trade, occupa fic by taxing it seems to rest upon a very transparent fallacy. It certainly overlooks or disregards some ideas that must always underlie taxation. Taxes are not favors; they are burdens. They are necessary, it is true, to the existence of government; but they are not the less burdens, and are only submitted to because of the necessity. It is deemed advisable to make careful provision to preclude these burdens becoming needlessly oppressive; but it is conceded by all the authorities that under some circumstances they may be carried to an extent that will be ruinous to individuals. It would be a remarkable proposition, under such circumstances, that a thing is sanctioned and countenanced by the government, when this burden, which may prove disastrous, is imposed upon it, while on the other hand it is frowned upon and condemned when the burden is withheld. It is safe to predict that if such were the legal doctrine, any citizen would prefer to be visited with the -untaxed frowns of government rather than with testimonials approval, which are represented by the demands of the tax-gatherer. of "It may be supposed that some idea of special protection is involved when a business is taxed; taxation and protection being reciprocal. If the tax upon any particular thing was the consideration for the thing given to the owner in respect to it, this might be so; but the maxim of reciprocity in taxation has no such meaning. No gov. ernment ever undertakes to tax all it protects. If the government were to levy only poll taxes, it would not be on the idea that it was to protect only the persons of its citizens, leaving their property open to rapine and plunder. In this state our taxes are derived mainly from real estate; but it has never been suggested that real estate was entitled to special consideration in consequence. In Great Britain, real estate pays a relatively insignificant portion of the taxes, although in the social and political state it is more important than any other property. As a general fact the United States has not taxed real property, and though during the recent rebellion it taxed most kinds of business for war purposes, the number of subjects taxed has been several times reduced by legislation since, and may reasonably be expected to be further reduced hereafter. But the business taxed is no more protected than the business not taxed; and the fisheries which are favored by bounties are as much protected as either. All this is only an apportionment of taxation by the selection of subjects which, under all the circumstances, it is deemed wise and politic to subject to the burden. Whether a person in respect to his property or his occupation falls within the category of taxables, or not, is immaterial as affecting his claim to protection from the government. It is enough for him that the government has selected for itself its own subjects for taxation, and prescribed its own rules. It is his liability to taxation at the will of the government that entitled him to protection, and not the circumstance of his being act |