Purpose for which license fee or tax is imposed. It is unnecessary to add, although it is done by way of caution, that, assuming the existence of the authority to impose a license fee or tax, valid in other respects, yet such can only be imposed for proper public purposes. The same rules and principles apply in this respect as apply to the imposition of taxes or the levy of special assessments.": 622 § 399. As based upon power of taxation. The state may, without any regard to the exercise of the police power, but as a means of raising revenue, impose license fees upon such trades, occupations or professions as it may elect, in the absence of constitutional restraint.623 When a fee is imposed for of the persons who may be engaged in it. The laws of the state are so framed. They are directed against the business of peddling. The ordinances of cities and boroughs must, in order to be supported, as an exercise of the police power residing in the municipality, be directed in like manner at the business. If a statute or a municipal ordinance is in reality directed only against certain persons who are engaged in a given business or against certain commodities in such manner as to discriminate between the persons who are engaged in the same trade or pursuit, in aid of some at the expense of others, such statute or ordinance is not a police but a trade regulation and it has no right to shelter itself behind the police power of the state or the municipality." 622 Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; Horton v. Mobile School Com'rs, 43 Ala. 598; City of St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247. See §§ 305 et seq., and 340 et seq., post. 623 License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 462; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 566; Ward v. Maryland, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 418; Kentz v. City of Mobile, 120 Ala. 623; State v. Fleming, 112 Ala. 179; People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232; City of Santa Barbara V. Stearns, 51 Cal. 499; Los Angeles County v. Eikenberry, 131 Cal. 461, 63 Pac. 766; City of Los Angeles v. Hance, 122 Cal. 77; Johnston v. City of Macon, 62 Ga. 645; City of Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300, 64 N. E. 469; State v. Menaugh, 151 Ind. 260, 43 L. R. A. 408; Fretwell v. City of Troy, 18 Kan. 271. Lucas v. Attorney General, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 490. "That a license is a tax is too palpable for discussion and comes within the terms of the law unless there is something in the idea that it is a political or police regulation intended to preserve, maintain and regulate the lottery system." Banks v. McCosker, 82 Md. 518; City of Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 112 Mich. 317; Simard v. Sullivan, 71 Minn. 517; City of St. Charles v. Elsner, 155 Mo. 671; City of York v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 56 Neb. 572; State v. Boyd, 63 Neb. this purpose, the principles of taxation as to uniformity and 829, 89 N. W. 417, 58 L. R. A. 108; Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57 L. R. A. 922; Gerrard v. State, 64 Neb. 368, 89 N. W. 1062. North Hudson County R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 41 N. J. Law, 71. "The distinction between the power to license, as a police regulation, and the same power when conferred for revenue purposes, is of the utmost importance. If the power be granted with a view to revenue, the amount of the tax, if not limited by the charter, is left to the discretion and judgment of the municipal authorities, but if it be given as a police power for regulation merely, a much narrower construction is adopted; the power must then be exercised as a means of regulation and cannot be used as a source of revenue." Brewing Imp. Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 65 N. J. Law, 466, 47 Atl. 426; Kennedy v. Borough of Belmar, 61 N. J. Law, 20; City of Wilmington v. Macks, 86 N. C. 88; State v. Klectzen, 8 N. D. 286, 78 N. W. 984; Com. v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634; City of Memphis v. American Exp. Co., 102 Tenn. 336, 52 S. W. 172; Thornburgh v. City of Tyler, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 439; Fleetwood v. Read, 21 Wash. 547, 47 L. R. A. 205; Cache County v. Jensen, 21 Utah, 207; Lewellen v. Lockharts, 21 Grat. (Va.) 570; Bogue v. City of Seattle, 19 Wash. 396. "The general statement is often made that occupation taxes are imposed for revenue and license taxes or fees for police regulation. When imposed for the latter purpose the rule generally obtains that the amount demanded should be reasonable and not in excess of the sum required for issuing the license providing necessary or desirable police regulations. Express charter power confers authority to exact a license tax from those pursuing useful occupations, avocations or professions within the corporate limits, which are in themselves beneficial to the community. Accurately speaking, it would seem that this should be regarded as a tax. However, it is often spoken of as a 'license' or 'privilege' for carrying on the business. Undoubtedly such fee is collected for the purpose of revenue, but where a money payment is exacted for the privilege of pursuing occupations, looked upon as more or less injurious to society or which require careful police supervision (as the liquor traffic, theaters, dance houses, certain kinds of amusements, as circuses and the like) or trades which may become detrimental to health or become public nuisances (as slaughter houses, bone and rendering factories, garbage reduction plants, stone quarries, dairies and cow stables, laundries, wash houses and dyeing establishments), this is usually designated a license tax levled by virtue of the police power. In construing the power to levy such exactions courts are usually McQuillin, Mun. Ord. pp. 618 et seq. "The various methods of delegating the power, as evidenced by municipal charters, and the somewhat divergent judicial views respecting the necessity of police regulation of certain occupations, has resulted in some confusion in judicial expres- quite liberal. If charter power ex equality will apply.62 If the fee is imposed as an exercise of the police power, then those rules and principles of law which control a government in the exercise of that power will control and govern its right.625 As it has been said, it is impossible to lay ists in such cases, the exaction may be made both for revenue and police protection, but if it is levied by virtue of general power, as power 'to regulate,' or under the general welfare clause, the amount, as stated, must not exceed what is reasonably required for police protection." 624 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. City of Attalla, 118 Ala. 362, 24 So. 450. The question of unreasonableness cannot be determined by the extent of the business of a single individual. Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606. An ordinance imposing license fee for the selling of goods cannot be unequal, partial, oppressive or in restraint of trade. a Ex parte Sims, 40 Fla. 432, 25 So. 280; Stewart v. Kehrer, 115 Ga. 184, 41 S. E. 680; Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524, 22 Am. Rep. 261. The power to grant a monopoly of an occupation cannot be implied from a grant of the power to license. Cullinan v. City of New Orleans, 28 La. Ann. 102. A license fee based upon business transacted held unconstitutional and void. City of St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122; American Union Exp. Co. v. City of St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675. The constitutional requirement of uniformity and equality is complied with if all persons engaged in the same business are taxed alike. City of St. Charles v. Elsner, 155 Mo. 671; Johnson v. Borough of Asbury Park, 58 N. J. Law, 604, 33 Atl. 850. The constitutional provision requiring property to be assessed for taxation by uniform rules according to its true value does not apply to the imposition of a license on franchises, trades and occupations. State v. Corson, 67 N. J. Law, 178, 50 Atl. 780; Johnson v. Borough of Asbury Park, 60 N. J. Law, 427; State v. Klectzen, 8 N. D. 286, 78 N. W. 984; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Town of Tarboro, 126 N. C. 68, 35 S. E. 231; Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 50 L. R. A. 86; State v. City of Columbia, 6 S. C. (6 Rich.) 1. A business and occupation tax with a different rate for each distinct busi-ness or occupation is not unconstitutional as violating its provision requiring uniformity of taxes with respect to persons and property. Hill v. City Council of Abbeville, 59 S. C. 396, 38 S. E. 11; Hoefling v. City of San Antonio, 85 Tex. 228, 20S. W. 85, 16 L. R. A. 608; Blue Jacket Consol. Copper Co. v. Scherr, 50 W. Va. 533, 40 S. E. 514; Poteet v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. App. 268, 53 S. W. 869; Rainey v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. App. 254, 53 S. W. 882; Brooks v. State, (Tex. Civ. App.) 58 S. W. 1032; Mullinnix v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 526, 60 S. W. 768; Thomas v. Snead, 99 Va. 613, 39 S. E. 586; Newport News & O. P. R. & Elec. Co. v. City of Newport News, 100 Va. 157, 40 S. E. 645. So long as the license fee is uniform as to each occupation or class, this is sufficient. Stull v. De Mattos, 23 Wash. 71, 62 Pac. 451, 51 L. R. A. 892. There is no discrimination where all occupations or persons within the same class are taxed equally. 625 Humes v. City of Ft. Smith, 93 Fed. 857; Denver City R. Co. v. City down any rule for the construction of such grants aside from the general one that all delegated powers to tax should be closely scanned and strictly construed. $400. Limitations upon the power. Independent of local limitations and treating generally the right to impose a license fee whether based upon a police power or that of taxation, certain statutory 626 or constitutional restrictions and limitations exist upon this sovereign right.627 The Federal constitution prohibits the states from exercising certain governmental powers and duties which the Federal government in the same instrument assumes exclusively for itself.28 The power to regulate commerce between states, with foreign na of Denver, 21 Colo, 350, 41 Pac. 826, 29 L. R. A. 608; City of Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300, 64 N. E. 469; The Germania v. State, 7 Md. 5; Holberg v. Macon, 55 Miss. 112; City of St. Louis v. Green, 6 Mo. App. 591. See, also, §§ 114 et seq., supra. 626 Webster v. City of Sherbrooke, 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 268; People v. Martin, 60 Cal. 153; City of Westport v. McGee, 128 Mo. 152; State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 48 L. R. A. 265, 77 Am. St. Rep. 765; Bassett v. City of El Paso, 88 Tex. 168; City of Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300, 64 N. E. 469; Kerrigan v. Poole, 131 Mich. 305, 91 N. W. 163. The 627 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. City of Bessemer, 113 Ala. 668, 21 So. 64; Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, 55 L. R. A. 588; City of Lebanon v. Welker, 9 Kan. App. 887, 58 Pac. 1036. imposition of a license fee is not double taxation since the fee is imposed on the business, not the property used in the business. Com. v. Smith, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 303; Alexander v. City of Elizabeth, 58 N. J. Law, 71, 28 Atl. 51. An act authorizing cities of over 100,000 in habitants to license race courses within their limits is in violation of N. J. Const., art. 4, § 7, par. 11, forbidding the passage of private, local or special laws "regulating the affairs of towns and counties" or "granting any corporation, association or individual any excessive privilege, immunity or franchises." Borough of Hightstown v. Glenn, 47 N. J. Law, 105; Borough of Taylor v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 202 Pa. 583, 52 Atl. 128; Com. v. Anderson, 178 Pa. 171. 628 See, also, authorities cited in § 408. San Benito County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 77 Cal. 518; City of Macon v. First Nat. Bank, 59 Ga. 648; State v. Thompson, 160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L. R. A. 950. The imposition of a pool license is not unconstitutional as repugnant to amendment 14, sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United States providing that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of its citizens. Debardelaben V. State, 99 Tenn. 649; 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 439, 445, and cases cited. tions and Indian tribes is one of these.62 The implied limitation also exists that an agency of the Federal government cannot be taxed by state authorities.630 The Federal constitution also prohibits the states from levying taxes or duties on imports or exports, but where a license fee does not amount to a regulation of commerce, its levy is not usually held to be such a duty or tax.631 Some authorities also hold that where a state has fixed a license fee for the carrying on of a certain trade or occupation a subordinate political agency cannot exact a higher license fee or one in excess of a certain proportion for the same thing.632 A license fee or tax should not discriminate. It has been held quite generally that constitutional provisions relative to uniformity and equality of taxation do not apply to license fees or taxes when considered with reference to other taxation. This principle, however, does not operate to prevent the rule from applying to license fees and taxes for in order to be valid they should operate uniformly upon all within a certain class and must not discriminate as to individuals of the same class.633 629 Downham v. Council of Alexandria, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 173; Guy v. City of Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434; Ward v. State, 31 Md. 279; City Council of Charleston v. Ahrens, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 241. 630 Brooks V. State (Tex. Civ. App.) 58 S. W. 1032, citing Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29; Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339; McCulloch v. State, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738. 631 Osborne v. City of Mobile, 44 Ala. 493, affirmed in 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 479, distinguishing Ward v. Maryland, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 423, and following Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 123; State v. Norris, 78 N. C. 443. 632 Los Angeles County v. Eikenberry, 131 Cal. 461, 63 Pac. 766. A license may be imposed for carrying on the same business by a county as well as the city included within its limits. Town of Greenwood v. Delta Bank, 75 Miss. 162, 21 So. 747; Town of Paris v. Graham, 33 Mo. 94; Schroder v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Tread. Const. (S. C.) 726; Ex parte Slaren, 3 Tex. App. 662; Hoefling v. City of San Antonio, 85 Tex. 228, 20 S. W. 85, 16 L. R. A. 608; City of Laredo v. Loury (Tex. App.) 20 S. W. 89, overruling Hirshfield v. City of Dallas, 29 Tex. App. 242, 15 S. W. 124, so far as in conflict with this decision. City of Marshall v. Snediker, 25 Tex. 460. 633 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. 121; City of Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 58 L. R. A. 921; Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557; Cutliff v. City of Albany, 60 Ga. 597; Weaver v. State, 89 Ga. 639; McGhee v. State, 92 Ga. 21; Stewart v. Kehrer, 115 Ga. 184; Braun v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. 186; Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223; City of Terre |