95TH CONGRESS 2d Session

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SENATE

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REPORT No. 95-806

ACTION BY THE CONGRESS ON CERTAIN PROPOSED SALES OF AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND SAUDI ARABIA

MAY 11 (legislative day, APRIL 24), 1978.-Ordered to be printed

Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS

[To accompany S. Con. Res. 86]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under consideration an original resolution objecting to the sale of certain aircraft and related defense articles and services to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, reports thereon without recommendation.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The purpose of the resolution is to express the objection of the Congress to the proposed sale to Egypt of 50 F-5 aircraft and related defense articles and services; the proposed sale to Israel of 15 F-15 and 75 F-16 aircraft and related defense articles and services; and, the proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of 60 F-15 aircraft and related defense articles and services.

These proposed sales were described in statements submitted by the executive branch, pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on April 28, 1978. Under this provision Congress has 30 calendar days within which it may, by passage of a concurrent resolution, reject proposed arms sales after they are submitted to it for review, in accordance with statutory requirements.

BACKGROUND

On February 14, 1978, the Department of State announced its intention to sell military aircraft to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Preliminary notifications were provided to the committee on February 22. On March 23, the President discussed the administration's intentions in detail with committee members. On April 28, 1978, the executive branch formally transmitted four notifications that it intended to issue letters of offer for sales, as follows:

(1) To Egypt, at a total estimated cost of $590 million,, 42 F-5E and eight F-5F aircraft, spare parts, associated munitions, including AIM-9J air-to-air missiles, training, and follow-on support; (2) to Israel, at a total estimated cost of $430.7 million, 15 F-15 aircraft plus support equipment and spare parts; (3) to Israel, at a total estimated cost of $1.518 billion, 75 F-16 aircraft, spare parts, ground support equipment and follow-on support; and, (4) to Saudi Arabia, at a total estimated cost of $2.5 billion, 60 F-15 aircraft (45 F-15's and 15 TF-15's) with spares, support equipment, two flight simulators, basic munitions, including AIM-9J and AIM-7F air-to-air missiles, technical data, United States technical and pilot training and aircraft delivery.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The committee held open hearings on May 3, 4, 5, and 8 on the proposed sales. The Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance; the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown; the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul C. Warnke; the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force; and Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher; testified in support of the administration's proposals on May 3, 1978. The next day the committee received a classified briefing on the military balance in the Middle East from Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Adm. Stansfield Turner. This presentation was followed by the testimony in open hearings of Mr. Dale Tahtinen, Assistant Director of Foreign and Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Profs. Steven Rosen and Nada Safran of Brandeis and Harvard Universities respectively; Mr. Jerome Stolarow, Deputy Director, General Accounting Office; and Mr. Erich von Marbod, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense.

Former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, George Ball, Mr. Morris Amitay of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee; Prof. Amos Perlmutter of American University, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. John Richardson, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of Arab-Americans; testified on May 5, 1978. On May 8, the former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and Mr. William Winpisinger, president, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, testified before the committee. The committee also discussed the proposed sales in executive session on April 28, May 1, 4, 9, and 10, 1978.

On May 11, a final discussion occurred in open session. Senator Biden introduced a resolution for himself and Senator Stone to disapprove all four sales. By a vote of 8-to-8, the committee failed to approve the resolution of disapproval. Voting for the resolution were Sena

tors Church, Pell, Clark, Stone, Sarbanes, Biden, Case, and Javits. Voting against the resolution were Senators Sparkman, McGovern Glenn, Humphrey, Percy, Pearson, Baker, and Griffin.

The committee then discussed the possibility of further action, and decided that the full Senate should have an opportunity to discuss the resolution considered by the committee. Accordingly, on the motion of Senator Sarbanes, the committee decided to report the resolution of disapproval without recommendation.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The committee considered in depth the administration's proposals to sell jet fighter aircraft to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia following the formal submission of the proposals on April 28. In doing so, the committee explored extensively such key questions as why the sales needed to be considered at this time, the executive branch's reasoning behind the decision to treat the sales as a single matter, if not necessarily as a package, and the effect congressional approval of this proposal would have upon the continuing efforts to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East. The committee also received expert testimony on the capabilities of the various aircraft under consideration for sale and explored the effect the proposed sales would have on the military situation and military balance in the region.

Following prolonged consideration and discussion, it was clear that the committee remained sharply divided as to whether the sales should be disapproved. The vote on the question of reporting a resolution of disapproval for all sales favorably resulted in a tie vote of 8-to-8; accordingly, the motion failed.

The committee did not wish the Senate or the public to conclude that the committee was unwilling to decide the issue. Instead, it should be understood that an equal number of members, for disparate reasons, held opposing views as to the wisdom of these sales at this time. However the committee was in agreement that, under these circumstances, it should report to the Senate a resolution covering all sales so that the committee could set forth the issues for the benefit of the full Senate.

A number of members believed that it was inappropriate for the proposed sales to be submitted as a package. Although the administration submitted the proposals individually, it was not clear that the administration would proceed with the remaining sales should the Congress object to one sale. Accordingly, the committee considered it appropriate that a single resolution be considered dealing with all of the sales and that the committee report thereon without recommendation to enable the Senate to consider what the administration had submitted to the Congress as an indivisible matter.

Some members of the committee were deeply disturbed at the timing of the proposed sales. It was felt by some that the forward-looking initiatives of President Sadat of Egypt had not had sufficient time to mature and that it was inappropriate to make a decision to inject an additional $5 billion in arms into the Middle East at this very delicate moment in the search for a settlement. The offer by President Carter to increase the sale of F-15's to Israel by an additional 20 aircraft was seen by some as an even more inappropriate action at this

time in that the proposal added substantially to the amount of arms which would be thrust into this troubled area. Another point was made that the offer of an additional 20 planes for Israel in the 1980's might be perceived, not so much as a generous, affirmative step, but as a restriction upon previous affirmations by the United States of its intention to be responsive to the security needs of Israel.

Some members expressed the view that, as progress is made toward settlement, it may well be appropriate to consider the further provision of aircraft to the three countries. Some believe that decisions on such proposals could be made wtih greater certainty at a more settled time. If, on the other hand, the initiatives fail, then the United States will have to consider how best to act to maintain stability and leave the way open for other peace efforts.

Others believe that, while there are risks in injecting additional arms into the Middle East, there are compelling arguments in favor of the proposed sales. Some are concerned that rejection will be seen by moderate Arab leaders as an indication that the United States is not prepared to be evenhanded in its dealing with those who turn to it for support. In addition, some argued, United States failure to sell planes to Saudi Arabia might lead the Saudis to procure French aircraft-possibly in greater numbers and without effective restrictions. On balance, some believe, provision of the aircraft, as requested by the Administration, would serve both the long-term political interests of the United States and the interests of all three nations affected by the proposed sales.

At the suggestion of Senators McGovern and Humphrey, members approved the inclusion in the report of the important point that, notwithstanding the action of the Foreign Relations Committee on the proposed arms sales, the committee strongly urges the administration to use all possible influence in encouraging the Governments of Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to proceed expeditiously with negotiations leading toward a peace settlement in the Middle East.

A number of members who opposed the arms sale proposal, as well as others who favored the proposal, made the point that the committee's action should not be seen as a reflection of the friendship of the United States for Egypt, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. Members of the committee appreciate the positive attitude shown by President Sadat in efforts to reach an understanding with the Israeli leadership. Members also appreciate that Israel's long term security requirements must be recognized and protected. In addition, the members recognize that Saudi Arabia has often been a moderating influence in the Middle East and can appreciate the concerns of the Saudi Arabian Government that it have adequate defenses in the event of conflict with its neighbors.

While the members disagree as to whether these sales would enhance or detract from efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East, there was a clear consensus that every effort should be made to move toward a settlement in the Middle East.