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important of all southern seaports. To do this, it will, of course, be necessary to take away a great part of the business which now goes to Norfolk. Instead

of making Norfolk our coast-distributing point, we shall turn our commerce southward, and deliver it at Brunswick and Savannah, each of which ports will be vastly benefited."

This language suggests one of the dangerous results that may follow upon the concentration in a few hands of such power over the commerce of a vast territory. If the traffic of the region controlled by the Terminal Company, or of any part of it, has heretofore, by an inequitable adjustment of traffic charges, been diverted from its natural channels to Norfolk; and if under a fair and natural arrangement of charges and facilities it would seek its tide-water outlet at Savannah or Brunswick, then it is proper that Norfolk should to that extent be the loser and the more southern ports the gainers. But, if Mr. Inman is correctly reported, the railway management does not propose to let the traffic originating on the lines of his system (" our commerce," he calls it) seek its own outlet. On the contrary, he declares that: "Instead of making Norfolk our coast-distributing point, we shall turn our commerce southward." If this diversion of traffic is to be accomplished by making rates and connections and offering facilities in one direction, which are refused in another, merely for the purpose of building up one port and injuring its rival, or of forcing traffic over

one route which naturally would pass over another, it is apt to meet with difficulties in the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Law. Perhaps Mr. Inman merely meant that under the changed condition of things a large amount of the business now done through Norfolk would naturally go to Savannah and Brunswick; and this may be true. It is not likely that any improper means will be attempted to deprive Norfolk of its legitimate business, or if attempted that it will be permitted. Upon the whole, there is nothing in this combination of railway interests to excite public apprehension. Compliance with the law and with the requirements of the commission is facilitated, many elements of injustice to shippers and of discord between the carriers are eliminated, and the general public, as well as the railroad companies, are unquestionably benefited by the result.

The modern device of the "trust," as a means of unifying industrial interests and eliminating competition, has not yet been applied in the field of railroad transportation. An approach to it is exhibited in the operation of the Richmond Terminal Company above referred to, where the capacity of that corporation for the acquisition and ownership of the stock of other companies has been largely utilized. This, however, presents a different case from a "railway trust," which, by analogy to other industrial combinations to which that name has been given, would be effected by a surrender of the stock (and with it the controlling power) of each separate company into the

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hands of trustees, in exchange for "trust certificates," bearing such ratio in amount to the par value of the shares in the several companies, as might be agreed on in the instrument creating the trust. The several properties thus fall under the management of a single board, namely the trustees, who, holding the stock, may name the directory and direct the policy of each company. The joint aggregate amount of net earnings is distributed among the holders of trust certificates, the stockholders in the respective companies as such having in the distribution of profits disappeared from consideration.

The scheme of trust here briefly outlined, would probably require for its successful operation the concurrence of the entire stockholding interest of each company embraced in it; and herein it seems likely will be found the chief difficulty in perfecting such a scheme. Should it ever be perfected, a far more stringent public supervision and control of the railroad transportation of the country, will inevitably be demanded.

CHAPTER IX.

EXPRESS TRAFFIC.

The Relations of Express to Railroad Carriers one of Contract Merely-Effect of Wars of Express Rates on Railway Charges and Earnings-The Express Company the Means of Warfare between Rival Railroads-The Case of the Express Companies before Congress and the Commission.

THE express business, which now embraces a large and increasing amount of traffic which was formerly carried on by the railroads as freight business, has not generally been made the subject of public regulation. There can scarcely be any doubt, however, of the right of public regulation of these agencies of commerce; for this right is not based exclusively upon the corporate character of the agency or the grant to it of the power of eminent domain, but exists wherever capital or property "is used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large." (Munn vs. Illinois, supra.)

The legal status of the express companies is undoubtedly that of common carriers, and such they have frequently been held to be, although in connection with the carrying business they may perform other services. (Redfield on Railways, vol. ii., pp. 4, 24.)

There are ten or twelve principal express carriers oper

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ating in the United States, and several of them—enjoying perhaps the most extensive and widely ramifying business of any are not incorporated companies; but though interests in them are evidenced by transferable shares of stock, the shareholders are nevertheless liable as partners among themselves and to the public.

Of course the express companies have to avail themselves largely of railroad facilities. Usually they do not own the cars on which their freight is carried; but they contract with the railroad companies for necessary facilities on their trains, either by renting so much car space, or by paying a certain price for estimated or actual weight of freight, or (which is the most usual method), by an agreement for division of the gross earnings received by the express company, for its entire service in respect to the article transported. "The reason is obvious why special contracts in reference to this kind of business are necessary. The transportation required is of a kind which must, if possible, be had for the most part on passenger trains. It requires not only speed, but reasonable certainty as to the quantity that will be carried at any one time. As the things carried are to be kept in the personal custody of the messenger or other employé of the express company, it is important that a certain amount of car space should be specifically set apart for the business, and that this should, as far as practicable, be put in the exclusive possession of the expressman in charge."

The agreement between the railroad and the express