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mination of his known poetry does not, I think, increase the probability of this notion: certainly we cannot assume, as Mr. B. appears to do, that, if ancient, it must have been written by Moses, and that, if not agreeing with his other writings, it cannot be ancient. If Moses was only the compiler of at least a considerable part of Genesis, we can hardly draw a conclusion from the comparison of a portion of that work with the book of Job, supposing it to be his composition; and, after all, if the Satan of the introduction to Job meant, as seems, I think, pretty certain, not a wicked and malignant spirit, but either an angelic servant of God, whose office it was to try, by suffering and temptation, the real characters of men, or a simple personification of Job's afflictions, and it was not at all intended to assert the actual existence of such a being,-then, even supposing the history of the fall to have been written by the same author, we can see no propriety in the introduction of such an imaginary being there. Mr. B. is mistaken in supposing 1 Chron. xxi. 1, to be the first place where the word Satan occurs in the Bible. It is found in the Pentateuch, Numb. xxii. 22; in 1 Sam. xxix. 4; 2 Sam. xix. 22, &e: it certainly then was not introduced at a late period, and may, for aught we know, be as old as any other Hebrew word.

The resemblance between the prophetic vision in Zech. iii. and the imaginary poetic scene in the opening of Job, is not such as to warrant the conclusion that they were written about the same time. Joshua is only introduced into the presence of the angel of Jehovah, and the opposers of the re-building of the temple are obviously intended by the adversary.

These remarks are designed to vindicate the patriarchal character of the Book of Job, in which I feel much interested, and with this view are submitted to the candid consideration of your readers, and especially of your excellent correspondent.

Whilst my pen is in my hand I am tempted to express my surprise that Ben-David (p. 24) should seem to ascribe to Mr. Belsham the well-known theory of Astruc, * adopted and im

In his Conjectures sur les Mé

proved by Eichhorn, and since maintained by many learned men, respecting the composition of the Book of Genesis. I will not here enter into the defence of this theory, but I cannot agree with your correspondent in thinking the style of the Book of Genesis uniform; the difference between the first chapter and the second and third strikes me as very remarkable, greater than any we can observe between several of the prophets. To my mind, Ben-David's explanation of Moses' intention, in his manner of using the different names of the Supreme Being, seems far-fetched and fanciful; whilst his choosing to give some explanation shews that he thought the circumstance deserving of attention; this, however, is but one of several important arguments employed by those who consider the Book of Genesis as a compilation, and if Moses be allowed to have been the compiler, there cannot be said to be any historical evidence against this opinion.

SIR,

W. HINCKS.

Maidstone,
November 30, 1821.

R. WELLBELOVED having

Mannounced his intention of pub

lishing more fully his views relative to "the origin and design of the three first chapters of Genesis," any remarks on what he has already published on the subject of those chapters, till we are favoured with his additional observations, may be thought premature. But as he has, in his notes on the third chapter, expressly said, that its doctrine clearly is, "that before the fall of man the serpent had the use of reason and speech, and also walked erect;" and as I cannot help thinking that this interpretation is highly incredible in itself, and irreconcileable with similar passages of Scripture, I am induced to offer the following hints for his consideration and that of your readers. And I am the more prompted to do it, from the hope that he may, in his preliminary observations, be led to reconsider a subject, the just interpretation of which is evidently of considerable importance to those rational views of scriptural principles which in general he advocates with

moires originaux qui ont servi à la Genèse." ED.

Three first Chapters in Genesis.

great ability and success, and to the promotion and practical influences of which, the arduous work in which he has so laudably engaged promises upon the whole to be eminently conducive.

But in exonerating this narrative, or rather allegory, from the charge of imputing diabolical possession to the serpent, he surely loads it with a still more palpable absurdity; it being easier to imagine that there might be an invisible influence from an evil spirit, than to believe that an animal, which originally walked erect, and was by nature endowed with reason and speech, was, in consequence of one criminal act, 66 deprived of feet," and reduced to the condition of a mere reptile in all respects, his whole progeny being involved in the same fate. To adopt such an interpretation is but adding to the difficulties attending the literal sense of a passage, which can be rendered credible only in the form of allegory. It is the more extraordinary that Mr. W. should attribute such a doctrine to the author of this account, when he very justly rescues him from the imputation of representing any prodigious or very great change, either intellectual, moral or physical, as being wrought in our first parents on this occasion. The act of partaking the forbidden fruit, he observes, 66 was simply an indication that man had not virtue enough to resist the temptation," so that "he must have been equally guilty in the sight of his Judge, had some miraculous interference prevented the commission of it." Now, if the dialogue between the serpent and the woman be considered as nothing more than a figurative description of the workings of her mind, it furnishes very reasonable grounds for the conclusion Mr. W. deduces; but if a literal conversation of our primitive mother with a creature of superior subtlety and intelligence were meant, the case would be materially altered. His artifices and persuasions might reasonably be expected to suggest ideas and motives very different from any that would have occurred to her, had no such extraordinary seductions been employed. It is plain, that in the note on ver. 6, Mr. W. is reasoning entirely upon the supposition that the narrative merely conveys an idea of the

207

moral frailty of the primitive pair, and not of their having been misled by so subtle a deceiver, as might justly be expected in a creature walking erect, and endowed with reason and speech, so artfully accosting the mother of mankind in all her original simplicity. But whence did he derive the former conclusion, but from the circumstances of the narration, (imperceptibly to himself perhaps,) conveying to him an idea that the dialogue was allegorical, representing the secret operations of the mind, just as, I doubt not, must be his opinion of the dialogue which is described between the Lord Jesus and Satan, "that old serpent" in the wilderness? In both cases certain mental operations are represented under the simile of a dialogue, and there is, perhaps, a general moral intended in each of them. Our primitive mother, allured by the low pleasures of taste, and captivated by a fond imagination, is easily induced to violate an express command of her Creator, though surrounded by the productions of his beneficence, which she was at free liberty to partake. Our great Exemplar, on the other hand, by the ener gies of a matured understanding well exercised in the Scriptures which were then extant, is enabled with ease and dignity to triumph over the most powerful temptations that could be presented by the joint influences of want, vanity and worldly ambition. In both cases, moral phenomena are represented by symbols taken from the natural creation; the design, probably, being not merely to represent the temptations by which these distinguished individuals were respectively exercised, but to convey a general idea of the state and destination of the human species, in the infancy and maturity of their intellectual and moral progress. This appears the more probable, as they were severally followed by general results of the greatest importance ;-the delinquency of our first parents, by the sentence to the ills of mortality common to mankind; and the fidelity of Jesus, by the promises and evidences of a universal revival. But if it be supposed that in either or both of these cases, some being of extraordinary subtlety and address, whether of the visible or the invisible world, was engaged, for the

express purpose of deluding, by fallacious statements, the analogy ceases; nor do the effects produced by dialogues of so very extraordinary a nature, appear to furnish proper grounds for the general denunciations and promises which followed in the respective

cases.

Is the existence of a speaking serpent "walking erect," and afterwards deprived of feet," more "clearly the doctrine of this chapter" than that of Satan or the devil assuming a visible shape and conversing with Jesus, is the doctrine of three of the Evangelists; or than that" he walketh up and down in the earth," and "goeth about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour," is the doctrine of Peter and the author of the book of Job? But since that "old serpent, which is also called the Devil and Satan," is identified, Rev. xii. 9, with "the great red dragon, whose tail drew after it the third part of the stars of heaven;" is it not clear, that these terms must all sustain the same symbolical character? Mr. W., indeed, appears to be influenced by the assertion of Josephus, "that at that period all animals partook of the gift of speech with man," &c.; as expressing the general opinions of the Jews, and of the writer of the third chapter of Genesis in particular. But is a writer, whose credulity or desire of amusing his readers appears to have led him to record such puerilities as these, or that of the fruit of Sodom being full of ashes,―of a cow calving a lamb in the Temple, of extracting demons from the nose, and the like, to be taken as the standard of the sentiments of an author who is recording the circumstances of an actual interposition from God, of great importance to the general interests of the human species? Dr. Lardner [Works, I. 488] has, with great reason and judgment, contrasted the ridiculous statements of Josephus respecting the cure of demoniacs, with the simple but rational narratives of the Evangelists; but the accounts which they give of our Saviour's temptation resemble, in many particulars, that of our primitive mother, and is probably but the counterpart of it, or another act of the same scenic representation. Taken literally, like all other symbols, they are attended with insuperable difficulties,

but under the allegorical form of man exposed to temptations, they seem susceptible of a very rational and instructive interpretation.

Mr. W. has himself, in his Note on Gen. i. 26, appealed to the vision of Micaiah, (1 Kings xxii. 19-24,) as an instance of the determinations of the Divine mind being represented by the figure of the Deity sitting in council with an assembly of spirits. This passage is, indeed, a remarkable case of the figurative use of visible imagery and dialogue, to convey a lively idea of mental operations. Mr. W. probably regards the dialogue of the Supreme Being with Satan (Job i. 7— 12) as of the same figurative description as his dialogue with the evil spirit in Micaiah's vision; and analogy requires that it should be of the same description, differing only with the nature and circumstances of the mind to which it relates, in the case of the temptation of Jesus. Now that Satan and" the old serpent" are identified, appears not only from Rev. xii. 9, but from Rom. xvi. 20, and Luke x. 18, 19; and hence it follows, that the dialogue between Eve and the serpent is in like manner descriptive of the operations of her mind, and that the wounds to be inflicted on the serpent's head are of the same figurative nature, as those of which Christ and his apostle speak. The serpent must, upon this principle, represent temptation or moral evil, as the lying spirit in Micaiah's vision represents this propensity in Ahab's pretended prophets. Upon this supposition the sentence passed upon it will be of unspeakable importance to the best interests of mankind, as well as far more credible in itself, and conducive to the glory of the Creator, than "that the venomous qualities of the serpent tribe, their power and disposition to injure mankind," &c. are to be attributed to the part which the serpent took in leading Eve into the first transgression.

The manner in which the Apostle Paul personates sin, in the Epistle to the Romans, particularly chap. vii. vers. 8-17, so strongly resembles, and is such an evident allusion to the story of Eve and the serpent, that it furnishes a strong confirmation of the above interpretation. He represents sin as "taking occasion by the commandment to work all manner of

Mr. Cogan on Cause and Effect.

concupiscence," to deceive and to destroy. He ascribes the misconduct of the Jew without the aid of the gospel, to the delusions of sin, and endeavours to lay the whole weight of his guilt on this enemy, just as Eve attempted to lay the burden of hers upon the serpent. As she excused her misconduct by attributing it to the deceptions of the serpent, so he apologizes for his transgressions of the Mosaic law, by ascribing them to the delusive influence and uncontroulable power of sin. Thus, under the simile of his own person quite deluded and overcome by this internal enemy, he represents the corrupt state of the Jewish nation, maintains that it is desperate and unavoidable, and, consequently, that the new dispensation of the gospel was necessary to effect their deliverance from its power; in like manner as the special favour of God was necessary to effect the deliverance of our first parents from the consequences of the guilt into which they had been betrayed, no doubt by the same principle of delusion. As the apostle, in his unconverted state, personates the Jewish nation, so the primitive pair may be conceived as personating their race in that moral imbecility which appertains to the first stages of their social existence. It is possible that Eve's youthful fancy may have actually attributed to a serpent the artful suggestions which were in reality the work of her own imagination, just as the solitary Laplander imagines that his rein-deer can understand his discourse, and that his cat has the power of predicting future events. But admitting that the story might originate in this way, it is, nevertheless, wrought into as regular an allegory as any of the other dialogues with the principle of evil, recorded in the Scriptures; and as it terminates in a divine interposition of high importance, I can see no reason why it is not entitled to the like credit and respect which is paid to the analogous passages in any other portions of the Sacred Writings; and particularly to that of the temptation of Jesus, to which it bears precisely that resemblance which appertains to the same species of allegory, with such differences only as correspond with the differences of characters, circumstances and results. In these allego

VOL. XVII.

209

ries, moral phenomena are represented by visible scenery and dialogue; and the serpent is selected as the emblem of moral evil or its causes; its grovelling nature, its sly, insinuating movements and its venomous bite, being apt symbols of vice. It has been the allotment of this and the two preceding chapters of Genesis to be treated with a degree of slight, as traditionary and involved in obscurity, if not in fable, by some late respectable writers. But they are not so represented any where in the Sacred Writings; and from the allusions made to them, which are not infrequent, they appear evidently to have been regarded as genuine accounts of extraordinary divine interpositions. And after all that has been objected, I must still confess myself an admirer of these primæval records, which, with a simplicity adapted to the occasion, acquaint us with the prominent circumstances of the creation, in reference to mankind and the inhabitants of this earth, and with those which relate to the introduction of moral evil. Surely it is reasonable to conclude that a divine care, if I may be allowed the expression, must have superintended the records of these in common with all the other extraordinary divine interpositions.

T. P.

SIR,
March, 1822.
N my last [p. 65] I committed a

I quoting words

2 E

of Mr. Hume.

Instead of writing, "all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects," &c., I should have written, "all reasoning from the relation of cause and effect," &c.

I will avail myself of this opportunity to say another word on the nature of this relation. The question is, whether the constant conjunction of cause and effect implies that there exists between them a necessary connexion. I contend that it does. The conjunction under consideration must either be fortuitous or necessary.* If

may be formed, namely, that the conI am aware that a third hypothesis junction between cause and effect is arbitrary, depending on the pleasure of the Deity, by whose energy the effect is produced. But as this hypothesis would

Nor does it in

fortuitous, then every event which not rise to-morrow.
takes place in the universe must be
truly and properly contingent. How
then comes it to pass that causes
should not often act without being
followed by their effects, and that
effects should not spring up without
being preceded by their causes? More-
over, as that whích is contingent, or
altogether independent of previous
circumstances, (could it happen at
all,) may happen at one time as well
as at another, how comes it to pass
that those events which we term
effects uniformly follow those which
we denominate causes? Whence is it,
for instance, that the motion of the
cricket-ball always instantly succeeds
to the impulse of the bat? Are not
the chances against such a succession
infinite, unless the phenomena which
are thus conjoined are necessarily
connected? And will not this rea-
soning hold with respect to the innu-
merable combinations of cause and
effect which take place throughout
the whole of nature? Is it not then
infinitely improbable that cause and
effect should be uniformly conjoined,
if they were not necessarily connected?
Here, I think, we have the necessary
connexion of cause and effect made
out by something like a process of the
understanding. But perhaps some
sceptical philosopher may say, that
the contrary hypothesis, namely, that
there is no necessary connexion be-
tween cause and effect, does not in-
volve a contradiction, and, therefore,
that it may possibly be true. This
inference is not quite correct. It does
not follow because a proposition does
not involve a contradiction, that there-
fore it may be true. It does indeed
follow, that it may be true for any
thing that we can prove to the con-
trary; but our ignorance is not an
infallible criterion of possibility. Mr.
Hume, I think, says, that this propo-
sition, The sun will not rise to-mor-
row, does not involve a contradiction;
from which the intended inference
doubtless is, that perhaps the sun may

volve a contradiction to say, that the
sun did not rise yesterday; so that
had I slept through the day, I might
have had some doubt whether the
world was not during that period in-
volved in total darkness. But the
information of my friends would, in
this case, have set me right. But who
could have vouched for the truth of
their information? The falsehood
of the strongest testimony does not
amount to a contradiction; conse-
quently (it might be said) the strong-
est testimony may be false.
But
methinks, Sir, I hear you say, Enough
of these extravagancies! I say so
too, and will take my leave of them
with observing, that scepticism, when
in her most incredulous, or what she
doubtless considers as her most philo-
sophic mood, borders on the opposite
extreme of puerile credulity.

only shift the notion of a cause from one

thing to another, and would imply a necessary connexion between the real cause and the effect; it does not require a distinct consideration.

E. COGAN. P. S. Your correspondent O. P. Q. [p. 76] is desirous of information respecting John xxi. 15. The little which I have to communicate he is welcome to, and that little will concern the Greek of the passage alone. If the sense were, "Lovest thou me more than these?" the Greek ought to have been, ayarq; tμe who TaTWY; I recollect but one passage in which as seems to be used as a contradistinctive, and that is Eur. Phoeniss. 447, παυσαι πανων με, και σε, και πασαν πολιν, but here it is easy to read παυσαι πόνων σὲ καμε και πασαν wox. See Eschylus Sept. contra Theb. v. 240. But to return to the passage under consideration; suppose the sense to be, "Lovest thou me more than these love me?" the Greek is correct, and may be compared with the following passage of Aristophanes : το Πλετε παρεχω βελτιονας άνδρας, the construction of which is precisely similar, and the pronoun is not inserted as the nominative to wapexw.

I

Bedford Row, SIR, March 1, 1822. AM pleased with the liberal manner in which your publication is conducted. I am gratified with your readiness to insert hints and plans for spreading the truth. The instance you gave last month (p. 94) of the scheme for promoting Christian know

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