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Capt. Gifford on the late "Examination of his Remonstrance.”

the strength of ours; for what does the Unitarian want but to force his opponent to a close contest, to draw him from a waste of time and words by desultory controversy, and to bring him within such an open, yet circumscribed field, as shall oblige him to meet the weight of the arguments tendered against him, as well as to exhibit his own?

The author of the "Examination" takes his ground upon an assumption of the suffrage of the immortal Locke (chiefly) and of Newton, and upon the use of two ostensible golden keys of his own manufacture, for the purpose of unlocking my questions; but the instant we begin to handle these keys, we plainly discover them to be nothing better than brass, and truly brazen ones they are. As to the Unitarianism of Locke and Newton, in so far as regards the question of the Trinity, I assert, and am ready to maintain it, that the proofs we are now enabled to bring forward, are so ample and decisive in their nature, that when duly presented, no Trinitarian of sound judgment and having a proper regard for the character of his understanding, as well as for the character of these two great men, can venture to resist the conviction; and as for the two keys or "propositions," they are not only mere trumpery, where they are placed, as serving to "exhibit the foundation of (Unitarian) objections," but, in truth, may admirably serve to unlock the arcanum of Trinitarians, and, in my conviction, to expose such a degree of awful responsibility as no man, holding the doctrines Trinitarians actually do, can possibly entertain, except under the grossest delusion and the most irrational conceptions of the Supreme Being. I feel satisfied that no man of acknowledged ability and having a due regard for it, will take up Unitarian questions upon the ground this "Trinitarian" has done; and at the same time I am as fully persuaded, that, being founded both upon scripture and reason, they are not to be met but by means of the same nature, and perhaps not much less palpably evasive.

I might state, as a further objection to any set reply to this "Trinitarian," that he has expressly identified himself with those who join in raising a ery of blasphemy, and who fly in the face

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of our legislators for abolishing penal laws which, even as a dead letter, they deemed too disgraceful to remain any longer upon our statute-book. This consideration alone is sufficient to condemn his work, since it is now notori ous that such men are uniformly as weak in judgment as they are violent in spirit; and I must express my surprise and concern, that the respectable pastors of our National Church, and Trinitarians generally, should so long have stood by and witnessed with indifference the manifestation of a spirit, as hostile to the true interests of the Church, as it is injurious to pure Christianity.

The author of the "Examination" has evidently proceeded upon the haughty and most odious principle of infallibility, which gave birth to that sanguinary spirit which has proved to be the abomination of desolation, which, in the language of the amiable Watts, "has made a slaughter-house of the church of Christ," which in former days crimsoned over our native soil, and which still haunts us; which, under a more efficient form, dictated the late horrible persecutions in France, and which now, leagued with despotism, thirsts to overthrow the altar of liberty in Spain, and to sink its ruins in the blood of its abettors. But if respectable Trinitarians can think that in our condemnation of this violence we are not guided by views to peace and good will, but only seek to ward off the weight of the accusation, then let their heated zealots proceed with redoubled ardour, let them blow their trumpets as it were in the new moon, let them vociferate in our market-places, let them proclaim blasphemy from our house-tops, under all the vehemence their rage would naturally dictate,-whilst Unitarians stand and look at them with equal surprise, pity and contempt. What a feast do these animosities and bitter revilings afford to the Deist! How have they continued to disfigure Christianity in the eyes of the whole Infidel world! It is high time then that Christians of every name should unite to put the perpetrators of such offences to utter shame, and to rescue Christianity from such a terror.

In common with every Unitarian, I proffer the right hand of good fellowship without reserve to all denomina

tions of Christians. I cannot imagine how any man, with a heart and mind duly imbued with genuine Christianity, can act otherwise. I cannot see what claim a man with an anti-christian temper can have to the title of Christian, for by their fruits ye shall know them. I cannot conceive any thing more hateful and disgusting than that assumed priestly infallibility, pride and presumption, which adjudges others to eternal damnation as the worst of reprobates, upon an unavoidable difference of opinion; and, for one, so long as life and health shall last," I will ever promptly place myself in the foremost rank against it, however great the authority or the numbers to which I may stand opposed.

JAMES GIFFORD.

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No. CCCXCI. SADI: A Specimen of the Mystical Poetry of the Sufis.

One day as I was in the bath, a friend of mine put into my hand a piece of scented clay. I took it and said to it, Art thou musk or ambergris? for I am charmed with thy delightful scent. It answered, I was a despicable piece of clay; but I was some time in the company of the rose: the sweet quality of my companion was communicated to me, otherwise I should have been only a piece of earth, as I appear to be.

No. CCCXCII.

From the Philoctetes of Sophocles. But piety, whate'er to man arrives,

No. CCCXCIII.

ZOHAIR concludes the Third of his Pastorals with the following, among other Apophthegms.

Experience has taught me the events of this day and yesterday; but as to the events of to-morrow, I confess my blindness.

Half of man is his tongue, and the other half is his heart; the rest is only an image composed of blood and flesh.

How many men dost thou see whose abundant merit is admired when they are silent, but whose failings are discovered as soon as they open their lips!

An old man never grows wise after his folly but when a youth has acted foolishly, he may attain wisdom.

No. CCCXCIV.
GOD, from the Alcoran.

God is mighty and wise. His is the kingdom of heaven and earth: he giveth life, and he putteth to death; yea, he is the Almighty. He is the first and the last, the manifest and the mysterious, and he knoweth all things. It is he who created the heaven and the earth in six days, and then ascended his throne. He knoweth that which entereth into the earth, and that which issueth out of it; that which cometh down from heaven and that which ascendeth to it; and he is with you wheresoever ye may be.

No. CCCXCV.

Asiatic Descriptions of Spring. Lo! at thy bidding Spring appears

Thy slave, ambitious to be seen; Lord of the world! thy voice she hears, And robes th' exulting earth in green.

Now had the stormy Winter departed, and the graceful Spring returned: the face of the fields was pictured by Providence, as by a painter. The birds sung from amidst the flowers, hundreds of nightingales and thousands of linnets ravished the ear and compelled mankind to listen; while the foot

Lives he, or dies he, still on earth sur- steps of heavenly benevolence recalled

vives.

the earth from death to newness of life.

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REVIEW.

"Still pleased to praise, yet not afraid to blame."-POPE.

ART. I.-Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Cr. 8vo. pp. 296, 8s. Hunter, 1821.

THIS is not a common book.

T The author (whoever he be) possesses an acute, discriminating mind; embraces comprehensive views of mankind; and asserts and maintains the most liberal and philosophical principles. His style appears to indicate a practised writer: it is free, perspicuous, manly, and often beautiful. We fall in so entirely with his speculations, that we have little more to do than to describe his plan and to quote a few passages as samples of his talents and illustrations of his design and spirit.

The first Essay is "On the Forma tion of Opinions." This is divided into eight Sections. Section I., is "On the terms Belief, Assent and Opinion." "Assent appears to denote the state of the understanding with regard only to propositions." "Belief has a more comprehensive acceptation, expressing the state of the mind with regard to any fact or eircumstance, although that fact or eircumstance may never have occurred to it in the form of a proposition, or, what is the same thing, may never have been reduced by it into words." "Opinion is seldom, if ever, used in reference to subjects which are certain or demonstrable;" it is employed by the author, "in reference to propositions of a probable nature, to designate that which is believed."

The IInd Section is "On the Independence of Belief on the Will." Here the Essayist examines and we think overturns the assumption of the voluntary nature of belief. He observes that there are a great number of facts and propositions in regard to our belief of which it is allowed that the will can have no power and motives no efficacy; e. g. mathematical axioms, propositions in geometry, and facts coming under the senses or supported by good testimony. If the will exercises any controul, it must be

VOL. XVII.

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on those subjects that admit of diversity of opinion. But the belief, doubt or disbelief which a man entertains of any proposition, may be the same in strength and every other re spect as the belief, doubt or disbelief which he entertains of a proposition in regard to which there is entire unanimity; and if in the latter case his opinion is involuntary, there can be no reason to suppose it otherwise in the former. It is supposed that when the understanding is in a state of fluctuation between two opinions, it is in the power of the will to determine the decision: but all the various degrees of belief and disbelief, from the fullest conviction to doubt, and from doubt to absolute incredulity, correspond to ture of the considerations present to the degree of evidence, or to the nathe mind. The understanding, it is clear, cannot believe a proposition on precisely the same evidence as that on yet to ascribe to mere volition a which it previously doubted it, and change from doubt to conviction, is asserting that this may take place; it is affirming that a man, without the slightest reason, may, if he please, believe to-day what he doubted yesterday. The following distinction is obviously just:

"Belief appears to be the firmest when there are no hostile or contrary considerations for the mind to rest upon. In proportion to the number and importance of contrary considerations belief is impaired, and if they are increased to a certain extent, it fades into doubt. The latter is often a state of oscillation, in which the mind passes from one class of arguments another, the predominant affection of the moment according with the arguments on which the contemplation happens to be fixed. The mind may also be said to be in doubt when it is acquainted with neither side of a question, and has therefore no grounds for a determinate opinion. The one may be called active or positive, the other passive or negative doubt."-Note, p. 11.

The author next meets the allegation that the will may have the power of changing the character of the evi

dence : this, he says, implies that it may be capable either of raising additional ideas in the mind, or of detaching some of the ideas already there, from the rest with which they are associated, and dismissing them from view; which is contrary to the conclusions of the best metaphysical writers.

"But the proof of the involuntary nature of belief depends not on the justness of any metaphysical argument. Every one may bring the question to the test of experiment; he may appeal to his own consciousness, and try whether, in any conceivable case, he can at pleasure change his opinion, and he will soon find that the most ardent wishes can be of no

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avail. Take any controverted fact in his tory; let a man make himself perfectly acquainted with the statements and authorities on both sides, and, at the end of his investigation, he will either believe, doubt, or disbelieve the fact in question. Now apply any possible motive to his mind. Blame him, praise him, intimidate him by threats, or allure him by promises, and after all your efforts, how far will you have succeeded in changing the state of his intellect with regard to the fact? How far will you have altered the connexion which he discerns between certain premises and certain conclusions ? affect his belief you must affect the subject of it by producing new arguments or considerations. The understanding being passive as to the impressions made upon it, if you wish to change those impressions you must change the cause which produces them. You can alter perceptions only by altering the thing perceived. Every man's consciousness will tell him, that the will can no more modify the effect of an argument on the understauding, than it can change the taste of sugar to the palate, or the fragrance of a rose to the smell; and that nothing can weaken its force, as apprehended by the intellect, but another argument opposed to it."-Pp. 14, 15.

Section III. treats of the "Opinions of Locke and some other Writers (Reid and Bacon) on this Subject." These great writers are shewn to have maintained the involuntary nature of belief. A little inconsistency is pointed out in Locke's language. The author had exposed in the 1st Section the incorrectness of some of the definitions in the "Essay on Human Understanding." These exceptions to Locke's accuracy are not made in disparagement of that great philosopher;

their being made is in fact an acknowledgment of his just authority. No one is at the pains to 'vindicate his dissent from Stillingfleet, Norris, or any other of Locke's antagonists.

In Section IV. the author suggests "the Circumstances which have led Men to regard Belief as voluntary." The common error may, he thinks, connexion subsisting between belief be mainly ascribed to the intimate and the expression or declaration of it, the latter of which is at all times an act of the will; the term assent being used to express the intimation of our concurrence with an opinion as well as the concurrence itself. Another source of the error he conceives to be the practice of confounding the consent of the understanding with that accounts for the error by remarking, of the will or feelings. He further that it may have arisen in some degree from the circumstance of many people having no real conception of the truth or falsehood of those opinions which they profess. With such persons opinions are mere professions, a party-badge, not depending on the understanding, and to be assumed or discarded at pleasure. In regard to predicament; opinions being on most some subjects, all mankind are in this occasions simply objects of memory, results at which we recollect to have arrived without at the moment recollecting the process. Hence it is obviously possible for even an acute logician to be mistaken, as to the opinions about which he has attained a decisive conviction, and not to find out his mistake till he is reduced to the necessity of recollecting, or rather repeating, the process through which he had originally gone.

The author proceeds in Section V. to "the Sources of Differences of Opinion," and on this very difficult part of the subject displays great ingenuity. Belief is an involuntary state of mind, but may, like sleep, which is also involuntary, be to a certain extent prevented or induced according to our pleasure. This result is traced to wilful partiality of attention or examination. Again, external circumstances which vary in the case of each individual, occasion different ideas to be presented to each mind, different associations to be established even amongst the same ideas, and of

Review.-Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions.

course different opinions to be formed. National circumstances occasion national, and individual circumstances individual peculiarities of thinking. How then, if belief is perfectly independent of the will, shall we account for the fact, that the same events or the same arguments produce different effects on different minds? Different conclusions from the same arguments originate either in that defect of language, in consequence of which the terms employed do not convey to every mind the same ideas, or in those

circumstances which occasion other ideas besides those actually expressed, (and different ideas in the case of dif. ferent individuals,) to present themselves to the understanding: to which we may add such circumstances as, when the original arguments or consequent suggestions are numerous and complicated, have a tendency to fix the attention of different persons on different parts, and thereby occasion different considerations to remain ultimately in view.

Section VI. is a continuation of the same subject, as far as regards "the feelings and passions of mankind." Here the author describes and explains the peculiar influence possessed by the sensitive over the intellectual part of our nature. The effects of arguments partly depend upon states of feeling. The attribute of drawing and fixing the attention belongs in a remarkable degree to all strong emotions:

"Fear, for example, may so concentrate our thoughts on some particular features of our situation, may so absorb our attention, that we may overlook all other circumstances, and be led to con

clusions which would be instantly rejected by a dispassionate understanding.

"While the mind is in this state of excitement, it has a sort of elective attraction (if we may borrow an illustration from chemical science) for some ideas to the neglect of all others. It singles out from the number presented to it those which are connected with the prevailing emotion, while the rest are overlooked and forgotten. In examining any question, it may really comprehend all the arguments submitted to it; but, at the conclusion of the review, those only are

retained which have been illuminated by the predominant passion; and since opinions, as we have seen, are the result of the considerations which have been attended to and are in sight, not of such

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as have been overlooked and have vanished, it is those by which the judgment will be determined."-Pp. 53, 54.

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The author next examines the justvolumus facile credimus," ness of the common saying, " quod dily believe what is agreeable to our wishes;" on which he remarks, that, like many other maxims current in the world, it points at a truth without much precision. Wishes, he contends, are totally inoperative till they are having a ground for hope, we have a transformed into hope. If, instead of reason for fear, our apprehension disposes us, in the same way, to believe the reverse of what we wish.

this part of the argument sufficiently Perhaps, the Essayist has not in adverted to the natural tendency of wishes to form themselves into hopes, and thus into opinions. The Roman poet appears to us to describe the true philosophy of the human mind : Quæque cupit, sperat; suaque illum ora

cula fallunt.

The influence of general opinion and some of the most striking effects of eloquence are explained by the author on the principle of the partiality of attention which they tend to create. Emotions are shewn to have less room to operate in proportion to the perspicuity of our views. With regard to the major part of mankind, traditionary prejudices and early associations have a predominant influence, imparting a tincture to every subject, and leaving traces in every conclusion.

The author proceeds to the practical part of his subject in Section VII., which is entitled, "On Belief and Opinions as Objects of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation, Rewards and Punishments." It follows, of course, that if opinions be involuntary they cannot involve either merit or demerit. The nature of an opinion cannot make it criminal. Praise or blame may, however, be justly attached to the manner in which an inquiry is prosecuted. But the consideration of opinions, as reprehensible in so far as they are the result of unfair investigation, can scarcely be rendered a useful or practical principle; for opinions furnish no criterion of the fairness or unfairness of investigation, since the most opposite results, the most contrary opinions, may ensue

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