fundity of research, and an acuteness of understanding, which would have done honour to the most illustrious statesmen of ancient or modern times.

The defects which, on a view of this constitution, immediately strike us as inherent in its composition, are weakness and instability. It has the appearance indeed, rather of an - experiment in politics, than of a steady permanent government; and in this view, as we gather from the speech made by Franklin, previous to giving his vote for its adoption, it was regarded by the most distinguished members of the convention, with which it originated. We have particular access indeed to know, that general Hamilton, who assisted in its formation, and who was regarded as the most enlightened man in the country, was used to express his conviction, that it had not within it the means of selfpreservation. Its framers themselves, therefore, were far from maintaining its excellence. Like Solon of old, they offered it to their countrymen only as the best which their peculiar circumstances would admit of.

The establishment of a more stable government was rendered peculiarly difficult, by the immense rapidity with which the United States were advancing. A country in which every thing is varying and increasing, cannot well have a permanent government. The insular situation of Great Britain seems to be a principal cause of the peculiar steadiness of the government under which we live. The bounds of our country are defined by nature; the population, though increasing, advances so slowly, as to produce no sensible impression on the machine of government; and, when it arrives at a certain pitch, is relieved by emigration, by war, and the other evils incident to an old country. The territory of the United States, when compared with that of the most conspicuous nations of Europe, deserves almost the epithet of boundless. At the time when the constitution was framed, this immense region contained only between three and four millions of souls. Its constitution, therefore, was adapted to a thin and scattered population; but it could not escape the penetration of its founders, that a government, which was suitable to the weak

ness of infancy, might be very ill adapted to the vigour of manhood.

Besides the smallness of the population in proportion to the extent of the territory, there were other circumstances in the situation of the United States which naturally suggested the idea of a republican, and even a democratical government. The population of the United States was of a peculiar description. Every man, possessing a certain share of property, had an interest in the general welfare. The agricultural interest greatly predominated. The greater part of the inhabitants of the United States cultivated their own farms, and were distinguished by those habits of industry, morality, and intellectual acuteness, which are the natural result of that situation. There was no mob, in short, no dissolute and servile populace in the country. When a considerable number of this class exists in any community, it may be pronounced unfit for a republican government. It must not at the same time be overlooked, that the distance of America from Europe, and the absence of any formidable enemy on the frontier, favoured the introduction of a republican government. Had any formidable neighbour rendered it necessary for the United States to maintain a considerable standing army, or to engage in frequent hostilities, we may pronounce, with certainty, that their present form of government could not have subsisted. The slender tie which holds them together would burst at once in the tumult of war. But, placed at a distance from the great theatre of contention and bloodshed, devoting themselves to the arts of peace, and studiously avoiding all occasions of hostility, they have hitherto prospered under a republican government; while the violent political contentions incident to such a constitution have supplied, in some measure, that agitation which in Europe is excited by war, and without which it seems impossible for any collection of men to maintain their vigour and activity.

In governments, as in every human institution, there is always found a mixture of good and evil. The most despotic have their benefits, the most free their disadvantages. The great recommendation of a republican government, as applied

to the United States, is, that it affords full scope to the growing energies of the nation, imposing on them no greater burdens or restrictions than are essential to their complete development. But this advantage is purchased at the expense of an evil, which must exist in a greater or less degree in every government, and has already risen to a most disagreeable, and even alarming height, in the United States. The evil we allude to is party spirit. It being essential to a republican government that the supreme rulers of the country should derive their power immediately from the people, and be chosen by them, these elections are naturally productive of very violent contests and furious animosities among the friends of the different candidates. It must always be kept in mind, that, in the United States, not only the legislative assemblies, but the chief magistrate, is chosen by a general election, held every four years throughout the union. Such an election, in almost any country of Europe, would be the signal for civil war; and although no such effect has hitherto resulted from it in America, because the country is thinly peopled, because there is no standing army, and because the office of chief magistrate is, comparatively speaking, of trifling importance; yet, in proportion as the country advances, these circumstances must be changed; and the United States will then be exposed to that multiplicity of evils which the periodical election of a chief ruler in an extensive country is calculated to produce. Already, according to Mr. Hillhouse, these evils are serious and alarming.

"Of the impropriety," he asks, "and impolicy of the present mode of electing a president, can there be stronger proof, can there be more convincing evidence, than is now exhibiting in the United States? In whatever direction we turn our eyes, we behold the people arranging themselves under the banners of different candidates, for the purpose of commencing the electioneering campaign for the next president and vicepresident. All the passions and feelings of the human heart are brought into the most active operation. The electioneering spirit finds its way to every fireside, pervades our domestic circles, and threatens to destroy the enjoyment of social har

mony. The seeds of discord will be sown in families, among friends, and throughout the whole community. In saying this, I do not mean any thing to the disadvantage of either of the candidates. They may have no agency in the business. They may be the involuntary objects of such competition, without the power of directing or controlling the storm. The fault is in the mode of election, in setting the people to choose a king. In fact, a popular election, and the exercise of such powers and prerogatives as are by the constitution vested in the president, are incompatible. The evil is increasing, and will increase, until it shall terminate in civil war and despotism. The people, suffering under the scourge of party feuds and factions, and finding no refuge under the state, any more than in the general government, from party persecution and oppression, may become impatient, and submit to the first tyrant who can protect them against the thousand tyrants.”

To suggest a remedy for this great and growing evil, is the' leading object of the propositions before us.

"It can be remedied," Mr. Hillhouse observes, "only in two ways: Either the office of president must be stripped of its high prerogatives and powers, or some other mode of appointing a president must be devised than that of popular election."

He is of opinion that both of these means ought to be employed. He proposes to reduce the president's terms of service from four years to one; to reduce his salary from 25,000 to 15,000 dollars per annum; to transfer from him to the legislature the power of appointing to and removing from office; and, as to the mode of appointing the chief magistrate, he intends that he shall be annually chosen by lot from a certain number of the senate. Mr. Hillhouse intends likewise, that the house of representatives, instead of serving, as at present, for two years, shall henceforth serve only for one; and that the term of service of the senate shall also be reduced from six to three years.

If this mode of appointing a president shall be adopted, Mr. Hillhouse flatters himself that the following advantages will result from it.

"1st, It will make the senate more respectable.

"2d, It is prompt and certain.

"3d, It will avoid the evils of a disputed election, which is now unprovided for in the constitution.

"4th, It will exclude intrigue and cabal.

"5th, It gives talents and modest merit an equal chance. "6th, It is economical.

"7th, It gives to the people a president of the United States, and not the chief of a party.

"8th, It removes temptation to use power, otherwise than for the public good.

"9th, It will annihilate a general party pervading the whole United States.

“10th, It will remove a direct, powerful, and dangerous influence of the general government on the individual states. "11th, It will prevent the influence of a presidential election on our domestic concerns and foreign relations.

"12th, And it will secure the United States against the usurpations of power, and every attempt, through fear, interest, or corruption, to sacrifice their interest, honour, or independence; for one year is too short a time in which to contrive and execute any extensive and dangerous plan of unprincipled ambition; and the same person cannot be president during two successive years."

Mr. Hillhouse therefore expects, that when amended in the manner proposed by him, the United States would enjoy the respective advantages of elective and hereditary governments, combining the freedom of the one with the tranquillity of the other. We should now consider how far his expectations are likely to be fulfilled.

The amendment regarding the president consists, as we have already stated, of two parts; namely, making the office itself less the object of ambition, and appointing to it by lot, instead of election. By the latter arrangement, there can be no doubt that the senate would be made more respectable; because each state, in electing its quota of senators, two in number, would consider itself as nominating, at the same time, two candidates for the presidency. It would likewise