Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. into the conclusions of law embodied therein, except in so far as the rulings during the progress of the trial were excepted to and duly preserved by bill of exceptions, as required by the statute. Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125, 128; Miller v. Insurance Co., 12 Wall. 285, 300; Dickinson v. Planters' Bank, supra, 257; Insurance Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237, 248; Cooper v. Omohundro, 19 Wall. 65, 69; Insurance Co. v. Sea, 21 Wall. 158, 161; Martinton v. Fairbanks, 112 U. S. 670, 673; Boardman v. Toffey, 117 U. S. 271, 272; British Mining Co. v. Baker Mining Co., supra, 222; Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U. S. 71, 73; St. Louis v. Telegraph Co., 166 U. S. 388, 390; Vicksburg Ry. v. Anderson-Tully Co., 256 U. S. 408, 415; Law v. United States, 266 U. S. 494, 496; Humphreys v. Third National Bank (C. C. A.), 75 Fed. 852, 855; United States v. Stock Yards Co., supra, 127. To obtain a review by an appellate court of the conclusions of law a party must either obtain from the trial court special findings which raise the legal propositions, or present the propositions of law to the court and obtain a ruling on them. Norris v. Jackson, supra, 129; Martinton v. Fairbanks, supra, 673. That is, as was said in Humphreys v. Third National Bank, supra, 855, "he should request special findings of fact by the court, framed like a special verdict of a jury, and then reserve his exceptions to those special findings, if he deems them not to be sustained by any evidence; and if he wishes to except to the conclusions of law drawn by the court. from the facts found he should have them separately stated and excepted to. In this way, and in this way only, is it possible for him to review completely the action of the court below upon the merits." These rules necessarily exclude from our consideration all the questions presented by the assignment of errors except those arising on the pleadings. All the others relate either to matters of fact or to conclusions of law embodied in the general finding. These are not open to review, as there were no special findings of fact and no 349 Opinion of the Court. exceptions to the rulings on matters of law were taken during the progress of the trial or duly preserved by a bill of exceptions. The defendants offered no exceptions to the rulings of the court until after the writ of error had issued, transferring jurisdiction of the case to the Court of Appeals. And the recitals in the subsequent "bills of exceptions" that the exceptions, then for the first time presented, were to be taken as made before the entry of the judgment, are nugatory. A bill of exceptions is not valid as to any matter which was not excepted to at the trial. Walton v. United States, 9 Wheat. 651, 657; Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117, 127. And it cannot incorporate into the record nunc pro tunc as of the time when an exception should have been taken, one which in fact was not then taken. Walton v. United States, supra, 658; Turner v. Yates, 16 How. 14, 29. The statute, however, relates only to those rulings of law which are made in the course of the trial, and by its terms has no application to the preliminary rulings of the District Judge made, in the exercise of his general authority, before the issues are submitted to him for hearing under the statutory stipulation. Such rulings on the pleadings and the sufficiency of the complaint are therefore subject to review as in any other case, independently of the statute. Norris v. Jackson, supra, 128; Martinton v. Fairbanks, supra, 673; Lehnen v. Dickson, supra, 72; St. Louis v. Telegraph Co., supra, 390; Vicksburg Railway v. Anderson-Tully Co., supra, 415. And see Campbell v. Boyreau, 21 How. 223, 226, Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 606, Erkel v. United States (C. C. A.), 169 Fed. 623, 624, and Ladd Bank v. Hicks Co. (C. C. A.), 218 Fed. 310, 311, as to the questions which are open to review where the case is heard by the judge by consent, but without the jurisdictional stipulation. Since, therefore, the questions arising on the pleadings in this case are now open to review, the motion to dismiss the writ of error must be denied. Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. 2. This brings us to the consideration of the questions arising on the pleadings as to which errors are assigned. We may assume for present purposes, without deciding, that the defendants did not waive their demurrers by pleading over to the merits after they had been overruled. Compare, however, Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354, 357; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, 553; Teal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 242, 246; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 652; Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165, 174; Denver v. Home Savings Bank, 236 U. S. 101, 104; Harper v. Cunningham, 8 App. D. C. 430, 434. The demurrers to the original declaration and petitions were based upon the grounds that they were insufficient in law, since the averment in the declaration that the contract was completed and final settlement had on September 25, 1920, was a mere conclusion of law, and the facts averred did not show that a right of action had accrued or that the court had jurisdiction of the cause when the suit was instituted. And the demurrers to the amended declaration and petitions were based on like grounds, and on the further ground that they set up new causes of action and were not filed within the times required by the Materialmen's Act. These demurrers were rightly overruled. The averments in the declaration, as originally filed and as amended, that the contract between the Construction Company and the United States was completed and finally settled on September 25, 1920, were not mere conclusions of law, but specific averments of an ultimate fact, appropriately pleaded. And since, as appeared from the record, the original suit was brought on April 6, 1921, they showed upon their face that it was instituted more than six months and "within one year after the performance and final settlement" of the contract, as required by the Act; thereby tendering an issue of fact as to the date of the final settlement which was conclusively 349 Opinion of the Court. determined against the defendants by the general finding of the court. And although the amended declaration and petitions showing the supplemental contract between the Construction Company and the United States, were filed more than one year after the date of the final settlement, they did not set up new causes of action at a time beyond that permitted by the Act. The original declaration set forth a provision in the original bond that it was given to secure the performance of the contract "as it now exists or may be modified according to its terms." And the supplemental contract-a copy of which was attached to and made a part of the amended declaration-specifically provided that it should be regarded as amendatory of the original contract; that all provisions and requirements of the original contract should remain in full force, except as specifically changed; and that the original bond should not be released or otherwise affected, but should remain in full force as though the changes provided for had been included in the original contract; and it expressly recited. that the Surety Company, which also signed the supplemental contract, was made a party thereto "for the purpose of extending the obligation of said bond to cover the changes herein provided." It is clear that the amended declaration and petitions did not set up new causes of action, but merely supplemented by appropriate allegations the defective statements of the rights which had existed when the original declaration and petitions were filed; and that the amendments when made related back, by operation of law, to the dates on which the original suit was brought and the original petitions filed. Texas Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157, 164; Illinois Surety Co. v. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214, 222. Furthermore, it was not essential that the petitions should allege the date on which the work was completed, in order to show that the intervenors' rights of action had Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. accrued when the claims were filed. It is urged that while the Act permits the original suit to be brought "within one year after the performance and final settlement" of the contract, it requires intervening creditors to file their claims in such action "within one year from the completion of the work" under the contract. It is obvious that if this latter provision is to be taken literally, the time allowed intervening creditors in which to file their claims would expire earlier than the time allowed for bringing the original suit, since such suit might be instituted within one year after the final settlement, but other creditors could only intervene within one year after the completion of the work, a period necessarily terminating within less than a year after the final settlement. The strict letter of an act must, however, yield to its evident spirit and purpose, when this is necessary to give effect to the intent of Congress. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459; Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 194. And unjust or absurd consequences are, if possible, to be avoided. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 59; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 213. The purpose of the Materialmen's Act, which is highly remedial and must be construed liberally, is to provide security for the payment of all persons who supply labor or material in a public work, that is, to give all creditors a remedy on the bond of the contractor, to be enforced within a reasonable time in a single proceeding in which all claimants shall unite. Bryant Co. v. Steam Fitting Co., 235 U. S. 327, 337; Illinois Surety Co. v. Davis, 244 U. S. 376, 380. In resolving the ambiguities in its provisions the court must endeavor to give coherence to them in order to accomplish the intention of Congress, and adapt them to fulfill its whole purpose. Bryant Co. v. Steam Fitting Co., supra, 337, 339. In this case it was further stated, as the premise on which the court rested |