349 Opinion of the Court. the solution of the particular ambiguity there involved, that the Act "imposes a limitation of time on all claimants, beginning to run from the same event," that is, the performance and final settlement of the contract; and that, just as the creditor who institutes the original suit has one year from the final settlement in which to commence the action, other creditors must file their claims "within the same limit of time." A like construction of the Act was also adopted in Pederson v. United States (C. C. A.), 253 Fed. 622, 626, and London Indemnity Co. v. Smoot (App. D. C.) 287 Fed. 952, 956. And this we now confirm. By the terms of the Act no creditor can institute a suit until after six months from the completion and final settlement of the contract, within which period the United States alone has the right to commence an action. Texas Cement Co. v. McCord, supra, 163; Miller v. Bonding Co., 257 U. S. 304, 307. And if a suit is then instituted by a creditor or creditors, "only one action shall be brought," and all shall file their claims in that suit. If, therefore, the provision limiting the right of other creditors to file their claims to twelve months after the completion of the work, is to be taken literally, the result would be that where, for any reason, the final settlement of the contract between the United States and the contractor is delayed until more than six months after the completion of the work, as may frequently happen, the only creditors who could recover on the contractor's bond would be those who should succeed in first commencing a suit after the expiration of the six months from the final settlement, since more than a year having then elapsed after the completion of the work, other creditors would be debarred. from any recovery whatever, either in the suit thus brought or in any independent action. In such case the bond would be appropriated solely to the payment of the debts due the creditors who instituted the suit; and to Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. the extent of any surplus the contractor and his surety would be entirely released from liability. It is clear, considering the entire provisions of the Act, that such an anomalous and unreasonable result was not intended, frustrating the plain purpose that the bond should inure to the benefit of all creditors and that all should share pro rata in the recovery. And to give effect to the manifest intention of Congress it must be held that the phrase "within one year from the completion of the work" was used in reference to the filing of intervening claims in the same sense as the phrase "within one year after the performance and final settlement of the contract" in reference to the commencement of the original suit; that is to say, not only that the original suit may be commenced within one year after the performance and final settlement of the contract but that other creditors may file their claims in such suit within the same period of time. In other words, as was said in the Bryant Co. Case, there is the same limit of time for the commencement of the suit and for the filing of intervening claims, beginning to run from the same event," namely, the performance and final settlement of the contract; thereby avoiding a race of diligence between creditors and bringing about the equality in the distribution of the avails of the bond among all creditors which Congress obviously intended. 3. We find no error in the allowance of the amendments to the declaration and petitions, setting up the supplemental contract. Aside from the fact that the defendants did not object to the allowance of these amendments or except to the orders of the court permitting them to be made, they were plainly germane to the causes of action originally alleged; and, as already stated, did not bring in any new causes of action. Their allowance was entirely proper. Illinois Surety Co. v. Peeler, supra, 222. 4. It is also contended that the judgment of the District Court is void for the reason that it is recited in one of the "bills of exceptions," and in a memorandum subsequently filed by the District Judge, that the case was heard and taken under advisement in April, while the opinion was filed and the judgment entered in August, that is, after the commencement of a new term of court. There was no exception to the judgment on this ground, and no assignment of error in reference to this matter. And even if the statements thus made by the District Judge, after the writ of error had issued, could be looked to for the purpose of contradicting a specific recital in the judgment that it was entered on the same day on which the case was heard and argued, the contention is in conflict with the long established practice and immemorial usage of the federal courts in this respect, and entirely wanting in merit. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is Affirmed. SEABOARD RICE MILLING COMPANY v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY. ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI. No. 311. Motion to affirm submitted January 25, 1926.-Decided March 1, 1926. 1. Under 8 51, Judicial Code, a suit brought by a non-resident in the District Court upon the basis of diverse citizenship, or because it arises under the laws of the United States, must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the defendant be not a resident of the district, and seasonably assert his privilege. P. 365. 2. A corporation (within the meaning of the jurisdictional statutes) is a resident of the State in which it is incorporated, and not a resident or inhabitant of any other State even of one within which it is engaged in business. P. 366. Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. 3. Section 28, Judicial Code, allowing removal of suits of which the District Courts "are given original jurisdiction," relates to the general jurisdiction of those courts and not to their local jurisdiction over the defendant's person, dealt with in § 51; so that the fact that a suit between non-residents might have been brought in the state court and removed to the District Court does not show that, if brought originally in the District Court, it could have been retained there over the defendant's objection. P. 366. Affirmed on motion. ERROR to a judgment of the District Court dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. Messrs. Thomas P. Littlepage, Lon O. Hocker, Frank H. Sullivan, W. F. Dickinson, Luther Burns, and M. L. Bell, for the defendant in error, in support of the motion. Mr. Alfred A. Hagerty for the plaintiff in error, opposition thereto. in MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action at law brought by the Milling Company against the Railway Company, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, to recover the sum of $3,035.73 for damages alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of the Railway Company, the initial carrier, and its connecting carriers, in the interstate transportation of rice shipped from Arkansas to New York. The Railway Company, appearing specially, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, on the ground that neither it nor the Milling Company was a resident or inhabitant of the district. This plea was sustained, without opinion, and the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This direct writ of error was allowed and the jurisdictional question certified, in February, 1925, under § 238 of the Judicial Code. The Railway Company has interposed a motion to affirm the judgment, upon the ground that the question 363 Opinion of the Court. upon which the decision depends is so unsubstantial as not to need further argument. Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600, 601. This motion must be granted. The declaration and the testimony heard upon the plea show that the Milling Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Texas; and that the Railway Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Illinois and Iowa, having its principal office in Chicago, but maintaining a branch office and operating a branch line within the eastern district of Missouri. Section 51 of the Judicial Code, which deals with the venue of suits originally begun in the District Courtsre-enacting in part a similar provision in the Judiciary Act of 18881 provides, subject to certain exceptions not material here, that "no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant." That is to say, the suit must be brought within the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, unless the general federal jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship alone, in which case it must be brought either in that district or in the district in which the plaintiff resides. While this provision does not limit the general jurisdiction of the District Courts, it confers a personal privilege on the defendant, which he may assert, or may waive, at his election, if sued in some other district. Lee v. Chesapeake Railway, 260 U. S. 653, 655; and cases cited. If this privilege is seasonably asserted, the suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line, 215 U. S. 501, 510; and cases cited. 125 Stat. 433, 434, c. 866. |