Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. express terms of § 8467 the procedure for making assessments for the additional cost of construction is like that provided for the first assessment for construction (§ 8464) after the equalization of benefits has been had under § 8463; and by § 8470 assessments for maintenance are to be made "upon the land owners affected in the proportions determined for such drainage." Both sections clearly contemplate that assessments for additional construction and for maintenance are to be made upon those lands which are already embraced within the drainage project, and on which the proportion of benefits has been determined by equalization proceedings had after the establishment of the original project. The statutes of South Dakota contain no provision for assessing the cost of reconstruction or maintenance of an existing drainage project except in the two sections last referred to, and they make no provision for assessing such costs upon lands not embraced within or assessed in connection with the drainage as originally established. Whether the cost of construction work actually done on ditch No. 1 and ditch No. 2 and involved in this litigation be regarded as additional costs of construction or as cost of maintenance, or partly one and partly the other, there is no statutory authority for assessing that cost on lands not included in the original drainage district. has been locate a drain under the By 8489 it is provided that "If any proceeding for the location, establishment or construction of any drain voluntarily abandoned for any cause, the board of county commissioners may nevertheless same or different names and in the same or different locations from those described in the proceeding under the provisions of this article." But the original proceedings for the establishment and construction of ditch No. 1 and ditch No. 2 were not abandoned, and the proceedings had for levying the assessments now . abandoned 378 Opinion of the Court. in question were not framed or conducted on that theory. They were consequently without authority in law and could not affect the rights of appellees. While there are expressions in the opinion in Gilseth v. Risty, 46 S. D. 374, decided after these suits were begun, which, standing by themselves, might be regarded as supporting the view that the proceedings now in question were authorized by the statutes of South Dakota, the court clearly rested its decision upon other grounds. It is the duty of the federal courts, in suits brought in or removed to the districts courts, to decide for themselves all relevant questions of state law, and while they will follow the decisions of state courts as to the interpretation of a state statute, we do not think that the case of Gilseth v. Risty, supra, so clearly or decisively passed upon the question here involved as to control our decision. Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349; Barber v. Pittsburgh, &c. Railway, 166 U. S. 83, 99; and see Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458. As our decision in these cases turns on the construction and application of the state law, we do not pass upon the constitutional questions raised. See Bohler v. Calloway, 267 U. S. 479, 489; Chicago, G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98. They are, however, questions of substance and sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to pass on the whole case. Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R. Co., supra; Chicago, G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, supra; Bohler v. Calloway, supra. The objections to the exercise of equity jurisdiction in these cases require no extended comment. When the appellees filed their bills, the drainage project had been completed and construction warrants had been issued for the work done; benefits apportioned to the lands of the appellee had been tentatively fixed and notice of a hearing for the equalization of benefits had been given. The steps next in order after the hearing would have been the Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. assessment of costs of construction and the filing of copies of the assessment with the County Treasurer, which would have established a lien on the property assessed. (§ 8464.) As the principal ground for appellees' suits was the invalidity of the whole proceeding and not merely inequality in apportionment of benefits, and as the effect of the proposed equalization would have been to bring the lands of appellees into the newly established drainage district and subject them to future assessments for construction costs and for maintenance, the threatened injury was imminent and the suits were not premature. The assessment, if made, would have established a lien on the appellees' property which would be a cloud on title to say nothing of the fact that the effect of the pending proceeding would have been to subject their property to future assessments; hence the case was one for equitable relief unless there was a plain and adequate remedy at law. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 46; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14. The remedy by appeal to the state court under § 8469 does not appear to be coextensive with the relief which equity may give In any event, it is not one which may be availed of at law in the federal courts, and the test of equity jurisdiction in a federal court is the inadequacy of the remedy on the law side of that court and not the inadequacy of the remedies afforded by the state courts. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Osborne, supra. It does not appear that the state law affords a remedy by payment of the assessment and suit to recover it back, which, if it exists, can be availed of in the federal courts, Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 486, or that such remedy, if available, would not entail a multiplicity of suits. It is not suggested that § 6826 of the state code, which permits suits to recover taxes and forbids injunctions to restrain their collection, has any 378 Opinion of the Court. application to assessments for drainage. In Gilseth v. Risty, supra, the Supreme Court of the State evidently did not deem that section applicable, as it did not rely upon it in denying relief. The legal remedy under the state law being uncertain, the federal court has jurisdiction in equity to enjoin the assessment. Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288. The objection that it was not shown that these cases involve the jurisdictional amount is unsubstantial. The court below found that the amount due on outstanding construction warrants was approximately $300,000 and that the tentative apportionment of benefits, if undisturbed, would result in assessments for amounts ranging from $6,000 to $50,000 against the lands of the appellees. As the substantial basis of the suits was want of jurisdiction in the Board of County Commissioners to make the apportionment and assessment, we think the jurisdictional amount was necessarily involved. Appellees are not estopped to seek the relief which was granted because of any relations which they may have had to the proceedings or to the construction work which had been carried on before notice of the tentative apportionment of benefits. The decrees of the District Court, which remain undisturbed, enjoin the assessments and further proceedings only so far as they affect lands lying outside of the original assessment areas of ditch No. 1 and ditch No. 2. As none of the appellees could have had any notice of the proposal to assess lands lying outside of these areas, until the published notice of the apportionment of benefits, their previous conduct cannot estop them from seeking the relief granted. Other objections were made to the decrees below, but they are not of sufficient gravity to require notice here. There is no diversity of citizenship in No. 99, the appellee in that case being the city of Sioux Falls, a South Dakota municipal corporation. Nor was any substantial Argument for Petitioner. 270 U.S. federal question raised by the bill of complaint in that suit. The power of the State and its agencies over municipal corporations within its territory is not restrained by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182; and see Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U. S. 394. The decree in that case must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's bili. No. 99 reversed and remanded. Nos. 95, 96, 97, 98 and 100 affirmed. ALEXANDER MILBURN COMPANY v. DAVISBOURNONVILLE COMPANY. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 107. Argued January 11, 12, 1926.-Decided March 8, 1926. 1. Where a patent application fully and adequately disclosed, but did not claim, the thing patented to a later applicant alleging a later date of invention, the later applicant was not the "first inventor " within Rev. Stats. § 4920. P. 399. 2. As regards "reduction to practice," a description that would bar a patent if printed in a periodical or in an issued patent is equally effective in an application. P. 401. 1 Fed. (2d) 227, reversed. CERTIORARI to a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed a decree of the District Court (297 Fed. 846) enjoining an alleged infringement of plaintiff's patent. Mr. James A. Watson, for petitioner. The court below erred in assuming that under the defense of R. S. 4920 it was necessary to show that Clifford was the "first inventor," whereas the statute simply requires proof that Whitford "was not the original and |