he answered: "Yes sir, we have the account for his house. The account of Mr. Peterson." That Davis Guion paid him the money on the account, He stated he did not know what was done with the lumber represented by the account. That the transaction was not made through him, but that he collected the money on the bill. No other testimony was offered to sustain the charge of fraud contained in the petition. At the close of the testimony a demurrer thereto was interposed by the defendants and sustained by the court, and the case comes to this court predicated upon error in sustaining of such demurrer. It is a principle as old as English jurisprudence that fraud must not only be distinctly alleged but must be clearly and satisfactorily proven, to entitle a party seeking relief on account of fraud charged, to a judgment, finding that the fraudulent transaction complained of wa entered into and consumated to his detriment. The evidence offered in this case manifestly falls far short of establishing such facts. The presumption indulged in by counsel for plaintiff in error, that because defendant Davis Guion paid over the money which satisfied the price of the lots and material and labor in constructing the house, is a conclusive presumption that he was using his own money and putting the title in his wife to defraud his creditors, cannot be entertained. The only evidence in the case touching the question as to whose money paid for this property shows that it was the money of Fannie Guion. The record is silent as to when or how, or where she got it, and in the absence of proof the presumption is she came by it, honestly, and wholly disconnected from the fraudulent transaction here charged. We are of the opinion that there was no error in the order of the court below sustaining the demurrer. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed, with costs. All the Justices concurring. except Justice Irwin, who presided in the court below not sitting. DISTRICT COURT RULINGS. Effect of Facts in Trial Practice. Judge J. W. Donovan, on page 18 of his excellent little book, "Tact in Court," says: "The law portion need never be ignored, but the case will turn on other than law questions fifteen times out of twenty." The force of Donovans' statement has never been more aptly illustrated than in the recent case of J. W. Murry, Petitioner in Bankruptcy, presented and argued by the firm of Erixon, Remy and Heggem, attorneys in behalf of the bankrupt. The point in issue was whether a piano valued at $350.00 should be considered as household furniture or household goods and be exempt property-whether it was a part or not of the family household goods, or a luxury. At first blush, and without sufficient reflection upon the status of modern society and education, one would say that a piano was not a necessary part of the household goods of a family, but on clear thinking, and correct theory of facts well reasoned and skillfully presented by counsel the court held that the piano was exempt property. A piano used in a family for practice by the children, especially girls as a means of education, is as essential as the school text books which no intelligent court of today, would refuse to hold exempt-In re Smith, 96 Fed. 832; Alsup vs. Jordan, 69 Tex. 300, 50 Amer. St. Rep.,53; Conklin vs. McCauley, 58 N. Y. Supp. 879. The above interesting question was first properly disposed of by the Referee, Judge S. S. Lawrence, and his ruling, on appeal sustained by Chief Justice Burford in the following opinion which in itself unfolds the merits of the contention: IN THE MATTER OF J. W. Murry, Bankrupt. No. 127 In the above entitled cause on August 15, 1906, the Trustee set off to the bankrupt one piano valued at $350. On the same day one of the creditors P. V. Smith filed his objections and exceptions to the action of the Trustee and claimed that under the laws of the Territory of Oklahoma a piano is not exempt property. The question was presented to Referee Lawrence who heard argument of counsel and examined briefs presented by opposing parties and on mature consideration said Referee decided that said piano was exempt property under the laws of Oklahoma and sustained the action of the Trustee, overruled the exceptions of the objecting creditor, and ordered the piano delivered to the bankrupt as exempt property. To this order and decision of the Referee the said P. V. Smith excepted and requested that said question be certified to the Court for review. I have examined the authorities and the statute relating to exemption of personal property to a bankrupt, and I am of the opinion that the decision of the Referee is fully sustained by the law. That a piano is when kept and used in the family in the home for the use of the members of the family, "household furniture" within the meaning and intent of the Statutes of Oklahoma. This statute was adopted from Texas and the Texas courts have so construed it and we think such construction reasonable and sound. It is therefore ordered that the objections and exceptions of the said P. V. Smith be overruled, and the decision and order of the Referee is in all things affirmed to which ruling the said Smith excepts. Done in Chambers at Chandler in said District this 11th day of September, 1906. John H. Burford, Judge. NOTEWORTHY CRIMINAL CASES. Vann vs. State. 1. Municipal Corporation- Hack Drivers Ordinance.-A municipal ordinance prohibiting hack drivers, hotel runners, and kindred classes of people from taking a stand at certain place within the limits, for the purpose of soliciting the patronage of passengers who come in on different railroad trains, and authorizing policemen to arrest without warrant whenever a violation of such ordinance was committed in their view, is valid. 2. Right to Resist Officer.-If an officer has a right to make an arrest and a killing grows out of such arrest, the act of the officer in arresting must not have been in a threatening and menacing manner, and if the officer acted in violation of law, the person whom he was attempting to arrest could legally resist him, if necssary to save his own life, to the extent of taking the officer's life. 3. Homicide-Manslaughter.—If homicide is committed under circumstances which render the mind of the accused incapable of cool reflection, and in a sudden fit of anger, he is not guilty of any higher offense than manslaughter. 4. Charge Shifting Burden of Proof.-A charge of the court that if the jury does not believe, from the evidence, that the deceased was in good faith attempting to arrest the accuse . shifts the burden of proof, and is reversibly erroneous. 5 Self-defense--Reasonable Doubt.- Instructions which require the jury to find affirmatively that the accused did not provoke the difficulty and that the deceased was acting without lawful authority at the time, and that this was known to the accused, before it can acquit, or reduce the crime below that of murder, without coupling such charge with the principle of reasonable doubt, are fatally erroneous. 6. Issue of Self-defense. When the issue of selfdefense is raised, the court must charge upon the law of self-defense without restricting its charge to the law of provoking the difficulty, and it is flagrant error to refuse a special charge correcting such erroneous general charge. 7. Provoking Difficulty.-The court, in instructing the jury on the law of provoking the difficulty, must instruct it that the accused must have said or done something which produced the occasion or provoked the difficulty before he can be held responsible for the result. 8. Relative Size of Combatants.-The right of self-defense against a man using a six-shooter cannot be fettered by a charge to the jury on the relative size and strength of the two combatants. 9. Evidence-Res gestæ.-If, at the termination of an affray ending in a killing, two officers seized the accused, and it is in doubt as to when he fired the last shot, whether after they seized him or immediately before, a statement made by him at that time relative to the homicide is admissible in evidence as part of the res gesta. 10. Witnesses-Impeachment -The answer of one |