and municipal governments were first established, and is now no longer questioned. Hence, there is no conflict, as the delegated power by the legislature can be exercised by the municipality only so long as the granting power deems it wise to remain in use. The granting of a charter, or the passing of general laws, is not a contract between the legislature and the municipality. Each succeeding legislature is a sovereignty—the people and each can annul the acts of the preceding body. An act of the law making body is not irrevocable, unless it assumes the form of a contract. Bloomer v. Stanley, McLean, 158.

The state having temporarily delegated a portion of its powers to a municipal corporation, such municipality must hold and exercise those powers in such a manner as not to conflict with the superior or granting power. Such delegated powers are to be held in trust by the local authorities to be used only for the purposes indicated in the grant.

After a municipality has been organized and invested by the legislature with certain legislative functions, a question arises as to its power to delegate its authority. The scope of municipal legislation may be divided into three general classes, namely: First, to those subjects which are of a general nature, but which are limited as to territory, and which would otherwise be exercised by the legislature; second, to those matters which are local in their nature and do not effect the state as a whole; third, to those things which are incidental to the municipality as a corporate entity.

The general rule is that the power delegated to municipalities cannot be delegated by them to any other body, an individual or set of officers. This is the well established rule in agency. By analogy, the principle can be applied to municipal bodies. But perhaps the stronger reason for the rule is that "power ves

ted in one department of government cannot be transferred to, assumed or exercised by another department. When the council or other city governing body has been vested with certain powers and trusts to be exercised in the interest of the public, such powers and trusts cannot be delegated to others. City of Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Ill. 494.

The general rule has been stated.

However, there

are many instances where certain powers may be delegated. The power to do ministerial acts may be delegated by the city government to an individual. But the person who receives the delegated power cannot delegated it to another person or body of persons. City of Tampa v. Solomonson, 17 So. 581.

When powers are once granted to a municipal body they may be exercised in conformity with the provisions of the state constitution and the general laws. The granting authority can impose such restrictions as it deems advisable, and all the formalities must be strictly followed. McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591. When no prescribed form is given by law, the city may proceed in such manner as it may determine for itself. Halsey vs. Rapid Transit R. Co., 20 Atl. 859. When there is a prescribed form to follow and an act is not executed in compliance with that form, the corporation may, at later period, ratify and confirm the informal act, and it will then become binding as if originally done in the proper manner. Lucas vs. City of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 463.

If a municipal corporation performs an act not authorized by an express grant, or fairly to be implied from the powers that are expressly granted, or incident to the purposes for which the corporation was created, such an act is ultra vires. So, also, when officers of the city act without proper authority, or fail to perform the re

quired preliminaries. State vs. Mayor, 22 Atl. 1004. Municipalities must follow the law, express or impli

ed. Express powers must be literally complied with. Implied powers are strictly construed. Implied powers must be exercised in keeping with some express power and directly and immediately appropriate to its exercise. Gundling vs. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340.

OKLAHOMA STATE OFFICERS.

For the benefit of many of our readers outside of the proposed new State of Oklahoma we publish the following paragraph of the Constitution of Oklahoma as given out by the Leader, the leading recognized official paper of Oklahoma:

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

The officers of the executive department are: Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of state, Auditor, Attorney-General, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Examiner and Inspector, Chief Inspector of Mines, oil and gas, Labor Commissioner, Commissioner of Charities and Correction, Commissioner of Insurance and other officers provided by law. The terms of office are for four years, though those first elected will fill terms expiring January 1, 1911. After the second election under the constitution, the governor, secretary of state, state auditor and state treasurer shall not be eligible to succeed themselves. The ballots for the election of the officers shall be sent to the secretary

of state, who shall transmit them to the members of the house, who shall, upon organization of the house, open and publish the same. In case of a tie, the legislature shall, by joint ballot, select one of the candidates having the equal number of votes.

Only persons thirty years of age, who have been three years residents of the state, are eligible to the office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state auditor, attorney general, treasurer and superintendent.

Among the powers of the governor enumerated in the constitution are commander-in-chief of the militia, power to convoke extraordinary sessions of the legisla ture; power to grant pardons and reprieves, the right to veto bills passed by the legislature, power to fix time legislature shall adjourn when two houses disagree, and power to commission officers not otherwise commissioned by law. An important power is the right to veto any part of the appropriation bill without vetoing the whole The governor shall send a message to each session of the legislature. In cases of vacancy in the office of governor, the line of succession is lieutenant governor, pro tempore president of the senate and speaker of the house.

NOTEWORTHY CRIMINAL CASES.

State vs. Ike Sakowshi.

1. Receiving Stolen Goods-Indictment.-An indictment for receiving stolen goods with knowledge of their character need not allege a criminal intent on the part of the receiver, if it is found under a statute which does not make such intent a constituent element of the offense.

2. Indictment-Sufficiency of description of the Goods,—In an indictment for receiving stolen goods, an allegation which describes the goods as being "two cases containing 35 pairs of shoes, all of the value of forty nine dollars and eighty cents," is not open to objection that it includes the boxes only, and not the shoes. 4 A. & E. Ann. Cases, 751.

Belden vs. State.

FORGERY-Particular Instruments.

Accused was

charged with forging a letter directed to a bank, purporting to have been signed by S., authorizing the bank on pay day of each month to pay to L. the amount of the signers account as presented, or if, at anytime before pay day, the signer should draw his check to pay the account to date. HELD, that such instrument did not on its face import an obligation, and hence an indictment failing to show by explanatory averments that S. had a running account in the bank, and that the bank was instructed to pay his account to L., etc., was fatally defective.

99 S. W. 563.