Savannah River Improvement. settled, and the object to be attained is important to the United States, and especially so to Georgia and the neighboring States, I would not advise against the payment of the sum awarded under the proceedings had in the local courts, if, by the legislation authorizing them, the United States acquired any title to the property for which it pays. Such is not the case. Reference to the before-quoted language of the first section of the act of the Georgia legislature approved October 8, 1879, shows that compliance with the provisions of the act "shall pass the title to the said land out of the owner into the State of Georgia upon the payment of the amount of the award," &c. The question whether or not the general legislation appro. priating certain sums for the improvement of the Savannah River satisfies the requirements of Revised Statutes, section 3736 "No land shall be purchased on account of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase"-does not arise in the present case; because, though the public money is paid out, the United States does not acquire the ordinary rights of a purchaser. The title passes to the State of Georgia. To its power of eminent domain the State thus adds the rights of private proprietorship. Such is not the usual course of legislation where property is taken for a public use, through the instrumentality of municipalities, corporations, or otherwise. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, through its chief justice, in Burt v. Merchants' Insurance Company, 106 Mass., 362, said: "The usual method of making the appropriation is to authorize some corporation to take the property in the manner prescribed by a statute. In this manner the right of eminent domain is exercised by railroad, turnpike, canal, and aqueduct corporations, and the property passes, NOT TO THE STATE, but to them." So, in Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal., 251, Baldwin, J., said, with the concurrence of his associates, Cope, J., and Field, C. J.: "Where private property is taken for the purposes of railroads, aqueducts, canals, turnpikes, &c., the State usually makes the application through the agency of private corpora. tions, to which she transfers the ownership of the property taken. And it seems not to be important whether the corporation Savannah River Improvement. through whose instrumentality the object is to be attained be a domestic or foreign corporation." (Cases cited.) In the matter of Townsend, 39 N. Y., 171, is an instance of taking by and title vested in a corporation created by a State other than that in which the property taken was situated. The construction of railroads has made this matter too familiar to permit the further citation of cases. No reason is perceived why the United States should not take the same title that an incorporated improvement company would under legislation of the customary character upon the subject. If it be said that no title was necessary, because the soil was to be removed to the level of the river bed, my answer is that title was needed in order so to remove it. The United States would have no more right to dig away the land of the State of Georgia than that of Patrick K. Sheils, the prior owner. Not one word in either section of the act of October 8, 1879, gives any consent of the State to the removal of the soil. The only possible argument that could be suggested, in support of the right of removal by the United States, is that consent is implied by the language of the preamble, though not expressly contained therein. The title of the act and the preamble are as follows: "AN ACT to provide for the improvement of the Savannah River. "Whereas there is a public necessity that the channel of the Savannah River, a navigable river in this State, shall be improved by straightening, widening, and deepening the same near, opposite, and within the city of Savannah, in order that the said stream may be made more available and useful for the purposes of navigation and commerce, a purpose which is common, useful, and of necessity to the whole people of the State of Georgia. And whereas for this purpose it is necessary to take and cut off portions of land from Hutchinson's Island and from Fig Island, making those portions a part of the bed of the stream. And whereas the Government of the United States has made appropriations of money for the purpose of accomplishing the work aforesaid, and its officers and agents are now ready to prosecute the work and to pay to the owners of the land so necessary to be taken a reasonable compensation for the same. And whereas Savannah River Improvement. the same work will serve a public purpose both as to the United States and to the State of Georgia. "SEC. 1. Be it enacted," &c., as hereinbefore indicated. These considerations induced the legislature to provide for the taking of the property of Patrick K. Sheils, and transferring the title thereto "into the State of Georgia," thereby retaining a control over the premises. For aught that appears, the State of Georgia or city of Savannah may be willing to have the work done and to co-operate in doing it, but yet desire to direct the method differently from that proposed to and accepted by Congress, or to be so situated as to control it. Be that as it may, the absolute legal title does not go to the United States, nor is the consent to its operations expressed. The preamble to an act, as Maxwell says, " usually states or professes to state the general object and intention of the legislature in passing the enactment." That object was the improvement of the Savannah River, it being, it is true, a part of the contemplated improvement to remove a portion of Fig Island. The same author adds that therefore the preamble "may legitimately be consulted for the purpose of solving any ambiguity or fixing the meaning of words which may have more than one, or determining the scope or limit of the effect of the act whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt." (Maxwell on Statutes, 35, 36.) He states the converse also: "But the preamble cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part when the language of the latter is plain, and not open to doubt either as to its meaning or its scope." (Ib. 39, top.) It is extremely probable that the officers in charge of this improvement would not be interfered with by the State of Georgia if they went on to remove this point of land; but it should not be left as a matter of supposed non-interference. The consent of the legislature should be absolute, unequivocal, and irrevocable, so that the United States could proceed in the exercise of an unquestionable right. Such has been the character of the legislation under which action was taken in the cases already cited. The first section of the Massachusetts act, as given in a note to Burt v. Insurance Company, 106 Mass., 357, pro Savannah River Improvement. vided that "the consent of this Commonwealth is hereby granted to the United States to the purchase of additional land for the site of the new post-office," &c. The purchase was by condemnation. The second section regulates the ap. praisement of damages, and provides that upon "their payment the fee of the said estate shall be forever vested in the United States." (Ib., 358.) The proceedings in California were under a general statute authorizing the condemnation of lands in that State upon the application of any authorized agent of the United States, and provided for the execution of a deed of the said land, "which said deed shall convey to the United States a good and absolute title to the said lands, against all persons whatever." (18 Cal., 248.) In order to bring water to this city, an aqueduct bridge had to be built over "the Cabin John Creek" and lands taken in Maryland. The legislature of that State assented to this by act, chapter 179, approved May 3, 1853. After a preamble, reciting the object to be attained, the appropriation therefor, the necessity for consent, the first section enacts that if the plan adopted should require it, "consent is hereby given to the United States to purchase such lands," &c. (Laws of Maryland, A. D. 1853, page 208; Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md., 444.) Numberless other similar statutes might doubtless be referred to, but I have only mentioned these three, to which my attention was attracted by the cases cited. As the legislation you have invited me to consider neither gives the United States any title to any portion of Fig Island, nor any unambiguous consent to the excavation of any part of it, I do not think the $1,000 assessed as damages can bè paid out of the sum appropriated for the continuance of the improvement of the Savannah River, nor from any other fund in the United States Treasury. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. ALEXANDER RAMSEY, Secretary of War. Port of Genesee-Transportation in Bond. PORT OF GENESEE-TRANSPORTATION IN BOND. The act of March 14, 1876, chap. 23, extending "the privileges of sections 2990 to 2997 of the Revised Statutes, inclusive" (i. e., the privilege of transportation in bond), to the port of Genesee, New York, is not repealed by the act of June 10, 1880, chap. 190, which repeals those sections and substitutes therefor other provisions. The former act conferred upon the port of Genesee a right to participate in the privileges of the class of ports mentioned in section 2997, as defined in the other sections above referred to, and as they might thereafter be defined in any subsequent legislation to be substituted therefor. Accordingly, the privileges to which that port is now entitled are those set forth in the latter act for the same class of ports (the ports designated in section 7 of the act). DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: The case of "the Port of Genesee," submitted for consideration in yours of the 30th ultimo, is in substance as follows: Section 2990 of the Revised Statutes confers upon certain ports the privilege of importing in bond through other ports therein named. Thereupon sections 2991 to 2996, inclusive, define the terms, methods, and other details of such importation, and section 2997 enumerates the ports upon which such privilege is conferred. By the act of 1876, chap. 23, "the privileges of sections 2990 to 2997 Revised Statutes, inclusive, [are] extended to the port of Genesee, in the State of New York." By an act passed at their recent session (June 10, 1880), Congress recast the provisions of the sections above mentioned, and thereupon also expressly repealed them. The changes in such provisions concern the character of the merchandise allowed to be imported, the ports through which such importation may be effected, and the provisions for keeping accounts and securing duties. By the act of 1880 the number of both classes of ports is largely increased. But the port of Genesee is not one of those enumerated in section 7 as entitled to the "privilege of immediate importation." Questions, therefore, arise (1) whether the act of 1876, above referred to, has by such |