But to ftrengthen this argument, we must confider farther, that if God created the whole universe, and particularly the human race, it was for fome end or other, whatever it be : and the most probable ends, in truth the only rational ones that can be conceived, were his own honour, and our happiness. If these then, or any other, be the ends, which he proposed to himself when he created man, it seems neceffary to believe, that he takes notice, at leaft, how far we his creatures act in view of thofe ends; whether we practise those things which promote them, and in the conduct of our lives, regulate ourselves by the divine will in the creation.

This is to afcribe no more to God in this cafe, than we look upon as a part of every wife man's character. When a man has undertaken any thing with a fixed and certain defign, and has executed his work according to his mind, if he immediately neglects it, we should call it a mettrifling away his time, a wavering in his nature, or fomething else which would not turn out much to the advantage of his understanding. And fhall we impute fuch a proceeding to God, which would fo ill be

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come even a man? no, there never was a more certain truth, a more close confequence, than there is between creation and providence. The eyes of the Lord are in every place, and all things lie naked and open unto his view.

But this is not all we mean by a providence. To afcribe this, and no more to God, is to make him a meer fpeculative and contemplative being, at beft only a curious obferver of the works of his own hands, I proceed, therefore, under the fecond head,

To fhew that God beholds the evil and the good, that he is not a meer fpectator of the world; but is immediately concerned in directing the course of it, and exercifes what divines call an actual providence over it. For this there are various proofs, which I fhall lay before you in the shortest and plaineft manner I can.

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But before I enter upon them, it may proper to take notice of one objection, which fome men of an atheistical turp have made against God's exercifing this actual providence over the world. The objection runs thus. Does it agree, fay they, with the character of an infinitely wife workman to make any machine, which shall be at every turn wanting C 4

his

his affiftance to rectify or keep it in order? fhould we think him, for inftance, a good artificer, who should make a piece of clockwork, which should continually stand in need of his help to set its wheels a-going? It fhews more skill, fay they, fo to finish the work at first, as that when once put together and set in motion, it shall thenceforward move regularly of itself, and proceed according to its first given direction.

This is what they object; but there is a very fatisfactory answer to be given.

One part of the creation, and a chief part of it, is man, and fince man was created a free being and master of his own actions, without which fuppofition we can conceive no good reafon for his being created at all, it may be replied, that God could not give at first any fuch immutable and fixed laws to this part of his work, as that it fhould always neceffarily follow his intent and direction; without taking away its liberty, and confequently all the merit of its obedience; the nature of this branch of his work, therefore, being fuch, it feems requifite that God fhould frequently Interpofe, to correct the irregularities, which man's

man's abuse of his free-will might introduce into the world.

So far all feems plain against the force of the objection; and as to the other parts of the creation, those I mean which have no life or fense, or at least no free-will in them, it seems reasonable to affert, that God wifely ordered things in making them at first not fufficient of themselves, but needing his frequent or conftant affiftance, because man is taught from thence, that all things which he enjoys in life, all his present bleffings, immediately and in every moment, depend upon the will and favour of his Creator. To a creature defigned for happiness this is a standing leflon, which teaches him, on whom he is to depend, and to whom he is indebted for all those things which in any way contribute to the neceffaries and comforts of his life.

Thus much may ferve for an answer to the objection: let us fee then, what proofs there are that God does actually interpofe in the courfe of nature, and in the affairs of mankind. In this larger fenfe of the word providence there are two things contained, God's fuftaining and directing power.

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By the fuftaining power of God, I mean that power, which he exerts in fupporting all the animal part of the world, in the life, which they enjoy, and keeping the other parts of it in the condition which he has affigned to them,

According to the doctrine of fcripture, in God we live and move, and have our being: for a meer causing a thing to be, does not infer a neceffity of its continuance in being: and, therefore, God's creating us, and giving us at firft life and breath, did not put us into a condition of continuing that life and breath with out his conftant affiftance.

And, agreeably to this, by the most accus rate experiments, and the best reasonings upon them, which the present or former ages have produced, we have good grounds to believe, that the continuance of all things, and the durableness of that state which they are in, depends as much upon the good-will of God, as did the creation of them at the beginning: For, first,

In ourselves, for instance, the power which the mind has to put the body in motion, can be accounted for by none of the known laws of nature: nor can that prodigious force, with