IN SENATE, February 3, 1831. ANNUAL REPORT Of John C. Donnelly, an Inspector of Hops for the city and county of Albany. To the Honorable the Legislature of the State of New-York. The inspector of hops, for the city of Albany, submits the following as his annual report. Inspected from the following counties, viz: Fees,..... Deduct store rent and expenses, ... $140 39 60 00 $80 39 The hop market opened the last season at one shilling the pound, and maintained that price until near the close of the season, when they gradually advanced to sixteen cents: although but a small quantity sold at the last mentioned price. The quality of hops has not been so good as ought to have been from the natural growth; in consequence of not having been properly cured. Some few lots from Madison, and one particularly, from Otsego, (counties,) were as fine a quality as can be raised and cured. All which is respectfully submitted, by your obt. servant. JNO. C. DONNELLY, Albany, Feb. 2, 1831, Inspector, IN SENATE, February 7, 1831. REPORT Of the Attorney-General, on the communication of the Hon. Smith Thompson, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Attorney-General, to whom was referred by the Senate, the communication of the Hon. Smith Thompson, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to his Excellency the Governor, RESPECTFULLY REPORTS: That his Honor Judge Thompson, after mentioning the late communication of the Attorney-General concerning the trials in the Circuit Court of the United States in relation to the claim of Mr. Astor, proceeds to remark-" This communication seems to contain a complaint that the charge of the court to the jury was not allowed to be incorporated in the bills of exceptions." If by "complaint," his honor the Judge means to be understood that the Attorney-General had in his communication expressed his dissatisfaction with the decision of the Circuit Court upon striking out the charge, and his intention to have that decision reviewed by an appellate court according to the ordinary forms of law, then the Attorney-General has no remark to make upon this part of the case. But if it was intended to say that the Attorney-General had attempted to arraign the Judge who presided at the trials, either before the Governor, the Legislature or the public, he hopes and believes that a sufficient answer to the allegation will be found in the communication itself. Without saying more upon a remark that does not necessarily carry with it any censure, it will be proper to consider another part [S. No. 28.] 1 of the communication of his honor the Judge, of a very different character. He says, "As the Attorney-General has thought proper to withhold from you the grounds upon which the charge was stricken out of the bills of exceptions, justice to the Court requires that they should be made known." And after stating those grounds, he concludes as follows-" As the letter of the Attorney-General has been communicated by your Excellency to the Legislature, it is respectfully submitted to you, whether it will not be proper also to communicate this letter, to prevent any erroneous impressions being made in relation to this subject." If the Attorney-General has been so wanting in self-respect, to say nothing of his character as a lawyer or his duty as a citizen, as to be justly chargeable with a designed concealment of a part of the case, for the purpose of bringing odium upon the Court, he has abundantly merited the displeasure of his honor the Judge. But it is respectfully submitted that nothing was either said or omitted in the communication of the Attorney-General, which could lay a just foundation for this allegation. Nothing either in the language or statements contained in that communication has been pointed out or complained of as being offensive to the Court: but the substance of the charge made against the Attorney-General, is that he has done injustice to the Court by "withholding" a statement of the grounds upon which the charge of the Judge was stricken out. It is believed that a brief consideration of the facts will furnish a sufficient answer to this imputation. Two suits in relation to the claim of Mr. Astor had been tried, and judgments had therein been recovered in favor of the claimant, since the Legislature had been advised of the progress of that litigation. Those judgments were, in pursuance of the act of 1827 in relation to that claim, to be presented to the Supreme Court of the United States for review, "without any unnecessary delay ;" and it was made the duty of the Attorney-General to "expedite" the ultimate decision of the causes. Those suits had been tried in season to have the judgments reviewed at the then approaching term of the appellate Court: but a difficulty had arisen in the settlement of the cases, which would prevent a final hearing at that time, unless what was supposed a legal right should be abandoned. The Judge had charged the jury on the trials, and the counsel for the defendants had excepted to the charges, because they were deemed objectionable in point of law. On the settlement of the bills, the Judge (for reasons which were no doubt satisfactory to him) had stricken out the charges. The counsel for the defendants, believing that the Judge had erred in this decision, and having failed in an effort to induce the Judge to correct it, had resolved on bringing that question before the Supreme Court of the United States, by way of a motion for a mandamus to the Circuit Court, to restore the charge in the bills of exceptions. This would necessarily prevent a final hearing of the cause at the then ensuing term. Such being the case, and there being some appearance of dissatisfaction on the part of the claimant, at the prospect of delay, the Attorney-General deemed it his duty not only to inform the Legislature of the trials and judgments in the two suits, but also of the reason which would prevent a final disposition of the causes so early as might otherwise have been expected. In doing so, it was simply stated that the charge had been stricken out, and that the decision of the court upon striking it out, was deemed to be erroneous; without giving any grounds or reasons for the one opinion or the other. No improper motive was attributed to the court, nor was a single argument or suggestion made to show that it had erred in judgment. If one side of the case had been stated, while the other had been kept out of sight, there might have been ground for imputing an improper concealment, for the purpose of prejudicing the court; but as nothing was said beyond what was necessary to the legitimate object which the communication was designed to accomplish, it is believed that candid and dispassionate men will acquit the Attorney-General of the improper motives that have been attributed to him. The grounds upon which the charge had been stricken out, was not the only thing that had been omitted or "withheld" in that communication: and it might with equal justice have been said, that the Attorney-General had "thought proper to withhold" the charge delivered to the jury, or the particular grounds upon which it was deemed exceptionable, or a correspondence that had taken place in relation to the settlement of the cases, or the reasons for believing the Judge had committed an error in striking out the charge, or, in short, any other of the many things that had transpired in relation to this litigation. So far was the Attorney-General from intending any injustice to the court by the omission complained of, and others that have been alluded to, that he believed a discussion of the merits of the motion about to be made, to correct the supposed error of the Circuit Court, before the Legislature, or any other forum than that having power to correct the error, if any had intervened, would have been an irregular course, disrespectful both to the Circuit and the Supreme Court, and justly subjecting him to censure. And but for the example that his honor the Judge has furnished in his com |