the North over the South, or of the East over the West, and vice versa.

In general the policy of having one department of the general government, depend upon another co-ordinate department, for the appointment of its officers, seems liable to exception, if it is intended to be, as it ought to be, perfectly independent. For the same reason, they ought not to be liable to be removed by an address of both houses. For, while they are exposed to this danger, if any political question should be brought before them, in which the dominant political party in congress for the time being, has any strong interest or bias, the judges will be liable to lose their offices, if their views of justice do not coincide with the feelings of a majority of congress. For the same reasons, they ought not to be under any obligations to the President for their nomination. All such relations are supposed to have a tendency to diminish the independence of a judge, and consequently his impartiality, in cases where the President's views, feelings or interests are concerned in any case brought before the court; and though such suspicions, it is believed, are almost invariably groundless, yet a judge ought not to be placed in a situation, where he may feel an inducement ungratefully to decide against one to whom he is under obligations and whom he believes to be in the right, or otherwise be exposed to the calumny and obloquy of the illiberal, as if he had sacrificed justice to partiality.

The supreme court of the United States is the firmest stay and support of the Union. Being the least swayed by party considerations, it is the most upright, and consequently, in a literal as well as figurative sense, it is the most firm and stable. Having its foundation in principle, and not in faction, ambition, love of popular applause or selfish interests, it is the most to be relied on of all the departments of government. Every thing possible therefore should be done to support its dignity and independence. For, while this department of the general government is kept spotless and incorruptible, and while it has power to enforce its decrees; though intrigue and corruption should taint every other part of the government, the union of the states, and the constitutional or political rights of each individual citizen, will still remain unviolable.

5. This Chapter it is believed cannot be better terminated, than by the quotation of the following passages in the opinion of Ch. Jus. Jay, in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia.

'Prior to the date of the constitution, the people had not any national tribunal, to which they could resort for justice. The distribution of justice was then confined to state judicatories, in whose institution and organization the people of the other states had no participation, and over whom they had not the least control. There was then no general court of appellate jurisdiction, by whom the errors of state courts, affecting either the nation at large, or the citizens of any other state, could be revised and corrected. Each state was obliged to acquiesce in the measure of justice, which another state might yield to her, or to her citizens, and that even in cases, where state considerations were not always favorable to the most exact measure. There was danger, that from this source animosities would in time result; and as the transition from animosities to hostilities was frequent in the history of independent states, a common tribunal for the termination of controversies became desirable, from motives both of justice and policy.

Prior also to that period, the United states had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations, and it was their interest, as well as their duty to provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed. In their national character and capacity, the United States were responsible to foreign nations for the conduct of each state relative to the laws of nations, and the performance of treaties, and there the inexpediency of referring all such questions to state Courts, and particularly to the courts of delinquent states, became apparent. While all the states were bound to protect each, and the citizens of each, it was highly proper and reasonable, that they should be in a capacity, not only to cause justice to be done to each, and the citizens of each; but also to cause justice to be done by each, and the citizens of each; and that, not by violence and force, but, in a stable, sedate, and regular course of judicial procedure.

These were among the evils against which it was proper for the nation, that is the people of all the United States, to provide by a national judiciary, to be instituted by the whole nation, and to be responsible to the whole nation.

Let us now turn to the constitution. The people therein declare that their design in establishing it, comprehended six objects. First, To form a more perfect union. Second, To establish justice. Third, To insure domestic tranquillity. Fourth, To provide for the common defence. Fifth, To promote the general welfare. Sixth, To secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.' ***

It may be asked, what is the precise sense and latitude, in which the words to establish justice,' as here used, are to be understood? The answer to this question will result from the provisions made in the constitution, on this head. They are specified in the second section of the third article, where it is ordained, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to ten descriptions of cases, viz. First, To all cases arising under this constitution; because the meaning, construction, and operation of a compact, ought always to be ascertained by all the parties, or by authority derived only from one of them. Second, To all cases arising under the laws of the United States; because, as such laws constitutionally made, are obligatory on each state, the measure of obligation and obedience ought not to be decided and fixed by the party, from whom they are due, but by a tribunal deriving authority from both the parties. Third, To all cases arising under treaties made by their authority; because, as treaties are compacts made by, and obligatory on, the whole nation, their operation ought not to be affected or regulated by the local laws or courts of a part of the nation. Fourth, To all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls; because, as these are officers of foreign nations, whom this nation are bound to protect and treat according to the laws of nations, cases affecting them ought only to be cognizable by national authority. Fifth, To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, because as the seas are the joint property of nations, whose right and privileges relative thereto, are regulated by the law of nations and treaties, such cases necessarily belong to national jurisdiction. Sixth, To controversies to which the United States shall be a party; because, in cases in which the whole people are interest-ed, it would not be equal or wise, to let any one state decide and measure out the justice due to others. Seventh, To con

troversies between two or more states; because, domestic tranquillity requires, that the contentions of states should be peaceably terminated by a common judicatory; and, because, in a free country, justice ought not to depend on the WILL of either of the litigants. Eighth, To controversies between a state and citizens of another state; because in case a state, that is all the citizens of it, has demands against some citizens of another state, it is better that she should prosecute their demands in a national court, than in a court of the state to which those citizens belong; the danger of irritation and criminations arising from apprehensions and suspicions of partiality being thereby obviated. Because, in cases where some citizens of one state, have demands against all the citizens of another state, the cause of liberty and the rights of men forbid, that the latter should be the sole judges of the justice due to the latter; and true republican government requires, that free and equal citizens should have free, fair, and equal justice.* Ninth, To controversies between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states; because, as the rights of the two states to grant the land, are drawn into question, neither of the two states ought to decide the controversy. Tenth, To controversies between a state, or the citizens thereof; and foreign states, citizens or subjects; because, as every nation is responsible for the conduct of its citizens towards other nations ; all questions touching the justice due to foreign nations, or people, ought to be ascertained by, and depend on national authority.****

* This last clause refers to the ground of the particular point decided in the case, Chisholm v. Georgia, viz., that under the constitution a state might be sued by a citizen of another state. In consequence of this decision the eleventh amendment to the constitution was made.

CHAPTER IV.

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Of the Powers delegated to the State Governments, by the people of each State respectively.

As the people of the several states have formed a political union by the federal constitution, for the purpose of providing for the general welfare of all; and, for the more effectual attainment of this object, have agreed upon a frame of government for the United States, thus constituting themselves to a certain extent a consolidated empire or government; in the same manner, the people of each of the states in the union, have formed a social compact with each other, and have agreed to adopt a state government, for the purpose of providing for the safety and happiness of each and of all the inhabitants, residing within their respective territories. The general government has the care and control of all the external relations of all the states collectively, as one great nation; the state governments have the regulation of the internal affairs of their respective states, and it is their duty to provide for the domestic safety and tranquillity of each citizen. The former protects the whole nation, and every state or constituent part, from the hostile aggression of foreign enemies, and all other political dangers, arising either from external or internal causes; the latter regulates the social intercourse of private individuals with each other in all the various relations of society, and furnishes as far as is practicable, a protection against private violence, fraud or other injustice. As the former depends upon the will or assent of the whole people of all the states in the Union; so each of the latter depends upon the will or assent of all the people of each state, collectively. As the national compact of the United States is contained in the federal constitution; so the social compact of the people of each state, is contained in their state constitution, respectively. For the more clear illustration of this doctrine, an example may be taken, viz: The people of the state of Massachusetts have made a social compact with each other, in their state constitution, for the