character, to bow their necks before him with servile fear; yet, after all, were thrust out of parliament by him with the utmost scorn and contempt.

What massacres followed the decapitation of the mild and benevolent Louis XVI? What a succession of demons afterwards controlled the public affairs of France, who, deluding the infatuated people with the ceaseless, false and senseless outcry and jargon of liberty, equality, the rights of man, tyranny, priestcraft, aristocrat, democrat, citizen and patriot, never hesitated to violate every precept of religion, every moral duty, and every feeling of humanity, and carried their extravagance to the height of the most blasphemous impiety. Were the horrors, which thus succeeded to the overthrow of this established government, a judgment from heaven, or were they merely the natural consequences, which may always be expected to flow from the prevalence of anarchy, atheism, and unbounded licentiousness? Certainly, no tyranny can occasion such evils, as an intoxication of the intellect, arising from an influx of false principles on the subject of religion, morals and philosophy.

Well-disposed men therefore will hesitate long, before they join in any attempt to overthrow or revolutionize their government, under any pretext whatever. It is true the people may be unanimous in subverting their government, and yet afterwards, they may not be able to agree in forming a new one, and, if so, they will be in a much worse condition, than they were in, under that which they have rejected; because, to destroy is not the same as to reform. Will it not be worse than living under any regular government, to remain in a state of anarchy and confusion, until the different parties and factions, are reduced by battles, massacres and assassinations, under one ; and another government is established by force or fraud, ten times more arbitrary and despotic than that which they have been induced to overturn? For, in many cases, revolutions do not result so much from a sense of intolerable oppression, as from a fondness for an idol-a golden calf—a false god-an imaginary degree of liberty, which, if it were real, the frailty, perverseness and folly of mankind, to say nothing of their wickedness, injustice and depravity, wholly disqualify them from enjoying.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Social Compact of the Citizens of the different States in the American Union, in the formation of the General Constitution, taken in connexion with the real or supposed compact of the citizens of each State, in the formation of its own Constitution or State Government.

In order to form distinct ideas on the subject of the present chapter, it will be necessary to consider the situation of the thirteen states which first adopted the general constitution, immediately previous to that important transaction. From the year A. D. 1776, when Congress declared the colonies free and independent states, the war with Great Britain was carried on under articles of confederation, the powers conferred on the Provincial Congress, by which, may be considered as constituting the first general government of these territories or provinces. The project of a union, however, seems first to have been suggested some twenty or thirty years previous, by commissioners appointed by the colonies, at the call of the crown. These commissioners met at Albany, in July, 1754, and as among them, were found such discordant materials, as Governor Hutchinson, Governor Pownall, and Dr Franklin, entertaining political opinions so very different,-it might be a matter of curiosity to examine thoroughly a plan of government which is principally ascribed to Dr Franklin, and to which, it appears, the others agreed. It must suffice however, to observe, that the general government was to unite the colonies of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, and be administered by a President General, to be appointed by the crown; and a grand council, to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several colonies, met in their respective assemblies. The assent of the President, who constituted the

executive, was requisite to all acts of the grand council; the members of which were to be chosen every three years. The general government was to have power to make treaties with the Indians, &c.; raise and pay soldiers, and equip vessels, &c.; to make laws, to lay and levy general duties, imposts and taxes. Each colony was to retain its own constitution, except so far as it might be altered by the act of parliament, which should establish the general constitution; that is, so far as they were inconsistent with the general constitution. Any colony however, was to be at liberty to defend itself on sudden emergencies. This project, though agreed to by Pownall and Hutchinson, was rejected in England.

To return; the government established by the articles of confederation, though it carried the country through the arduous conflict with so powerful a country as Great Britain, yet would hardly have been sufficient to do so, if the sense of common danger, as well as an enthusiastic ardor in pursuit of what they esteemed their natural rights and liberties, had not sustained the people. These powerful motives supplied what was wanting through the inefficiency of this system, and without their aid, the struggle for independence would have been weak and unsuccessful. But the hurry of arms, and the uncertainty of the final result of the conflict, rendered it impossible, while the suspense lasted, to remedy the evils and defects of this system of confederation, though they were most sensibly felt; since Congress were not able to bring into the field, or to sustain while there, so much of the strength of the country, as its extreme exigencies frequently required. The desperate struggle might not have been of so long continuance, if the provincial congress had been able to enforce its requisitions, instead of being obliged to rely on the provinces or states, for that purpose.

After the termination of the war, which was brought to a successful close in 1783, by a treaty with Great Britain, acknowledging the independence of the United States, and the bond which connected them with that country was severed, the states were left in a state of nature, and consequently were at liberty to assume whatever relations towards each other, they thought expedient, or could agree upon. It is

true, they were at that time associated or allied together by the articles of confederation, and whatever duties or obligations they had assumed upon themselves by virtue of those articles, were still binding. Yet, as those articles were generally admitted to be insufficient for the purposes for which they were adopted, and it was proposed, if practicable, to frame a government less liable to this objection, the articles of confederation may be wholly overlooked, so far as the subject of this chapter is concerned.

The relation which the several states had to each other at that time, being thus settled, it remains to consider, what relation the citizens of each state had to their own state governments and towards each other, when the federal constitution was adopted. This is sufficiently evident. Because, as soon as the connexion of the provinces or states, with the British government was completely dissolved, by the treaty of 1783, acknowledging their independence, the authority of the several state governments, over their respective citizens, was either the result of an express compact by the people of each state for the formation of a state government; or, without any such express compact, derived its sanction, in part, from long previous usage under the colonial or provincial government; and, as to the rest, though in some few instances it might seem to be founded on a temporary assumption of power, arising from the extreme urgency of the case, yet was immediately ratified by the approbation of the people, or sanctioned by their peaceable and ready acquiescence. For, the state constitutions were adopted by the people of the respective states at different periods of time. Some, while the revolution was going on; some after the termination of the war; and some but lately. Some of these, therefore, must be considered as being governed, from the time of the declaration of independence to the formation and adoption of constitutions by the conventions of their respective states, by rulers chosen under a temporary government, grounded merely on a supposed or implied compact, to conform to the usages adopted while under the colonial government, as far as was consistent with the change of condition and circumstances; because the colonial government was dissolved, and yet no other had been expressly agreed

upon; and the colonial government being abolished, there remained no authority for any other, except such as must be inferred from the acquiescence of the people.

If, at this critical time, therefore, any acts should appear to be done by the rulers, beyond their express authority, in order to insure the public safety merely; yet the urgency of the occasion, the danger of delay in order to obtain the express concurrence of the people, and the fair intentions of the rulers, seem to furnish a sufficient excuse. For, it cannot be doubted, that in cases of extremity, where there is not time to wait for express instructions, the rulers having it in their power to do certain acts, which they think necessary to preserve the citizens, though such acts are not strictly within the scope of any powers expressly delegated to them, will do well to assume this responsibility. And though such acts, if performed by the rulers from motives of personal aggrandizement, or other considerations merely selfish, would have deserved the severest censure and animadversion, as consisting in a tyrannical usurpation of power; yet, when actuated by a regard for the general welfare alone, the rulers have resorted to them from a want of any other safe resource, they become highly praiseworthy. It is true, if such acts are thought inexpedient by the people, and as so, are rejected by them, they will not be binding upon any one; yet, until so rejected, they may be considered as sanctioned by the tacit acquiescence of the citizens; and if they are adopted or expressly approved of by the people, they become as effectual as if authorized by them in the first instance.

By a reference to the state constitutions, it will immediately appear, that though the powers delegated in them by the people of each state, vary in extent and duration; yet they are all republican in their form, consisting of a legislative body, variously divided, an executive or chief magistrate, and a judiciary. These for the most part are independent of each other; and, with the exception of the judiciary, depend on popular suffrage for their offices. In some states, however, the judges also are elected by the people.

It does not, however, come within the limits of this work to enter into any particular detail, as to the forms of the various