pose, conditions and exact forfeitures (State, Lantz, Prosecutor, v. Hightstown, supra; Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 345, note 4, and cases cited); and the authority of the board as a governmental agent is commensurate with the provisions of the statute clothing it with this power. Abbott v. Frost, 185 Mass. 398, 400, 70 N. E. 478. A licensee should not be subjected to the uncertainties that constantly would arise if unauthorized limitations, of which he can have no knowledge, are subsequently and without notice to be read into his license at might be exercised. In any instance, if the | Com. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562, 48 Am. Dec. granting of a license would be detrimental 679; Cambridge v. Munroe, 126 Mass. 496, to the public health, or contrary to regula- 502; Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 383, tions already established, then it would not 2 L. R. A. 142, 12 Am. St. Rep. 566, 19 N. E. be issued. If the statute had given to the 224. It is the legislature alone that priboards of health of cities a general author-marily can impose, or give authority to imity similar to that conferred by Pub. Stat. 1882, chap. 80, § 10, it might be that they lawfully could make the violation of their regulations a sufficient ground for revoking the privilege, and could issue it upon such a condition. Young v. Blaisdell, supra; Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 677, 678, 32 L. R. A. 116, 55 Am. St. Rep. 472, 64 N. W. 29. At least, it could be said that the licensee then would take it subject to this reservation; and, having agreed to its terms, no injustice would be done by a subsequent cancelation. Generally, under statutes regulating the conduct of certain kinds of employment or of business which require the protection of a license before they can be lawfully prosecuted, the penalty of forfeit ure is dealt with either by conferring express authority to revoke for violations upon the licensing board or some other tribunal, or else a general power is delegated, under which such a clause may be inserted in the license itself. Rev. Laws, chap. 100, §§ 15, 47, 89, chap. 102, §§ 9, 28, 29, 33, 58, 72; Grand Rapids v. Braudy, supra. Upon application for permission to erect a stable, which, in the absence of a restricting statute, would be a legitimate improvement in the enjoyment of his property, the applicant is entitled to know the full measure of im munity that can be granted to him before making the expenditure of money required to carry out his purpose. A resort to the general laws relating to the subject, or to ordinances or regulations made pursuant to them, should furnish him with the required information. When this has been obtained, he has a right to infer that he can safely act, with the assurance that, so long as he complies with the requirements under which it is proposed to grant the privilege, he has a constitutional claim to protection, until the legislature further restricts, or entirely abolishes, the right bestowed. Com. v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; Com. v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578, 579; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 20, 21; Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 444; State, Lantz, Prosecutor, v. Hightstown, 46 N. J. L. 102, 107; Grand Rapids v. Braudy, supra. Independently of this statute, while the board of health, under Pub. Stat. 1882, chap 80, §§ 8, 12, after a hearing and on proper evidence, might have adjudged the defendant's building, when erected and occupied as a stable, detrimental to the public health. and therefore a nuisance, it had no jurisdiction to issue a license to him permitting and regulating such use except as authorized. the pleasure of the licensing board. Besides, all reasonable police regulations, enacted for the preservation of the public health or morality, where a penalty is provided for their violation, while they may limit or prevent the use or enjoyment of property except under certain restrictions, and are constitutional, create statutory misdemeanors, which are not to be extended by implication. Com. v. Beck, 187 Mass. 15, 72 N. E. 357. The license issued to the defendant contained no limit of time for its exercise, nor was it made subject to an existing regulation which so provided. It stated that permission was given to keep eight horses, and purported to and did set out in full the statute under which it was granted, but contained no further recitals. Thus, neither by its terms, nor by the statute itself, was it made revocable; nor does it appear that any regulations had been adopted or promulgated the violation of which would cause a forfeiture. Originally it may have been improvidently issued, but upon being informed that citizens in the vicinity of the defendant's premises objected to the erection of the building for its proposed use, it was not within the power of the board of health, even after a hearing, in the absence of authority conferred upon them by legislative sanction, to deprive him of the privilege they had unreservedly granted. Com. v. Moylan, 119 Mass. 109, 111; Com. v. Kinsley, supra; New York v. Third Ave. R. Co. 33 N. Y. 42; Shuman v. Ft. Wayne, 127 Ind. 109, 11 L. R. A. 378, 26 N. E. 560; Hirn v. State; Grand Rapids v. Braudy; and State, Lantz, Prosecutor, v. Hightstown, supra. In the opinion of a majority of the court, the decree must be reversed, and a decree entered dismissing the bill, with costs. So ordered. 1. Dower-renunciation—right of widow. The renunciation, by the widow, of the provision made for her in her husband's will, entitles her to her share of the estate after the debts are paid from the entire estate, under a statute providing that she shall be entitled to such part of the estate as she would have been entitled to if he had died intestate; and it does not make only Case Note. In determining whether specific legacies must be wholly applied to the payment of the testator's debts before resorting to lands specifically devised, the intent of the testator, where it can be ascertained, must govern. As is said by Chief Justice Marshall, in Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346, 7 L. ed. 701: "The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills; and, if that intent can be clearly perceived, and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it must prevail." An intention that devisees and legatees shall contribute ratably to the payment of debts has been held to exist where the testator makes the debts a charge upon his real, as well as his personal, estate, or upon his estate generally; as is the case where he commences his will with a direction to pay debts. Shreve v. Shreve, 10 N. J. Eq. 385; Brant v. Brant, 40 Mo. 266. Contra, as to the latter portion of the foregoing statement, Miller v. Cooch, 5 Del. Ch. 161. But, where the property not specifically disposed of, or expressly devoted to the payment of debts, proves inadequate, a case arises where the intention of the testator ceases to be a guide, since a situation presents itself which was manifestly not within his contemplation. Whether, in such a case, specific devises should contribute, along with specific legacies, to make up the deficiency, is a question on which there is some conflict of authority. Those cases which are in accord with GORDON V. JAMES (for some of which, see citations therein) rest their decisions on the general rule that the personal estate is the primary fund for the payment of debts. See Shaw v. McBride, 56 N. C. (3 Jones, Eq.) 173; Baptist Female University v. Borden, 132 N. C. 476, 44 S. E. 47; Shreve v. Shreve, supra. A contrary conclusion has been reached in a number of cases, among which are Maybury v. Grady, 67 Ala. 147, in which the authorities are elaborately reviewed, and Manlove v. Gaut, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 410, in which it is said: "While the rule of law is general, that personalty must be subjected before realty, it is clearly, also, a rule of law that the testator may, if he choose, entirely exonerate the personalty, and subject the realty by the terms of his will. So, at the property going to her intestate, so as to throw the entire debts upon it. 2. Same-right to land. A statutory provision that, in case a widow renounces the provision made for her in her husband's will, she may have the difference between her separate estate and what she would be entitled to in case of intestacy made up to her notwithstanding the will, does not deprive her of her rights in the separate parcels of property, and require her portion to be made up to her in money, where the further provision for the distribution of the estate declares that she shall have her lawful portions of the lands and her distributive share of the personalty. last, it is not so much a question of the application of the abstract rule of law above referred to, as an ascertainment of the testator's intention. That intention. as above stated, we think, is evidenced by his making specific bequests and specific devises. He, in this manner, indicates a purpose on his part that both should be exonerated from debts. When that becomes impossible because of a deficiency of assets, it does not seem logical that we should resort to the dry rule of law above referred to; but, on the contrary, it does seem that we should sustain the testator's intention as far as possible. This can only be done by subjecting the specific legacies and specific devises pro rata. this manner, the testator's purpose of exoneration is as little interfered with as possible. On the other hand, if the personalty covered by the specific bequest is wholly subjected to debts, the testator's purpose with regard thereto is entirely superseded. We are, therefore, of opinion that the specific devises and specific bequests should contribute pro rata.” In Another class of cases, reaching the same conclusion, is seemingly based on the equity principle that, where a person may resort to two funds, persons interested in the one to which he resorts may enforce contribution by the other. Of this class is Armstrong's Appeal, 63 Pa. 312, in which the court says: "It was settled in England, by Long v. Short, 1 P. Wms. 403, that specific devises of land and specific bequests of personalty must abate ratably in case of a deficiency of assets for the payment of the bond debts of the testator, because both lands and chattels were liable in law for those debts, and it was equally the intention of the testator that the legatee should have the chattel, and the devisee the land. 1 Roper, Legacies, 254. In this state, where lands have always been assets for the payment of debts by simple contract, as well as by specialty, the rule is general, that, wherever there is a deficiency of assets to pay both debts and legacies, specific devisees and specific legatees shall contribute proportionably." This principle is, of course, inapplicable in cases where, as in GORDON V. JAMES, the law requires an exhaustion of the personal, before resort to the real, assets. 3. Decedent's estate-crops as assets. lees. Messrs. Barnett & Perrin and Noel, PepCrops on the land at the time of the own-per, & Elmore for appellants. er's death are assets for payment of debts, Messrs. Campbell & Campbell for appelunder a statute directing the executor to sell for cash such crops, and account for the proceeds as assets, notwithstanding his will may imply that they shall belong to the devisee; nothing short of an express direction will avoid the application of the statute. 4. Same-testamentary direction. A testamentary direction as to the disposition of crops growing on the land in case testator's death shall occur within a specified year will cease to have any effect at the expiration of the year; and after that time the matter will be governed by the statute. 5. Same dividends on securities. Dividends on stocks and bonds, declared after the death of the owner, belong to the specific devisee of the stocks and bonds, and are not assets for the payment of the debts of the estate, in the absence of statutory direction to the contrary. 6. Same-contribution toward debts. Specific devises of land do not share with specific bequests of personalty, in contribution towards payment of the debts of the estate, where the statutes plainly indicate that the land is to stand charged only for such debts as the personalty may not be sufficient to pay. 7. Dower-renunciation-right of specific devisee of land. A devisee of land, who, before the renunciation by the widow of the provisions of the will, has accepted the devise with the condition that he pay the encumbrance on the property, cannot compel the widow to share in the satisfaction of such encumbrance, but she will recover her share of the property free from the encumbrance; the doctrine of purchase for value not applying in favor of the devisee. A (July 24, 1905.) PPEAL by the executors of the will of D. A. James, deceased, from a decree of the Chancery Court for Yazoo County in a proceeding asking for the construction of the will and instructions as to distribution of the assets. Modified. In addition to the facts set out in the opinion, it appeared that a provision of the will devised a plantation to T. W. James, "with the distinct understanding that the said T. W. James is to pay and assume any and all indebtedness due by me on account of purchase money of said place." This indebtedness was assumed by the devisee before the widow renounced the will, and he contended that that constituted him a purchaser for value of the plantation, so that the widow was not entitled to share in the portion so purchased. Further facts appear in the opinion. Truly, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is a proceeding instituted by appellants, as executors of the last will and testament of D. A. James, seeking a construction of that testament, and asking instructions from the chancery court as to the proper method to be adopted in distributing the assets of the estate. All devisees and legatees, and other parties in interest, were cited, and duly appeared as parties defend ant. or more The facts which rendered the action of the executors advisable and seemingly nec essary are these: D. A. James, the testator, died on the 14th day of December, 1903, leaving a last will and testament, in which the appellants herein were nominated as executors. James left surviving him a widow and an only child, an infant of tender years, born since the date of the execution of the testament, but dealt with and provided for in a codicil thereto. At the date of his death the testator was seised and possessed of a large estate, consisting of three valuable plantations stocked with farming implements and work stock, one houses and lots, about 1,500 bales of cotton, a large amount of insurance on his life, stock in several banks and in many other enterprises, interests in mercantile estab lishments, jewelry, and other personalty. All of his property, without exception, was dealt with by the will, there being a general residuary clause. Most of it, and all of the more valuable portion, was either specifically devised or the subject of specific or demonstrative legacies. The will, executed over three years before the death of the testator, made no adequate provision for the payment of the debts. Hence, in entering upon the administration of the estate, it was evident to the executors that the property not specifically devised or bequeathed would be insufficient to pay in full the debts due by the testator. The widow, being dissatisfiel with the provision made in her favor by the will in due time and in the manner pointed out by the statute, filed her formal renunciation of the will, and demanded the allotment of the portion granted her by the law. The agreed statement of facts admits that the separate estate of the widow did not amount in value to one fifth of what she would lawfully have been entitled to, anu, as there was only one child, she claimed to be entitled to a one-half interest in the real and personal estate of her deceased husband. Upon final hearing the chancellor sale for the satisfaction of the debts of the decedent before any of the property which has been disposed of by the testator can be devoted to that purpose. The argument is perfectly sound, but the existence of the rendered a decree giving specific directions of partial intestacy, primarily subject to with regard to the distribution of the estate. Some of the provisions of the decree are not excepted to, and we will recite only such portions as are directly challenged by this appeal, and shall deal with them, not in the order of their presentation, but accord-premises is erroneously assumed. Section ing to the magnitude of the property interests and the importance of the legal principle involved. The first ground of error which we shall consider arises from the second paragraph of the decree, which is as follows: "Second. It appearing that Mrs. Carrie W. James, the widow of said D. A. James, deceased, had renounced the provisions made for her under said will, and that the separate estate of said Carrie W. James was less than one fifth of what her legal portion of the estate of said D. A. James, deceased, would amount to, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said Carrie W. James be, and she is, entitled to receive one half of said estate after the payment of the debts and costs aforesaid, and said executors be, and they are hereby, ordered to turn the same over to said Carrie W. James in kind so far as the same can be done." The facts disclosed by the record upon which this portion of the decree is based are uncontradicted. The widow, in pursuance of the provisions of § 4496 of the Revised Code of 1892, within six months of the probating of the will filed her renunciation thereof in the form indicated by the statute. It is admitted that the entire separate estate owned by the widow, which consisted exclusively of portions of the proceeds of certain insurance policies upon the life of her husband, taken out by him for her benefit, and collected by her after his death, and therefore, under the decision of this court in Osburn v. Sims, 62 Miss. 429, constituting a portion of her separate property, amounted in value to less than one fifth of what she would be entitled to by law in her hus band's estate. It is conceded that D. A. James had only one child, and therefore the widow's lawful portion of her husband's property would be one half of the real and personal estate. It is contended by counsel for appellants that, inasmuch as the widow in this case renounced the provision made for her by the will of her husband, by operation of law her share of the property descends to her as heir, and coupled with all the burdens imposed by law as if her husband had died intestate as to this portion; and that the one half of the estate as to which the decedent died intestate is first liable to all the debts of the decedent, by operation of the general principle of law which renders property undisposed of by will, and which descends to the heir in cases And 4496 does not say, upon the renunciation of the will by the widow the decedent becomes "partially intestate," or "intestate as to a portion of his estate," but expressly recites that upon the filing of such renunciation the widow "shall be entitled to such part of his estate, real and personal, as she would have been entitled to if he had died intestate." If the decedent had died intestate in the instant case, and by operation of the statute quoted so he did, so far as regards the rights of his widow, the widow would have been entitled to one half of his real and personal estate under certain well-understood conditions and limitations. they are not difficult of understanding. Upon the death of an intestate the estate, both real and personal, stands charged with the debts of the decedent, the personal estate primarily; secondarily, when the personalty is exhausted, the real estate. After the payment of debts, an heir's lawful portion of the residue vests in the widow. This is the right of the appellee in this case. The widow's lawful portion of the residue under the facts of this record is an undivided one half. To adopt the argument of appellants that, by renouncing the provision made in the will, and demanding, in lieu thereof, her lawful portion in the estate of her husband, that thereby her share became chargeable with all of the debts of the decedent, might defeat the very end sought by the statute. In many instances, especially where the decedent leaves several children surviving him, the lawful portion of the widow in the estate would be entirely consumed in the payment of the debts due by the decedent, and thereby the widow either practically disinherited by the inadequate provision of the will, or absolutely so by having her portion devoted to the satisfaction of the creditors. Appellants endeavor to avoid the result of this consideration by the observation that it is not compulsory upon the widow to renounce the provision made for her, but that she is granted six months after the probating of the will to investigate the condition of the estate, and decide advisedly whether she will abide by the wish of her husband as expressed in his last will and testament, or, renouncing that, place herself under the protection of the law. Counsel evidently overlooked the fact that, while the renunciation is required to be made within six months after the probating of the will, debts due by the testator are not required to be registered or filed for probate until | law the decedent, so far as her rights are twelve months after publication for credi- concerned, becomes an intestate, and her tors; so that it might often be that an rights are fixed by the law, which would estate apparently solvent six months after control if he had died in a state of total the probate of the will would subsequently intestacy. Hence, after the debts are paid, be shown to be deeply involved, and thus she is entitled to her lawful portion in the the widow be left destitute through a mere residue of the estate, both real and personerror of business judgment into which she al, subject to the deduction which must be had been entrapped by a misleading appear- made therefrom, provided she owned at the ance of solvency. But a far weightier and date of the death, any separate property more potential consideration is that the exceeding in value one fifth of her lawful manifest intent of the legislature, as portion in her husband's entire estate. gleaned from all the statutory enactments In the instant case, Mrs. Carrie W. James, bearing on this question, shows beyond per- by her act of renunciation, became entitled adventure that this privilege of renunciation to a one-half interest in the real and perwas granted the widow so that she might sonal estate of her deceased husband as if be protected from possible injustice or mis- he had been an intestate. Therefore, when judgment, and her proportionate interest in all of the debts of the estate have been the residue of his estate not be at all de- fully paid, she will be entitled to her dispendent upon the whim or caprice of her tributive share of one half of all the resihusband. So, Rev. Code 1892, § 4497, pro- due of the personal property, and will bevides that, if the will of the husband or come a cotenant with each devisee, and own wife shall not make any provision for the a half interest in each and every parcel of other, the survivor shall have the right to real estate specifically devised by her deshare in the estate of the deceased husband eeased husband. The contention that Rev. or wife as in case of unsatisfactory provision Code, § 4499, by making use of the expresin the will; and in such case a renunciation sion that the widow may signify her disof the will shall not be necessary, but the sent to the will and "claim to have the defirights of the survivor shall be as if the will ciency made up to her, notwithstanding the had contained a provision that was unsatis- will," intends to convey the meaning that factory, and it had been renounced. In such this deficiency between the value of her sep. case, if the argument of counsel for appel- arate estate and her lawful portion in her lants were sound, by the simple device of husband's estate has to be "made up to her" omitting all mention of his wife in his will in money, and that to this extent she beany husband, if financially involved, could comes, not a tenant in common of the propeffectually disinherit his wife, or force her erty, but a creditor of the estate, is manilawful portion of his estate to assume the festly unsound. The contrary intention entire burden of his indebtedness. For this is plainly disclosed by the clause of the secreason, there being no provision made for tion immediately following, which announher, and no renunciation of the will under ces the rule whereby the court shall be govsuch circumstances being required (because erned in proceeding to make up the defithe law does not demand the doing of an ciency. That rule provides that she is to idle thing), when the wife made a demand have a certain proportion of her "lawful for her lawful share, and it was allotted to portion of the lands" and her "distributive her, it would be consumed in the payment share of the personalty;" such interest beof the debts, under the principle alreadying arrived at by a calculation based upon adverted to that it had not been dealt with, the relative value of her lawful portion of and was, therefore, liable to the debts of the decedent; thus bringing about, without the chance of escape or remedy by the disinherited wife, the very condition of affairs which the legislature wisely sought to prevent. We see nothing complex or involved in the beneficent legislative plan developed by the sections under review. It is this: The wife for whom in her husband's will an unsatisfactory provision is made, or for whom no provision is made, and who does not own separate property at the time of the death of her husband equal in value to what would be her lawful portion of her husband's real and personal estate, is at liberty to signify her dissent to the will; and, when she has done this, in the eyes of the the estate as compared with the previously ascertained value of her own separate property. This is the interpretation which has been placed upon similar provisions in other states in the few cases which our research has disclosed. In Doyle v. Doyle, 50 Ohio St. 330, 34 N. E. 166, the view which we have above announced, after full discussion, is approved, and the court in that case quotes from Hartshorne v. Ross, 2 Disney (Ohio) 15, where it is said: "If he [the husband] die intestate, there is manifest propriety that she [the widow] should receive a liberal allowance; and, should he devise his estate without providing as generously for his widow as did the statutes, she should have the option to abide by the will |