v. City of Ft. Madison, 30 Iowa, 542; Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa, 194; Ford v. Town of North Des Moines, 80 Iowa, 626, 45 N. W. 1031. The fact that property within municipal limits is subject to overflow does not exempt it from taxes for municipal purposes.

Brooks v. Polk County, 52 Iowa, 460; Taylor v. City of Waverly, 94 Iowa, 661, 63 N. W. 347; Evans v. City of Council Bluffs, 65 Iowa, 238; Tubbesing v. City of Burlington, 68 Iowa, 691. Under Iowa Laws 1876, c. 47, § 4, amended by laws of 1878, c. 169, a tract of land within the city limit used for agricultural purposes and also for the owner's residence is not taxable. Farwell v. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa, 286, 35 L. R. A. 63; Perkins v. City of Burlington, 77 Iowa, 553.

Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90, 77 N. W. 532. Land within the city limits occupied by lumber yards, pasture, etc., is not used for agricultural purposes within the law exempting such land from taxation for city purposes. Windsor v. Polk County, 109 Iowa, 156; Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570; Hurla v. Kansas City, 46 Kan. 738. Simms v. City of Paris, 8 Ky. L. R. 344, 1 S. W. 543. Land not used exclusively for farming when within the limits of a city is liable to taxation for municipal purposes. Maltus v. Shields, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 553. An unplatted tract of nine acres of land used for residences within the city limits will be subject to taxation for municipal pur

poses.

Torbett v. City of Louisville, 9 Ky. L. R. 202, 4 S. W. 345; Courtney v. City of Louisville, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 419. The court in this case held that in order to subject real property within the corporate limits of a town or city to taxation for ordinary municipal purposes, there must be benefits actual or presumed to such property derived from the municipal corporation.

City of Covington v. Arthur, 12 Ky. L. R. 163, 14 S. W. 121; Trustees of Elkton v. Gill, 14 Ky. L. R. 755, 21 S. W. 579; Briggs v. Town of Russellville, 18 Ky. L. R. 389, 36 S. W. 558; City of Pineville v. Creech, 16 Ky. L. R. 172, 26 S. W. 1101; City of Lebanon v. Bevill, 18 Ky. L. R. 924, 38 S. W. 872; Town of Latonia v. Hopkins, 20 Ky. L. R. 620, 42 S. W. 248. Although agricultural lands receive no benefit from corporate organization, they are still subject to taxation for municipal purposes.

(

Bell County Coke & Imp. Co. v. City of Pineville, 23 Ky. L. R. 933, 64 S. W. 525; City of Frankfort v. Gaines, 88 Ky. 59; Eifert v. Town of Central Covington, 91 Ky. 194; Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 90 Ky. 498; Stickley v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 93 Ky. 323; Briggs v. Town of Russellville, 99 Ky. 515, 34 L. R. A. 193; City of New Orleans v. Michoud, 10 La. Ann. 763; Groff v. City of Frederick, 44 Md. 67; Smith v. City of Saginaw, 81 Mich. 123; Baldwin v. City of Hastings, 83 Mich. 639; Adams v.

Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 75 Miss. 275; Adams v. Mississippi State Bank, 75 Miss. 701.

Giboney v. City of Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141. An extension to the city limits is not necessarily illegal because it operates to subject to municipal taxes farm property. City of Stanberry v. Jordan, 145 Mo. 371; Bradshaw v. City of Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Gottschalk v. Becher, 32 Neb. 653. Where suburban property is annexed to municipal organization under Comp. St. Neb. 1891, c. 14, § 95, it is exempt from taxation. Lancaster County v. Rush, 35 Neb. 119; Sage v. City of Plattsmouth, 48 Neb. 558; McClay v. City of Lincoln, 32 Neb. 412, 49 N. W. 282. Rev. St. Neb. 1866, c. 53, § 1, authorizes the taxation of unplatted lands within the city limits. Bailey v. Brown, 53 N. J. Law, 162, following Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570.

Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170. Lands embraced within the borders of a city and used only for farming purposes may be taxed for municipal objects from which the lands do not receive any protection or derive any benefit. Appeal of Hewitt, 88 Pa. 55; City of Erie v. Reed's Ex'rs, 113 Pa. 468. The final determination of whether real estate is within the limits of a city is rural and capable of receiving the benefits of street lighting, paving and other improvements, is left under act of February 25, 1870 (P. L. 242) to the council of the city of Erie. Their decision is conclusive unless this discretion is abused.

Carriger v. City of Morristown, 69 Tenn. (1 Lea) 116; Lum v. City of

Bowie (Tex.) 18 S. W. 142. Suburban land annexed without the consent of the owner residing upon it is not subject to taxation for municipal purposes and an injunction will lie to restrain city taxes as levied. Norris v. City of Waco, 57 Tex. 635; Cook v. Crandall, 7 Utah, 344; Ellison v. Linford, 7 Utah, 166. Where farming land within the corporate limits will derive no benefit from the expenditure of taxes raised for municipal purposes, it is not subject to such taxation.

Land

pur

Kaysville City v. Ellison, 18 Utah, 163, 55 Pac. 386, 43 L. R. A. 81; Ferguson v. City of Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 24 L. R. A. 795. used solely for agricultural poses may be included within the limits of a municipal corporation and under act of March 27, 1890 (page 131) which provides for the incorporation, government and classification of such corporations, it is subject to general municipal taxation.

Frace v. City of Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69. It is not necessary that lands should receive the benefits of municipal organization to render a tax for such purposes valid. Powell v. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698. Under West Va. Act of 1875, c. 54, §§ 101 and 103, outlying farming lands within the city limits can be taxed as city lands.

Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. The legislature has the power to annex farming lands to a city and subject them to the burden of taxation for municipal purposes. Davis v. Town of Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289.

100 See, also, authorities cited in the following note as sustaining the right to compel by mandamus a levy of taxes. The President v. City of Elizabeth, 40 Fed. 799; Vickrey v. Sioux City, 104 Fed. 164; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dill. 130, Fed. Cas. No. 17,372. Where a municipal corporation refuses to levy a tax to pay a judgment or to elect officers whose duty it is to levy such taxes, a circuit court of the United States may appoint its marshal a special commissioner to assess, levy and collect the requisite tax.

Wells v. Cole, 27 Ark. 603; Meyer v. Brown, 65 Cal. 583; People v. Lake County Com'rs, 12 Colo. 89; Jones v. State, 17 Fla. 411. All prior proceedings must have been properly performed before mandamus will lie. State v. City of New Orleans, 42 La. Ann. 92; Attorney General v. City of Salem, 103 Mass. 138; Jarvis V. Warren County Sup'rs, 49 Miss. 603. A petition for mandamus to compel the levy of a tax that fails to state the particular district for the benefit for which this tax was levied is insufficient.

Musgrove v. Vicksburg & N. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677. Where certain subordinate officials refuse or neglect to levy a tax, Miss. Act of March 15, 1872 (p. 102) empowers

the county auditor to perform their duties in this respect.

State v. Paddock, 36 Neb. 263, 54 N. W. 515. In this case the court writing the syllabus says: "South Omaha as shown by the census of 1890, is a city of the second class, having more than 8,000 and less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and not a city of the first class. The school board of South Omaha on the 6th day of June, 1892, made an estimate of the amount of school tax to be levied in said city for that year. This estimate was imperfect in its statements and details. The defendants held the same until July 14, 1892, when they refused to levy the tax. Afterwards proceedings in mandamus were instituted and the court rendered judgment for the defendants. Corrected estimates were then filed. Held, that such estimates related back to June 6 of that year, and that it was the duty of the defendants to levy the tax." Davis v. Simpson, 25 Nev. 123, 58 Pac. 146; Joint Free High School Dist. v. Town of Green Grove, 77 Wis. 532. See, also, Cooley, Taxation, pp. 734 et seq., for a full discussion of the question and the many authorities there cited.

101 Butz v. City of Muscatine, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 575; Carroll County

Orleans, 98 U. S. 381; Ex parte Parsons, 1 Hughes, 282, Fed. Cas. No. Sup'rs v. United States, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 71; Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 655; Barkley v. 769; United States v. City of New States v. County of Clark, 95 U. S. Levee Com'rs, 93 U. S. 258; United 10,774; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dill. 130, Fed. Cas. No. 17,372; Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 Dill. 522, Fed. Cas. No. 16,538; Britton v. Platte City, 2 Dill. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 1,907; Com. v. Select & Common Councils of Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. 496; Com. v. Allegheny Com'rs, 37 Pa.

277.

102 People v. Stockton & C. R. Co., 49 Cal. 414; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 174 Ill. 80; City of Indianapolis v. Morris, 25 Ind. App. 409, 58 N. E. 510; City of Owensboro v. Callaghan, 13 Ky. L. R. 418, 17 S. W. 278; Halleck v. Inhabitants of Boylston, 117 Mass. 469, construing Mass. St. 1870, c. 196, § 3; Koontz v. Burgess & Com'rs of Hancock, 64 Md. 134.

Auditor General v. McArthur, 87 Mich. 457. A school tax affecting a portion only of the taxable property within the school district is void. Lockey v. Walker, 12 Mont. 577. Under Const. art. 12, §§ 4, 5, 11, municipal authorities are vested with a discretionary power in the determination of the property assessment, the basis of taxation. Stephens v. School Dist. No. 21, 6

Or. 353. The assessment of property for school taxes should be determined upon the same general principles governing the making and the assessments for general taxes. San Antonio St. R. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 341. Construing San Antonio city charter, § 194, as limited by Const. art. 8, §§ 5 and 11, relating to the taxation of railroad property. Eustis v. City of Henrietta, 90 Tex. 468, 39 S. W. 567; Bigelow v. Town of Washburn, 98 Wis. 553, 74 N. W. 362; Hixon v. Oneida County, 82 Wis. 515.

103 Murphy v. Harbison, 29 Ark. 340; Holland v. Davies, 36 Ark. 446. In the absence of a showing of an injury, a school district tax not held invalid because the polls were closed before the time fixed by law. Rogers v. Kerr, 42 Ark. 100. The vote should be for a specified amount. Cooper v. Miller, 113 Cal. 238, 45 Pac. 325; Prowers County Com'rs v. Pueblo & A. V. R. Co., 3 Colo. App. 398, 33 Pac. 682; Pickett v. Russell, 42 Fla. 116, 634, 28 So. 764; Ayers v. McCalla, 95 Ga. 555, 22 S. E. 295; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 174 Ill. 80. A vote based upon a vote of the people and other preliminary proceedings is presumed valid.

Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 184 Ill. 240; Houston v. Clay County, 18 Ind. 396; Locker v. Keiler, 110 Iowa, 707, 80 N. W. 433; Mac

§ 316. Agency of tax levy.

Kenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. Ann. 944; Longyear v. Auditor General, 72 Mich. 415, 40 N. W. 738; Gamble v. Auditor General, 78 Mich. 302, 44 N. W. 329, and Newaygo County Mfg. Co. v. Echtinaw, 81 Mich. 416, 45 N. W. 1010, hold that upon a failure of the electors to levy the taxes needed, under How. St. of Mich. § 750, a town board has authority to act and raise the necessary amount.

Tillotson v. Webber, 96 Mich. 144, 55 N. W. 837; Williams v. Mears, 61 Mich. 86. The vote of electors to levy a tax can only be proved by official records. Auditor General v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co., 116 Mich. 122, 74 N. W. 505; Auditor General v. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574, 74 N. W. 881. When electors "neglect or refuse" to vote money to defray township expenses under public laws of Michigan, the town board are authorized to act in this respect. Thayer Lumber Co. v. Springfield Tp., 131 Mich. 12, 90 N. W. 677; Taft v. Barrett, 58 N. H. 447; Vail v. Bentley, 23 N. J. Law (3 Zab.) 532; Canda Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Woodbridge Tp., 58 N. J. Law, 134, 32 Atl. 66; Apgar v. Van Syckel, 46 N. J. Law, 492. Meetings for such purpose must be regularly called.

Haley v. Whitney, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 119; Vaughn v. School Dist. No. 31, 27 Or. 57, 39 Pac. 393; Mowry v. Mowry, 20 R. I. 74, 37 Atl. 306; Martin v. School Dist. of Laurens, 57 S. C. 125. A taxpayer attending and taking part in the proceedings of such an election is estopped to deny its legality. Rhomberg v. McLaren, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 21 S. W.

571; Miller v. Crawford Independent School Dist., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 495, 63 S. W. 894; Adams v. Sleeper, 64 Vt. 544; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 271.

104 Purcell v. Town of Bear Creek, 138 Ill. 524, 28 N. E. 1085, affirming 39 Ill. App. 499; Bebb v. People, 172 Ill. 376. County Com'rs under Rev. St. of 1893, c. 139, have power to assess and collect town taxes. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 174 Ill. 80. The signatures of a majority of the highway commissioners to a road tax list is sufficient to sustain its legality. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 183 Ill. 247; Southern Warehouse & Transfer Co. v. Mechanics' Trust Co., 21 Ky. L. R. 1734, 56 S. W. 162. It is not necessary that the tax board should be one de jure. Connelly v. Trego County Com'rs, 64 Kan. 168, 67 Pac. 453; Hall v. Anne Arundel County Com'rs, 94 Md. 282, 51 Atl. 86; Mills v. Richland Tp., 72 Mich. 100; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Ullman, 137 Mo. 543; Hutchinson v. City of Omaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218; State v. Aitken, 62 Neb. 428, 87 N. W. 153; Hayes v. Hanson, 12 N. H. 284.

Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Ass'n v. Lloyd, 25 Misc. 207, 55 N. Y. Supp. 108. The authority of taxing officials is confined to the territory within their jurisdiction. State v. Woodside, 30 N. C. (8 Ired.) 104. A majority of an official body acting at an official meeting may levy local taxes. Board of Education of Ogden v. Brown, 12 Utah, 251, 42 Pac. 1109.