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Dissenting Opinion: Shiras, J., Fuller, C.J., McKenna, J.

not be resorted to as ratifying the objectionable clause, irrespective of the inability to ratify that which could not have been originally authorized."

In Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, this court held invalid a statute of the State of Minnesota, which made it a matter of fine or imprisonment for any one to sell any fresh beef, mutton, lamb or pork which had not been inspected in a manner prescribed in the act. Referring to the contention, in behalf of the State, that there was no discrimination against the products and business of other States for the reason that the statute requiring an inspection of animals on the hoof, as a condition for the privilege of selling in the State, was applicable alike to all owners of such animals, whether citizens of Minnesota or citizens of other States, this court, through Mr. Justice Harlan, said: "To this we answer that a statute may, upon its face, apply equally to the people of all the States, and yet be a regulation of Interstate Commerce which a State may not establish. A burden imposed by a State upon Interstate Commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the States, including the people of the State enacting such statute. The people of Minnesota have as much right to protection against the enactments of that State, interfering with the freedom of commerce among the States, as have the people of other States. Although this statute is not avowedly, or in terms, directed against the bringing into Minnesota of the products of other States, its necessary effect is to burden or affect commerce with other States, as involved in the transportation into that State, for the purposes of sale there, of all fresh beef, veal, mutton or pork, however free from disease may have been the animals from which it was taken."

We did not find it necessary in Scott v. Donald to pass upon the validity of a scheme whereby a State should seek to establish itself as a trader in articles of commerce, and to punish as criminals all persons who should attempt to deal in such articles. Nor has the court seen fit to discuss that question in the present case. It may be that, if counned to articles of

Syllabus.

state production, such a scheme might not be open to objections on Federal grounds. But where a State proposes to create a monopoly in articles which its own legislation recognizes as proper subjects of manufacture, sale and use, and where those articles are a part of international and Interstate Commerce, it is, I submit, too plain to call for argument that such an attempt does not comport with that freedom of trade and commerce, to preserve which is one of the most important purposes of our Federal system.

If these views are sound, then the acts of South Carolina in question, in so far as they seek to prevent citizens of that State from importing for their own use wines and liquors, and to arbitrarily forbid, and not by reasonable regulations, control sales of such articles when imported, are void as an unconstitutional interference with Interstate Commerce.

I think the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.

I am authorized to state that the CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA concur in the views of this opinion.

VANCE v. W. A. VANDERCOOK COMPANY (No. 2).

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

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In determining from the face of a pleading whether the amount really in dispute is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court of the United States, it is settled that if from the nature of the case as stated in the pleadings there could not legally be a judgment for an amount necessary to the jurisdiction, jurisdiction cannot attach even though the damages be laid in the declaration at a larger sum.

The courts of South Carolina having held that in an action of trover consequential damages are not recoverable, and the damage claimed by the plaintiff below, in this case, omitting the consequential damages, being less than the sum necessary to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction of it, it follows that, on the face of the complaint, that court was without Jurisdiction over the action.

Statement of the Case.

THE appellee, a corporation of the State of California, began this action against the present plaintiffs in error, citizens of the State of South Carolina, averring the alleged wrongful seizure by the defendants Bahr and Scott, at a railroad depot in the city of Charleston, South Carolina, of packages of wines. and brandies, the property of the plaintiff. It was averred that at the time of the seizure the liquors were in the custody of a common carrier, under a shipment from San Francisco to the agent of the plaintiff at Charleston, who was to make delivery of each package to a particular individual, who, prior to the shipment, had given an order for the same. Averring that the defendant Vance had subsequently to the seizure, and with knowledge of its wrongful nature, received said packages into his custody, it was further alleged that demand had been made for the return of the property seized, that it was still detained, and that plaintiff was entitled to the immediate possession thereof. Judgment was prayed against the defendants for the recovery of possession of the packages or their value, alleged to be one thousand dollars, in case delivery could not be had, and for damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars. There was an allegation of special damage, to wit: "That by said malicious trespass of said defendants and their continuation in the wrongful detention of said sixty-eight packages of wine the plaintiff has been greatly injured in its lawful trade and business with the citizens and residents of the State of South Carolina to its great hurt and damage in the breaking up of such trade and commerce." Itemized lists of the packages were attached as exhibits to the complaint.

It was also alleged that the defendants claimed that the acts by them done were performed under the authority of a law of South Carolina designated as the dispensary law, and it was charged that the statute was void, 'because in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. It was moreover averred that the forcible seizure and carrying away of the packages and the detention thereof were done "knowingly, wrongfully, wilfully and maliciously, with intent to oppress and humiliate and intimidate this plaintiff, and make it afraid

Statement of the Case.

to rely upon the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the judicial power thereof, for its protection in those rights, privileges and immunities secured to the plaintiff by the Constitution and laws of the United States." It was also alleged that the defendants, by "the said malicious trespass and wrongful detainer," intended to deter and intimidate plaintiff and others from asserting their rights under the Constitution of the United States.

S. W. Vance filed a separate answer, while Bahr and Scott jointly answered. The respective answers set up that the court had no jurisdiction of the action; that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; that by the provisions of the dispensary law of South Carolina, approved March 6, 1896, the action could not be maintained against the defendants, for the reason that the acts complained of were by them performed in the discharge of duties imposed upon the defendants by the said law; and, if the action was maintainable, that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, in that the plaintiff sued for the recovery of the possession of personal property, and also for exemplary damages for the commission of a trespass in taking the same. It was denied that the seizures and detentions complained of were made with the intent to injure or oppress the complainant, and it was also denied that the property was of the value alleged in the complaint, or that the plaintiff had been damaged in the sum claimed. It was, further, specially averred that the packages were seized and detained because the liquors contained therein had not been inspected as required by the provision of an amendment to the dispensary law, adopted in 1897, and because of a failure to have attached to each package a certificate of inspection, as required by the statute.

By a stipulation in writing it was agreed that the issues of fact should be tried by the court without a jury. At the trial, as appears by a bill of exceptions allowed by the presiding judge, the court, on the request of counsel for the defendants, passed upon the matters of law heretofore referred to and also upon several propositions of law relied on by the defendants, that is, that the dispensary law was not in conflict with the

Opinion of the Court.

Constitution of the United States and was a valid exercise of the police power of the State, particularly by reason of the provisions of the act of Congress of 1890, known as the Wilson act. Each of these propositions of law was decided adversely to the defendants, and an exception was noted.

The facts found by the court were: "That the property described in the complaint is the property of the plaintiff, and that the value thereof is the sum of one thousand dollars, and that the damages to the plaintiff from the detention of the said property by the defendants is the sum of one thousand dollars." And, as matter of law, the court found "That the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendants for the recovery of the possession of the said property described in the complaint, or the sum of one thousand dollars-value of said property in case delivery thereof cannot be had, and for the further sum of one thousand dollars damages." Judg ment was entered in conformity with the findings. A writ of error having been allowed, the cause was brought to this court for review.

Mr. William A. Barker, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. J. P. Kennedy Bryan for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

Counsel for plaintiffs in error discuss in their brief the contentions that the Circuit Court erred in holding that it had jurisdiction of the action and that there was not a misjoinder of causes of action, and also assert that the court erred in refusing to hold that the dispensary law of South Carolina was a valid enactment.

We shall dispose of the case upon the jurisdictional question, as it is manifest that the amount of recovery to which the plaintiff was entitled, upon the construction put upon the complaint by its counsel and acted upon by the trial court, could not equal the sum of two thousand dollars.

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