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Decisions announced without Opinions.
Fifth Circuit. Denied May 9, 1898. Mr. J. Parker Kirlin for petitioner.
No. 656. UNITED STATES v. MORRISON & Son. Second Cir. cuit. Granted May 23, 1898. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General Richards for petitioner. Mr. Albert Comstock opposing
No. 657. UNITED STATES 2. WOLFF & Co. Second Circuit. Granted May 23, 1898. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General Richards for petitioner. Mr. Albert Comstock opposing
1. A collision between two vessels by the fault of one of them creates a
inaritime lien upon her for the damages to the other, which is to be
preferred, in admiralty, to a lien for previous supplies. The John G.
2. A lien upon a tug, for damages to her tow by negligent towage bring-
ing the tow into collision with a third vessel, is to be preferred, in
admiralty, to a lien for supplies previously furnished to the tug in her
home port. Ib.
3. I'nder the settled doctrine of this court, that the concurrent decisions
of two courts upon a question of fact will be followed unless shown
to be clearly erroneous, this court accepts as indisputable the finding
that the Carib Prince was unseaworthy at the time of the commence-
nient of the voyage in question in this case, by reason of the defect in
the tank referred to in its opinion. The Carib Prince, 655.
4. The condition of unseaworthiness so found to exist was not within the
exceptions contained in the bill of lading, and, under the other facts
disclosed by the record, the ship owner was liable for the damages
caused by the unseaworthy condition of his ship; and there is nothing
in the act of February 19, 1893, c. 105, 27 Stat. 445, cominonly knowu
as the Harter Act, which relieved him from that liability. Ib.
5. The provision in that act exempting owners or charterers froin loss :
resulting from “ faults or errors in navigation or in the management.
of the vessel,” and from certain other designated causes, in no way
implies that because the owner is thus exempted when he has been
duly diligent, the law has thereby also relieved him from the duty of
furnishing a seaworthy vessel. 16.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
Tennessee v. Union f Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, followed. Sawyer v.
See Criminal Law, 2;
Municipal CORPORATION, 7;
District ATTORNEY, 2; RAILROAD, 5;
Tax AND TAXATiox, 1, 2.
See ConstitutIONAL LAW, 6.
The appellant shipped, by a vessel belonging to the appellee, goods under
a bill of lading which contained the following stipulation : “ In accept-
ing this bill of lading, the shipper, owner and consignee of the goods
and the holder of the bill of lading agree to be bound by all of its
stipulations, exceptions and conditions as printed on the back hereof,
whether written or printed, as fully as if they were all signed by such
shipper, owner, consignee or holder.” Of these stipulations and con-
ditions, this court regards only the following as material: “1. It is also
mutually agreed that the carrier shall not be liable for gold, silver,
bullion, specie, documents, jewellery, pictures, embroideries, works of
art, silks, furs, china, porcelain, watches, clocks or for goods of any
description which are above the value of $100 per package, unless
bills of lading are signed therefor, with the value therein expressed,
and a special agreement is made." "I. Also, in case any part of the
goods cannot be found for delivery during the steamer's stay at the
port of destination, they are to be forwarded by first opportunity,
when found, at the company's expense, the steamer not to be held
liable for any claim for delay or otherwise." “14. This agreement is
made with reference to, and subject to the provisions of the U. S. car-
riers' act, approved February 13, 1893.” The goods were not delivered
at the port to which they were consigned, and were subsequently lost
at sea ou another vessel belonging to the appellee, on which they had
been placed without the appellant's knowledge. In a suit in admi-
ralty to recover their value, Held, (1) That as the negligence of the
company was clearly proven, there can be no doubt of its liability
under the act of February 13, 1893, c. 105, known as the “ Harter
Act;” (2) That the clause limiting the amount of the carriers' lia-
bility is to be construed as a statement that the carrier shall not be
liable to any amount for goods exceeding $100 per package; and
being so interpreted, that it is a clear attempt on the part of the car-
rier to exonerate itself from all responsibility for goods exceeding the
value of $100 per package, and as such is not only prohibited by the
Jlarter Act, but lield to be invalid in a series of cases in this court.
Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Co., 272.
1. The provision in the act of the legislature of New York of May 9, 1893,
c. 661, relating to the public health, as amended by the act of April
25, 1895, c. 398, that “any person who,
after conviction of a
felony, shall attempt to practise medicine, or shall so practise,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred and fifty dollars, or
imprisonment for six months for the first offence, and on conviction
of any subsequent offence, by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars, or imprisonment for not less than pne year, or by both fine
and imprisonment,” does not conflict with Article I, section 10, of the
Constitution of the United States which provides that “No State shall
pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law or law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts," when applied to a person who had been con-
victed of a felony prior to its enactment. Hawker v. New York, 189.
2. The provisions in section 241 of the constitution of Mississippi prescrib-
ing the qualifications for electors; in section 242, conferring upon the.
legislature power to enact laws to carry those provisions into effect;
in section 244, making ability to read any section of the constitution,
or to understand it when read, a necessary qualification to a legal
voter; and of section 264, making it a necessary qualification for a
grand or petit juror that he shall be able to read and write; and sec-
tions 2358, 3643 and 3644 of the Mississippi Code of 1892, with regard
to elections, do not, on their face, discriminate between the white and
negro races, and do not amount to a denial of the equal protection of
the law, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution ;
and it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil,
but only that evil was possible under them. Williams v. Mississippi,
3. The provision in the constitution of Texas of 1869, that the legislature
should not thereafter grant lands to any person or persons, as enforced
against the Galveston, Ilarrisburg and San Antonio Railway Company,
the successor of the Buffalo Bayou, Brazos and Colorado Railway Corr-
pany, which had received grants of public land under previous legisla-
tion to encourage the construction of railroads in that State, involved
no infraction of the Federal Constitution. Galveston, Harrisburg sc.
Railway Co. v. Texas, 226.
4. A clause in a charter of a railroad company, granting it power to con-
solidate with or become the owner of other railroads, is not such a
vested right that it cannot be rendered inoperative by subsequent
legislation, passed before the company avails itself of the power thus
5. The question in this case was as to whether the railroad company was
entitled to the particular lands in controversy by virtue of the location
thereon of certificates issued for building the road from Columbus to
San Antonio. The ruling was that, as the law stood, no title was ac-