Decisions announced without Opinions.
Fifth Circuit. Denied May 9, 1898. Mr. J. Parker Kirlin for petitioner.
No. 656. UNITED STATES v. MORRISON & SON. Second Circuit. Granted May 23, 1898. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General Richards for petitioner. Mr. Albert Comstock opposing.
No. 657. UNITED STATES 2. WOLFF & Co. Second Circuit. Granted May 23, 1898. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General Richards for petitioner. Mr. Albert Comstock opposing.
1. A collision between two vessels by the fault of one of them creates a
maritime lien upon her for the damages to the other, which is to be preferred, in admiralty, to a lien for previous supplies. The John G. Stevens, 113.
2. A lien upon a tug, for damages to her tow by negligent towage bring- ing the tow into collision with a third vessel, is to be preferred, in admiralty, to a lieu for supplies previously furnished to the tug in her home port. Ib.
3. Under the settled doctrine of this court, that the concurrent decisions of two courts upon a question of fact will be followed unless shown to be clearly erroneous, this court accepts as indisputable the finding that the Carib Prince was unseaworthy at the time of the commence- ment of the voyage in question in this case, by reason of the defect in the tank referred to in its opinion. The Carib Prince, 655.
4. The condition of unseaworthiness so found to exist was not within the exceptions contained in the bill of lading, and, under the other facts disclosed by the record, the ship owner was liable for the damages caused by the unseaworthy condition of his ship; and there is nothing` in the act of February 19, 1893, c. 105, 27 Stat. 445, commonly known as the Harter Act, which relieved him from that liability. Ib. 5. The provision in that act exempting owners or charterers from loss: resulting from "faults or errors in navigation or in the management. of the vessel," and from certain other designated causes, in no way implies that because the owner is thus exempted when he has been duly diligent, the law has thereby also relieved him from the duty of furnishing a seaworthy vessel. Ib.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, followed. Sawyer v.
The appellant shipped, by a vessel belonging to the appellee, goods under a bill of lading which contained the following stipulation: "In accept- ing this bill of lading, the shipper, owner and consignee of the goods and the holder of the bill of lading agree to be bound by all of its stipulations, exceptions and conditions as printed on the back hereof, whether written or printed, as fully as if they were all signed by such shipper, owner, consignee or holder." Of these stipulations and con- ditions, this court regards only the following as material: "1. It is also mutually agreed that the carrier shall not be liable for gold, silver, bullion, specie, documents, jewellery, pictures, embroideries, works of art. silks, furs, china, porcelain, watches, clocks or for goods of any description which are above the value of $100 per package, unless bills of lading are signed therefor, with the value therein expressed, and a special agreement is made." "9. Also, in case any part of the goods cannot be found for delivery during the steamer's stay at the port of destination, they are to be forwarded by first opportunity, when found, at the company's expense, the steamer not to be held liable for any claim for delay or otherwise." "14. This agreement is made with reference to, and subject to the provisions of the U. S. car- riers' act, approved February 13, 1893." The goods were not delivered at the port to which they were consigned, and were subsequently lost at sea on another vessel belonging to the appellee, on which they had been placed without the appellant's knowledge. In a suit in admi- ralty to recover their value, Held, (1) That as the negligence of the company was clearly proven, there can be no doubt of its liability under the act of February 13, 1893, c. 105, known as the "Harter Act;" (2) That the clause limiting the amount of the carriers' lia- bility is to be construed as a statement that the carrier shall not be liable to any amount for goods exceeding $100 per package; and being so interpreted, that it is a clear attempt on the part of the car- rier to exonerate itself from all responsibility for goods exceeding the value of $100 per package, and as such is not only prohibited by the Harter Act, but held to be invalid in a series of cases in this court. Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Co., 272.
1. The provision in the act of the legislature of New York of May 9, 1893, c. 661, relating to the public health, as amended by the act of April 25, 1895, c. 398, that "any person who,
after conviction of a felony, shall attempt to practise medicine, or shall so practise, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred and fifty dollars, or imprisonment for six months for the first offence, and on conviction of any subsequent offence, by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not less than one year, or by both fine and imprisonment," does not conflict with Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States which provides that "No State shall pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law or law impairing the Obligation of Contracts," when applied to a person who had been con- victed of a felony prior to its enactment. Hawker v. New York, 189. 2. The provisions in section 241 of the constitution of Mississippi prescrib- ing the qualifications for electors; in section 242, conferring upon the legislature power to enact laws to carry those provisions into effect; in section 244, making ability to read any section of the constitution, or to understand it when read, a necessary qualification to a legal voter; and of section 264, making it a necessary qualification for a grand or petit juror that he shall be able to read and write; and sec- tions 2358, 3643 and 3644 of the Mississippi Code of 1892, with regard to elections, do not, on their face, discriminate between the white and negro races, and do not amount to a denial of the equal protection of the law, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, but only that evil was possible under them. Williams v. Mississippi, 213.
3. The provision in the constitution of Texas of 1869, that the legislature should not thereafter grant lands to any person or persons, as enforced against the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway Company, the successor of the Buffalo Bayou, Brazos and Colorado Railway Com- pany, which had received grants of public land under previous legisla- tion to encourage the construction of railroads in that State, involved no infraction of the Federal Constitution. Galveston, Harrisburg &c. Railway Co. v. Texas, 226.
4. A clause in a charter of a railroad company, granting it power to con- solidate with or become the owner of other railroads, is not such a vested right that it cannot be rendered inoperative by subsequent legislation, passed before the company avails itself of the power thus granted. Ib.
5. The question in this case was as to whether the railroad company was entitled to the particular lands in controversy by virtue of the location thereon of certificates issued for building the road from Columbus to San Antonio. The ruling was that, as the law stood, no title was ac-
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