quired thereby, and the State was entitled to recover. But it was also contended that no recovery could be had because the company had earned other lands of which it had been, as it alleged, unlawfully de- prived. The Supreme Court of the State held that it was no defence to the suit, by way of set-off, counter claim, or otherwise, that the com- pany might have been entitled to land certificates for road constructed under the law of 1876, and said that it had "never been ruled that the claimant of land against the State under a location made by virtue of a void certificate has any equity in the premises by reason of being the possessor of another valid certificate." Held, that in arriving at this conclusion the state courts did not determine whether as to those other lands any vested right of the railway company had or had not been impaired or taken away; and that this court cannot hold that the company was denied by the judgment of those courts in this respect any title, right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Ib.
6. In Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 226, the grants of land repealed by the operation of Section 6 of Article X of the constitution of Texas of 1869, were grants to aid in the con- struction of lines of railway not authorized until after that provision took effect; whereas, in this case, the grants which are claimed to be affected by it were grants made prior to the adoption of that constitu- tion, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of the road from Brenham to Austin. Held, that that constitutional provision, as thus enforced, impairs the obligation of the contract between the State and the railway company, and cannot be sustained. Houston & Texas Cen- tral Railway Co. v. Texas, 243.
7. Argument was urged on behalf of defendant in error that the particular lands sued for are situated in what is known as the Pacific reservation, being a reservation for the benefit of the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, created by a special act of May 2, 1873, and hence, that though the certificates were valid, they were not located, as the law re- quired, on unappropriated public domain. This question was not de- termined by either of the appellate tribunals, but, on the contrary, their judgments rested distinctly on the invalidity of the certificates for reasons involving the disposition of Federal questions. This court therefore declines to enter on an examination of the controversy now suggested on this point. Ib.
8. The inheritance tax law of Illinois, of June 15, 1895 (Laws of 1895, page 301), makes a classification for taxation which the legislature had power to make, and does not conflict in any way with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 283.
9. The legislation of the State of Connecticut whereby the franchise and property of a company which had constructed and was maintaining a toll bridge across the Connecticut at Hartford were condemned for
public use, and the cost was apportioned between the State and the town of Glastonbury and four other municipal corporations in propor- tions determined by the statutes, and the proceedings had under this and subsequent legislation set forth in the statement of the case and the opinion of the court, did not violate any provisions of the Federal Constitution. Williams v. Eggleston, 304.
10. The provision in the constitution of the State of Utah, providing for the trial of criminal cases, not capital, in courts of general jurisdiction by a jury composed of eight persons, is ex post facto in its application to felonies committed before the Territory became a State. Thompson v. Utah, 343.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1 to 5; RAILROAD, 1, 2;
1. The contract between the city of Omaha, the Union Pacific Railway Company, and the Omaha & Southwestern Railroad Company of Feb- ruary 1, 1886 (founded upon the act of Nebraska of March 4, 1885, relating to viaducts, bridges and tunnels in cities), providing for the building of a viaduct along Eleventh street in Omaha, at the expense of the two railway companies, was a contract in such a sense that the respective parties thereto continued to be bound by its provisions so long as the legislation, in virtue of which it was entered into, remained unchanged; but it was not a contract whose continuance and opera- tion could not be affected or controlled by subsequent legislation. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Nebraska, 57.
2. When the subject-matter of such a contract is one which affects the safety and welfare of the public, the contract is within the supervising power and control of the legislature, when exercised to protect the pub- lic safety, health and morals, and the clause of the Federal Constitu- tion which protects contracts from legislative action cannot in every case be successfully invoked. Ib.
1. It is again decided that it is no ground for reversal that the court below omitted to give instructions which were not requested by the defend- ant. Humes v. United States, 210.
2. The charge of the trial court was sufficiently full and elaborate. Ib. 3. It is again held that this court cannot consider an objection that the
verdict was against the weight of evidence, if there was any evidence proper to go to the jury in support of the verdict. Ib.
1. Plaintiff in error was indicted for alleged violations of Rev. Stat. § 5457. The indictment contained four counts. The first charged the unlaw-
ful possession of two counterfeit half dollars; the second, an illegal passing and uttering of two such pieces; the third, an unlawful pass- ing and uttering of three pieces of like nature; and the fourth, the counterfeiting of five like coins. After the jury had retired, they returned into court and stated, that, whilst they were agreed as to the first three counts, they could not do so as to the fourth, and the court was asked if a verdict to that effect could be lawfully rendered. They were instructed that it could be, whereupon they rendered a verdict that they found the prisoner guilty on the first, second and third counts of the indictment, and that they disagreed on the fourth count, which verdict was received, and the jury discharged. Held, that there was no error in this. Selvester v. United States, 262. 2. Latham v. The Queen, 8 B. & S. 635, cited, quoted from, and approved as to the point that, “in a criminal case, where each count is, as it were, a separate indictment, one' count not having been disposed of no more affects the proceedings with error than if there were two indictments." Ib.
3. Postage stamps belonging to the United States are personal property, within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 5156, which enacts that "Every person who robs another of any kind or description of personal prop- erty belonging to the United States, or feloniously takes and carries away the same, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment at hard labor not less than one year nor more than ten years, or by both such fine and imprison- ment," and may be made the subject of larceny. Jolly v. United States, 402.
4. The indictment in this case, which is set forth at length in the state- ment of the case, alleged the murder to have been committed "on the high seas, and within the jurisdiction of this court, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State of the said United States of America, in and on board of a certain American vessel." Held, that nothing more was required to show the locality of the offence. Andersen v. United States, 481.
5. The indictment was claimed to be demurrable because it charged the homicide to have been caused by shooting and drowning, means incor- sistent with each other, and not of the same species. Held, that the indictment was sufficient, and was not objectionable on the ground of duplicity or uncertainty. Ib.
6. There was no irregularity in summoning and empanelling the jury. Ib.
7. There was no error in permitting the builder of the vessel on which the crime was alleged to have taken place, to testify as to its general char- acter and situation. Ib.
8. As there was nothing to indicate that antecedent conduct of the captain, an account of which was offered in evidence, was so connected with the killing of the mate as to form part of the res gesta, or that it could have any legitimate tendency to justify, excuse or mitigate the crime for the commission of which he was on trial, there was no error in excluding the evidence relating to it. Ib.
9. After the Government had closed its case in chief, defendant's counsel moved that a verdict of not guilty be directed, because the indictment charged that the mate met his death by drowning, whereas the proof showed that his death resulted from the pistol shots. Held, that there was no error in denying this motion. Ib.
10. While a homicide, committed in actual defence of life or limb, is ex- cusable if it appear that the slayer was acting under a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from the deceased, and that his act was necessary in order to avoid death or harm, where there is manifestly no adequate or reasonable ground for such belief, or the slayer brings on the difficulty for the purpose of killing the deceased, or violation of law on his part is the reason of his expectation of an attack, the plea of self-defence cannot avail. Ib.
11. The evidence offered as to the general reputation of the captain was properly excluded. Ib.
12. As the testimony of the accused did not develop the existence of any facts which operated in law to reduce the crime from murder to man- slaughter, there is no error in instructing the jury to that effect. Ib. 13. An indictment for a violation of the provisions of section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, forbidding the carrying on of the busi- ness of a rectifier, wholesale liquor dealer, etc., without first having paid the special tax required by law, which charges the offence in the language of the statute creating it, is sufficient; and it comes within the rule, well settled in this court, that where the crime is a statutory one, it must be charged with precision and certainty, and every ingre- dient of which it is composed must be clearly and accurately set forth, and that even in the cases of misdemeanors, the indictment must be free from all ambiguity, and leave no doubt in the minds of the accused and of the court, of the exact offence intended to be charged. Led- better v. United States, 606.
14. Properly speaking, the indictment should state not only the county, but the township, city or other municipality within which the crime is alleged to have been committed; but the authorities in this particular are much less rigid than formerly. Ib.
1. Muriate of cocaine is properly dutiable under paragraph 74 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, and not under paragraph 76 of that act. Fink v. United States, 584.
2. A protest by an importer, addressed to the collector and signed by the importer saying, "I do hereby protest against the rate of 50 % assessed on chocolate imported by me, Str. La Bretagne, June 23/91. Import entry 96,656.-M. S. No. 52/53, I claiming that the said goods under existing laws are dutiable at 2 cts. per lb., and the exaction of a higher rate is unjust and illegal. I pay the duty demanded to obtain possession of the goods, and claim to have the amt. unjustly exacted refunded," is, in form and substance a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890. c. 407, 26 Stat. 131, 137. United States v. Salambier, 621.
3. When the Government takes no appeal from the action of the board of appraisers upon an importer's protest made under the act of June 10, 1890, c. 407, it is bound by that action; and in case the importer appeals from that action, and subsequently abandons his appeal, the Government cannot claim to be heard, but it is the duty of the court to affirm the decision of the appraiser. United States v. Lies, 628.
1. The boundaries of his district are the limits of the official duties of a District Attorney, and if he is called upon by the Attorney General to do professional duty and services for the Government outside of those limits, and is allowed compensation therefor, he is entitled to receive the same, or to recover it in the Court of Claims if he has the certificate required by Rev. Stat. § 365, or if the court may, from all the evidence before it, fairly assume that the allowance was made in such a way as to secure to him the compensation to which he was entitled. United States v. Winston, 522.
2. United States v. Crosthwaite, 168 U. S. 375, is adhered to, and the rule laid down in it is not qualified in the least by this decision. Ib.
3. It is not a part of the official duties of the District Attorney of the district in which at the time a session of the Court of Appeals is held to assume the management and control of Government cases in that court. United States v. Garter, 527.
1. The enactment by Congress that assessments levied for laying water mains in the District of Columbia should be at the rate of $1.25 per linear front foot against all lots or land abutting upon the street, road or alley in which a water main shall be laid, is conclusive alike
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