quired thereby, and the State was entitled to recover. But it was also
contended that no recovery could be had because the company had
earned other lands of which it had been, as it alleged, unlawfully de-
prived. The Supreme Court of the State held that it was no defence
to the suit, by way of set-off, counter claim, or otherwise, that the com-
pany might have been entitled to land certificates for road constructed
under the law of 1876, and said that it had "never been ruled that
the claimant of land against the State under a location made by virtue
of a void certificate has any equity in the premises by reason of being
the possessor of another valid certificate." Held, that in arriving at
this conclusion the state courts did not determine whether as to those
other lands any vested right of the railway company had or had not
been impaired or taken away; and that this court cannot hold that the
company was denied by the judgment of those courts in this respect
any title, right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. Ib.
6. In Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S.
226, the grants of land repealed by the operation of Section 6 of Article
X of the constitution of Texas of 1869, were grants to aid in the con-
struction of lines of railway not authorized until after that provision
took effect; whereas, in this case, the grants which are claimed to be
affected by it were grants made prior to the adoption of that constitu-
tion, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of the road from
Brenham to Austin. Held, that that constitutional provision, as thus
enforced, impairs the obligation of the contract between the State and
the railway company, and cannot be sustained. Houston & Texas Cen-
tral Railway Co. v. Texas, 243.
7. Argument was urged on behalf of defendant in error that the particular
lands sued for are situated in what is known as the Pacific reservation,
being a reservation for the benefit of the Texas and Pacific Railway
Company, created by a special act of May 2, 1873, and hence, that
though the certificates were valid, they were not located, as the law re-
quired, on unappropriated public domain. This question was not de-
termined by either of the appellate tribunals, but, on the contrary,
their judgments rested distinctly on the invalidity of the certificates
for reasons involving the disposition of Federal questions. This court
therefore declines to enter on an examination of the controversy now
suggested on this point. Ib.
8. The inheritance tax law of Illinois, of June 15, 1895 (Laws of 1895,
page 301), makes a classification for taxation which the legislature had
power to make, and does not conflict in any way with the provisions of
the Constitution of the United States. Magoun v. Illinois Trust &
Savings Bank, 283.
9. The legislation of the State of Connecticut whereby the franchise and
property of a company which had constructed and was maintaining a
toll bridge across the Connecticut at Hartford were condemned for
public use, and the cost was apportioned between the State and the
town of Glastonbury and four other municipal corporations in propor-
tions determined by the statutes, and the proceedings had under this
and subsequent legislation set forth in the statement of the case and
the opinion of the court, did not violate any provisions of the Federal
Constitution. Williams v. Eggleston, 304.
10. The provision in the constitution of the State of Utah, providing for
the trial of criminal cases, not capital, in courts of general jurisdiction
by a jury composed of eight persons, is ex post facto in its application
to felonies committed before the Territory became a State. Thompson
v. Utah, 343.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1 to 5;
RAILROAD, 1, 2;
1. The contract between the city of Omaha, the Union Pacific Railway
Company, and the Omaha & Southwestern Railroad Company of Feb-
ruary 1, 1886 (founded upon the act of Nebraska of March 4, 1885,
relating to viaducts, bridges and tunnels in cities), providing for the
building of a viaduct along Eleventh street in Omaha, at the expense
of the two railway companies, was a contract in such a sense that the
respective parties thereto continued to be bound by its provisions so
long as the legislation, in virtue of which it was entered into, remained
unchanged; but it was not a contract whose continuance and opera-
tion could not be affected or controlled by subsequent legislation.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Nebraska, 57.
2. When the subject-matter of such a contract is one which affects the
safety and welfare of the public, the contract is within the supervising
power and control of the legislature, when exercised to protect the pub-
lic safety, health and morals, and the clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion which protects contracts from legislative action cannot in every
case be successfully invoked. Ib.
1. It is again decided that it is no ground for reversal that the court below
omitted to give instructions which were not requested by the defend-
ant. Humes v. United States, 210.
2. The charge of the trial court was sufficiently full and elaborate. Ib.
3. It is again held that this court cannot consider an objection that the
verdict was against the weight of evidence, if there was any evidence
proper to go to the jury in support of the verdict. Ib.
1. Plaintiff in error was indicted for alleged violations of Rev. Stat. § 5457.
The indictment contained four counts. The first charged the unlaw-
ful possession of two counterfeit half dollars; the second, an illegal
passing and uttering of two such pieces; the third, an unlawful pass-
ing and uttering of three pieces of like nature; and the fourth, the
counterfeiting of five like coins. After the jury had retired, they
returned into court and stated, that, whilst they were agreed as
to the first three counts, they could not do so as to the fourth, and the
court was asked if a verdict to that effect could be lawfully rendered.
They were instructed that it could be, whereupon they rendered a
verdict that they found the prisoner guilty on the first, second and
third counts of the indictment, and that they disagreed on the fourth
count, which verdict was received, and the jury discharged. Held,
that there was no error in this. Selvester v. United States, 262.
2. Latham v. The Queen, 8 B. & S. 635, cited, quoted from, and approved
as to the point that, “in a criminal case, where each count is, as it
were, a separate indictment, one' count not having been disposed of
no more affects the proceedings with error than if there were two
indictments." Ib.
3. Postage stamps belonging to the United States are personal property,
within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 5156, which enacts that "Every
person who robs another of any kind or description of personal prop-
erty belonging to the United States, or feloniously takes and carries
away the same, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment at hard labor not less than
one year nor more than ten years, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment," and may be made the subject of larceny. Jolly v. United
States, 402.
4. The indictment in this case, which is set forth at length in the state-
ment of the case, alleged the murder to have been committed "on the
high seas, and within the jurisdiction of this court, and within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of
America, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State of the
said United States of America, in and on board of a certain American
vessel." Held, that nothing more was required to show the locality
of the offence. Andersen v. United States, 481.
5. The indictment was claimed to be demurrable because it charged the
homicide to have been caused by shooting and drowning, means incor-
sistent with each other, and not of the same species. Held, that the
indictment was sufficient, and was not objectionable on the ground of
duplicity or uncertainty. Ib.
6. There was no irregularity in summoning and empanelling the
jury. Ib.
7. There was no error in permitting the builder of the vessel on which the
crime was alleged to have taken place, to testify as to its general char-
acter and situation. Ib.
8. As there was nothing to indicate that antecedent conduct of the captain,
an account of which was offered in evidence, was so connected with
the killing of the mate as to form part of the res gesta, or that it could
have any legitimate tendency to justify, excuse or mitigate the crime
for the commission of which he was on trial, there was no error in
excluding the evidence relating to it. Ib.
9. After the Government had closed its case in chief, defendant's counsel
moved that a verdict of not guilty be directed, because the indictment
charged that the mate met his death by drowning, whereas the proof
showed that his death resulted from the pistol shots. Held, that
there was no error in denying this motion. Ib.
10. While a homicide, committed in actual defence of life or limb, is ex-
cusable if it appear that the slayer was acting under a reasonable
belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
from the deceased, and that his act was necessary in order to avoid
death or harm, where there is manifestly no adequate or reasonable
ground for such belief, or the slayer brings on the difficulty for the
purpose of killing the deceased, or violation of law on his part is the
reason of his expectation of an attack, the plea of self-defence cannot
avail. Ib.
11. The evidence offered as to the general reputation of the captain was
properly excluded. Ib.
12. As the testimony of the accused did not develop the existence of any
facts which operated in law to reduce the crime from murder to man-
slaughter, there is no error in instructing the jury to that effect. Ib.
13. An indictment for a violation of the provisions of section 16 of the
act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, forbidding the carrying on of the busi-
ness of a rectifier, wholesale liquor dealer, etc., without first having
paid the special tax required by law, which charges the offence in the
language of the statute creating it, is sufficient; and it comes within
the rule, well settled in this court, that where the crime is a statutory
one, it must be charged with precision and certainty, and every ingre-
dient of which it is composed must be clearly and accurately set forth,
and that even in the cases of misdemeanors, the indictment must be free
from all ambiguity, and leave no doubt in the minds of the accused
and of the court, of the exact offence intended to be charged. Led-
better v. United States, 606.
14. Properly speaking, the indictment should state not only the county, but
the township, city or other municipality within which the crime is
alleged to have been committed; but the authorities in this particular
are much less rigid than formerly. Ib.
1. Muriate of cocaine is properly dutiable under paragraph 74 of the tariff
act of October 1, 1890, and not under paragraph 76 of that act. Fink
v. United States, 584.
2. A protest by an importer, addressed to the collector and signed by the
importer saying, "I do hereby protest against the rate of 50 % assessed
on chocolate imported by me, Str. La Bretagne, June 23/91. Import
entry 96,656.-M. S. No. 52/53, I claiming that the said goods
under existing laws are dutiable at 2 cts. per lb., and the exaction of
a higher rate is unjust and illegal. I pay the duty demanded to obtain
possession of the goods, and claim to have the amt. unjustly exacted
refunded," is, in form and substance a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890. c. 407, 26 Stat.
131, 137. United States v. Salambier, 621.
3. When the Government takes no appeal from the action of the board of
appraisers upon an importer's protest made under the act of June 10,
1890, c. 407, it is bound by that action; and in case the importer
appeals from that action, and subsequently abandons his appeal, the
Government cannot claim to be heard, but it is the duty of the court
to affirm the decision of the appraiser. United States v. Lies, 628.
1. The boundaries of his district are the limits of the official duties of a
District Attorney, and if he is called upon by the Attorney General
to do professional duty and services for the Government outside of
those limits, and is allowed compensation therefor, he is entitled to
receive the same, or to recover it in the Court of Claims if he has the
certificate required by Rev. Stat. § 365, or if the court may, from all
the evidence before it, fairly assume that the allowance was made in
such a way as to secure to him the compensation to which he was
entitled. United States v. Winston, 522.
2. United States v. Crosthwaite, 168 U. S. 375, is adhered to, and the rule
laid down in it is not qualified in the least by this decision. Ib.
3. It is not a part of the official duties of the District Attorney of the
district in which at the time a session of the Court of Appeals is held
to assume the management and control of Government cases in that
court. United States v. Garter, 527.
1. The enactment by Congress that assessments levied for laying water
mains in the District of Columbia should be at the rate of $1.25 per
linear front foot against all lots or land abutting upon the street,
road or alley in which a water main shall be laid, is conclusive alike
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