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upon which the appellee claims that his title to the grant in question
in this case is founded, the court arrives at the conclusion that the
officers who made the grant had no power to make it; and the decree
of the Court of Private Land Claims establishing it is rever
versed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings. United States v. Coe, 681.
1. The Supreme Court of Missouri having held that the act of the legisla-
ture of that State incorporating the Laclede Gas Light Company and
conferring upon it the sole and exclusive privilege of lighting the
streets in parts of St. Louis, though construed to include the right to
use electricity for illuminating purposes in respect to such right, was
taken subject to reasonable regulations as to its use, and that the
power to regulate had been delegated to the city of St. Louis, and that
under its general public power the city had the right to require com-
pliance with reasonable regulations as a condition to using its streets
for electric wires, this court concurs with the conclusion of the
Supreme Court that the company was subject to reasonable regula-
tions in the exercise of the police powers of the city, and holds that,
so far as that involved any Federal question, such question was cor-
rectly decided. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 78.
2. If the company, as it asserted, possessed the right to place electric wires
beneath the surface of the streets, that right was subject to such rea-
sonable regulations as the city deemed best to make for the public
safety and convenience, and the duty rested on the company to comply
with them. 16.
3. If requirements were exacted or duties imposed by the ordinances,
delivery of the bonds of the county to the Railroad Company, were
had in the utmost good faith. Provident Life f Trust Co. v. Mercer
7. Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 395, reaffirmed to these points;“that mu-
nicipal corporations have no power to issue bonds in aid of railroads,
except by legislative permission; that the legislature, in granting per-
mission to a municipality to issue its bonds in aid of a railroad, may
impose such conditions as it may choose ; and that such legislative
permission does not carry with it authority to execute negotiable bonds,
except subject to the restrictions and conditions of the enabling act.”
But when the good faith of all the parties is unquestionable, the courts
will lean to that construction of the statute which will uphold the
transaction as consummated. Ib.
8. The provision in the act authorizing the issue of Mercer County bonds
to the Louisville Southern Railroad Company, when its railway should
have been so completed “through such county that a train of cars
shall have passed over the same," was fully complied with when the
railroad was so completed, from the northern line of the county to
Harrodsburg, that a train of cars passed over it; but, even if this con-
struction be incorrect, it must be held that when the trustee, in whose
hands the county bonds were placed in escrow, adjudged that the con-
dition prescribed for their delivery had been complied with, and de-
livered the bonds to the railroad company, the company took such a
title as, when the bond was transferred to a bona fide holder, would
enable him to recover against the county, even if the condition had
in fact not been performed. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, A, 1;
The Boyden device for a fluid-pressure brake is not an infringement of
patent No. 360,070 issued to George Westinghouse, Jr., March 29,
1887, for a fluid-pressure automatic-brake mechanism. Westinghouse
v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 537.
1. On an appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of a Territory,
the findings of fact are conclusive upon this court. Holloway v. Dun-
2. One general exception to thirteen different instructions cannot be con-
sidered sufficient when each instruction consists of different proposi-
tions of law and fact, and many of them are clearly correct. Ib.
1. In 1869 Congress granted a quantity of land in New Mexico, in fulfil-
ment of a grant of non-mineral lands nade by Mexico before its
transfer, the land to be selected by the grantees, and the surveyor
general to survey and locate the land selected, and thus determine
whether it was such as the grantees might select. The grantees made
their selection, and after considerable correspondence as to the forms
of the application and as to the evidence that the selected lands were
not mineral lands, the surveyor general, under the direction of the
Land Department, approved the selection, and made the survey and loca-
tion. The Land Department approved the survey, field notes and plat,
and the parties were notified thereof, but no patent was issued, as Con-
gress had not provided for such issue. The Land Department noted on
its maps that this tract had been segregated from the public domain,
and had become private property, and so reported to Congress, and
that body never questioned the validity of its action. The grantees
entered into possession, fenced the tract, and paid all taxes assessed
upon it as private property by the State. Held, that the action
taken by the Land Department was a finality, and that the title
passed, all having been done which was prescribed by the statute.
Shaw v. Kellogg, 312.
2. Such approval entered upon the plat in the Land Department by the
surveyor general, under the directions of that department, was in
terms “subject to the conditions and provisions of section 6 of the act
of Congress, approved June 21, 1860.” Held, that such limitation was
beyond the power of executive officers to impose. Ib.
3. When an entryman goes to the public land office for the purpose of
obtaining public land, and is told by the receiver that his proofs can-
not be filed or accepted unless and until he pays the purchase price of
the land, which he thereupon does, he makes such payment to the re-
ceiver as a public officer of the United States, and not to him as the
agent of the entryman, and the payment is to be regarded as one
made to the Government and as public money, within the meaning of
the law and of any bond given for the faithful discharge of the duties
of his office by the receiver, and for his honestly accounting for all
public funds and property coming into his hands. Smith v. United
4. The construction and legal effect of a patent for land is matter for the
court, and evidence to aid in that construction is incompetent.
Stuart v. Easton, 383.
See Mexican GRANT.
1. In view of the paramount duty of a state legislature to secure the
safety of the community at an important railroad crossing within a
populous city, it was and is within its power to supervise, control and
change agreements from time to time entered into between the city
and the railroad company as to a viaduct over such crossing, saving
any rights previously vested. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
v. Nebraska, 57.
2. It is competent for the legislature of the State to put the burden of
the repairs of such a viaduct crossing several railroads upon one of
the companies, or to apportion it among all, as it sees fit; and an ap
portionment may be made through the instrumentality of the City
3. Where expenditures have been made which were essentially necessary
to enable a railroad to be operated as a continuing business, and it
was the expectation of the creditors that the indebtedness so created
would be paid out of the current earnings of the company, a superior
equity arises, in case the property is put into the hands of a receiver,
in favor of the material man, as against mortgage bondholders, in
income arising from the operation of the property both before and
after the appointment of the receiver, which equity is not affected by
the fact that the company itself is the purchaser of the supplies, but
is solely dependent upon the facts that the supplies were sold and
purchased for use, that they were used in the operation of the road,
that they were essential for such operation, and that the sale was not
made simply upon personal credit, but upon the understanding, tacit
or expressed, that the current earnings would be appropriated for the
payment of the debt. Virginia f Alabama Coal Co. v. Central Rail-
road & Banking Co., 355.
4. Upon the evidence contained in the record it is Held, that in the con-
tract with the Virginia and Alabama Coal Company and in that with
the Sloss Iron and Steel Company, it was the intention of the parties
that the coal furnished was to be used in the operation of the lines of
the Central Company, and that the Coal Companies looked to the
earnings of the Central System as the source from which the funds to
pay for the coal to be furnished were to be derived. Ib.
5. In concluding that the claims of the intervenors were entitled to
priority out of the surplus earnings which arose during the control of
the road by the court, this court must not be understood as in any-
wise detracting from the force of the intimations contained in its
opinions in Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., 136 U. S. 89, and
Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95., 16.
6. A provision in a contract, made with a railroad company for the car-
riage of live stock, that the person in charge of the stock shall re-
main in the caboose car while the train is in motion, is not violated by
his being in the car with the live stock when the train is not in
motion, even though he may have been in that car instead of in the
caboose car when the train was in motion; and in case of an acci-
dent happening to him, while so in the cattle car, caused by a sudden
jerk made when the train was at rest, his being in the cattle car at
that time, and under such circumstances, does not make him guilty of
contributory negligence. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Reeder, 530.
7. It is the duty of a railroad company to use reasonable care to see that
the cars employed on its road, both those which it owns and those
which it receives from other roads, are in good order and fit for the
purposes for which they are intended, and this duty it owes to its
employés as well as to the public. Teras & Pacific Railway Co. v.
8. An employé of a railroad company has a right to rely upon this duty
being performed, as, while in entering the employment he assumes
the ordinary risks incident to the business, he does not assume the
risk arising from his employer's neglect to perform the duties owing
to him with respect to the appliances furnished.
See ConstiTUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 5.
When it does not appear from the plaintiff's statement of his case, that