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Missouri.
Nebraska.
New York.
Oklahoma.
Pennsylvania.
South Carolina.
Texas.

Utah.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1.
See CONTRACT, 1,

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 2, 3.
See TRUST, 1, 3, 4, 5.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 4.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10.

SURETY BOND.

1. In an action against the maker of a bond, given to indemnify or insure
a bank against loss arising from acts of fraud or dishonesty on the
part of its cashier, if the bond was fairly and reasonably susceptible
of two constructions, one favorable to the bank and the other to the
insurer, the former, if consistent with the objects for which the bond
was given, must be adopted. American Surety Co. v. Pauly (No. 1),
133.

2. Under the condition of the bond in this case, requiring notice of acts of
fraud or dishonesty, the defendant was entitled to notice in writing
of any act of the cashier which came to the knowledge of the plaintiff
of a fraudulent or a dishonest character as soon as practicable after
the plaintiff acquired knowledge; and it is not sufficient to defeat the
plaintiff's right of action upon the policy to show that the plaintiff
may have had suspicions of dishonest conduct of the cashier; but it
was plaintiff's duty, when it came to his knowledge, when he was
satisfied that the cashier had committed acts of dishonesty or frand
likely to involve loss to the defendant under the bond, as soon as was
practicable thereafter to give written notice to the defendant: though
he may have had suspicions of irregularities or fraud, he was not
bound to act until he had acquired knowledge of some specific fraudu-
lent or dishonest act that might involve the defendant in liability for
the misconduct.

1b.

3. When the bank suspended business, and the investigation by the ex-
aminer commenced, O'Brien ceased to perform the ordinary duties
of a cashier; but, within the meaning of the bond, he did not retire
from, but remained in, the service of the employer during at least the
investigation of the bank's affairs and the custody of its assets by the
national bank examiner, which lasted until the appointment of a re-
ceiver and his qualification. Held, that the six months from "the
death or dismissal or retirement of the employé from the service of the
employer," within which his fraud or dishonesty must have been dis-
covered in order to hold the company liable, did not commence to run
prior to the date last named. Ib.

4. The making of a statement as to the honesty and fidelity of an employé
of a bank for the benefit of the employé, and to enable the latter to

obtain a bond insuring his fidelity, was no part of the ordinary rou-
tine business of a bank president, and there was nothing to show that
by any usage of this particular bank such function was committed to
its president. Ib.

5. The presumption that an agent informs his principal of that which his
duty and the interests of his principal require him to communicate
does not arise where the agent acts or makes declarations not in exe-
cution of any duty that he owes to the principal, nor within any
authority possessed by him, but to subserve simply his own personal
ends or to commit some fraud against the principal; and in such cases
the principal is not bound by the acts or declarations of the agent un-
less it be proved that he had at the time actual notice of them, or
having received notice of them, failed to disavow what was assumed
to be said and done in his behalf. Ib.

6. When an agent has, in the course of his employment, been guilty of an
actual fraud contrived and carried out for his own benefit, by which
he intended to defraud and did defraud his own principal or client, as
well as perhaps the other party, and the very perpetration of such
fraud involved the necessity of his concealing the facts from his own
client, then under such circumstances the principal is not charged with
constructive notice of facts known by the attorney and thus fraudu-
lently concealed. Ib.

7. This was an action upon a bond guaranteeing à national bank against
loss by any act of fraud or dishonesty by its president. The bond
was similar in its provisions to the one referred to in the case preced-
ing this, and contained among other provisions the following: "Now, -
therefore, in consideration," etc.,
"it is hereby declared and
agreed, that subject to the provision herein contained, the company
shall, within three months next after notice, accompanied by satisfac-
tory proof of a loss, as hereinafter mentioned, has been given to the
company, make good and reimburse to the employer all and any pecu-
niary loss sustained by the employer of moneys, securities or other
personal property in the possession of the employé, or for the posses-
sion of which he is responsible, by any act of fraud or dishonesty, on
the part of the employé, in connection with the duties of the office or
position hereinbefore referred to, or the duties to which in the em-
ployer's service he may be subsequently appointed, and occurring dur-
ing the continuance of this bond, and discovered during said continu-
ance, or within six months thereafter, and within six months from the
Ideath or dismissal or retirement of the employé from the service of
the employer. It being understood that a written statement of such
loss, certified by the duly authorized officer or representative of the
employer, and based upon the accounts of the employé, shall be prima
facie evidence thereof." Held, (1) That this language was suscepti-
ble of two constructions, equally reasonable, and that the one most
favorable to the insured should be accepted, namely, that the required

written statement of loss arising from the fraud or dishonesty of the
president of the bank, based upon its accounts, was admissible in evi-
dence, if suit was brought, and was prima facie sufficient to establish
the loss; (2) That within the meaning of the bond in suit, the presi-
dent of the bank remained in its service at least up to the day on
which the receiver took possession of books, papers and assets.
American Surety Company v. Pauly (No. 2), 160.

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. On the authority of Louisville Water Company v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1,
which is affirmed, it is held that the exemption from taxation ac-
quired by the Louisville Water Company under the act of Kentucky
of April 22, 1882, c. 1349, was not withdrawn except from the day on
which the act of May 17, 1886, known as the Hewitt Act, took effect;
and the company cannot be held for taxes which were assessed and
became due prior to September 14, 1886, when that act took effect.
Louisville Water Company v. Kentucky, 127.

2. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, affirmed and followed to the point that
"the act of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Oklahoma of
March 5, 1895, which provided that 'when any cattle are kept or
grazed or any other personal property is situated in any unorganized
country, district or reservation of this Territory, such property shall
be subject to taxation in the organized county to which said country,
district, or reservation is attached for judicial purposes,' was a legiti-
mate exercise of the Territory's power of taxation, and when enforced
in the taxation of cattle belonging to persons not resident in the Ter-
ritory grazing upon Indian reservations therein, does not violate the
Constitution of the United States." Wagoner v. Evans, 588.

2. Prior to the passage of that act there existed no power in the authori-
ties of Canadian County to tax property within the attached reserva-
tion; and, as such authority was first given by that act, it could only
be validly exercised on property subjected to its terms after its enact-
ment.

Ib.

4. Taxes, otherwise lawful, are not invalidated by the fact that the result-
ing benefits are unequally shared. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.

TREATY.

See INDIAN, 2.

TRUST.

1. The clear intent of the act of the Province of Pennsylvania of March
11, 1752, authorizing trustees to acquire the land in question, was, that
while the legal estate in fee in the land should be acquired by the

trustees, the beneficial use or equitable estate was to be in the inhabi-
tants of the county; and the provision following the authorization to
acquire the land, "and thereon to erect and build a court house and
prison," was no more than a direction to the trustees as to the use to
be made of the land after it had been acquired. Stuart v. Easton, 383.
2. The language of the habendum that the conveyance is " in trust,” never-
theless to and for the erecting thereon a court house for the public use
and service of the said county, and to and for no other use, intent or
purpose whatsoever, under the decisions of the courts of Pennsylvania
amounted simply to conforming the grant to the legislative authority
previously given, and cannot be deemed to have imported a limitation
of the fee. Ib.

3. The purposes of the grant by the patent of 1764 of the lot in the centre
of the public square at Easton, in conformity to the clear intent of the
act of 1752, was undoubtedly to vest an equitable estate in the land in
the inhabitants of the county, the trust in their favor being executed
so soon as the county became capable of holding the title. Ib.
4. If the grant be viewed as one merely to trustees to hold "for the uses
and purposes mentioned in the act of the assembly," it is clear that the
fee was not upon a condition subsequent nor one upon limitation.
Ib.

5. Without positively determining whether the estate in the county is
held charged with a trust for a charitable use, or is an unrestricted fee
simple on the theory that the trustees were merely the link for pass-
ing the title authorized by the act of 1752, it is held, that the trial
court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant. Ib.

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