Missouri. Nebraska. New York. Oklahoma. Pennsylvania. South Carolina. Texas.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1. See CONTRACT, 1,
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1. See TAX AND TAXATION, 2, 3. See TRUST, 1, 3, 4, 5. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 4. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10.
1. In an action against the maker of a bond, given to indemnify or insure a bank against loss arising from acts of fraud or dishonesty on the part of its cashier, if the bond was fairly and reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one favorable to the bank and the other to the insurer, the former, if consistent with the objects for which the bond was given, must be adopted. American Surety Co. v. Pauly (No. 1), 133.
2. Under the condition of the bond in this case, requiring notice of acts of fraud or dishonesty, the defendant was entitled to notice in writing of any act of the cashier which came to the knowledge of the plaintiff of a fraudulent or a dishonest character as soon as practicable after the plaintiff acquired knowledge; and it is not sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's right of action upon the policy to show that the plaintiff may have had suspicions of dishonest conduct of the cashier; but it was plaintiff's duty, when it came to his knowledge, when he was satisfied that the cashier had committed acts of dishonesty or frand likely to involve loss to the defendant under the bond, as soon as was practicable thereafter to give written notice to the defendant: though he may have had suspicions of irregularities or fraud, he was not bound to act until he had acquired knowledge of some specific fraudu- lent or dishonest act that might involve the defendant in liability for the misconduct.
3. When the bank suspended business, and the investigation by the ex- aminer commenced, O'Brien ceased to perform the ordinary duties of a cashier; but, within the meaning of the bond, he did not retire from, but remained in, the service of the employer during at least the investigation of the bank's affairs and the custody of its assets by the national bank examiner, which lasted until the appointment of a re- ceiver and his qualification. Held, that the six months from "the death or dismissal or retirement of the employé from the service of the employer," within which his fraud or dishonesty must have been dis- covered in order to hold the company liable, did not commence to run prior to the date last named. Ib.
4. The making of a statement as to the honesty and fidelity of an employé of a bank for the benefit of the employé, and to enable the latter to
obtain a bond insuring his fidelity, was no part of the ordinary rou- tine business of a bank president, and there was nothing to show that by any usage of this particular bank such function was committed to its president. Ib.
5. The presumption that an agent informs his principal of that which his duty and the interests of his principal require him to communicate does not arise where the agent acts or makes declarations not in exe- cution of any duty that he owes to the principal, nor within any authority possessed by him, but to subserve simply his own personal ends or to commit some fraud against the principal; and in such cases the principal is not bound by the acts or declarations of the agent un- less it be proved that he had at the time actual notice of them, or having received notice of them, failed to disavow what was assumed to be said and done in his behalf. Ib.
6. When an agent has, in the course of his employment, been guilty of an actual fraud contrived and carried out for his own benefit, by which he intended to defraud and did defraud his own principal or client, as well as perhaps the other party, and the very perpetration of such fraud involved the necessity of his concealing the facts from his own client, then under such circumstances the principal is not charged with constructive notice of facts known by the attorney and thus fraudu- lently concealed. Ib.
7. This was an action upon a bond guaranteeing à national bank against loss by any act of fraud or dishonesty by its president. The bond was similar in its provisions to the one referred to in the case preced- ing this, and contained among other provisions the following: "Now, - therefore, in consideration," etc., "it is hereby declared and agreed, that subject to the provision herein contained, the company shall, within three months next after notice, accompanied by satisfac- tory proof of a loss, as hereinafter mentioned, has been given to the company, make good and reimburse to the employer all and any pecu- niary loss sustained by the employer of moneys, securities or other personal property in the possession of the employé, or for the posses- sion of which he is responsible, by any act of fraud or dishonesty, on the part of the employé, in connection with the duties of the office or position hereinbefore referred to, or the duties to which in the em- ployer's service he may be subsequently appointed, and occurring dur- ing the continuance of this bond, and discovered during said continu- ance, or within six months thereafter, and within six months from the Ideath or dismissal or retirement of the employé from the service of the employer. It being understood that a written statement of such loss, certified by the duly authorized officer or representative of the employer, and based upon the accounts of the employé, shall be prima facie evidence thereof." Held, (1) That this language was suscepti- ble of two constructions, equally reasonable, and that the one most favorable to the insured should be accepted, namely, that the required
written statement of loss arising from the fraud or dishonesty of the president of the bank, based upon its accounts, was admissible in evi- dence, if suit was brought, and was prima facie sufficient to establish the loss; (2) That within the meaning of the bond in suit, the presi- dent of the bank remained in its service at least up to the day on which the receiver took possession of books, papers and assets. American Surety Company v. Pauly (No. 2), 160.
1. On the authority of Louisville Water Company v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1, which is affirmed, it is held that the exemption from taxation ac- quired by the Louisville Water Company under the act of Kentucky of April 22, 1882, c. 1349, was not withdrawn except from the day on which the act of May 17, 1886, known as the Hewitt Act, took effect; and the company cannot be held for taxes which were assessed and became due prior to September 14, 1886, when that act took effect. Louisville Water Company v. Kentucky, 127.
2. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, affirmed and followed to the point that "the act of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Oklahoma of March 5, 1895, which provided that 'when any cattle are kept or grazed or any other personal property is situated in any unorganized country, district or reservation of this Territory, such property shall be subject to taxation in the organized county to which said country, district, or reservation is attached for judicial purposes,' was a legiti- mate exercise of the Territory's power of taxation, and when enforced in the taxation of cattle belonging to persons not resident in the Ter- ritory grazing upon Indian reservations therein, does not violate the Constitution of the United States." Wagoner v. Evans, 588.
2. Prior to the passage of that act there existed no power in the authori- ties of Canadian County to tax property within the attached reserva- tion; and, as such authority was first given by that act, it could only be validly exercised on property subjected to its terms after its enact- ment.
4. Taxes, otherwise lawful, are not invalidated by the fact that the result- ing benefits are unequally shared. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.
1. The clear intent of the act of the Province of Pennsylvania of March 11, 1752, authorizing trustees to acquire the land in question, was, that while the legal estate in fee in the land should be acquired by the
trustees, the beneficial use or equitable estate was to be in the inhabi- tants of the county; and the provision following the authorization to acquire the land, "and thereon to erect and build a court house and prison," was no more than a direction to the trustees as to the use to be made of the land after it had been acquired. Stuart v. Easton, 383. 2. The language of the habendum that the conveyance is " in trust,” never- theless to and for the erecting thereon a court house for the public use and service of the said county, and to and for no other use, intent or purpose whatsoever, under the decisions of the courts of Pennsylvania amounted simply to conforming the grant to the legislative authority previously given, and cannot be deemed to have imported a limitation of the fee. Ib.
3. The purposes of the grant by the patent of 1764 of the lot in the centre of the public square at Easton, in conformity to the clear intent of the act of 1752, was undoubtedly to vest an equitable estate in the land in the inhabitants of the county, the trust in their favor being executed so soon as the county became capable of holding the title. Ib. 4. If the grant be viewed as one merely to trustees to hold "for the uses and purposes mentioned in the act of the assembly," it is clear that the fee was not upon a condition subsequent nor one upon limitation. Ib.
5. Without positively determining whether the estate in the county is held charged with a trust for a charitable use, or is an unrestricted fee simple on the theory that the trustees were merely the link for pass- ing the title authorized by the act of 1752, it is held, that the trial court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant. Ib.
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