Opinion of the Court.

In the opinion of the court, per Peckham, J., it was said: "The legislature has power and has exercised it in countless instances to enact general laws upon the subject of the public health or safety without providing that the parties who are to be affected by those laws shall first be heard before they shall take effect in a particular case. The fact that the legislature has chosen to delegate a certain portion of its power to the board of health, would not alter the principle, nor would it be necessary to provide that the board should give notice and afford a hearing to the owner before it made such order. Laws and regulations of a police nature, though they may disturb the enjoyment of individual rights, are not unconstitutional, though no provision is made. for compensation for such disturbance. They do not appropriate private property for public use, but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the owner. If he suffer injury, it is either damnum absque injuria, or, in the theory of the law, he is compensated for it by sharing in the general benefits which the regulations are intended and calculated to secure." So, in the present case, while no notice may have been given to the railroad companies of the pendency of the ordinance, and while they may not have been invited to participate in the proposed legislation, yet they had an opportunity to, and did in fact, put in issue, by the answer, both the validity of the ordinance and the reasonableness of the amount apportioned to them respectively for the repair of the viaduct in question.

The validity of the statute and of the ordinance having been passed upon and upheld by the courts of the State, it is not the function of this court, apart from the provisions of the Federal Constitution supposed to be involved, to declare state enactments void, because they seem doubtful in policy and may inflict hardships in particular instances.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is, accordingly, Affirmed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the hearing and decision of the case.

Statement of the Case.

MISSOURI, ex rel. LACLEDE GAS LIGHT COMPANY v. MURPHY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 47. Argued March 1, 2, 1898. Decided April 11, 1898.

The Supreme Court of Missouri having held that the act of the legislature of that State incorporating the Laclede Gas Light Company and conferring upon it the sole and exclusive privilege of lighting the streets in parts of St. Louis, though construed to include the right to use electricity for illuminating purposes in respect to such right, was taken subject to reasonable regulations as to its use, and that the power to regulate had been delegated to the city of St. Louis, and that under its general public power the city had the right to require compliance with reasonable regulations as a condition to using its streets for electric wires, this court concurs with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the company was subject to reasonable regulations in the exercise of the police powers of the city, and holds that, so far as that involved any Federal question, such question was correctly decided.

If the company, as it asserted, possessed the right to place electric wires beneath the surface of the streets, that right was subject to such reasonable regulations as the city deemed best to make for the public safety and convenience, and the duty rested on the company to comply with them.

If requirements were exacted or duties imposed by the ordinances, which, if enforced, would have impaired the obligations of the company's contract, this did not relieve the company from offering to do those things which it was lawfully bound to do.

The exemption of the company from requirements inconsistent with its charter could not operate to relieve it from submitting itself to such police regulations as the city might lawfully impose; and until it had complied, or offered to comply, with regulations to which it was bound to conform, it was not in a position to assert that its charter rights were invaded because of other regulations, which, though applicable to other companies, it contended would be invalid if applied to it.

The Supreme Court of Missouri did not feel called on to define in advance what might, or might not, be lawful requirements; and there is nothing in this record compelling this court to do so.

On a writ of error to a state court this court cannot revise the judgment of its highest tribunal unless a Federal question has been erroneously disposed of.

THE Laclede Gas Light Company filed its petition for mandamus in the name of the State of Missouri, on its relation,

Statement of the Case.

against Michael J. Murphy, street commissioner of the city of St. Louis, on November 26, 1894, in the Supreme Court of that State.

This petition stated that the relator was incorporated by an act of the general assembly of Missouri, approved March 2, 1857, which was amended by an act approved March 3, 1857, and by an act approved March 26, 1868; and set forth the three acts in extenso.

The fifth section of the act of March 2, 1857, read as follows:

"§ 5. The said company, its successors and assigns, shall, within all that portion of the present corporate limits of the city of St. Louis, in St. Louis county, not embraced within the corporate limits of said city, as established by the act entitled 'An act to incorporate the city of St. Louis,' approved February 8, 1839, have and enjoy, during the continuance of this act, the sole and exclusive privilege and right of lighting the same, and of making and vending gas, gas lights, gas fixtures, and of any substance or material that may be now or hereafter used as a substitute therefor; and to that end, may establish and lay down, in said portion of said corporate limits, all pipes, fixtures or other thing properly required, in order to do the same, (the same to be done with as much dispatch and as little inconvenience to the public as possible,) and shall also have all other powers necessary to execute and carry out the privileges and powers hereby granted to said company."

The words "sole and exclusive" in the fifth section were stricken out by the act of March 3, 1857. Laws Missouri, 1856-57, pp. 598, 599.

Section one of the act of March 26, 1868, (amending the act of March 2, 1857,) was as follows:

"SECTION 1. The said Laclede Gas Light Company shall and may, within the corporate limits of the city of St. Louis, as the same are now or may hereafter be established, exercise, have, hold and enjoy forever all the rights, privileges and franchises granted to it by the fifth section of the act to which this act is amendatory, and may, at any time, lease, sell or dispose of any portion of said rights, privileges and

Statement of the Case.

franchises to individuals, associations or corporations intending or desiring to exercise the same within any portion of the limits aforesaid." Laws Missouri, 1868, p. 187.

The petition then averred that the act of March 2, 1857, as amended by the subsequent acts, constituted relator's charter, by which relator was granted the privilege and right of lighting the city of St. Louis as in the acts set forth; "and to that end may establish and lay down in any portion of said corporate limits all pipes, fixtures or other thing properly required in order to do the same, with this limitation only, that in laying down pipes, fixtures or other thing properly required therefor relator shall do the same with as much dispatch and as little inconvenience to the public as possible."

It was further stated that by a certain agreement, executed February 28, 1873, relator had "abandoned and surrendered any and all exclusive rights and all claims or pretences of claims of sole or exclusive privilege or right of lighting any part of the city of St. Louis with gas, or making or vending gas, gas lights or gas fixtures, and also all exclusive right whatsoever under its said charter."

The petition went on to say that in pursuance of its charter relator had been for a long time engaged in the lighting business, both by gas and electricity; that under a contract with the city it was lighting a part of the public streets and alleys by electricity, and would be obliged to do so for some years to come; that it was furnishing light by means of gas or electricity to a large part of the inhabitants of the city; that in order to fulfil its obligations to the city and the public the company had erected and was maintaining "extensive and costly plants for the manufacture and distribution of gas as well as for generating and distributing electric currents;" that for distributing gas it had constructed a system of pipes laid under ground, without objection; that for the distribution of electricity it had "hitherto used overhead wire strung upon poles along the streets and alleys of said city," which poles and electric wires had been and are maintained and used by relator without objection by said city or the authorities thereof for the distribution of electricity, as well to furnish

Statement of the Case.

light to private consumers as for the fulfilment by relator of its said contract with said city of St. Louis for the lighting by electricity of certain public streets and alleys thereof; that to effect such distribution it is necessary to transmit through and by means of said wires electric currents of great power. which if and when accidentally diverted are dangerous to human life and property; that in order to avoid the inconvenience and danger to the public necessarily incident to that method of distributing electric currents, and in order to provide more effective and proper service relator has made arrangements to lay its wires underground along and under the streets of said city according to approved and practicablė plans, and is now ready to do so with as much dispatch and as little inconvenience to the public as possible.

It was then stated that Murphy was street commissioner, to whom was committed, under the city charter, "the supervision and control of the streets and alleys of said city and the enforcement of city ordinances relating thereto." And relator averred that, having completed its preparation to carry out the work above indicated, and having given notice to the street commissioner of its intention to do so, the company proceeded, on the 30th day of October, 1894, to begin the work of excavating at a point on the east side of Broadway street in St. Louis, near the corner of Mound street, that point being adjacent to its generating plants, which work was proper and necessary for placing wires under ground, when the street commissioner caused the work to be stopped, and notified relator "that he would not allow any part of any street of said city to be excavated for any purpose whatever without a permit previously obtained from him for that purpose, as provided by ordinance; and relator states that by section 568, article I, chapter 15, of the Revised Ordinance, 1887, of said city of St. Louis, it is provided that no person shall make or cause to be made any excavation on any public street, highway or alley without written permission of the street commissioner so to do, excepting public work under the authority of the water or sewer commissioner, who at the time of ordering any such excavating shall notify the street commissioner of the same."

VOL. CLXX-6