DUTIES.

1. H., on the entry of merchandise at
the custom house, added 18 per cent.
to the market value, as stated in the
invoice, with a protest, stating that
he made the addition to prevent a
seizure, and that the real value was
the original invoice value. On like
merchandise entered before by H.,
on like invoices, 18 per cent. had, on
appraisal, been added to the invoice
value, and the goods had been seized
for forfeiture. In a suit brought by
H. to recover back the duties paid on
the added 18 per cent.: Held, that the
action could not be maintained. Haas
346
v. Arthur,

3. S., through his agent, K., purchased,
in England, unfinished goods, and,
through K., had them dyed there by
one man and made up by another.
In each case S. paid the cost of the
work. K. then invoiced the goods to
S., at New York, at a price equal to
the cost of purchase, dyeing and mak-
ing up, with K.'s commission added.
Entry of the goods was made on such
invoice, on the ordinary purchaser's
oath, provided for by 4 of the Act
of March 1st, 1823, (3 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 730,) (now § 2841 of the Re-
vised Statutes.) The valuation in the
invoice was below the fair market
value: Held, that the invoice and the
oath ought to have been such as the
statute requires from a manufacturer.
Sinn v. United States,

E

EQUITY.

550

1. Where a bill is brought for a dis-
covery and for other equitable relief
within the appropriate jurisdiction of
a Court of equity, and the ultimate
object of the plaintiff is to obtain
damages, the Court, having granted a
discovery, will proceed and give the

5. Where a demurrer to the whole of a
bill sets up that some of the relief
prayed is not cognizable in equity, it
will be overruled, if some of the re-
lief prayed is properly prayed. id.

6. A cross-bill is properly filed to estab-
lish an equitable title to letters pat-
ent, the legal title to which is in the
plaintiff in the original bill filed for
an infringement of such patent. id.

7. Where a cross-bill, brought for re-
lief as well as defence, shows that
persons not parties to the original
bill are necessary parties to the cross-
bill, they may properly be made
such.
id.

8. H., the owner of shares in the capital
stock of a Connecticut corporation,
filed a bill in equity against the pres-

ident and the directors and the cor-
poration, alleging acts of mismanage-
ment and breach of trust on the part
of the president and directors, and
that the directors had sanctioned all
such acts, and that a request to them
to take proceedings for the relief of
the stockholders, would be useless.
The bill prayed for the dissolution of
the corporation, and for the distribu-
tion of its assets among its creditors
and stockholders, and for such further
relief as the case might require. The
defendants put in a plea, that, by the
statutes of Connecticut, a Court of
equity could dissolve a corporation
only under certain specified circum-
stances, which did not exist in this
case: Held, that the plea was good.
Hardon v. Newton,

376

Held, also, that, on the facts set forth,
the Court could prevent the continu-
ance of the breach of trust, and could
compel the officers to account for
such as they had committed, but that,
to obtain such relief, it should be
specifically prayed for; and the
plaintiff was given leave, on motion,
to amend his bill in respect to the
prayer for relief.
id.

See INJUNCTION.
MORTGAGE.

PATENT, 11 to 17, 19.
PLEADING, 1, 2.

PRACTICE, 3, 7, 11, 13, 14.
TRADE-MARK.

EVIDENCE.

G. and O. were indicted for a con-
spiracy with S. and others to defraud
the United States out of the duties on
silks and laces to be imported con-
trary to law. The indictment set
forth several acts done by several of
the accused to effect the object of the
conspiracy. On the trial of G. and
O., only one of such acts, an act of
O., was proved. Other acts, not set
forth, done by the defendants to effect
the object of the conspiracy, were
proved, to show its character. S.
swore to an agreement made by him
with O., who was the purser of a
steamer, that O. should bring in
goods, which S. should sell, for a
commission. Under this agreement,

8.

O. brought in silks in barrels and
cases, which S. disposed of, no duty
being paid. S. sent the proceeds to
O. W. was employed on O.'s steamer.
S. swore that W. introduced him to
O.; that he, in W.'s presence, agreed
with O. to dispose of silks which O.
should bring out in the same way W.
brought out his; and that there was,
at the time, an agreement between S.
and W., whereby W. was bringing,
in the steamer, silks which were
landed without paying duty, and sold
by S. At the trial, letters from W.
to S. were admitted as evidence for
the prosecution, to explain the nature
of the importations by W., and of the 9.
agreement between S. and O., and to
corroborate the testimony of S.
United States v. Graff,
381

2. A witness was allowed to describe
the marks on the heads of certain
barrels, to identify them, without
proving the destruction or loss of
such heads.

id.

In a suit to recover damages for the
alleged fraudulent sale to the plaintiff
by two defendants, of a mine, the
plaintiff introduced evidence to show
a fraudulent intent in the vendors,
consisting of statements made to
them, or one of them, unfavorable to
the character and value of the mine:
Held, that the defendants, in reply,
had a right to show the statements of
third persons, made to them, prior to
the sale of the mine, in regard to its
character and value. Emma Silver
Mining Co. v. Park,

411

P., one of the defendants, was a di
rector and a shareholder in the plaint-
iff corporation. At the trial, the
plaintiff offered in evidence the min-
utes of a meeting of the plaintiff's
board of directors, held in England,
nearly a year after the sale of the
mine, and at which P.was not present,
and when he was absent from En-
gland, with a view to charge him with
knowledge of the contents of a tele-
gram sent to the directors by the
pre-
sident of the company, and of the
action of the directors thereon:
Held, that the evidence was not ad-
missible.

id.

12. The verdict of the jury was upheld,
as not contrary to the evidence, and
the charge of the Court to the jury
was upheld, as not unjust to the
plaintiff.
id.

13. The suit being one in which it was
alleged that the directors of the
plaintiff corporation were induced to
purchase the mine by the fraudulent
representations or concealments of
the two defendants, as vendors, re-
garding material facts, and they being
two of such directors at the time of
the sale of the mine, it was held, that
if the defendants withheld from their
co-directors any information as to
material facts affecting the mine, in-
tending thereby that their co-direct-
ors should be misled, their conduct
was actionable concealment, if it
operated to induce the purchase. id.

See BILL OF LADING, 1.
FIRE INSURANCE, 8.
PATENT, 24, 25.
PRACTICE, 1, 2.

EXECUTION.

See BANKRUPTCY, 21 to 23.
PROBABLE CAUSE.

EXECUTOR.

See ADMINISTRATOR.

EXTRADITION.

1. The extradition treaty between the
United States and Belgium, (18 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 804,) declares that its
provisions shall not apply to any
crime committed prior to the date of
the treaty, except murder and arson.
The date of the signing of the treaty
was March 19th. 1874. It was not to
take effect until 20 days after the day
of the date of the exchange of ratifi-
cations. They were exchanged April
30th, 1874: Held, that a crime com-
mitted in Belgium on the 1st of May,
1874, was covered by the treaty. In
re Vandervelpen,

137

2. Where an extradition case, under a
treaty, is brought before a United

Manhattan to Nassau Island, and
from thence back to Manhattan's,
and also from the said Island, Man-
hattan's, to any of the opposite shores
all around the same Island," in such
and so many places as the Common
Council should think fit, and the fer-
riages from such ferries were also
granted to the corporation. The
boundaries of the city were made co-

extensive with Manhattan Island. In
1874, part of another county was an.
nexed by the Legislature of New
York to the city of New York, and
declared to be a part of the city as if
it had always been so, and the like
powers were given to the corpora-
tion, over the annexed territory, as
if it had always been a part of the
city. Afterwards, a ferryboat, fitted
up to transport railroad cars only,
was run to and fro between a place
in such annexed territory and a place
in New Jersey opposite the city of
New York, connecting with railroads
ronning from the termini of the ferry.
The boat was provided with two
railroad tracks, which prevented the
entrance of ordinary vehicles and of
foot passengers, except as transported
in the cars: Held, that such ferry
was not such a ferry as the charter
contemplated, and did not invade the
exclusive franchise of the corpora-
tion. Mayor v. N. E. Transfer Co.,

After knowledge by the insurer of
the fact of loss, its repudiation of the
policy without objecting to the suffi-
ciency of the notice of loss, was an
acquiescence in the sufficiency of
such notice.
id.