E. Construction of Statutes § 64. In general. All of the canons of interpretation which apply to civil statutes apply to criminal statutes as well. The paramount rule for construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,5 and they should be fairly and reasonably interpreted with this end in view. The intention referred to is the intention expressed in the statute," which must be ascertained from the language used. If the meaning of the language employed 4 Snitkin v. United States, 265 Fed. 489. 5 United States. United States v. Williams, 159 Fed. 310. Arkansas. State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154, 18 Ann. Cas. 293. Colorado. Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525, 99 Pac. 330. Florida. Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677; Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533; Snowden V. Brown, 60 Fla. 212, 53 So. 548. Georgia. Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. Dec. 269. Idaho. State v. Fite, 29 Idaho 463, 159 Pac. 1183. Illinois. Struthers v. People, 116 Ill. App. 481. Iowa. State v. Claiborne, 185 Iowa 170, 170 N. W. 417, 3 A. L. R. 392; Noble v. State, 1 G. Greene 325. Maryland. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 74 Am. Dec. 522. Massachusetts. Com. v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366. Mississippi. State v. Ware, 102 Miss. 634, 59 So. 854. Nevada. Eureka Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308; Ex parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134, 135 Am. St. Rep. 651. New Mexico. Ex parte De Vore, 18 N. M. 246, 136 Pac. 47. New York. People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330. Texas. Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355; Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 552, 169 S. W. 411; Ex parte Lingenfelter, 64 Tex. Cr. 30, 142 S. W. 555, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 765; Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex. App. 313; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245. 6 Adams v. People, 192 U. S. 585; 48 L. Ed. 575, 24 Sup. Ct. 372; Wiborg v. United States, 163 U. S. 632, 41 L. Ed. 289, 16 Sup. Ct. 1127, 1197; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 33 L. Ed. 1080, 10 Sup. Ct. 625; State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154, 18 Ann. Cas. 293; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245, 32 Am. Rep. 595. 7 State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 76 Atl. 295; Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533; Ex parte De Vore, 18 N. M. 246, 136 Pac. 47. 8 United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210, 64 L. Ed. 229, 40 Sup. Ct. 139, aff'g 260 Fed. 486; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, L. R. A. 1917 F 502, Ann. Cas. 1917 B 1168, aff'g 220 Fed. 545, 231 Fed. 106; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37; Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533; Eureka Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. is plain, it must be given effect, and there is no room for construction or interpretation.10 Courts cannot correct supposed errors, omissions or defects in a statute.11 But words necessarily implied and obviously omitted merely by oversight in drawing the act, or in its engrossment, may be supplied,12 and words manifestly inserted as the result of a clerical error will be disregarded.18 And punctuation may always be disregarded in order to make the statute conform to the evident intention of the legislature.14 § 65. Ordinary meaning of language. Except as to technical terms, statutes are to be construed according to the ordinary and 308; Ex parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134, 135 Am. St. Rep. 651. The question is not what the legis lature meant to say, but what is the meaning of what it did say. State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 76 Atl. 295. Whether or not a particular act constitutes a crime under a particular statute must be determined from the language used in the statute. Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 19 Pac. 237, 11 Am. St. Rep. 257. The courts are not at liberty to construe a statute contrary to its ordinary and grammatical meaning, merely because such a construction is necessary to render the statute effective. If the legislature has failed to accomplish its object by the enactment of a penal statute, "it is to that authority, and not to the courts, that the public must look for a correction of the mistake." Remmington v. State, 1 Ore. 281. 9 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37; Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533; Ex parte De Vore, 18 N. M. 246, 136 Pac. 47. The courts have no authority to disregard words in a statute, but it must be construed according to the letter. State v. Guidry, 142 La. 422, 76 So. 843; Territory v. Nugent, 1 Mart. O. S. (La.) 169, 174. V. 10 United States. Caminetti United States, 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, L. R. A. 1917 F 502, Ann. Cas. 1917 B 1168, aff'g 220 Fed. 545, 231 Fed. 106; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37. Iowa. State v. Shea, 106 Iowa 735, 72 N. W. 300. Nevada. Ex parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134, 135 Am. St. Rep. 651. Oregon. State v. Young, 74 Ore. 399, 145 Pac. 647. Virginia. Com. v. Bailey, 124 Va. 800, 97 S. E. 774. 11 Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533. Cannot supply omissions. State v. Gaunt, 13 Ore. 115, 9 Pac. 55. In State v. Claiborne, 185 Iowa 170, 170 N. W. 417, 3 A. L. R. 392, the court refused to supply the word "not." 12 Earhart v. State, 67 Miss. 325, 7 So. 347; State v. Crockett, 137 Tenn. 679, 195 S. W. 583. 18 State v. Ware, 102 Miss. 634, 59 So. 854. 14 State v. Pilgrim, 17 Mont. 311, 42 Pac. 856; Schriedley v. State, 23 Ohio St. 130; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428, 20 Am. Rep. 12, rev'd 154 U. S. 626 (App'x) 23 L. Ed. 1009, 14 Sup. Ct. 1206. literal meaning of their language, if that meaning can be clearly ascertained.15 But words will be construed contrary to their literal meaning when necessary in order to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature.16 Technical words are to be given their technical meaning unless it appears from the context that a different meaning was intended.17 § 66. Strict construction. It is a well-settled rule that, in the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused.18 By this it is Virginia. Com. v. Bailey, 124 Va. 800, 97 S. E. 774. Words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them, unless the contrary appears. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, L. R. A. 1917 F 502, Ann. Cas. 1917 B 1168, aff'g 220 Fed. 545, 231 Fed. 106. 16 Noble V. State, 1 G. Greene (Iowa) 325; People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330; Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355; Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex. App. 313; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245, 32 Am. Rep. 595; Price v. State, 168 Wis. 603, 171 N. W. 77. 17 Bragg v. State, 134 Ala. 165, 32 So. 767, 58 L. R. A. 925. 18 United States. United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 33 L. Ed. 1080, 10 Sup. Ct. 625; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 51 L. Ed. 37; Snitkin v. United States, 265 Fed. 489; St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry. Co. v. United States, 188 Fed. 191; United States v. Williams, 159 Fed. 310; MacDaniel v. United States, 87 Fed. 324, certiorari denied 171 U. S. 689, 43 L. Ed. 1179, 19 Sup. Ct. 885; In re McDonough, 49 Fed. 360. Alabama. Dumas v. State, 17 Ala. App. 492, 86 So. 162. Alaska. United States V. DooNoch-Keen, 2 Alaska 624. Georgia. Gibson v. State, 38 Ga. 571. Illinois. Allardt v. People, 197 Ill. 501, 64 N. E. 533. Indiana. Steel v. State, 26 Ind. 82; Rosenbaum v. State, 4 Ind. 599. Iowa. State v. Shea, 106 Iowa 735, 72 N. W. 300. Maine. State v. Staples, 110 Me. 264, 85 Atl. 1063; State v. Wallace, 102 Me. 229, 66 Atl. 476. Michigan. People v. Reynolds, 71 Mich. 343, 38 N. W. 923. Minnesota. State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N. W. 935, 9 Ann. Cas. 634; s. c., 102 Minn. 470, 113 N. W. 634, 114 N. W. 738, meant that they are to be construed strictly in those parts which are against the accused, but liberally in those parts which are in his favor,19 and that all doubts concerning their interpretation are to be resolved in his favor.20 No person is to be made subject to such statutes by implication,21 nor will they be extended so as to include. aff'd 218 U. S. 57, 54 L. Ed. 930, 30 Sup. Ct. 663. Mississippi. Abbott v. State, 106 Miss. 340, 63 So. 667. Missouri. State v. Shields, 230 Mo. 91, 130 S. W. 298; State v. Schuchmann, 133 Mo. 111, 33 S. W. 35, 34 S. W. 842; State v. Bryant, 90 Mo. 531, 2 S. W. 836; State v. Davidson, 172 Mo. App. 356, 157 S. W. 890. Nevada. Eureka Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308; Ex parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134, 135 Am. St. Rep. 671. New Mexico. Ex parte De Vore, 18 N. M. 246, 136 Pac. 47. New York. People v. Salter, 191 App. Div. 723, 182 N. Y. Supp. 252. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 Atl. 968; Warner v. Com., 1 Pa. 154, 44 Am. Dec. 114; Com. v. Hickey, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 317. Texas. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. State, 100 Tex. 420, 100 S. W. 766; Ex parte Leslie, 87 Tex. Cr. 476, 223 S. W. 227. lature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishnent." Per Chief Justice Marshall, in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37. 19 Alaska. United States v. Kono, 4 Alaska 613. Connecticut. Conn. 300, 76 State v. Faatz, 83 Atl. 295; Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 63, 10 Am. Dec. 100. District of Columbia. Garrison v. District of Columbia, 30 App. Cas. 551. Missouri. State v. Shields, 230 Mo. 91, 130 S. W. 298; State v. Schuchmann, 133 Mo. 111, 33 S. W. 35, 34 S. W. 842; State v. Bryant, 90 Mo. 334, 2 S. W. 836. Nevada. Eureka Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308; Ex parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134, 135 Am. St. Rep. 651. New York. People v. Salter, 191 App. Div. 723, 182 N. Y. Supp. 252. 20 Missouri. State v. Bryant, 90 Mo. 534, 2 S. W. 836. Ohio. State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St. 340, 47 N. E. 138. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 Atl. 968. Texas. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. State, 100 Tex. 420, 100 S. W. 766; Ex parte Leslie, 87 Tex. Cr. 476, 223 S. W. 227. Wyoming. State v. Thompson, 15 Wyo. 136, 87 Pac. 433. 21 California. People v. Tisdale, 57 Cal. 104. Connecticut. State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 76 Atl. 295; Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 10 Am. Dec. 100. 22 acts not clearly made offenses by their terms, nor so as to embrace new things not in esse at the time of their enactment or offenses subsequently created.23 There can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can be punished for violating a statute, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within its terms.24 The rule of strict construction does not require a statute to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature, however, but the courts are bound to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning, and not narrow it by construction.25 Florida. Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 61, 84 So. 677. Ma'ne. State v. Staples, 110 Me. 264, 85 Atl. 1063. Missouri. State v. Bryant, 90 Mo. 34, 2 S. W. 836. Washington. State v. Eberhart, 106 Wash. 222, 179 Pac. 853. Wyoming. State v. Thompson, 15 Wyo. 136, 87 Pac. 433. 22 United States. United States v. Standard Brewery, 260 Fed. 486, aff'd 251 U. S. 210, 64 L. Ed. 229, 40 Sup. Ct. 139; Welsch v. United States, 220 Fed. 761; St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry. Co. v. United States, 188 Fed. 191. Alabama. umas v. State, 17 Ala. App. 492, 86 So. 162. Florida. Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 51. 84 So. 677. Maine. State v. Peabody, 103 Me. 327, 69 Atl. 273. Montana. State v. Lutey Bros., 55 Mont. 545, 179 Pac. 457. Nevada. Eureka Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308. New York. People v. Hewson, 224 N. Y. 136, 120 N. E. 115. Virginia. Gottlieb Va. 807, 101 S. E. 872. V. Com., 126 A criminal offense cannot be created by inference or implication, nor can the effect of a penal statute be extended beyond the plain meaning of the language used. State v. LeBlanc, 115 Me. 142, 98 Atl. 119; State v. Wallace, 102 Me. 229, 66 Atl. 476; State v. Bunker, 98 Me. 387, 57 Atl. 95. The accused must be brought strictly within the provisions of the statute. Allardt v. People, 197 Ill. 501, 64 N. E. 533. 23 A statute making murder committed in the perpetration of rape murder in the first degree, passed at a time when force was an essential element of rape in all cases, does not apply to murder committed in perpetrating the offense of statutory rape on a female under the age of consent, created by a subsequent statute, and of which force is not an essential element. Com. v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 Atl. 968. 24 United States v. Bathgate, 246 U. S. 220, 62 L. Ed. 676, 38 Sup. Ct. 269; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 33 L. Ed. 1080, 10 Sup. Ct. 625; Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 19 Pac. 237, 11 Am. St. Rep. 257. 25 United States. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 18 L. Ed. 380; United States v. Morris, 14 Peters 464, 10 L. Ed. 543; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 51 L. Ed. 37; United States v. Williams, 159 Fed. 310; MacDaniel v. United States, 87 Fed. 324, certiorari denied 171 U. S. 689, 43 L. Ed. 1179, 19 Sup. Ct. 885; In re Coy, 31 Fed. 794. Illinois. Meadowcroft v. People, |