The rule of strict construction has been abrogated in some jurisdictions by statutes providing in effect that criminal statutes are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.26 § 67. Reason and purpose of statute. When the meaning of a statute is doubtful, the reason and purpose of its enactment are to be taken into consideration in construing it, and determining the intention of the legislature. In other words, though a penal statute cannot be extended by construction, it should, if possible, receive such a construction as, when practically applied, will tend to suppress the 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991, 35 L. R. A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447; Gibbons v. People, 33 Ill. 442. Iowa. State v. Shea, 106 Iowa 735, 72 N. W. 300. Maine. State v. Cavalluzzi, 113 Me. 41, 92 Atl. 937. Maryland. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 74 Am. Dec. 522; Wedge v. State, 12 Md. 232; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226. Michigan. People v. Plumsted, 2 Mich. 465. Mississippi. State v. Ware, 102 Miss. 634, 59 So. 854. Missouri. State v. Shields, 230 Mo. 91, 130 S. W. 298; State v. Davidson, 172 Mo. App. 356, 157 S. W. 890. Nevada. Eureka Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Név. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308. New Mexico. Ex parte De Vore, 18 N. M. 246, 136 Pac. 47. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Schmunk, 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 348. The rule is not violated by permitting the words of a statute to have their full meaning. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N. E. 182. In State v. Thatcher, 35 N. J. L. 445, 452, it was said: "The rule of strict interpretation for criminal statutes does not hinder the court from searching for the legislative will; nor is the rule violated by giv ing words, in some cases, their full, or the more extended of two meanings, as the wider popular, instead of the narrow technical, one. Cases are not wanting where some elasticity has been given to criminal statutes in order to extend them to the mischief obviously aimed at." This is well illustrated by the case of People v. Cotteral, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 115, where a jail was held to be an inhabited dwelling house," within the meaning of the statute against arson. 26 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: California. Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429. Nebraska. Kinnan v. State, 86 Neb. 234, 125 N. W. 594, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478, 21 Ann. Cas. 335. New York. People v. Atwater, 229 N. Y. 303, 128 N. E. 196, rev'g 191 App. Div. 345, 181 N. Y. Supp. 742. Oklahoma. Bowes v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 277, 127 Pac. 883; Stewart V. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 564, 109 Pac. 243, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505. South Dakota. State V. Central Lumber Co., 24 S. D. 136, 123 N. W. 504, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804. Texas. Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 552, 169 S. W. 411; Malz v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 447, 34 S. W. 267, 37 S. W. 748. evil which the legislature intended to prohibit.27 And it will not be given a construction which would in many cases defeat the legislative purpose unless the express language of the statute makes it necessary to do so.28 It is not permissible, however, to vary or add to the provisions of a statute on any consideration of its reason and purpose, if the meaning of the legislature is clear.29 And a person cannot be punished for an act not enumerated in the statute merely because it is within the reason or spirit of the statute, or the mischief 30 sought to 27 Alabama. Smith v. State, 52 Ala. 384. Colorado. Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525, 99 Pac. 330. Idaho. State v. Fite, 29 Idaho 463, 159 Pac. 1183. Illinois. Gibbons v. People, 33 Ill. 443. Iowa. State v. Claiborne, 185 Iowa 170, 170 N. W. 417, 3 A. L. R. 392; State v. Sherman, 46 Iowa 415. Michigan. People v. McKinney, 10 Mich. 54; People v. Plumsted, 2 Mich. 465. New York. People v. Forbes, 52 Hun 30, 4 N. Y. Supp. 757. The court is bound to look to the purpose of the statute, to the necessity for its enactment, and the object it was intended to accomplish." Hedderich v. State, 101 Ind. 564, 1 N. E. 47, 51 Am. Rep. 768. "The pre-existing law, the evils which arose out of it, and the remedy intended to be applied, are useful guides in the interpretation of a doubtful statute. A knowledge of the old law and the remedy applied by the new frequently points out the evil, and enables us to correct it." State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 334. 28 State v. Cooley, 141 Tenn. 33, 206 S. W. 182. 29 Indiana. Ball v. State, 50 Ind. 595. Michigan. People v. Plumsted, 2 Mich. 465. Pennsylvania. Warner v. Com., 1 Pa. 154, 44 Am. Dec. 114. South Carolina. State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey 334. Texas. Atkinson v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 229, 79 S. W. 31, 3 Ann. Cas. 839. 30 United States. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37; United States v. Williams, 159 Fed. 310. Connecticut. State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 76 Atl. 295; Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 10 Am. Dec. 100. Delaware. State v. Peo, 1 Pennew. 525, 42 Atl. 622. Iowa. State v. Lovell, 23 Iowa 304. Ohio. State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St. 340, 47 N. E. 138. Washington. State V. 110 Wash. 82, 188 Pac. 25. Hoffman, A statute will not be construed so as to include what is not within the language used merely because it partakes of similar mischievous qualities. People v. Reilly, 50 Mich. 384, 15 N. W. 520, 45 Am. Rep. 47. Only those transactions are included in the statute which are within both its spirit and its letter. State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St. 340, 47 N. E. 138. In Nebraska it is provided by statute that no person shall be punished for an offense which is not made penal by the plain import of the words of a statute upon pretense that he has offended against its spirit. Kinnan v. State, 86 Neb. 234, 125 N. be remedied, nor because it is of equal atrocity or of a kindred character with the acts there enumerated.31 § 68. Preamble and title of act. It is a well-settled principle, applicable to penal statutes, as well as to others, that the preamble and the title though they are no part of an act may be resorted to as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature.32 The title, however, can never be used to set at naught the obvious meaning of the statute itself.38 33 Nor can the name given to an act by way of designation or description change the plain import of its words.34 § 69. Construction with reference to the common law. Where a statute prescribes a punishment for an offense without defining it further than by giving it a name known to the common law, the common law must be resorted to in order to determine the nature and elements of the offense.35 And when a statute uses terms, which have W. 594, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478, 21 Ann. Cas. 335; Bailey v. State, 57 Neb. 706, 78 N. W. 284, 73 Am. St. Rep. 540; Moore v. State, 53 Neb. 831, 74 N. W. 319. It is sufficient if a case comes within the spirit and also within one reasonable interpretation of the letter of the statute, although a literal construction may be put upon it which would not include the case. United States v. Williams, 159 Fed. 310. 31 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37; State v. Peo, 1 Pennew. (Del.) 525, 42 Atl. 622. 32 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch (U. S.) 358, 2 L. Ed. 304. So where an act made it larceny for any person to fraudulently take from any field, not belonging to him, "any cotton, corn, rice, or other grain," etc., without saying anything as to its being severed before the taking, but the act was entitled, "An act to make the fraudulent and secret taking of cotton, corn, and other grain, before severance from the soil, larceny," the court took the title into consideration and held that the act made a severance and taking of growing grain larceny, though it was not larceny at common law. State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 334. 33 Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. Ed. 1002, 23 Sup. Ct. 821. It cannot overcome the meaning of plain and unambiguous words used in the body of the act. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, L. R. A. 1917 F 502, Ann. Cas. 1917 B 1168, aff'g 220 Fed. 545, 231 Fed. 106. 34 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, L. R. A. 1917 F 502, Ann. Cas. 1917 B 1168, aff'g 220 Fed. 545, 231 Fed. 106. 35 United States. United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611, 26 L. Ed. 1135; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 4 L. Ed. 471; In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104; United States v. Wilson, Baldw. 78, Fed. Cas. No. 16,730; United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209, Fed. Cas. No. 15,494. a settled meaning in the common law, this meaning is to be given. them, unless there is something to show that the legislature intended otherwise. Thus, the words "dwelling house," "breaking,' and "entry," in statutes defining and punishing burglary, "burning," in statutes defining and punishing arson, "from the person," "or by violence or putting in fear," in statutes defining and punishing robbery, etc., are, unless a contrary intention appears, to be given a construction in accordance with their meaning at common law.36 And where the legislature adopts the common-law definition of an offense, it must be deemed to have intended to adopt the content of each and law crimes. See § 22, supra. Alabama. Brooke V. State, 154 Ala. 53, 45 So. 622; Thompson v. State, 106 Ala. 67, 17 So. 512. Delaware. State v. Rash, 2 Boyce 77, 78 Atl. 405. Indiana. State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185, 38 Am. Rep. 117. Iowa. State v. Twogood, 7 Iowa 272. Kentucky. Payne v. Com., 110 S. W. 311. Massachusetts. Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dee. 711; Com. v. York, 9 Mete. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373. Minnesota. Benson v. State, 5 Minn. 19. Nebraska. Smith v. State, 58 Neb. 731, 78 N. W. 1059. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 Atl. 968; Respublica v. Roberts, Dall. 124, 1 Yeates 6, 1 L. Ed. 316. Texas. Prindle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 551, 21 S. W. 360, 37 Am. St. Rep. 833. Vermont. State v. Camley, 67 Vt. 322, 31 Atl. 840. Virginia. Houston v. Com., 87 Va. 257, 12 S. E. 385. West Virginia. State v. Pyles, 86 W. Va. 636, 104 S. E. 100. The common law must be looked to for the definition of a crime which is not a statutory offense. State V. Messner, 43 Wash. 206, 86 Pac. 636. This is equally true in those jurisdictions where there are no common. 36 Alabama. Ex parte Vincent, 26 Georgia. Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293. 165 Ill. 618, 46 N. E. 809. Iowa. State v. Calhoun, 72 Iowa 432, 34 N. W. 194, 2 Am. St. Rep. 252. Massachusetts. Com. v. Humphries, 7 Mass. 242. Michigan. Pitcher v. People, 16 Mich. 142. New York. Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561, 27 Am. Rep. 87; People v. Gates, 15 Wend. 159. Oklahoma. Crowell v. State, Okla. Cr. 148, 117 Pac. 883 ("steal"'). Virginia. Finch v. Com., 14 Gratt. 643. West Virginia. State v. Pyles, 86 "When words are used by the legislature in relation to a matter or subject, which, when used in reference to the same subject at common law, have obtained a fixed and definite meaning, the inference is irresistible that they were intended to be used in the common-law sense. 99 Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, 62 Am. Dec. 714. every word used therein as defined at the common law.87 But "where the statute clearly defines the thing or act which is forbidden, a resort to common-law definitions to add or detract from the effect of the language of the statute is neither necessary nor permissible." 38 Statutes defining and punishing offenses are also to be construed in accordance with the common law in relation to principals and accessaries, responsibility of children, insane persons, etc., and the necessity generally for a criminal intent.39 And the common-law elements of a crime may be considered in determining whether there was any intention to change them by a statute.40 Further, if the statute enjoin an act to be done, or prohibit it, without pointing out any mode of punishment, an indictment as at common law will lie.41 It must be remembered, however, that it is competent for the legis lature to create new offenses, and to extend the common-law definitions of particular offenses, so as to punish, under common-law names, acts not embraced in the common-law definitions.42 And it follows that identity in the name of offenses at common law and under a statute does not necessarily imply that the same elements, and no others, enter into both.43 But the rules of the common law are not to be 37 Dunville v. State, 188 Ind. 373, 123 N. E. 689. 28 State v. Clough, 181 Iowa 783, 165 N. W. 59. 39 Kentucky. Com. v. Carter, 94 Ky. 527, 23 S. W. 344; Stamper v. Com., 7 Bush. 612. Massachusetts. Com. v. Knox, 6 Mass. 76. South Carolina. State v. Martindale, 1 Bailey 163. Tennessee. Duncan v. State, 7 Humph. 148. England. Rex v. Groombridge, 7 Car. & P. 582. Statutes punishing any person who should dispose of crops or other property after giving a mortgage thereon, have been construed in the light of the common-law principle that the contract of an infant is voidable at his option, and it has been held that an infant's sale of property on which he has given a mortgage, being a disaffirmance and avoidance of the mortgage, does not render him liable under such a statute. State v. Plaisted, 43 N. H. 413; State V. Howard, 88 N. C. 650. Accessaries. State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154, 18 Ann. Cas. 293. Unless the plain intent of the statute creating an offense is to inflict punishment only on the person actually committing it, principals in the second degree and accessaries will be considered as within its terms. Com. v. Carter, 94 Ky. 527, 23 S. W. 344. 40 State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154, 18 Ann. Cas. 293. 41 4 Bl. Com. 122; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226; State v. Fletcher, 5 N. H. 257; State v. Parker, 91 N. C. 650. 42 See $29, supra. 43 People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108, 27 N. E. 970, 26 Am. St. Rep. 458. "In construing a statute which contains new and different elements |