sponsible for the act of a lien holder in selling it in violation of law by ratifying the sale.48 But a publisher who adopts an article written by another, and indorses the sentiments therein expressed, is as responsible for its publication as if he had written it himself.49 § 90. Intent may be inferred from circumstances. Intent need not necessarily be shown by direct or positive evidence, but it may be inferred from the circumstances.50 And this is equally true in cases where a specific intent is an essential element of the offense.51 48 So where the holder of a lien on pooled tobacco sells it without the consent of the agent to whom it is pooled, in violation of law, and without the knowledge or consent of the owner, the latter does not become criminally responsible by subsequently ratifying the sale. Cook v. Com., 141 Ky. 439, 132 S. W. 1032. 49 Where the article advocates murder, etc., he may be punished under a statute making it an offense to do any act which endangers the public peace. People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175, 58 L. R. A. 509, aff'g 71 App. Div. 160, 75 N. Y. Supp. 591. 50 California. People v. Hiltel, 131 Cal. 577, 63 Pac. 919. District of Columbia. Masters v. United States, 42 App. Cas. 350. Indiana. Bleiweiss v. State, 188 Ind. 184, 119 N. E. 375, 122 N. E. 577; Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E. 640. Missouri. State v. Santino, Mo. 186 S. W. 976. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Miller, 258 Pa. 226, 101 Atl. 1006. See also the cases cited in the following notes, and the chapters treating of the various specific offenses: 51 United States. Acers v. United States, 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. Ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. 91; Walsh v. United States, 174 Fed. 615; Hibbard v. United States, 172 Fed. 66, 18 Ann. Cas. 1040; McKnight v. United States, 115 Fed. 972. Alabama. Walls v. State, 90 Ala. 618, 8 So. 680; Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1; Williams v. State, 13 Ala. App. 133, 69 So. 376. Arkansas. Davis v. State, 115 Ark. 566, 173 S. W. 829; Hankins v. State, 103 Ark. 28, 145 S. W. 524; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 15 S. W. 889, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44. California. People v. Johnson, 131 Cal. 511, 63 Pac. 842; People v. Watson, 125 Cal. 342, 57 Pac. 1071; People v. Landman, 103 Cal. 577, 37 Pac. 518. Colorado. Keady V. People, 32 Colo. 57, 74 Pac. 892, 66 L. R. A. 353. Delaware. State v. Lichter, 7 Boyce 119, 102 Atl. 529; State v. Mills, 6 Pennew. 497, 69 Atl. 841. Florida. Peterson v. State, 41 Fla. 285, 26 So. 709. Illinois. Friederich v. People, 147 Ill. 310, 35 N. E. 472. Indiana. 220. Kunkle v. State, 32 Ind. Iowa. State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162 N. W. 28, L. R. A. 1917 D 944; State v. Gillett, 56 Iowa 459, 9 N. W. 362. Michigan. Mich. 401. Roberts v. People, 19 Missouri. State v. Wansong, 271 Mo. 50, 195 S. W. 999; State v. Patterson, 116 Mo. 505, 22 S. W. 696. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Miller, 258 Pa. 226, 101 Atl. 1006. Virginia. Wash v. Com., 16 Gratt. 530. § 91. Criminal intention presumed from act. As a general rule a criminal intent will be presumed from the intentional doing of an unlawful act, and the burden of overcoming this presumption is on the defendant.52 The act itself, in such case, is evidence of the intent.53 Generally this presumption or inference is one of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not one of law for the court.54 As a Washington. State v. Clark, 98 Wash. 81, 167 Pac. 84; State v. Davis, 72 Wash. 261, 130 Pac. 95. Wyoming. Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 311, 51 Pac. 879, 56 Pac. 596. As in prosecutions for forgery (see § 577, infra), or burglary (see § 479, infra), or larceny (see § 783 et seq., infra), or obtaining money or property by false pretenses (see § 248 et seq., infra), or assault with intent to kill (see § 409, infra), or to rape (see § 412, infra), or to rob (see § 413, infra), or to commit great bodily harm (see § 419, infra), and the like (see chapters dealing specifically with the various particular offenses). 52 United States. United States v. Breese, 173 Fed. 402, aff'd 203 Fed. 824; Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed. 225; McKnight v. United States, 115 Fed. 972. Alabama. Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 125, 24 So. 111; Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308, 23 Am. Rep. 575; Jacobs v. State, 17 Ala. App. 396, 85 So. 837; Williams v. State, 13 Ala. App. 133, 69 So. 376. California. People v. Ford, 25 Cal. App. 388, 143 Pac. 1075; People v. Moxley, 17 Cal. App. 466, 120 Pac. 43; People v. Wolfrom, 15 Cal. App. 732, 115 Pac. 1088. Illinois. Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991, 35 L. R. A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447. Mo. 505, 22 S. W. 696. New Mexico. State v. Blacklock, 23 N. M. 251, 167 Pac. 714. New York. Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. Rep. 492; People v. Kathan, 136 App. Div. 303, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1096; People v. Hegeman, 57 Misc. 295, 107 N. Y. Supp. 261. North Carolina. State v. Barnard, 88 N. C. 661; State v. Presnell, 12 Ired. 103. Oregon. State v. Selby, 73 Ore. 378, 144 Pac. 657. Texas. Combs v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 332, 116 S. W. 595. Utah. Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 Pac. 487. Vermont. Crawford v. Joslyn, 83 Vt. 361, 76 Atl. 108, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 428; Haynes v. Hall, 37 Vt. 20. Virginia. Harrison v. Com., 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. Rep. 634. West Virginia. State v. Abbott, 64 W. Va. 411, 62 S. E. 693. Intention to injure may be implied from the commission of an unlawful act which leads directly and naturally to an injury. Bleiweiss v. State, 188 Ind. 184, 119 N. E. 375, 122 N. E. 577; Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E. 640. Generally, in homicide, malice and an intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of the killing. See § 624, infra. 53 Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 125, 24 So. 111; State v. Lane (Mo. App.), 193 S. W. 949; People v. Kathan, 136 N. Y. App. Div. 303, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1096; Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 Pac. 487. 54 State v. Blacklock, 23 N. M. 251, rule it is not conclusive, but may be rebutted.55 But in the case of statutory crimes where the legislature has dispensed with the necessity for a criminal intent, a person who knowingly violates the statute will be conclusively charged with a criminal intent.56 How far it applies where a specific intent is an essential element of the offense will be considered in a separate section.57 § 92. Responsibility for unintended results. To constitute a criminal intent, so as to render a person responsible for the results of his acts, it is not always necessary that he shall have intended the particular results for which he is punished. Thus, if a person intends to commit one offense, and by reason of mistake of fact, or for any other reason, commits another, he may be punished for the latter.58 If a person strikes or shoots at one person and uninten 167 Pac. 714; People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324, 26 N. E. 267, 11 L. R. A. 807; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. Rep. 492. 55 McKnight v. United States, 115 Fed. 972; Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991, 35 L. R. A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447; State v. Barnard, 88 N. C. 661; Crawford v. Joslyn, 83 Vt. 361, 76 Atl. 108, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 428; Haynes v. Hall, 37 Vt. 20. And see § 94, infra. The inference may be, and often is, removed by the attending circumstances, showing the absence of a criminal intent. Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308, 23 Am. Rep. 575. Illinois. Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686. Iowa. State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa, 447. Massachusetts. Com. v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N. E. 504, 30 L. R. A. 734, 52 Am. St. Rep. 496; Com. v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862. Minnesota. State v. Damuth, 135 Minn. 76, 160 N. W. 196. Mississippi. McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772, 52 Am. Rep. 209; Barcus v. State, 49 Miss. 17, 19 Am. Rep. 1. Missouri. State v. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am. Rep. 131. Ohio. Callahan v. State, 21 Ohio St. 306. England. Rex v. Pedley, Cald. 218; Rex v. Conner, 7 Car. & P. 438; Reg. v. Latimer, 16 Cox C. C. 70, 17 Q. B. D. 359; Reg. v. Lynch, 1 Cox C. C. 361; Rex v. Brown, 1 Leach C. C. 148. And see cases cited in the sections referred to in the following notes: The intent with which a criminal act is done determines the legal character of its consequences, and this doctrine applies to cases where the consequences of the criminal act differ from those intended by the criminal. The rule is derived from the common law, but applies to statutory offenses as well. State v. Gallagher, 83 N. J. L. 321, 85 Atl. 207. A slave, who kills a white man, intending to kill a negro, is guilty of a criminal homicide in the degree in which he would have been guilty if the person slain had been a negro; and he is subject to the punishment prescribed for the commission of the offense upon a white person. Isham v. State, 38 Ala. 213. See Reg. v. Packard, Carr. & M. tionally injures another, or assaults a person under the mistaken belief that he is some one else, he is guilty of an assault and battery upon the person injured.59 A person who unintentionally kills one person while attempting to kill another is guilty of the same. degree of homicide of which he would have been guilty had the person intended been slain.60 And a person who unintentionally injures another while engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is guilty of an assault and battery.61 And it is murder to unintentionally kill another, while engaged in the commission of some felony.6 62 And it is manslaughter to unintentionally kill a person in committing an assault and battery.68 Nor is it a defense to a prosecution for adultery, where the intercourse is known to be illicit, that the accused did not know that the other party was married,64 nor to a prosecution for rape or having carnal knowledge of a girl under the statutory age of consent that the accused reasonably believed that she was above that age. 65 This principle has been held not to apply where the act is a mere civil wrong, and neither a crime nor immoral, as where it is a mere civil trespass upon land or goods.66 And some courts have held that it does not apply where the act is merely malum prohibitum,67 although there is also authority to the contrary.68 How far it applies in cases where a specific intent is an essential element of the offense is considered in another section.69 § 93. Natural and probable consequences. It is a general rule that every man of sufficient mental capacity to know what he is doing is presumed to have intended the necessary or natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.70 This presumption is not conclusive, however, but may be rebutted or overcome by evidence Ala. App. 396, 85 So. 837; Williams v. State, 13 Ala. App. 133, 69 So. 376; Pearce v. State, 4 Ala. App. 32, 58 So. 996. Arkansas. Hankins v. State, 103 Ark. 28, 145 S. W. 524; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 15 S. W. 889, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44. California. People v. Munn, 65 Cal. 215, 3 Pac. 650; People v. Ford, 25 Cal. App. 388, 143 Pac. 1075; People v. Moxley, 17 Cal. App. 466, 120 Pac. 43; People v. White, 5 Cal. App. 329, 90 Pac. 471. Delaware. State v. Pepe, 1 Boyce 232, 76 Atl. 367; State v. Moore, 1 Boyce 142, 74 Atl. 1112; State v. Mills, 6 Pennew. 497, 69 Atl. 841. Georgia. Conley v. State, 21 Ga. App. 134, 94 S. E. 261; Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41; Cosper v. State, 13 Ga. App. 301, 79 S. E. 94. Illinois. Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686. Indiana. Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21. Iowa. State v. Ockij, 165 Iowa 237, 145 N. W. 486; State v. Grossheim, 79 Iowa 75, 44 N. W. 541; State v. Gil. lett, 56 Iowa 459, 9 N. W. 362. Maine. State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am. Rep. 257. Massachusetts. Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen 173; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; Com. v. York, 9 Metc. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373. Michigan. People v. Hodge, 196 Mich. 546, 162 N. W. 966; People v. Sweeney, 55 Mich. 586, 22 N. W. 50. Mississippi. Barcus v. State, 49 Miss. 17, 19 Am. Rep. 1. Missouri. State v. Patterson, 116 Mo. 505, 22 S. W. 696. New Jersey. State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 Atl. 112, aff'd 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 Atl. 659. New York. People v. Meadows, 199 N. Y. 1, 92 N. E. 128, aff'g 136 App. Div. 226, 121 N. Y. Supp. 17; People v. Hegeman, 57 Misc. 295, 107 N. Y. Supp. 261. North Carolina. State v. Holmes, 120 N. C. 573, 26 S. E. 692; State v. White Oak River Corp., 111 N. C. 661, 16 S. E. 331; State v. Barnard, 88 N C. 661; State v. King, 86 N. C. 603. Oklahoma. Wells v. Territory, 14 Okla. 436, 78 Pac. 124; Jones v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 255, 154 Pac. 689; Tyner v. United States, 2 Okla. Cr. 689, 103 Pac. 1057. Texas. High v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 10 S. W. 238, 8 Am. St. Rep. 488. Virginia. Harrison v. Com., 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. Rep. 634. Washington. State V. Clark, 98 Wash. 81, 167 Pac. 84; State v. Davis, 72 Wash. 261, 130 Pac. 95. West Virginia. State v. Abbott, 64 W. Va. 411, 62 S. E. 693; State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E. 676; State v. Welch, 36 W. Va. 690, 15 S. E. 419. Wisconsin. Cupps v. State, 120 Wis. 504, 97 N. W. 210, 98 N. W. 546, 102 Am. St. Rep. 996. "When one puts in motion machinery, knowing the results to follow, he is responsible for all criminal acts that are the natural and intended results of his action." Phillips v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. 627, 167 S. W. 353. So it is murder at common law and under most of the statutes where death results from an assault or other unlawful act intentionally done in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm, although there may have been no actual intent to kill. See § 623, infra. For other applications of the rule see the chapters dealing with the various specific crimes. |