as the only test,92 although some of the courts go further and hold States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489, 54 Am. Rep. 293. Georgia. This is the rule aside from cases of delusional insanity. Bowden v. State, Ga. -, 106 S. E. 575; Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115, 72 S. E. 922; Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500, 51 S. E. 506; Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 296; Spann v. State, 47 Ga. 553; Carter v. State, 2 Ga. App. 254, 58 S. E. 532. Illinois. People v. Lowhone, 292 Ill. 32, 126 N. E. 620; s. c., 296 Ill. 391, 129 N. E. 781; O'Shea v. People, 218 Ill. 352, 75 N. E. 981; Meyer v. People, 156 Ill. 126, 40 N. E. 490; Lilly v. People, 148 Ill. 467, 36 N. E. 95; Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620, 32 N. E. 677, 18 L. R. A. 237; Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635; Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385, 83 Am. Dec. 231. Kentucky. Hall v. Com., 155 Ky. 541, 159 S. W. 1155; Thompson v. Com., 155 Ky. 333, 159 S. W. 829; Abbott v. Com., 107 Ky. 624, 55 S. W. 196; Montgomery v. Com., 88 Ky. 509, 11 S. W. 475. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Massachusetts. Com. v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 N. E. 336; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458. Michigan. People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 N. W. 109. Montana. State V. Colbert, 58 Mont. 584, 194 Pac. 145; State v. Crowe, 39 Mont. 174, 102 Pac. 579, 18 Ann. Cas. 643. Nebraska. Hawe v. State, 11 Neb. 537, 10 N. W. 452, 38 Am. Rep. 375. New York. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216. Pennsylvania. Com. v. De Marzo, 223 Pa. 573, 72 Atl. 893; Com. v. Hallowell, 223 Pa. 494, 72 Atl. 845; Com. v. Barner, 199 Pa. 335, 49 Atl. 60. Texas. Thomas v. State, 40 Tex. 60; Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500, 62 Am. Dec. 539. Utah. This is the proper test where the only question is as to general insanity, and there is no evidence of any mental lesion, disease, weakness, or other aberration. State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 Pac. 632, L. R. A. 1916 D 590, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 537; State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 545. Vermont. State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 108 Atl. 391; Rogers v. State, 77 Vt. 454, 61 Atl. 489; Doherty v. State, 73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113. Wyoming. Flanders v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 Pac. 39, 1121. And see the cases cited in the following notes: The accused must have sufficient mind to see all the essential ingredients of the offense and acknowledge their existence. People v. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334, 11 N. W. 184. For this reason, in the case cited, where temporary insanity was set up as a defense in the prosecution for larceny, it was held erroneous to charge that, if the accused knew enough to know that he was taking property that did not belong to him, he was sane enough to be guilty. He might have had mind enough to know this, it was said, and yet not enough to fraudulently intend to deprive the owner permanently of his property. 92 United States. Perkins v. United States, 228 Fed. 408, rev'g 221 Fed. 109. California. People v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6; People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124; People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329, 63 Am. St. Rep. 72; People v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120, 45 Am. Rep. 651; that a person is not criminally responsible for an act if done solely by reason of an insane irresistible impulse, though he may have. known that it was both morally and legally wrong.93 People v. McDonell, 47 Cal. 134; People v. Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168, 128 Pac. 798; People v. Estes, 36 Cal. App. Dec. 343, holding that confu sional insanity is not a defense unless it meets this test. Delaware. State v. Cole, 2 Pennew. 344, 45 Atl. 391. Florida. Hall V. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513; Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822. Iowa. Fouts v. State, 4 G. Greene 500. Kansas. State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 33 Pac. 287, 24 L. R. A. 555. Minnesota. State v. Williams, 96 Minn. 351, 105 N. W. 265. Mississippi. Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360. - Missouri. State v. Weagley, Mo. - 228 S. W. 817; State v. Rose, 271 Mo. 17, 195 S. W. 1013; State v. Porter, 213 Mo. 43, 111 S. W. 529, 127 Am. St. Rep. 589; State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193, 101 S. W. 27. Nebraska. Philbrick v. State, Neb. 179 N. W. 398; Schwartz v. State, 65 Neb. 196, 91 N. W. 190; Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 78 N. W. 508, 76 Am. St. Rep. 78. New Jersey. State v. Maioni, 78 N. J. L. 339, 74 Atl. 526, 20 Ann. Cas. 204. New York. People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978; People v. Carlin, 194 N. Y. 448, 87 N. E. 805; People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 87 N. E. 457; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep. 731; People v. Nyhan, 171 N. Y. Supp. 466. North Carolina. State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72; State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 458, 6 S. E. 657. South Carolina. State v. Bramlett, 114 S. C. 389, 103 S. E. 755; State v. Bethune, 88 S. C. 401, 71 S. E. 29; State v. Jackson, 87 S. C. 407, 69 S. E. 883; State v. McIntosh, 39 S. C. 97, 17 S. E. 446; State v. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 8 S. E. 440, 14 Am. St. Rep. 879. Tennessee. Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S. W. 168; Bond v. State, 129 Tenn. 75, 165 S. W. 229; Johnson v. State, 100 Tenn. 254, 45 S. W. 436. Texas. Woods v. State, 67 Tex. Cr. 569, 150 S. W. 633; Hogue v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. 539, 146 S. W. 905; Kelley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 151, 101 S. W. 230. West Virginia. State v. Alie, 82 W. Va. 601, 96 S. E. 1011; State v. Cook, 69 W. Va. 717, 72 S. E. 1025; State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982, 18 L. R. A. 224. Wisconsin. Aborn V. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966, reviewing and distinguishing earlier Wisconsin cases; Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365, 99 N. W. 593. See also § 120, infra. § 118. - Meaning of rule. According to the weight of authority, the knowledge of right and wrong test is capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, not in the abstract, but as to the particular act. If such capacity existed, the accused is fully responsible, though in other respects he may have been insane.94 And if it did not exist in respect to the particular act, then he is not responsible although he knew or could distinguish right from wrong in the general affairs of life.95 Nor is he responsible if he does not have sufficient capacity to distinguish between right and wrong although he understands the nature of the act.96 Knowledge that an act is forbidden by law will in most cases permit an inference of knowledge that it is also morally wrong,97 and will generally be sufficient to render the accused responsible.98 But the word "wrong" is not necessarily or always limited to legal as dis tinguished from moral wrong.99 The test has been said to be capacity Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. Illinois. Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620, 32 N. E. 677, 18 L. R. A. 237; Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635. Missouri. State v. Paulsgrove, 203 New York. Freeman v. People, 4 South Carolina. State v. Bramlett, 114 S. C. 389, 103 S. E. 755; State v. Jackson, 87 S. C. 407, 69 S. E. 883; State v. McIntosh, 39 S. C. 97, 17 S. E. 446; State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439, 58 Am. Rep. 263. Texas. Thomas v. State, 40 Tex. 60. England. McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595. Contra. Thompson v. Com., 155 Ky. 333, 159 S. W. 829. 95 Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. As to insane delusions, see § 119, infra. 96 Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 78 N. W. 508, 76 Am. St. Rep. 78. In Vermont it is sufficient if he could not, by reason of mental disease, perceive that his act was wrong, and it is not necessary that, in addition, he was ignorant of the character and consequences of his act. State v. Kelley, 74 Vt. 278, 52 Atl. 434. The capacity to plan a crime does not necessarily imply sanity. And it has been held wrong, therefore, to instruct the jury that a person accused of homicide is responsible, if he had sufficient power of mind "to deliberate and premeditate a design to effect the death" of the deceased. Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N. W. 912, 46 Am. Rep. 26. 97 People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978. 98 Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S. W. 168. 99 People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D 519, to distinguish moral or legal right from moral or legal wrong, and to recognize the particular act as morally or legally wrong.1 If there is an insane delusion that God has directed the commission of the act, it cannot be said that the defendant knows the act to be wrong although he knows that it is forbidden by law, and he will be held not to be responsible although he has such knowledge. But a belief that providence will intervene to prevent the detection and punishment of any act he may commit is not a defense where he knows that his act is a violation of the criminal law.3 § 119. Insane delusions. A man may be insane as to certain objects, or on certain subjects only, and perfectly sane with respect to other objects and on other subjects. In such a case he labors under partial insanity, or insane delusions. Because of disease of the mind. he sees objects in a false light, or believes in the existence of facts which do not exist. In respect to this species of insanity the judges in McNaghten's case, referred to in a preceding section, held that in case a person labors under a partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real, and that if he would have been exempt from punishment if the facts had been really as he, by reason of his delusion, supposed them to be, he is not criminally responsible, but if he would have been liable to punishment even if the facts had been as he believed them to be, then he is responsible. This rule is still recognized in England, and has been generally adopted and applied by the courts in this country. Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978, reviewing the cases on the subject. Capacity to know that one's acts are in violation of law is not recognized separately as one of the tests of insanity. Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186. "Cases may be found where, in explaining what is meant by knowledge that an act is wrong, the courts have blended the elements of legal and moral wrong, but none, we believe, can be found in which the element of moral wrong has been excluded." People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978. 1 State v. Bramlett, 114 S. C. 389, 103 S. E. 755; State v. Jackson, 87 S. C. 407, 69 S. E. 883; State v. McIntosh, 39 S. C. 97, 17 S. E. 446. 2 Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161; People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916 D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 978. 3 Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S. W. 168. 4 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595. 5 See Reg. v. Burton, 3 Fost. & F. 772; Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281. 6 Arkansas. Hankins v. State, 133 According to the weight of authority, an insane delusion, as was stated in the McNaghten case, is no ground of exemption, unless the party would be exempt if the facts were really as he supposed. Thus, a man is responsible for a homicide committed as the result of an in Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784; Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 30, 180 S. W. 186; Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S. W. 237; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. Colorado. Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, L. R. A. 1917 F 646, Ann. Cas. 1917 C 605. Georgia. Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500, 51 S. E. 506; Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310; Carter v. State, 2 Ga. App. 254, 58 S. E. 532. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Maine. State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574. Massachusetts. Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458. Mississippi. Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360. Nebraska. Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N. W. 338. New York. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216. Pennsylvania. Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 262; Com. v. Freth, 3 Phila. 105, 5 Clark 455; Com. v. Winnemore, 1 Brewst. 356. Texas. Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 70, 45 S. W. 21. And see the other cases cited in the following notes: Insane delusion is insanity, whether partial or general. State v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 304. This form of insanity is variously denominated "partial insanity," "monomania," or "paranoia" in its first stage of development. Hankins v. State, 133 Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784. 7 Arkansas. Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. California. People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329, 63 Am. St. Rep. 72. State V. Mewherter, 46 Iowa. Iowa 88. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Mississippi. Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665, 35 L. R. A. 117. Nebraska. Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N. W. 338. Nevada. State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241. New York. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. Rep. 625. • England. McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595. And see the other cases cited in the following notes: In Arkansas this is true of a person afflicted with paranoia in its first or earliest stage of development, but when that disease has reached the second stage or subsequent stage, and its form and hallucinations are such as to indicate that its victim, because of the disease, is no longer able to control his will and actions, then the doctrine of irresistible impulse applies. Hankins v. State, 133 Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784; Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S. W. 237. |