The mere fact that a person has become degraded and depraved in his morals by the excessive use of intoxicants does not alone constitute insanity within this rule, however, nor absolve him from responsibility.74 § 131. Drunkenness of insane person. If a person is insane to such an extent as to be irresponsible, under the rules governing the criminal responsibility of insane persons,75 the fact that he is also voluntarily drunk at the time he commits an act does not render him responsible. "It is as possible for an insane man to get drunk as a sane man. The addition of drunkenness to insanity does not withdraw from such person the protection due to insanity, but, where ordinarily regard remote causes. United States v. Drew, 5 Mason 28, Fed. Cas. No. 14,993. Mania a potu is a brief or temporary madness or insanity, resulting from protracted hard drinking immediately preceding the commission of the act. State v. Hand, 1 Marv. (Del.) 545, 41 Atl. 192. To constitute a defense the insanity or delirium tremens must be such as to render the accused incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. California. People v. Fellows, 122 Cal. 233, 54 Pac. 830. Delaware. State v. Hand, 1 Marv. 545, 41 Atl. 192. Georgia. Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115, 72 S. E. 922; Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452. Missouri. State v. Riley, 100 Mo. 493, 13 S. W. 1063. Oklahoma. Agent v. State, Okla. Cr. - 194 Pac. 233; Tubby v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 496, 178 Pac. 491; McCarter v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 305, 170 Pac. 712; Cheadle v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 566, 149 Pac. 919, L. R. A. 1915 E 1031. Utah. State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 Pac. 275. It is not sufficient to show merely that the accused was suffering from mania a potu, but it must be connected as part of the transaction, and the jury must be satisfied that by reason of that fact he was not responsible for the crime. State V. Hand, 1 Marv. (Del.) 545, 41 Atl. 192. It must be shown to have antedated the fit of drunkenness during the existence of which the act was committed. State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 22 So. 254, 62 Am. St. Rep. 644. And to have existed at the very time the act was committed. The presumption of continued insanity does not apply to delirium tremens, and proof of prior attacks raises no presumption of its existence when the offense was committed. State V. Thomas, Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 511; State v. Kavanaugh, 4 Pennew (Del.) 131, 53 Atl. 335. The insane condition must be the remote and not the immediate effect of intoxication. That defendant had from the length of his debauch become "crazy drunk" is no defense. State v. Haab, 105 La. 230, 29 So. 725. 74 Sharp v. State, 161 Ind. 288, 68 N. E. 286. 75 See § 113 et seq., supra. a person commits homicide during drunkenness, reliance must be placed upon the original insanity itself, and not upon the subsequent drunkenness.'' 76 Generally, mental unsoundness, short of that which would of itself excuse the defendant, will not excuse him for a crime committed while he was intoxicated, although it renders him more susceptible to the influence of intoxicants than a normal man would be.77 So if a person knows or has good reason to believe that by reason of a dormant tendency to insanity, intoxication will be likely to produce an extraordinary degree of mental derangement beyond the effects likely to be produced upon persons free from any such tendency, he must be held to have intended this extraordinary derangement as well as the intoxication and the other results produced by it, and his responsibility for acts done while intoxicated is the same as though no such tendency had existed.78 But it has been held that if he is ignorant that he has any such tendency, and has no reason to believe that such extraordinary effects are likely to result 76 Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424; State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 22 So. 254, 62 Am. St. Rep. 664; People v. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334, 11 N. W. 184, 186; Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 42 N. W. 243. And see Edwards v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 386, 43 S. W. 112, 39 L. R. A. 262. When the defendant is shown to have been insane, it helps nothing to show that he was intoxicated as well. Com. v. Snyder, 224 Pa. 526, 73 Atl. 910. In State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 22 So. 254, 62 Am. St. Rep. 664, it was held that, when a charge of murder is defended on the ground that the accused was laboring under delirium tremens at the time of the commitment of the act, and that he was therefore unable to know, realize, or appreciate what he was doing, the delirium tremens must be shown to have antedated the fit of drunkenness during which the act was committed. The court said: "In other words, if a person, being in possession of his mental faculties, voluntarily gets into a fit of drunkenness, and during such drunkenness commits a homicide under a diseased mental condition, occasioned by the same, he cannot set up such diseased mental condition as an excuse for his act; that, in order that a man should stand excused for a homicide committed during drunkenness, and while in a diseased mental condition, the diseased mental condition which excuses the homicide should be able to be successfully urged as an excuse for the act of getting drunk." 77 So epilepsy not resulting in legal insanity will not excuse a crime com. mitted by the defendant while intoxicated, though its effect is to produce a state of mind easily excited by provocation which is intensified by intoxication to a degree that would be unexpected in one not epileptic from the same amount of drink. Com. v. Snyder, 224 Pa. 526, 73 Atl. 910. 78 Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424; Upstone v. People, 109 Ill. 169; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401. from his intoxication, he will not be held responsible for such extraordinary effects, but as to them his responsibility will be judged as in cases of insanity alone.79 § 132. Drunkenness may negative specific intent or knowledge— In general. Proof of drunkenness, though voluntary, is admissible, and may constitute a defense, when the accused is charged with an offense of which some specific intent is an essential element. As the offense cannot be committed without such an intent, if the fact of drunkenness negatives its existence, as where it appears that the accused was so drunk that he could not have entertained such an intent, it necessarily constitutes a complete defense.80 This is true, for example, in prosecutions for assault with intent to kill or mur 79 Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401. 80 United States. Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. Ed. 873. Alabama. McLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. 274, 25 So. 247. Arkansas. Byrd v. State, 76 Ark. 286, 88 S. W. 974; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 15 S. W. 889, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44. California. People v. Hill, 123 Cal. 47, 55 Pac. 692; People v. Fellows, 122 Cal. 233, 54 Pac. 830; People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 30 Pac. 581; People v. Ferris, 55 Cal. 588; People v. Goodrum, 31 Cal. App. 430, 160 Pac. 690. Delaware. State v. Di Guglielmo, 4 Pennew. 336, 55 Atl. 350. V. District of Columbia. Sabens United States, 40 App. Cas. 440. Florida. Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232. Illinois. People v. Jones, 263 Ill. 564, 105 N. E. 744; Addison v. People, 193 Ill. 405, 62 N. E. 235. Indiana. Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N. E. 123, 8 L. R. A. 33. Kansas. State v. Rumble, 81 Kan. 16, 105 Pac. 1, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 376. Michigan. People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401. Minnesota. State V. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154. Nebraska. Head v. State, 43 Neb. 30, 61 N. W. 494; Hill v. State, 42 Neb. 503, 60 N. W. 916. New York. People v. Gerdvine, 210 N. Y. 184, 104 N. E. 129; People v. Pekarz, 185 N. Y. 470, 78 N. E. 294; People v. Mills, 98 N. Y. 176; People v. Robinson, 2 Park. Cr. 235. North Carolina. State V. Foster, 172 N. C. 960, 90 S. E. 785; State v. Shelton, 164 N. C. 513, 79 S. E. 883; State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72; State v. Murphy, 157 N. C. 614, 72 S. E. 1075. Ohio. Cline v. State, 43 Ohio St. 332, 1 N. E. 22; Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555, 45 Am. Dec. 558. Oklahoma. Miller V. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 55, 130 Pac. 813. Oregon. State v. Trapp, 56 Ore. 588, 109 Pac. 1094. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 Atl. 271. Tennessee. Pirtle V. State, 9 Humph. 663. Texas. Loza v. State, 1 Tex. App. 488, 28 Am. Rep. 416. Utah. State v. Dewey, 41 Utah. 538, 127 Pac. 275. West Virginia. State v. Phillips, 81 der, or to inflict great bodily harm,82 or to commit rape,88 and in prosecutions for burglary, wherein a specific intent to commit a felony or crime must be shown; 84 for larceny or robbery, wherein an intent to steal-the animus furandi-must be shown; 85 for cruelty 80 W. Va. 748, 93 S. E. 828, L. R. A. 1918 A 1164; State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799. England. Steph. Dig. Crim. Law, art. 29; Reg. v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463. See also other cases cited in the following notes, and see § 133, infra. 81 Alabama. Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 So. 268; Fonville v. State, 91 Ala. 39, 8 So. 688; Williams v. State, 13 Ala. App. 133, 69 So. 376. Arkansas. Alford v. State, 110 Ark. 300, 161 S. W. 497; Chowning v. State, 91 Ark. 503, 121 S. W. 735, 18 Ann. Cas. 529; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 15 S. W. 889, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44. California. People v. Nihell, 144 Cal. 200, 77 Pac. 916. Connecticut. State v. Fiske, 63 Conn. 388, 28 Atl. 572, where a charge to this effect was held to be sufficiently favorable to the accused. Illinois. Crosby v. People, 137 Ill. 325, 27 N. E. 49. Indiana. Booher v. State, 156 Ind. 435, 60 N. E. 156, 4 L. R. A. 391. Iowa. State v. Cather, 121 Iowa 106, 96 N. W. 722. Louisiana. State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086, 36 Am. Rep. 293. Michigan. Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401. Ohio. Cline v. State, 43 Ohio St. 332, 1 N. E. 22. Washington. State V. Dolan, 17 Wash. 499, 50 Pac. 472. 82 State v. Grear, 28 Minn. 426, 10 N. W. 472, 41 Am. Rep. 296; State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154. 83 Alabama. Whitten v. State, 115 Ala. 72, 22 So. 483. Delaware. State v. Truitt, 5 Pennew. 466, 62 Atl. 790. Illinois See Addison v. People, 193 Ill. 405, 62 N. E. 235. Nebraska. Head v. State, 43 Neb. 30, 61 N. W. 494. Rhode Island. State v. Vanasse, 42 R. I. 278, 107 Atl. 85. Texas. Reagan v. State, 28 Tex. App. 227, 12 S. W. 601, 19 Am. St. Rep. 833. 84 California. People v. Phelan, 93 Cal. 111, 28 Pac. 855. Florida. Jenkins v. State, 58 Fla. 62, 50 So. 582. Illinois. People v. Jones, 263 Ill. 564, 105 N. E. 744; Bruen v. People, 206 Ill. 417, 69 N. E. 24; Schwabacher v. People, 165 Ill. 618, 46 N. E. 809. Iowa. State v. Bell, 29 Iowa 316. Kentucky. Hayes v. Com. 171 Ky. 291, 188 S. W. 415. This is true where there is no showing that any property was taken or attempted to be taken after the entry of the building. State v. Phillips, 80 W. Va. 748, 93 S. E. 828, L. R. A. 1918 A 1164, distinguishing State v. Shores, 31 W. Va. 491, 7 S. E. 413, 13 Am. St. Rep. 875, where it was held that intoxication was no defense, on the ground that in that case there was an appropriation of property after the entry from which the necessary specific intent to steal could be inferred. 85 Alabama. Chatham v. State, 92 Ala. 47, 9 So. 607. Arkansas. Wood v. State, 34 Ark. 341, 36 Am. Rep. 13. Delaware. State v. Kavanaugh, 4 Pennew. 131, 53 Atl. 335. to animals, where a malicious intent is an essential element of the offense; 86 for obtaining money under false pretenses; 87 for going out of the state and contracting a bigamous marriage with intent to return; 88 for an attempt to commit a crime, wherein it must be shown that there was the specific intent to commit the particular crime charged to have been attempted; 89 for conspiracy; 90 for perjury; for arson; 92 for bribery; 93 or for forgery.94 91 On the same principle, proof of voluntary drunkenness may be shown to negative the existence of a knowledge of particular facts, when such knowledge is an essential element of the offense charged, as in prosecutions for passing counterfeit money or uttering a forged instrument, in which it is necessary to allege and prove that the accused knew that the money was counterfeit or the instrument, forged.95 And the same has been held to be true of a prosecution for illegally voting at an election,96 although there is authority to the contrary.97 Georgia. Walker v. State, 9 Ga. App. 863, 72 S. E. 446. Illinois. Bartholomew V. People, 104 Ill. 601, 44 Am. Rep. 97. Kentucky. Brennon v. Com., 169 Ky. 815, 185 S. W. 489; Mearns v. Com., 164 Ky. 213, 175 S. W. 355; Terhune v. Com., 144 Ky. 370, 138 S. W. 274; Keeton v. Com., 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 748. Michigan. People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156. Nebraska. Latimer v. State, 55 Neb. 609, 76 N. W. 207, 70 Am. St. Rep. 403. North Dakota. State v. Koerner, 8 N. D. 292, 78 N. W. 981, 73 Am. St. Rep. 752. Texas. Loza v. State, 1 Tex. App. 488, 28 Am. Rep. 416. Wisconsin. State v. Schingen, 20 Wis. 74. Contra, Dawson v. State, 16 Ind. 428, 79 Am. Dec. 439. 86 State v. Avery, 44 N. H. 392. 87 People v. Neetens, 184 Pac. 27. 88 State v. Bacon, Atl. 682. Cal. App. 89 Reagan v. State, 28 Tex. App. 227, 12 S. W. 601, 19 Am. St. Rep. 833 (where the charge was attempt to rape); Reg. v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463 (where the charge was attempt to commit suicide). 90 McLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. 274, 25 So. 247; Booher v. State, 156 Ind. 435, 60 N. E. 156, 54 L. R. A. 391. 91 Williams v. Com., 113 Ky. 652, 68 S. W. 871; Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196; Lyle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 103, 19 S. W. 903. Compare People v. Willey, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 19, and Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502. 92 Kehoe v. Com., 149 Ky. 400, 149 S. W. 818. 93 White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 63. 94 People v. Blake, 65 Cal. 275, 4 Pac. 1. 95 United States V. Roudenbush, Baldw. 514, Fed. Cas. No. 16,198; Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555, 45 Am. Dec. 558. 96 People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678. 97 McCook v. State, 91 Ga. 740, 17 S. E. 1019; State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22. |