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riage is a continuing one, and the statute does not run so long as the cohabitation continues.4

In jurisdictions where the offense of abandoning and failing or neglecting to provide for one's wife or children is not regarded as a continuing one, the statute commences to run from the date when a complete act of abandonment occurs, and is not tolled although the separation and failure to provide continues, unless there is a renewal of the association between the parties after an abandonment, and a new abandonment occurring subsequently, in which case the statute will run from the date of such subsequent abandonment. But in those jurisdictions where the offense is held to be a continuing one, the statute does not run so long as the failure to provide continues, regardless of when the original abandonment occurred.9

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§ 202. — Bastardy. Generally in bastardy proceedings the offense is consummated and the statute commences to run from the date of the birth of the child,10 and this is the rule by express statutory provision in some states.11 But under some statutes limitations begin to run on the refusal of the putative father to give bond and make payments required by the statute.12 And it has been held that the

Pitts v. State, 147 Ga. 801, 95 S. E. 706; s. c., 22 Ga. App. 247, 95 S. E.

935.

This is true under a statute providing that "if any person shall have two wives or two husbands at one and the same time, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Gise v. Com., 81 Pa. St. 428.

4 The prosecution is not barred where the cohabitation continues to a time within the period fixed by the statute, although the bigamous marriage took place more than the statutory period before the finding of the indictment. State v. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 7 N. W. 516.

5 See § 1138, infra.

6 People v. Heise, 257 Ill. 443, 100 N. E. 1000; State v. Langdon, 159 Ind. 377, 65 N. E. 1; State v. Hannon, 168 N. C. 215, 83 S. E. 701; State v. Davis, 79 N. C. 603.

7 People v. Heise, 257 Ill. 443, 100 N. E. 1000; State v. Beam, 181 N. C.

597, 107 S. E. 429; State v. Hannon, 168 N. C. 215, 83 S. E. 701; State v. Davis, 79 N. C. 603.

8 See § 1138, infra.

9 Richardson V. State, 7 Boyce (Del.) 534, 109 Atl. 124; Towns v. State, 24 Ga. App. 265, 100 S. E. 575; Phelps v. State, 10 Ga. App. 41, 72 S. E. 524; McRae v. State, 104 Miss. 861, 61 So. 977. And see Vance v. Means, 104 Miss. 227, 61 So. 305; Com. v. Wibner, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 349.

10 Neff v. State, 57 Md. 385; Bake v. State, 21 Md. 422.

11 State v. Perry, 122 N. C. 1043, 30 S. E. 139; State v. Hedgepeth, 122 N. C. 1039, 30 S. E. 140.

This is true although the relatrix is an infant, since the state, and not the relatrix, is the plaintiff. State v. Pavey, 82 Ind. 543.

12 Jones v. State, 11 Ga. App. 760, 76 S. E. 72.

statute commences to run against the offense of fornication and bastardy from the date of the fornication rather than from the date of the birth of the child.18

§ 203. Exceptions to and interruption of statute-In general. Generally, after the statute of limitations has commenced to run it cannot be interrupted by the happening of any subsequent event or disability 14 in the absence of an express provision to that effect.15 And even definitely expressed statutory exceptions refer to conditions existing when the cause for prosecution accrued, and not to those of the same general character subsequently arising.16

§ 204. - Absence from state; nonresidence. The fact that the accused absents himself from the state will not prevent the running of limitations unless the statute so provides.17 But it is sometimes provided by statute that if the accused is out of the state when the crime is committed the indictment may be found or the prosecution instituted within the time prescribed after he comes into the state.18 And statutes in many states, in somewhat varying terms, provide that any time during which the person committing a crime is absent from the state,19 or is not an inhabitant of or usually resident within

13 Com. v. Ruffner, 28 Pa. St. 259. 14 State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S. E. 401.

And see §§ 204, 205, infra.

So when the statute has once commenced to run against the crime of withholding money by an attorney from his client, it is not tolled by subsequent demands for payment made by the client. State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S. E. 401.

And where the statute has commenced to run against the crime of a failure on the part of a public officer to pay over public money in his hands to his successor in office, the statute is not tolled by subsequent demands and refusals. State v. Mason, 108 Ind. 48, 8 N. E. 716. And see State v. Ensley, 177 Ind. 483, 97 N. E. 113, Ann. Cas. 1914 D 1306. And time during which the accused was

imprisoned cannot be excluded in computing the statutory period. United States v. Hewecker, 79 Fed. 59; State v. Bowman, 106 Kan. 430, 188 Pac. 242; In re Griffith, 35 Kan. 377, 11 Pac. 174.

15 See §§ 204, 205, 206, infra.

16 See State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S. E. 401.

17 Rouse v. State, 44 Fla. 148, 32 So. 784, 1 Ann. Cas. 317.

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18 People v. Miller, 12 Cal. 291; State v. Steensland, Idaho -, 195 Pac. 1080; People v. Bailey, 103 N. Y. Misc. 366, 171 N. Y. Supp. 394; Coleman v. Territory, 5 Okla. 201, 47 Pac. 1079.

19 Pitts v. State, 147 Ga. 801, 95 S. E. 706; s. c., 22 Ga. App. 247, 95 S. E. 935; Colvin v. State, 127 Ind. 403, 26 N. E. 888; Whitaker v. State, 12 Tex. App. 436.

the state,20 or usually in personal attendance upon business or employment within the state,21 shall not be included in computing the period of limitation. Statutes of the latter kind are generally he'd to apply regardless of whether the accused was a resident of the state,22 or was within or without the state,23 when the offense was committed, and hence to apply to a person who is in the state at that time and afterwards leaves it.24 But there is authority to the effect that they apply only to persons not in the state when the crime.

20 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases:

California. People v. Montejo, 18 Cal. 38.

Idaho. State v. Steensland, Idaho, 195 Pac. 1080. Illinois. People v. Whittington, 143 Ill. App. 438.

Iowa. State v. Soper, 118 Iowa 1, 91 N. W. 774.

Missouri. State v. Kullman, 225 Mo. 625, 125 S. W. 449; State v. Miller, 188 Mo. 370, 87 S. W. 484. Montana. State V. Clemens, 40 Mont. 567, 107 Pac. 896.

New York. People v. Bailey, 103 Misc. 366, 171 N. Y. Supp. 394; People v. Buccolieri, 91 Misc. 156, 152 N. Y. Supp. 707; People v. Sewell, 56 Misc. 250, 107 N. Y. Supp. 382. Oklahoma. Coleman v. Territory, 5 Okla. 201, 47 Pac. 1079.

Wisconsin. State v. Heller, 76 Wis. 517, 45 N. W. 307.

The words "inhabitant of" and "usually resident within" are synonymous, although connected by the word "or" in the statute. State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S. W. 12. Compare State v. Kullman, 225 Mo. 625, 125 S. W. 449.

In Michigan the statute to this ef fect, by its terms, applies only to prosecutions which are required to be commenced within six years, and does not apply to a prosecution for seduction, which is required to be commenced within one year. People v. Clement, 72 Mich. 116, 40 N. W. 190.

The Pennsylvania statute provides that if the defendant shall not have been an inhabitant of the state, or usual resident therein during the respective terms for which he shall be subject and liable to prosecution, an indictment may be brought against him at any time within a similar space of time during which he shall be an inhabitant of or usually resident within the state. Com. V. Weber, 259 Pa. 592, 103 Atl. 348, aff'g 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 497. The commonwealth makes out a prima facie case under this provision by showing the flight of the defendant from his usual place of residence within the state in order to avoid arrest, and that he could not be found in the state although efforts were made to find him. Blackman v. Com., 124 Pa. St. 578, 17 Atl. 194.

21 People v. Bailey, 103 N. Y. Misc. 366, 171 N. Y. Supp. 394.

22 Com. v. Wilcox, 56 Pa. Super. Ct. 244.

23 Coleman v. Territory, 5 Okla. 201, 47 Pac. 1079.

24 California. People v. Montejo, 18 Cal. 38.

Illinois. People V. Whittington, 143 Ill. App. 438.

52.

Indiana. Ulmer v. State, 14 Ind.

Iowa. State v. McIntire, 58 Iowa 572, 12 N. W. 593.

New York. People v. Sewell, 56 Misc. 250, 107 N. Y. Supp. 382.

was committed, and not to a person who commits a crime while. within the state and afterwards leaves it.25

They do not refer to mere absence from the state, but only to such absence as destroys residence or domicile, and where the accused continues to be a resident of the state, the time during which he may have been temporarily absent therefrom cannot be deducted.26 It has been held that such a provision does not include cases where a person goes under an assumed name within the state while continuing to reside there,27 but there is also authority to the contrary.2

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§ 205. Concealment of perpetrator or of fact of crime, etc. The fact that the accused conceals himself will not prevent the running of limitations unless the statute so provides.29 Nor will the fact

25 State v. Clemens, 40 Mont. 567, 107 Pac. 896.

26 People v. McCausey, 65 Mich. 72, 31 N. W. 770; State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S. W. 12.

Such a provision is intended to apply to persons escaping and absenting themselves to avoid punishment until lapse of time would enable them to return with impunity. It does not apply to a person who enlists in the army in time of war, and is absent from the state on military service. He still remains a resident and inhabitant of the state under such circumstances. Graham v. Com., 51 Pa. St. 255, 88 Am. Dec. 581.

A man does not lose his domicile and residence because he engages in business in another state even if he has a permanent business office in the latter state. State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S. W. 12.

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and that if, after having fled, he returns to the state and lives there secretly, or in a concealed manner, or in such a way that his presence may not readily be known, he is not a usual resident within the meaning of the law. Coleman v. Territory, 5 Okla. 201, 47 Pac. 1079.

Whether there has been a change of residence and domicile is a question of intention. State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S. W. 12.

27 Ex parte Vice, 5 Cal. App. 153, 89 Pac. 983; Com. v. Blackburn, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 464.

28 Where it appeared that defendant left the state, but afterwards returned and took up his residence in another city in the state, where he lived under his proper name, and that, while a resident there, he frequently visited the place where the crime was committed, on which occasions he used an assumed name and denied his identity, and that he denied his identity when arrested, it was held that the evidence warranted a finding that he was not a usual resident of the state. Com. v. Weber, 259 Pa. 592, 103 Atl. 348, aff'g 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 497.

29 Rouse v. State, 44 Fla. 148, 32 So. 784, 1 Ann. Cas. 317.

that it was not known that he was the person who committed the offense,30 nor the fact that he conceals his crime,31 or that the offense is not discovered.32 But statutes in some states provide that limitations shall not run so long as the offender or offense is unknown, or while the offender conceals the fact of the crime,34 or while he so conceals himself that process cannot be served upon him,35 or that

30 United States v. White, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 38, Fed. Cas. No. 16,675.

31 State v. Nute, 63 N. H. 79.

32 Com. v. Ruffner, 28 Pa. St. 259; Com. v. Sheriff, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 394. 33 Pitts v. State, 147 Ga. 801, 95 S. E. 706; s. c., 22 Ga. App. 247, 95 S. E. 935; Dale v. State, 88 Ga. 552, 15 S. E. 287; Flint v. State, 12 Ga. App. 169, 76 S. E. 1032; Brown v. State, 6 Ga. App. 329, 64 S. E. 1001; Cohen v. State, 2 Ga. App. 689, 59 S. E. 4.

34 Colvin v. State, 127 Ind. 403, 26 N. E. 888; In re Clyne, 52 Kan. 441, 35 Pac. 23.

To come within such a provision the concealment must be the result of positive acts done by the accused which were calculated to prevent the discovery of the fact of the crime. Robinson v. State, 57 Ind. 113; State v. Fries, 53 Ind. 489; Jones v. State, 14 Ind. 120. And the concealment must be of the fact that a crime has been committed and not merely of the accused's connection with it. State v. Hoke, 84 Ind. 137; Robinson v. State, 57 Ind. 113; State v. Fries, 53 Ind. 492; Jones v. State, 14 Ind. 120; In re Clyne, 52 Kan. 441, 35 Pac. 23. A mere denial of guilt by the accused is not a concealment of the crime. Robinson v. State, 57 Ind. 113.

Acknowledgment by the defendant of a woman as his wife is not a concealment of the fact of the crime of open and notorious fornication committed with her. Robinson v. State, 57 Ind. 113.

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It does not follow from the fact that the owner of stolen goods and his family have no knowledge of the theft that there is a concealment of the crime on the part of the thief. Free v. State, 13 Ind. 324.

That a township trustee, who has raised the amount of a receipt for public money paid out by him, in settling with his successor adjusts his account to correspond with the forged receipt, and thus makes it a part of the public records of the township, is not calculated to prevent the discovery of the forgery, and does not amount to a concealment of the fact of the crime. State v. Fries, 53 Ind. 489.

35 Pitts v. State, 147 Ga. 801, 95 S. E. 706; s. c., 22 Ga. App. 247, 95 S. E. 935; Watkins v. State, 68 Ga. 832; Colvin v. State, 127 Ind. 403, 26 N. E. 888; State v. Rook, 61 Kan. 382, 59 Pac. 653, 49 L. R. A. 186.

The time of concealment occurring during the period of limitations fixed by the statute must be added to that period. Ulmer v. State, 14 Ind. 52.

If the offender is arrested, and then escapes and conceals himself before indictment, the statute does not run while he is so concealed. Watkins v. State, 68 Ga. 832; Jones v. State, 6 Ga. App. 803.

Concealment is not established where the evidence shows that on more than one occasion during the statutory period, the defendant was openly on the streets of a city within the county where the crime was committed, and at other times within such

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