tempt proceedings,63 but it has been held that it does not prevent the disbarment of an attorney for a crime the commission of which he has in substance confessed in his testimony.64

The immunity relates only to the past. It does not extend to crimes committed after the privileged testimony or evidence is given or produced, nor does it prevent a prosecution for perjury committed in the course of the proceedings in which the privileged testimony is given.66

A state immunity statute cannot prevent a prosecution of a witness under a federal statute, and cannot prevent testimony given by him in a state proceeding from being used against him in a criminal proceeding in a federal court for violation of a federal statute.67 It has been said that immunity granted by a federal statute would probably extend to prosecutions in the state as well as in the federal courts,68 except, of course, where the statute is in terms limited to proceedings in the federal courts, and that in any event the possibility that a witness granted immunity by such a statute may be subjected to the criminal laws of the state is not a real and probable danger, but is so improbable that it need not be taken into account.70

256; United States v. Brod, 176 Fed. 165; Wechsler v. United States, 158 Fed. 579; Edelstein v. United States, 149 Fed. 636, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236, certiorari denied 205 U. S. 543, 51 L. Ed. 923, 27 Sup. Ct. 791 (mem. dec.).

Other testimony given by the witness in the same proceeding may be used as evidence of the falsity of that portion which is charged to be perjury. United States v. Coyle, 229 Fed. 256; Daniels v. United States, 196 Fed. 459. But the use of testimony given under an immunity statute to prove the falsity of testimony given by the witness at another time and place on a prosecution for perjury based on the latter testimony violates the immunity given by the statute. Cameron v. United States, 231 U. S. 710, 58 L. Ed. 448, Ct. rev'g 192 Fed. 548.

Sup.

67 Jack v. State of Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 50 L. Ed. 234, 26 Sup. Ct. 73, 4 Ann. Cas. 689, aff'g 69 Kan. 387, 76 Pac. 911, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171.

That this is so does not invalidate the state statute under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Jack v. State of Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 50 L. Ed. 234, 26 Sup. Ct. 73, 4 Ann. Cas. 689, aff'g 69 Kan. 387,

76 Pac. 911, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171.

In People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349, the statute was held to require disclosures as to violations of the state anti-trust laws only, so that such disclosures would not furnish a foundation for prosecutions under the federal statutes, or the statutes of other states.

The danger that disclosures made by the witness may subject him to prosecution under the federal statutes or the laws of some other state is not a real and probable one, but is too improbable and unsubstantial to render the immunity incomplete. People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349.

68 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. 370; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. Ed. 819, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, aff'g 70 Fed. 46.

69 Ensign v. State of Pennsylvania, 227 U. S. 592, 57 L. Ed. 658, 33 Sup. Ct. 321, aff'g 228 Pa. St. 400, 77 Atl. 657, which aff'd 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 157; In re Hess, 134 Fed. 109.

70 Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S. 92, 50 L. Ed. 673, 26 Sup. Ct. 358; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 L Ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. 370; Brown v.

§ 214. --As dependent upon testimony given. Immunity statutes should, in so far as the words used fairly allow, be construed as coterminous with what otherwise would have been the privilege of the person concerned.71 So a witness is not entitled to immunity because of testimony having no such tendency to incriminate him as would have afforded ground for refusing to give it apart from the statute,72 nor because he produces books and papers of a corporation of which he is an officer, where, apart from the statute, he could not have prevented their production, or refused to have produced them if in his custody,78 nor because he gives testimony which in no way concerns any matter involved in the subsequent charge gainst him.74 "When the statute speaks of testimony concerning a matter it means concerning it in a substantial way, just as the constitutional protection is confined to real danger and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of the law." 75 A declaration Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. Ed. 819, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, aff'g 70 Fed. 46. And see Jack v. State of Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 50 L. Ed. 234, 26 Sup. Ct. 73, 4 Ann. Cas. 689, aff'g 69 Kan. 387, 76 Pac. 911, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171.

71 Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 57 L. Ed. 450, 33 Sup. Ct. 226, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 128, aff'g 192 Fed. 83, which aff'd 175 Fed. 852; United States v. Skinner, 218 Fed. 870; United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002.

Such a statute will be construed as intended to give an immunity as broad as the constitutional privilege, and no broader. In re Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 116 N. E. 782, aff'g 169 App. Div. 629, 155 N. Y. Supp. 557; State v. Murphy, 128 Wis. 201, 107 N. W. 470.

The immunity is as broad as the constitutional right or privilege of silence which it invades, and no broader. Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 465, 132 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 381.

The statute does not grant him any broader protection than that of which he has been deprived. Kain v. State, 16 Tex. App. 282.

72 Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 57 L. Ed. 450, 33 Sup. Ct. 226, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 128, aff'g 192 Fed. 83, which aff'd 175 Fed. 852.

V..

The evidence must be of a selfincriminatory character. State Murphy, 128 Wis. 201, 107 N. W. 470. 73 Because he produces and hands over to the grand jury a summary made from the books of the company by its servants at his direction. Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 57 L. Ed. 450, 33 Sup. Ct. 226, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 128, aff'g 192 Fed. 83, which aff'd 175 Fed. 852.

74 Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 57 L. Ed. 450, 33 Sup. Ct. 226, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 128, aff'g 192 Fed. 83, which aff'd 175 Fed. 852.

The immunity extends only to the particular transaction in regard to which he testified. Kain v. State, 16 Tex. App. 282.

75 The fact that in an investigation under the anti-trust act a witness admitted his signature to certain checks was held not to entitle him to immunity from a prosecution for a fraud on the revenue act in which his signature to certain other checks became material, where there was no

by a witness to the effect that he can give no evidence as to any transactions within a general class does not constitute the giving of testimony concerning a transaction within such class, and does not entitle him to immunity from prosecution for such a transaction.76 To entitle the witness to immunity it is not necessary that his testimony should be adverse to himself," and it has also been held that it is not necessary that such testimony should have been true.7 But there is authority to the effect that the witness loses his right to immunity if he wilfully testifies falsely to any material matter or wilfully conceals any material fact within his knowledge.79 The fact that a person testifies before a court of inquiry, or in an authorized proceeding for the discovery of crime, does not make him immune from prosecution based on information obtained during such

inquiry from sources other than his testimony.80

testifying before the grand jury is not deprived of his right to immunity because there was other evidence adduced before it which was sufficient, without his testimony, to authorize the finding of an indictment against him.81 Usually a person cannot acquire immunity by volunteering evidence without lawful demand.82 It has been held by some of the courts that to render the immunity available the witness must claim his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination