whether the vessel is on the high seas, or in the ports or navigable waters of another country, for the vessels of a country, as we have seen, are a part of its territory.62 And it also applies to foreign consuls.63 But it does not apply to foreign ambassadors or ministers and their retinue. By the law of nations, they cannot be arrested or punished for offenses committed in the country to which they are deputed.64 § 285. Belligerents. It is settled that, in time of war, a belligerent who commits in a country or state acts which would, under ordinary circumstances, be punishable as a crime against its laws, is not punishable therefor in the civil courts, but must be treated as a prisoner of war only.65 It seems that, even in time of peace, a subject of one of two foreign sovereigns who are at war is not punishable in our courts for illegal acts in our territory, if he is an officer or functionary of the foreign sovereign, or if the foreign sovereign adopts his act, but we must seek redress from the foreign sovereign.66 And where our government recognizes the existence of a civil war in a foreign country, and remains neutral, its courts cannot consider as criminal those acts of hostility on the high seas which the war authorizes.67 § 286. Jurisdiction over subjects or citizens abroad. In the absence of legislation on the subject, the courts of a state or nation have no jurisdiction to punish offenses committed by its subjects or citizens in Wend. 483, 1 Hill 377, 37 Am. Dec. 328. England. Reg. v. McCafferty, Ir. R. C. L. 363, 10 Cox C. C. 603. And see State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. (3 N. C.) 109; s. c. Tayl. (1 N. C. 143) 65. 62 Reg. v. Carr, 10 Q. B. D. 76, 15 Cox C. C. 129, 52 L. J. Mag. Cas. 12, 47 L. T. (N. S.) 451; Reg. v. Anderson, L. R. 1 C. C. 161, 11 Cox C. C. 198; Reg. v. Lopez, Dears. & B. 525, 7 Cox C. C. 431. And see Longchamps, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 111; State v. De La Foret, 2 Nott & M. (S. C.) 217. 65 1 Whart. Crim. L. § 283. This principle was applied during the late Civil War in this country. 1 Whart. Crim. L. § 283, citing The Emulous, 1 Gall. 563, Fed. Cas. No. 4,479; Com. v. Blodgett, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 56; People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 377, 25 Wend. 483, 37 Am. Dec. 328. 66 See Coleman v. State of Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 24 L. Ed. 1118; Com. v. Holland, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 182; Hammond v. State, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 129. 67 United States V. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (16 U. S.) 610, 4 L. Ed. 471. another state or country.68 It is well settled, however, that a nation has the power to prohibit and punish acts by its own subjects or citizens committed in a foreign state or country, if the legislature sees fit to do so.69 And especially is this true where the penal act or offense is intended to take effect and operate within the limits of the country seeking to punish it, and would be cognizable by its courts if committed there.70 Such power as a state may have in this regard can only be exercised by express words or necessary implication, and mere general words in a state statute will be held not to include acts done in another state, though broad enough to do so.71 § 287. Offenses committed partly in one jurisdiction and partly in another-Different states or countries. In the absence of a statute, a person cannot be punished in a state where he does some act con Michigan. Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 74 Am. Dec. 703. New York. People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. 590. North Carolina. State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822. England. Musgrave v. Medex, 19 Ves. 652. Thus, where a citizen of North Carolina, while standing on the North Carolina side of the line between that state and Tennessee, shot across the line and killed a man in Tennessee, it was held that the murder was committed in Tennessee, and the North Carolina courts had no jurisdiction. State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602, 28 L. R. A. 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822. And where a citizen of the United States, on board a United States merchant vessel in a foreign port, shot at and killed a person on board a foreign vessel, it was held that the homicide was committed on board the foreign vessel, and the federal courts of this country had no jurisdiction to punish therefor. United States v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, Fed. Cas. No. 14,932. 69 United States V. Dawson, 15 How. (U. S.) 467; United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. (18 U. S.) 184, 5 L. Ed. 64; In re Stupp, 11 Blatchf. 124, Fed. Cas. No. 13,562; Com. v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cas. 172; State v. Main, 16 Wis. 398. And see United States v. New York Cent. & H. River R. Co., 232 Fed. 179, aff'd 239 Fed. 130; United States v. Craig, 28 Fed. 795. Compare United States V. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 186 Fed. 391. In England, a statute punishes the murder of one British subject by another, though committed in a foreign country. 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, §7; In re Tivnan, 5 Best & S. 465; Reg. v. Azzopardi, 2 Moody C. C. 289, 1 Car. & K. 203; Rex v. Sawyer, Russ. & R. 294. 70 United States v. Craig, 28 Fed. 795. 71 State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512, 36 S. W. 39. And see Cruthers v. State, 161 Ind. 139, 67 N. E. 930. stituting a part of an offense or making the offense possible, if the offense was actually consummated in another state.72 But where an act is made up of a series of events, and is criminal in its result, all the occurrences leading up to the consequence need not have been done in the jurisdiction where it is sought to be punished, but it is enough if the result constitutes an offense under its laws.78 And it has been held that the United States may punish an attempt to commit an offense against its laws where some of the overt acts are committed in this country and some abroad.74 A person, who in one state does an act which takes effect and constitutes a crime in another state, may be punished in the latter state. And a person who commits a crime in one state for which he may there be punished, is liable for its continuous operation in another state.75 And statutes in some of the states provide for the punishment of persons who commence an offense in the state which is consummated out of it,76 or make all persons who commit in whole or in part, any crime within the state liable to punishment under its laws.77 72 Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 19 Am. Rep. 739; State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512, 36 S. W. 39; State v. Shaeffer, 89 Mo. 271, 1 S. W. 293. 73 Com. v. Crass, 180 Ky. 794, 203 S. W. 708; Com. v. Adair, 121 Ky. 689, 89 S. W. 1130. 74 A domestic railroad company may be punished for an attempt to violate the alien contract labor law, where it sends an agent into Canada to procure laborers, and gives him passes for their transportation into this country, and such agent hires laborers there and attempts to bring them in. United States v. New York Cent. & H. River R. Co., 232 Fed. 179, aff'd 239 Fed. 130. 75 See § 292, infra. 76 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Roberson v. State, 42 Fla. 212, 28 So. 427; Richburger v. State, 90 Miss. 806, 44 So. 772; State v. Adams, 137 Tenn. 521, 194 S. W. 579. To come within such a provision, there must be an act of intervention in the state proceeding directly from the perpetrator himself, either through an innocent or guilty agent, or by any other means. It does not cover a case where death ensues in the state as a result of a criminal act performed in another state. Edge v. State, 117 Tenn. 405, 99 S. W. 1098, 10 Ann. Cas. 876. 77 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 Pac. 286, 84 Am. St. Rep. 39; s. c., 9 Cal. App. 244, 98 Pac. 861; People v. Sansom, 37 Cal. App. 435, 173 Pac. 1007; People v. Arnstein, 211 N. Y. 585, 105 N. E. 814, rev'g 157 N. Y. App. Div. 766, 142 N. Y. Supp. 842, which reversed 78 N. Y. Misc. 18, 138 N. Y. Supp. 806; People v. Bihler, 154 N. Y. App. Div. 618, 139 N. Y. Supp. 819, aff'd 210 N. Y. 592, 104 N. E. 1136. To come within such a provision, the facts charged must constitute a crime both in the state where the prosecution is instituted and in the foreign state, and the crime must be of equal degree in both jurisdictions. § 288. Different counties. At common law a crime was only triable in the county where completely committed, and hence if committed partly in one county and partly in another, was not triable in either and could not be punished in either, unless so much was done in one as would constitute a completed offense.78 But a person may be punished in a county where his acts, committed in another county, take effect, though he was never personally present there.79 And statutes in many of the states provide that where a crime is committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the acts or effects thereof, constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense, occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either.80 A single, indivisible offense, not consisting of several parts, is not within the operation of such a provision, however.81 Nor does such If it is a felony in the state where the prosecution is instituted, it is not sufficient to show that it would be a misdemeanor in the other state. People v. Arnstein, 211 N. Y. 585, 105 N. E. 814, rev'g 157 N. Y. App. Div. 766, 142 N. Y. Supp. 842, which reversed 78 N. Y. Misc. 18, 138 N. Y. Supp. 806. 78 In re Kelly, 46 Fed. 653; Brown v. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 So. 811; State v. Mispagel, 207 Mo. 557, 106 S. W. 513; State v. Fraker, 148 Mo. 143, 49 S. W. 1017. The courts of either county in which there was a substantial act of wrong constituting a material part of the crime, had jurisdiction. Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 7 N. E. 225. As to the rule where property stolen in one county is taken into another, see § 314, infra. 79 See § 292, infra. 80 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Alabama. Brown v. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 So. 811. Florida. Smith v. State, 42 Fla. 605, 28 So. 758; Roberson v. State, 42 Fla. 212, 28 So. 427. Indiana. Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465. Iowa. State v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 150 Iowa 46, 129 N. W. 336; State v. Dvoracek, 140 Iowa 266, 118 N. W. 399; State v. Hengen, 106 Iowa 711, 77 N. W. 453; State v. Smith, 82 Iowa 423, 48 N. W. 727; State v. Hollenbeck, 36 Iowa 112. Kentucky. Ellison v. Com., 190 Ky. 205, 227 S. W. 458; Com. v. Morton, 140 Ky. 628, 131 S. W. 506, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 454. Mississippi. State v. Hughes, 96 Miss. 581, 51 So. 464. New York. People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 47 N. E. 883; People v. Britton, 134 App. Div. 275, 118 N. Y. Supp. 989. Oklahoma. Williams v. State, 16 Okla. Cr. 217, 182 Pac. 718; Arnold v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 519, 178 Pac. 897. Oregon. In re Kelly, 46 Fed. 653. Tennessee. State v. Adams, 137 Tenn. 521, 194 S. W. 579. Such a statute is within the power of the legislature. Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 7 N. E. 225. For applications of such provisions in prosecutions for various specific offenses, see following sections dealing with particular crimes. 81 Living in adultery. Brown V. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 So. 811. county unless some And if the offense a statute authorize the venue to be laid in any essential element of the crime occurred there.8 82 is wholly completed in one county it must be prosecuted there, although certain resulting consequences of the act occur elsewhere.83 $289. Different federal districts. The federal statutes provide that if an offense is commenced in one judicial district and completed in another, it shall be deemed to have been committed in either, and may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined and punished in the same manner as if it had been actually and wholly committed therein.84 But this provision has no application where the offense is committed wholly within a single district.85 § 290. Offenses on or near county line. Statutory provisions, giving adjoining counties concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed on or within a certain distance of the county line, are common, and have been upheld in many of the states,86 although some courts have 82 State v. Dvoracek, 140 Iowa 266, 118 N. W. 399; State v. Hengen, 106 Iowa 711, 77 N. W. 453. 83 State v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 150 Iowa 46, 129 N. W. 336. The offense of administering medieine with intent to procure miscarriage is committed where the medicine is administered, and does not come within the statute although the miscarriage occurs in another county. State v. Hollenbeck, 36 Iowa 112. 84 Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 56 L. Ed. 1114, 32 Sup. St. 793, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 614, aff'g 35 App. Cas. (D. C.) 451; Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 26 Sup. Ct. 688, 6 Ann. Cas. 362; Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, 49 L. Ed. 919, 25 Sup. Ct. 569; Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 49 L. Ed. 482, 25 Sup. Ct. 243; In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257, 34 L. Ed. 514, 10 Sup. Ct. 1034; United States v. Craig, 28 Fed. 795. There is a similar provision in the Elkins act. New York Cent. & H. River R. Co. v. United States, 166 Fed. 267, rev'g 153 Fed. 630. 85 Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 49 L. Ed. 482, 25 Sup. Ct. 243; United States v. Capella, 169 Fed. 890; New York Cent. & H. River R. Co. v. United States, 166 Fed. 267, rev'g 153 Fed. 630; Davis v. United States, 104 Fed. 136; In re Belknap, 96 Fed. 614. 86 Alabama. 184 Ala. 5, 63 So. 975; McKay v. State, 110 Ala. 19, 20 So. 455; Jackson v. State, 90 Ala. 590, 8 So. 862; Grogan v. State, 44 Ala. 9; Davis v. State, 8 Ala. App. 147, 62 So. 1027. Granberry V. State, California. People v. Cipolla, 155 Cal. 224, 100 Pac. 252. Iowa. Carter v. Barlow, 105 Iowa 78, 74 N. W. 745. Massachusetts. Com. v. Matthews, 167 Mass. 173, 45 N. E. 92; Com. v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; Com. v. Gillon, 2 Allen (84 Mass.) 502. Michigan. People v. Hubbard, 86 Mich. 440, 49 N. W. 265; Bayliss v. People, 46 Mich. 221, 9 N. W. 257. Minnesota. Minn. 447. New York. N. Y. 95. State v. Robinson, 14 People v. Davis, 56 |