held that they violate constitutional provisions giving the accused a right to be tried in the county where the offense is committed, in so far as they permit a prosecution in any other county.87 To come within such a provision in any case the act done must be an offense under the laws of the forum, and the law of the forum must be identical in its definitions of the offense and its penalties therefor with the law obtaining in the county where the offense was committed:88 Under some statutes where an offense is committed on a highway forming the boundary between two counties, jurisdiction is given to the courts of the county where the offender last resided.89 Jurisdiction over offenses on streams forming the boundary line between counties is considered in another section.90 § 291. Offenses on railroad trains or other conveyances. Statutes permitting offenses committed on railroad trains or vessels in transit to be prosecuted in any county through which the train or vessel Pennsylvania. Com. v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295, 110 Atl. 738. Texas. Madrid v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. 420, 161 S. W. 93; McElroy v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 57, 111 S. W. 948; Hackney v. State (Tex. Cr.), 74 S. W. 554. Wisconsin. Ryan v. State, 168 Wis. 14, 168 N. W. 566; State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 N. W. 429, 50 Am. Rep. 388. Such a provision, when not restricted by its terms, applies even where the exact locus of the crime is known. Com. v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295, 110 Atl. 738. Such a provision applies where a river constitutes the boundary line, if the statutory distance extends beyond the stream. Jackson v. State, 90 Ala. 590, 8 So. 862; Hackney v. State (Tex. Cr.), 74 S. W. 554. At common law where the offense was committed right on the line, the jurisdiction seems to have been in either county. State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 N. W. 429, 50 Am. Rep. 388. Louisiana. St. John v. M. A. Talbot & Son, 132 La. 86, 60 So. 1028; State v. Montgomery, 115 La. 155, 38 So. 949. And see State v. Harris, 107 La. 325, 31 So. 782, where it was held that the objection to the venue was waived because not taken until after verdict. Missouri. In re McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370. Tennessee. Armstrong v. State, 1 Coldw. (41 Tenn.) 338. West Virginia. State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 45 Am. Rep. 570. If the offense is committed on the line, or SO near thereto that the distance is inappreciable, it may be regarded as committed in either, without depriving the accused of any constitutional right. Dougan v. State, 30 Ark. 41; Buckrice v. People, 110 Ill. 29. 88 McKay v. State, 110 Ala. 19, 20 So. 455. 89 Kerr v. State, 61 N. J. L. 385, 39 Atl. 907. 90 See § 282, supra. passes on its trip or voyage have been upheld in some states.91 But other courts have held that they violate constitutional provisions giving the accused a right to be tried in the county where the offense was committed.92 § 292. Necessity for personal presence. To render one guilty of an offense in a particular jurisdiction, it is not always necessary that he shall be personally within such jurisdiction when the offense is consummated, or at any time.93 A person who, in one jurisdiction, does an act which takes effect and constitutes a crime in another, may be punished in the latter jurisdiction, if he can be apprehended there.94 And a person who commits a crime in one jurisdiction, for which he may be there punished, is liable for its continuous operation 91 Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N. E. 340, 1 L. R. A. 403; Nash v. State, 2 Greene (Iowa) 286; People v. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 478. And see Powell v. State, 52 Wis. 217, 9 N. W. 17, holding that, in the absence of statute, where a person, with intent to steal, enters a moving car in one county and with the same intent continues therein until the car enters another county, where the theft is committed, he may be prosecuted in the latter, as well as in the former county. 92 People v. Brock, 149 Mich. 464, 112 N. W. 1116, 119 Am. St. Rep. 684; State v. Anderson, 191 Mo. 134, 90 S. W. 95; Craig v. State, 3 Heisk. (50 Tenn.) 227; State v. Reese, 112 Wash. 507, 192 Pac. 934. 93 United States. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 26 Sup. Ct. 688, 6 Ann. Cas. 362. Georgia. Danzley v. State, 25 Ga. App. 170, 102 S. E. 915. Indiana. Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. Dec. 408. Iowa. State v. Dvoracek, 140 Iowa 266, 118 N. W. 399. New York. People v. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468, aff'd 1 N. Y. 173. Ohio. In re Poage, 87 Ohio St. 72, 100 N. E. 125. And see the other cases cited in the following notes: To make one guilty of the offense of assisting a foreigner to enter the United States in violation of the contract labor law, it is not necessary for him to have been personally present when such entry was made. United States v. Craig, 28 Fed. 795. A person may be a party to a conspiracy and indictable where it was formed, although he was not physically present there when it was formed. Price v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 488, 54 L. Ed. 581, 30 Sup. Ct. 257. And a conspirator may be prosecuted where an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, although he was never there. Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 56 L. Ed. 1114, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 614, aff'g 35 App. Cas. (D. C.) 451. And may be prosecuted there for the substantive offense. Danzley v. State, 25 Ga. App. 170, 102 S. E. 915. in another jurisdiction, if he can be apprehended in the latter.95 A person who while without a state or county commits a crime within its limits by means of an innocent agent, may be punished there, since he is regarded as being personally present where the offense is committed.96 And the same is true in the case of misdemeanors committed by means of a guilty agent.97 But there is a conflict of authority as to whether an accessary to a felony may be punished in the jurisdiction where the principal felony is committed where he becomes accessary in another jurisdiction.98 Statutes in some states provide for the prosecution and punishment 14 Pet. U. S. 540; United States v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, Fed. Cas. No. 14,932. California. Ex parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 109. Georgia. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S. E. 984, 44 Am. St. Rep. 75. Indiana. Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421. Kansas. In re Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131 Pac. 598, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227. Massachusetts. Cơm. v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 15 Am. Dec. 214. Missouri. State v. Stewart, 194 Mo. 345, 92 S. W. 878, 112 Am. St. Rep. 529, 5 Ann. Cas. 963. North Carolina. State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822. Ohio. Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131. South Carolina. State v. Morrow, 40 S. C. 221, 18 S. E. 853. West Virginia. Weil v. Black, 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666. England. Reg. v. Jones, 1 Den. C. C. 551, 4 Cox C. C. 198; Rex. v. Brisac, 4 East 164. In Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 78 N. H. 533, 103 Atl. 263, it is said by way of dictum that one who while in Canada throws combustible material across the line and burns buildings in the United States may be punished for arson in the state where such buildings are situated. Of course he cannot be punished if he cannot be apprehended, and if he does not come within the state in which his act takes effect, there is no way in which he can be apprehended without the consent of the country or state in which he is. The act of congress relating to interstate rendition of fugitives from justice does not apply, for it only applies to persons who flee from justice, and a person who has never been in a state cannot be a fugitive from its justice. See State v. Hall, 115 N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729, 44 Am. St. Rep. 501; State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822. 95 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 25, § 37; Com. v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 15 Am. Dec. 214. And see United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 186 Fed. 391. The provision of the Elkins Act that persons who violate its provisions relative to the transportation of property at less than tariff rates may be punished in any district through which the transportation may have been conducted is valid. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 52 L. Ed. 681, 28 Sup. Ct. 428, aff'g 153 Fed. 1, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400. 96 See § 293, infra. within the state of a person who, while without the state, commits or consummates an offense by an agent or means within the state,s 99 or who, with intent to cause within it a result contrary to its laws, does an act which in its natural and usual course results in an act or effect contrary to its laws,1 or of persons who commence an offense out of the state which is consummated in it.2 § 293. Acts committed by means of an innocent agent. As we have seen, one who commits a crime by means of an innocent agent is him self guilty as the principal in the first degree. And, in contemplation of the law, he is personally present and commits the crime, by means of such agent, in the jurisdiction in which it is actually committed, and may be punished there. So one who commits murder 5 99 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. Dec. 408; In re Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131 Pac. 598, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227; In re Carr, 28 Kan. 1; Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. App. 289. Such a provision is but declaratory of the common law. State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052, L. R. A. 1918 D 949, Ann. Cas. 1918 D 1006. To come within such a provision, the offense must be consummated within the state. Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 19 Am. Rep. 739. 1 See the statutes. The intent is essential to bring one within this provision. People v. International Nickel Co., 168 N. Y. App. Div. 245, 153 N. Y. Supp. 295, aff'g 155 N. Y. Supp. 156, aff'd 218 N. Y. 644, 112 N. E. 1068. 2 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Elliott v. State, 77 Fla. 611, 82 So. 139; Foster v. State, 62 Fla. 52, 56 So. 945; Richburger v. State, 90 Miss. 806, 44 So. 772. 3 See § 265, supra. 4 Alabama. Bishop v. State, 30 Ala. 34. Arkansas. State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. Dec. 452. California. See Ex parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 109. Florida. Harrell v. State, 79 Fla. 220, 83 So. 922; Elliott v. State, 77 Fla. 611, 82 So. 139. Georgia. Carter v. State, 143 Ga. 632, 85 S. E. 884. Indiana. Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. Dec. 408. Massachusetts. Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 25 Am. Rep. 116. New Jersey. State v. Faunce, 91 N. J. L. 333, 102 Atl. 147; Noyes v. State, 41 N. J. L. 418, aff'd 43 N. J. L. 672. New Mexico. State v. Faggard, 25 N. M. 76, 177 Pac. 748. Ohio. Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507. West Virginia. Weil v. Black, 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666. England. Reg. v. Garrett, Dears. C. C. 232, 6 Cox C. C. 260. 5 A person who, while in one jurisdiction, procures poison to be administered in another jurisdiction by an innocent agent, and thereby causes a death, is guilty of murder as principal in the jurisdiction in which the poison is administered. See Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131; State v. Morrow, 40 S. C. 221, 18 S. E. 853. 6 while he is in one jurisdiction, or larceny, or embezzlement, or utters a forged instrument,8 or obtains money by false pretenses, or cheats and defrauds another, 10 or receives deposits in a bank of which he is an officer, knowing that it is insolvent,11 by means of an innocent agent in another jurisdiction, may be prosecuted in the latter jurisdiction. Similarly conspirators may be prosecuted for conspiracy in a jurisdiction where they procure an overt act to be committed by an innocent agent.12 And an accessary after the fact who acts through an innocent agent may be prosecuted in the county where the accessorial acts are committed by such agent.18 And in those states in which it is held, or provided by statute, that the carrying into one state of goods stolen in another is larceny in the latter, a person who steals goods in one state, and sends them into another state by an innocent agent, is himself guilty of larceny in the latter state.14 And a person who receives the goods in such state from the innocent agent, knowing that they have been stolen, receives them, in contemplation of law, from the original thief, and is guilty of receiving stolen goods.15 6 Walls v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 70, 63 S. W. 328. 7 State v. Mispagel, 207 Mo. 557, 106 S. W. 513; State v. Barnett, 15 Ore. 77, 14 Pac. 737. Where the president of a bank in Georgia, while out of the state, telegraphs to the cashier to send him stock certificates belonging to the bank, representing that he will return them, but really intending to embezzle them, and the cashier sends them to him by mail, whereupon he disposes of them to his own use, he may be tried in the county in Georgia where the bank is located. Carter v. State, 143 Ga. 632, 85 S. E. 884. 8 Bishop v. State, 30 Ala. 34; In re Carr, 28 Kan. 1; Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507. 9 People v. Adams, 3 Den. (N. Y.) 190, 1 N. Y. 173. And see Reg. v. Garrett, Dears. C. C. 232, 6 Cox C. C. 260. 10 As where, pursuant to a conspiracy to cheat and defraud a bank, a person out of the state draws checks upon the bank against an ex- 11 The president of a bank who, 12 Hyde v. United States, 35 App. 14 Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430, As to whether bringing stolen goods into a state is larceny there, see § 314, infra. 15 Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 25 Am. Rep. 116. And see § 321, infra. 1 |