States, either expressly or by necessary implication, on admission of the state into the Union.38 If there is a purchase with the consent of the state, exclusive jurisdiction follows and attaches ipso facto by virtue of the constitutional provision itself, while in the case Texas. Lasher v. State, 30 Tex. App. 387, 17 S. W. 1064, 28 Am. St. Rep. 922. The United States is a mere proprietor of land purchased without the consent of the legislature. In re O'Connor, 37 Wis. 379, 19 Am. Rep. 765. The state and not the federal courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed on land purchased by the United States at a tax sale, without the consent of the state, for the purpose of establishing Arlington national cemetery. United States Penn., 48 Fed. 669. V. In re O'Connor, 37 Wis. 379, 19 Am. Rep. 765, it was held that the state courts had jurisdiction over offenses committed on the premises of a national soldiers' home, although the legislature had attempted to cede exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, for the reason that title to the premises was not in the United States but in a corporation created by congress for the management of such homes. But other courts have held to the contrary. In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 2 Am. Rep. 397. The state courts are not deprived of jurisdiction over offenses on land occupied as a military reservation, where it was not purchased with the consent of the state, and exclusive jurisdiction over it was not reserved by the federal government on the admission of the state into the Union. Clay v. State, 4 Kan. 49. A cession of "jurisdiction" over lands purchased for a soldier's home was held not a cession of exclusive jurisdiction. In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545. In Wills v. State, 3 Heisk. (50 Tenn.) 141, it was held that a cession of exclusive jurisdiction over land granted to the government for a cemetery related alone to the measures necessary to be adopted by the United States from time to time in order to effectuate the purpose of the grant, and that it was not intended to deprive the state of jurisdiction over offenses committed within the cemetery and grounds adjacent when not in the actual occupation of the United States, but that it did deprive the state of jurisdiction over offenses committed during such occupation. Acceptance of the act of cession will be presumed in the absence of any dissent. Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. Ed. 264, 5 Sup. Ct. 995; State v. Seymour, 78 Miss. 134, 28 So. 799. 33 Fort Leavenworth R. Co. V. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. Ed. 264, 5 Sup. Ct. 995; United States v. Tully, 140 Fed. 899; United States v. Bateman, 34 Fed. 86; Clay v. State, 4 Kan. 49; State v. Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 Pac. 760, 3 Ann. Cas. 824. A reservation of jurisdiction over military reservations does not include land used as a military reservation, but never legally established as such. United States v. Tully, 140 Fed. 899. 34 United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason 60, Fed. Cas. No. 14,867; State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763, 62 Am. St. Rep. 811. Aside from an unqualified assent to the purchase, no declaration or enactment of cession on the part of the of an express cession of jurisdiction by an act of a state legislature for that purpose, jurisdiction is derived from the act, and not necessarily from the constitutional provision per se.35 It is not necessary that there be both a purchase with the consent of the state and an express cession of jurisdiction, but either will be sufficient if the place is owned by the United States and is actually used for governmental purposes.86 The reservation or purchase must also have been made for one or more of the purposes specified in the constitution.87 But the constitutional provision will be broadly construed so as to cover all structures and places necessary for carrying on the business of the government.38 A cession of jurisdiction may be made with conditions or reservations which do not interfere with the use of the property for the purposes intended,39 and in ceding jurisdiction the right to execute civil and criminal process on the property is frequently reserved to the state. Such a provision does not reserve to the state concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed on the land purchased or ceded, but its purpose is merely to prevent such land from be 35 United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518. 36 Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, 36 L. Ed. 991, 13 Sup. Ct. 60; United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518; United States v. Carter, 84 Fed. 622. And see other cases cited in preceding notes. 87 United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518; Clay v. State, 4 Kan. 49. If the purpose is not one of those specified, the act of congress which provides for the purchase and requires the legislative consent must unequivocally declare that exclusive jurisdiction is intended and is necessary for the proposed use, or at least the purpose stated must be one of which it is manifest that any exercise of concurrent or other jurisdiction would be incompatible therewith. In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545, holding that state courts had jurisdic tion of offenses on lands purchased for a soldier's home. 38 United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518. It includes land used for maintaining locks and dams erected to improve the navigation of a river (United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518), or for a soldier's home (Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 2 Am. Rep. 397), or a cemetery (see Wills v. State, 3 Heisk. [50 Tenn.] 141), and land purchased for the erection of a post office and court house. Battle v. United States, 209 U. S. 36, 52 L. Ed. 670, 28 Sup. Ct. 422; State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763, 62 Am. St. Rep. 811. 39 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 29 L. Ed. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. 1005; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. Ed. 264, 5 Sup. Ct. 995. And other cases cited in the following note. coming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice for acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the state.40 It has been held that the jurisdiction of the United States over military reservations in territories is not exclusive, and that the territorial courts have jurisdiction over offenses against territorial statutes committed on such reservations.41 The state courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed in a post office, where it appears that the building was not on ground ceded to the United States, but was rented by the postmaster,42 and also over offenses committed on a public street of a city in front of a lot and building owned and occupied by the United States for governmental purposes.48 § 334. Offenses by and against Indians and on Indian reservations. Congress has power to punish offenses committed by Indians against the persons or property of other Indians on an Indian reser 40 Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. Ed. 264, 5 Sup. Ct. 995; United States v. Andem, 158 Fed. 996; United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518; United States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason 60, Fed. Cas. No. 14,867; Com. v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 298; State v. Seymour, 78 Miss. 134, 28 So. 799; State v. Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 Pac. 760, 3 Ann. Cas. 824; Lasher v. State, 30 Tex. App. 387, 17 S. W. 1064, 28 Am. St. Rep. 922. This was held to be true of a provision ceding exclusive jurisdiction "for all purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of this state, and the service of any civil process therein or thereon." Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763, 62 Am. St. Rep. 811. State v. 41 Territory v. Burgess (Burgess v. Territory), 8 Mont. 57, 19 Pac. 558, 1 L. R. A. 808. The constitutional provision does not apply to territories. Reynolds v. People, 1 Colo. 179. The organic act of the territory of Oklahoma expressly gave the territorial courts power to try and condemn for violations of both state and federal law upon land reserved for the use of the federal government, and especially did they have such jurisdiction in view of the fact that the reservation did not retain exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. In re Terrill, 144 Fed. 616. But, of course, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction where the organic act reserves exclusive jurisIdiction to the United States. Scott v. United States, 1 Wyo. 40. And the federal district court of Porto Rico has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed on military reservations on the island over which the insular legislature has granted exclusive jurisdiction to the United States. United States v. Hernandez, 2 Porto Rico Fed. 81. 42 Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 78, 46 So. 491. 43 As of murder committed on a street in front of a post office and land office. State v. Chin Ping, 91 Ore. 593, 176 Pac. 188. 44 vation within the limits of a state, and generally state courts have no jurisdiction of offenses committed by tribal Indians on such reservations.45 The federal statutes expressly give to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain of the graver crimes when so committed.46 And this exclusive jurisdiction exists in respect to the crimes enumerated in the statute, although the Indians have received allotments of lands and have thereby become citizens, at least so long as the government holds the title to such lands in trust for the benefit of the allottees. But state courts have jurisdiction over 44 United States v. Thomas, 151 U. S. 577, 38 L. Ed. 276, 14 Sup. Ct. 426; United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 30 L. Ed. 228, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109. 45 In re Lincoln, 129 Fed. 247; In re Blackbird, 109 Fed. 139; State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N. W. 553, 21 L. R. A. 169. 46 Murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary and larceny. Act March 3, 1885, § 9; Pen. Code, § 328, Apapas v. United States, 233 U. S. 587, 58 L. Ed. 1104, 34 Sup. Ct. 704; United States v. Thomas, 151 U. S. 577, 38 L. Ed. 276, 14 Sup. Ct. 426; United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 30 L. Ed. 228, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109; State v. Buckaroo Jack, 30 Nev. 325, 96 Pac. 497; People v. Daly, 212 N. Y. 183, 105 N. E. 1048, Ann. Cas. 1915 D. 367, rev'g 158 App. Div. 892, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1137; State v. Columbia George, 39 Ore. 127, 65 Pac. 604. The federal courts have no jurisdiction to try an Indian for an offense committed on a reservation which is not one of those enumerated in the statute. United States v. Cardish, 143 Fed. 640; United States v. King, 81 Fed. 625. Arson as used in the statute means arson as defined at common law. An indictment charging a burning which would not be arson at common law will be quashed. United States v. Cardish, 143 Fed. 640. 47 United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 54 L. Ed. 195, 30 Sup. Ct. 93; In re Lincoln, 129 Fed. 247; United States v. Logan, 105 Fed. 240; State v. Columbia George, 39 Ore. 127, 65 Pac. 604; State v. Condon, 79 Wash. 97, 139 Pac. 871. See also Kitto v. State, 98 Neb. 164, 152 N. W. 380, L. R. A. 1915 F 587. The contrary was true in the case of allottees under act of Feb. 8, 1887, which in terms made them subject to the criminal laws of the state. United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 54 L. Ed. 195, 30 Sup. Ct. 93; State v. Lott, 21 Idaho 646, 123 Pac. 491. And see Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488, 49 L. Ed. 848, 25 Sup. Ct. 506. It has been held that a state court has jurisdiction of an offense committed by an Indian against an Indian on land formerly a part of a reservation but which was allotted to an Indian after it had been opened to settlement and had ceased to be a part of the reservation, Ex parte Moore, 28 S. D. 339, 133 N. W. 817, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 648; and of an offense committed on allotted lands within the limits of a reservation, where all restrictions against alienation of the land have been removed, and the Indians occupying the land sustain no tribal relations and are qualified electors of the state, and the gov ernment maintains no control over them. State v. Smokalem, 37 Wash. 91, 79 Pac. 603. offenses other than those enumerated in the statute committed by an allottee against an allottee on a reservation within the state.48 The federal courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed against Indians by persons other than Indians on Indian reservations within a state,49 or on allotted lands, at least while the United States holds the title to such lands in trust for the benefit of the allottee.50 The states have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by persons other than Indians against persons other than Indians on Indian reservations within a state,51 except where such jurisdiction is reserved to the federal government on the admission of the state into the Union,52 or is ceded to it by the state after its admission, in 48 Kitto v. State, 98 Neb. 164, 152 N. W. 380, L. R. A. 1915 F 587. 49 Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 57 L. Ed. 820, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, Ann. Cas. 1913 E 710. 50 Such land is "Indian country" within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 2145, providing that the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of crimes committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 58 L. Ed. 676, 34 Sup. Ct. 396. 51 Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 41 L. Ed. 419, 17 Sup. Ct. 107; United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621, 26 L. Ed. 869; State v. Columbia George, 39 Ore. 127, 65 Pac. 604. United States Pen. Code, § 328, does not apply where the indictment does not allege that the offender was an Indian or that the injured party was an Indian. United States V. La Plant, 200 Fed. 92; Hollister United States, 145 Fed. 773. V. The jurisdiction of the state extends to all persons in a reservation not tribal Indians under the care of the United States. A state court has jurisdiction to try a person not a tribal Indian for adultery committed with a tribal Indian on a reservation. State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N. W. 553, 21 L. R. A. 169. 52 United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621, 26 L. Ed. 869; State v. Columbia George, 39 Ore. 127, 65 Pac. 604. The enabling act of South Dakota contained such a provision, and it was agreed to by art. 26 of the constitution of that state, and by 8. D. Sess. Laws, 1901, p. 132, c. 106. Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773. Act Cong. Feb. 2, 1903, c. 351, 32 stat. 793, Pen. Code, § 329, gives to the federal courts of South Dakota jurisdiction over certain named offenses committed by any person within the limits of any Indian reservation within that state. This provision becomes inoperative as to any particular reservation upon the extinguishment of the Indian title. United States v. La Plant, 200 Fed. 92; Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773. The state courts have jurisdiction over offenses not enumerated in Pen. Code, § 329, committed by an allottee who has severed his tribal relations and adopted the habits of civilized life. State v. Nimrod, 30 S. D. 239, 138 N. W. 377. A provision in an enabling act |