And

which case the jurisdiction of the federal courts is exclusive.53 state jurisdiction extends to Indians who have ceased their tribal relations and have adopted civilized habits and become citizens of the state, even where the offense is committed against an Indian and on a reservation, except in those cases where acts of congress, by express provision in particular cases, have made the laws of the United States applicable to them.54 State courts also have jurisdiction of crimes committed by Indians outside of Indian reservations and within the limits of the state.5 55

The federal statutes give to the territorial courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain of the graver crimes when committed by Indians within a territory, whether within or without a reservation.56 And they also have jurisdiction over crimes committed by a person other than an Indian upon an Indian reservation in a territory.57

that "Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States' does not constitute such a reservation. Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 41 L. Ed. 419, 17 Sup. Ct. 107.

53 Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773.

54 State v. Smokalem, 37 Wash. 91, 79 Pac. 603; State v. Howard, 33 Wash. 250, 74 Pac. 382; State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 Pac. 15.

Indians in South Dakota who have taken allotments under the Dawes Act, and who have abandoned tribal relations and adopted the habits of civilized life, are amenable to state laws in respect to crimes not enumerated in Pen. Code, § 329. State v. Nimrod, 30 S. D. 239, 138 N. W. 377.

55 United States. See Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542, 53 L. Ed. 644, 29 Sup. Ct. 416; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504, 41 L. Ed. 244, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076, rev'g 70 Fed. 598.

Colorado. Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 46 Pac. 636, 37 L. R. A. 636. Idaho. State v. Tilden, 27 Idaho 262, 147 Pac. 1056.

Maine. State v. Newell, 84 Me. 465, 24 Atl. 943.

Montana. State v. Little Whirlwind, 22 Mont. 425, 56 Pac. 820; State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 Pac. 1026.

Nevada. State v. Buckaroo Jack, 30 Nev. 325, 96 Pac. 497; State v. Johnny, 29 Nev. 203, 87 Pac. 3.

New York. People v. Becker, 215 N. Y. 42, 109 N. E. 116, aff'g 165 App. Div. 881, 151 N. Y. Supp. 138.

North Carolina. State v. Wolf, 145 N. C. 440, 59 S. E. 40, 13 Ann. Cas. 189; State v. Ta-cha-na-tah, 64 N. C. 614.

South Dakota. Ex parte Moore, 28 S. D. 339, 133 N. W. 817, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 648.

Washington. State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 Pac. 15.

56 Captain Jack, Petitioner, 130 U. S. 353, 32 L. Ed. 976, 9 Sup. Ct. 546; Gon-shay-ee, Petitioner, 130 U. S. 343, 32 L. Ed. 973, 9 Sup. Ct. 542; United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 30 L. Ed. 228, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109.

57 In re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575, 35 L. Ed. 513, 11 Sup. Ct. 870.

The right of congress, under its constitutional power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, to enact penal laws applicable to commerce with Indians within the limits of a state, is considered in another section.58

§ 335. Commerce with Indians. Under the provision of the constitution giving congress power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes,59 and the general power to make laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers given it, it may constitutionally prohibit and punish the introduction of intoxicating liquors into Indian reservations or lands allotted to Indians even though they are within the limits of a state,60 or the traffic in such liquors with tribal Indians, whether upon or off a reservation and whether within or without the limits of a state.61 And it may, when securing the cession of a part of an Indian reservation within a state, by a provision in the ceding treaty to that effect, prohibit the sale of intoxicants upon the ceded lands to such an extent and for such a length of time as may be reasonably essential to the protection of the Indians residing there.62

58 See § 335, infra. 59 See § 24, supra.

60 United States v. Shaw-Mux, 2 Sawy. 364, Fed. Cas. No. 16,268; Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 58 L. Ed. 691, 34 Sup. Ct. 387; United States v. Wright, 229 U. S. 226, 57 L. Ed. 1160, 33 Sup. Ct. 630.

This is true where the state enabling act provides that lands owned and occupied by Indians shall be deemed Indian country, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 58 L. Ed. 107, 34 Sup. Ct. 1, rev'g 198 Fed. 539; or that Indian lands within its limits shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of congress, United States v. Sutton, 215 U. S. 291, 54 L. Ed. 200, 30 Sup. Ct. 116; or provides that the state constitution shall prohibit the manufacture or sale of liquor on lands previously constituting Indian reservations. United States Express Co. v. Friedman, 191 Fed. 673.

And it is true as to an allotment while the United States holds the

legal title to the allotted land in trust. Hallowell v. United States, 221 U. S. 317, 55 L. Ed. 750, 31 Sup. Ct. 587.

61 Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 58 L. Ed. 691, 34 Sup. Ct. 387.

When an Indian is made a citizen and is emancipated from federal control, he is outside the reach of police regulations on the part of congress, and a person who sells him liquor within the limits of a state cannot be prosecuted under the federal statute prohibiting sales of liquor to Indians. Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488, 49 L. Ed. 848, 25 Sup. Ct. 506.

The mere fact that an Indian is given citizenship does not constitute an emancipation, however. Mosier v. United States, 198 Fed. 54.

62 Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 58 L. Ed. 691, 34 Sup. Ct. 387; Dick v. United States, 208 U. S. 340, 52 L. Ed. 520, 28 Sup. Ct. 399; United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188, 23 L. Ed.

But, in the absence of such a provision by treaty or act of congress, the federal statute prohibiting the introduction of liquor into the Indian country does not apply to land within the limits of a state which was formerly part of an Indian reservation, but to which the Indian title has been wholly extinguished, and over which and its inhabitants the jurisdiction of the state, for all purposes of government, has become full and complete,68 nor to land of this character within the limits of a territory.64

§ 336. Army and navy. The constitution empowers congress to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." 65 Under this power and the general power to make laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers given it,66 congress may constitutionally punish, as an offense against the United States, the receipt of an excessive fee by an agent employed to collect a pension,67 detention from a pensioner of money collected for him as his pension,68 and embezzlement by a guardian of his ward's pension money. And it may punish offenses committed on a ship of war, wherever she may be, even though in waters within the jurisdiction of a particular state.70 The war power is considered in a separate chapter.71

§ 337. Aliens. Congress has power to exclude aliens from the United States; to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may come in; and to deport aliens who have entered in violation of law.72 But it has no power to control the dealings of citizens with aliens residing within the United States merely because they are aliens.73 It may make it an offense to import alien women for

846, 108 U. S. 491, 27 L. Ed. 803, 2 Sup. Ct. 906. And see Clairmont v. United States, 225 U. S. 551, 56 L. Ed. 1201, 32 Sup. Ct. 787; State v. Lott, 21 Idaho 646, 123 Pac. 491. 63 Clairmont v. United States, 225 U. S. 551, 56 L. Ed. 1201, 32 Sup. Ct. 787; Dick v. United States, 208 U. S. 340, 52 L. Ed. 520, 28 Sup. Ct. 399; State v. Tilden, 27 Idaho 262, 147 Pac. 1056.

64 Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, 24 L. Ed. 471.

65 Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8, cls. 12-14.

66 See § 24, supra.

67 United States v. Marks, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 534, Fed. Cas. No. 15,721.

68 United States v. Fairchilds, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 74, Fed. Cas. No. 15,067. 69 United States v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343, 25 L. Ed. 180.

70 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 336, 390.

71 See chapter 46, infra.

72 Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 53 L. Ed. 737, 29 Sup. Ct. 470, 16 Ann. Cas. 1066.

78 Keller v. United States, 213 U.

purposes of prostitution, but it cannot make it an offense merely to hold or harbor an alien woman for that purpose after she has entered the country, that being a matter pertaining exclusively to the police power of the state.75

$338. Ambassadors and consuls. The federal constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.'' 76 And the federal statutes provide that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all suits and proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, or against consuls or vice-consuls.77

§ 339. Civil rights. The thirteenth amendment to the federal constitution went no further than to prohibit slavery or involuntary servitude. It secures the civil right of liberty, but creates no other civil rights.78 Thus, it does not prevent discrimination between negroes and white citizens with respect to accommodations in schools, railroad cars, hotels, etc., and does not give congress the power to punish individuals for denying to negroes equal accommodations,79 or for conspiring within a state to prevent negroes, because of their race and color, from making or carrying out contracts to labor,80 but the remedy for wrongs of this character must be sought through state action and in state tribunals, subject to the supervision of the United States Supreme Court by writ of error in proper cases.81

S. 138, 53 L. Ed. 737, 29 Sup. Ct. 470, 16 Ann. Cas. 1066.

74 Ex parte Lair, 177 Fed. 789. 75 Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 53 L. Ed. 737, 29 Sup. Ct. 470, 16 Ann. Cas. 1066; Ex parte Lair, 177 Fed. 789.

76 Const. art. III, § 2; In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403, 34 L. Ed. 222, 10 Sup. Ct. 854; United States v. Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205, Fed. Cas. No. 15,598.

For a discussion of the statutes enacted pursuant to this power see § 1557 et seq., infra.

77 Judicial Code, § 256, 18.

For construction of earlier provisions on this subject see In re Iasigi, 79 Fed. 751; United States v. Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205, Fed. Cas. No. 15,598; Com. v. Kosloff, 5

Serg. & R. (Pa.) 545 (holding that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by consuls.)

78 Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 51 L. Ed. 65, 27 Sup. Ct. 6; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 Sup. Ct. 18; Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 676, 12 Am. Rep. 375; State v. Strauder, 11 W. Va. 803, 27 Am. Rep. 606.

79 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 Sup. Ct. 18. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. Ed. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405. 80 Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 51 L. Ed. 65, 27 Sup. Ct. 6.

81 Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 51 L. Ed. 65, 27 Sup. Ct. 6.

The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution provides that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the states wherein they reside," and that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 82 It applies, not to acts of individuals merely, which may constitute an invasion of the rights of citizens of the United States, but to the invasion or denial of such rights by the states,83 and therefore congress has no power, by virtue of the amendment, to punish acts of individuals merely, as distinguished from acts by or under authority of the state.84 But it has the power, under this amendment, to punish acts by state officers which constitute a violation thereof.85 And it also has the power to punish acts of individuals depriving citizens of the United States of rights given them by the federal constitution, and therefore the supreme court has sustained acts punishing conspiracies to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States, or to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment thereof.86

82 Const. U. S. amend. 14.

For a discussion of this amendment in its relation to state statutes see §§ 41-43, supra.

83 Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 51 L. Ed. 65, 27 Sup. Ct. 6; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. Ed. 290; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588; United States v. Sanges, 48 Fed. 78; Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 19 S. W. 1109, 33 Am. St. Rep. 527.

84 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed 835, 3 Sup. Ct. 18; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.

For this reason, acts of congress making it an offense for the proprietors of hotels, public conveyances, theaters, etc., to deny equal accommodations to any persons (Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed.

835, 3 Sup. Ct. 18), and punishing conspiracies to deprive any person of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or equal protection of the laws (Rev. St. § 5519; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 30 L. Ed. 766, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 763, United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. Ed. 290, 1 Sup. Ct. 601), were held to be unconstitutional.

85 Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 101, 41 L. Ed. 87, 16 Sup. Ct. 990 (discrimination in selecting and summoning jurors). And see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 347, 25 L. Ed. 680; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667.

86 In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 39 L. Ed. 1080, 15 Sup. Ct. 959; United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 28 L. Ed. 673, 5 Sup. Ct. 35; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. Ed.