Some of the statutes in terms include the obtaining of a person's signature to a written instrument,78 or compelling or attempting to compel any person to do any act or to refrain from doing any lawful act against his will.79 Property includes a check, though it would not have been cashed because of irregularities in the signature.80 And it has been held that it is none the less an attempt to extort money by threats because the party has been induced to give his note for the amount in question.81 It is immaterial whether the money obtained belonged to the person from whom it was obtained or to another. It is sufficient if it was obtained from him.82 Nor is it material that the defendant was not seeking to obtain the property for himself and would not have been benefited by the obtaining of it.83 § 455. Money or property legally due. According to some of the courts, it is not a defense that the money or property demanded or extorted was legally owing to the defendant by the victim, or that the defendant thought that it was justly due him, since the law does not authorize the collection of just debts by threats of the character denounced by the statute,84 and this has been held to be true even 78 Bush v. State, 19 Ariz. 195, 168 Pac. 508. And see the statutes. 79 Chunn v. State, 125 Ga. 789, 54 S. E. 751; Cook v. State, 22 Ga. App. 770, 97 S. E. 264. And see § 453, supra. 80 State v. Barr, 67 Wash. 87, 120 Pac. 509. 81 Com. v. Carpenter, 108 Mass. 15. 82 People v. Weinseimer, 117 N. Y. App. Div. 603, 102 N. Y. Supp. 579, aff'd 190 N. Y. 537, 83 N. E. 1129; People v. Lee, 70 N. Y. Misc. 446, 129 N. Y. Supp. 185. 83 In re Sherin, 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 446. 84 Illinois. Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464. Louisiana. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265; State v. Logan, 104 La. 760, 29 So. 336. Massachusetts. Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55. Missouri. State v. McCabe, 135 Mo. 450, 37 S. W. 123, 34 L. R. A. 127, 58 Am. St. Rep. 589. New York. People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163. But see people v. Griffin, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 427. South Dakota. In re Sherin, 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 760, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D. 446. Texas. Cohen v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 118, 38 S. W. 1005. Washington. State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 167 Pac. 47. The word "wrongful,' in a statute defining extortion as the obtaining of money or property from another with his consent by a wrongful use of force or fear, relates solely to the methods used to obtain the results sought, and has no reference whatever to the justness of that result. People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152; In re Sherin, though such indebtedness arose from and was created by the crime charged.85 But other courts have held that a threat to prosecute for an alleged or supposed offense connected with the creation of a debt is not within the statute, where the object is merely to secure payment of such debt,86 provided the accusation is made in good faith.87 And it has been held that threats by a person whose goods have been stolen to prosecute the supposed thief unless he pays for the property cannot, standing alone, be considered to have been made maliciously and with intent to extort, if there are grounds to suspect such person to be guilty.88 It is not blackmail for a person who has 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 446. The privilege of an attorney does not sanction the writing of a letter to the defendant in a case in which he represents the plaintiff to force the settlement of the unliquidated claim of his client, in which he has a monetary interest, by threats to accuse him of crime. People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163. 85 It is within the statute to threaten to prosecute a thief for stealing property unless he pays for the property stolen. People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152. A person who maliciously threatens to accuse a thief who has stolen his property of the crime, or to do an injury to his person or property, unless he makes compensation, with intent to extort money from him, is within the statute. State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71. 86 Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N. E. 226, 11 L. R. A. 656. And see People v. Wightman, 104 N. Y. 598, 11 N. E. 135. Threatening to accuse a person of obtaining money from the defendant under false pretenses unless he repays it is not within the statute. State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80, 41 Am. Rep. 791. Nor is charging a person with cutting defendant's timber and threatening to prosecute him criminally unless he pays the amount of the damage. State v. Ricks, 108 Miss. 7, 66 So. 281, Ann Cas. 1917 E 244. Nor does the statute cover the case of an owner who demands from the offender a reasonable compensation for property which he has maliciously and criminally destroyed, and accompanies his demand with a threat to accuse the offender of the crime. Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N. E. 226, 11 L. R. A. 656. 87 If the accusation is false and is known by the party making it to be false, it may be a threat though in form the person against whom it is made is simply called upon to render satisfaction for that which, if the charge were true, would entitle the accuser to pecuniary compensation. People v. Wightman, 104 N. Y. 598, 11 N. E. 135. A claim that the victim had stolen property from the defendant is no defense to a prosecution for obtaining notes from him in settlement by threats to prosecute him for the theft, where it is a mere pretense for the purpose of imposing upon the credulity of the victim, who is mentally deficient. State v. Gilbert, 31 N. D. 537, 153 N. W. 1009. 88 State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71, Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55. in good faith commenced a civil action against another for damages for seducing his wife to take money from him in settlement of the suit.89 80 McMillen v. State, 60 Ind. 216 § 456. Definition and elements. Burglary is one of the commonlaw felonies. At common law it is the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another by night, with intent to commit a felony, whether the intent be executed or not.1 Statutes have been very gen 1 Delaware. State V. Manluff, Houst. Cr. Cas. 208. Kentucky. Hayes v. Com., 171 Ky. 291, 188 S. W. 415. Maryland. Bowser v. State, 136 Md. 342, 110 Atl. 854; Robinson v. State, 53 Md. 151, 36 Am. Rep. 399. New Jersey. Downs v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co. of South Carolina. State v. Puckett, 95 S. C. 114, 78 S. E. 737, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 999. "A burglar," said Lord Coke, "is erally enacted changing or adding to the common-law definition, and dispensing with the necessity for proving some of the common-law elements of the offense. These statutes are to be construed in the light of the common law, and, unless a contrary intention appears, the terms used, such as "break," "enter," "dwelling house," and the like, are to be taken in the sense in which they are understood at common law.3 In some states, burglary has been divided into degrees, according to the character of the premises, the time the offense is committed, or other circumstances.4 he that in the nighttime breaketh and entreth into a mansion house of another of intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit some other felony within the same, whether his felonious intent be executed or not."' 3 Inst. 63; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 38, § 1; 4 Bl. Com. 224; Britt. (Nicholl's Trans.) 42; Clarke v. Com., 25 Gratt. (Va.) 908. In State v. Whit, 4 Jones (N. C.) 349, it was said: "To a conviction, it is necessary to prove, first, the breaking; second, the entering; third, that the house broken and entered is a mansion house; fourth, that the breaking and entering was in the nighttime; fifth, that the breaking and entering were with intent to commit a felony. In all these particulars there must be proof satisfactory to the minds of the jury; and if the state fails upon any one point, the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal." And see to the same effect State v. Wilson, 1 N. J. L. 439, 1 Am. Dec. 216; State v. Puckett, 95 S. C. 114, 78 S. E. 737, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 999. 2 What acts shall constitute burglary is a matter that is left entirely to the discretion of the legislature, within its constitutional powers. Pinson v. State, 91 Ark. 434, 121 S. W. 751; People v. Brittain, 142 Cal. 8, 75 Pac. 314, 100 Am. St. Rep. 95; |