question will be presented subsequently.1 The following calm, dispassionate language of the Supreme Court of Ohio commends itself to the consideration of the reader. It was a case of committal to reformatory school on an ex parte examination by the grand jury, of a boy under sixteen, who had been charged with crime, under statutes which authorize and direct the proceeding: - "The proceeding is purely statutory; and the commitment, in cases like the present, is not designed as a punishment for crime, but to place minors of the description, and for the causes specified in the statute, under the guardianship of the public authorities named, for proper care and discipline, until they are reformed, or arrive at the age of majority. The institution to which they are committed is a school, not a prison, nor is the character of this detention affected by the fact that it is also a place where juvenile convicts may be sent, who would otherwise be condemned to confinement in the common jail or penitentiary. Owing to the ex parte character of the proceeding, it is possible that the commitment of a person might be made on a false and groundless charge. In such a case neither the infant nor any person who would, in the absence of such commitment, be entitled to his custody and services, will be without remedy. If the remedy pro * 1 "It cannot be said that in this case there is no imprisonment. This boy is deprived of a father's care; bereft of home influences; has no freedom of action; is committed for an uncertain time; is branded as a prisoner; made subject to the will of others, and thus feels that he is a slave. Nothing could more contribute to paralyze the youthful energies, crush all noble aspirations, and unfit him for the duties of manhood. Other means of a milder character; other influences of a more kindly nature; other laws less in restraint of liberty would better accomplish the reformation of the depraved, and infringe less upon inalienable rights." People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280. But see, contra, Ex parte Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (42 Am. Rep. 10). See post, § 166a. § 50 vided in the twentieth section should not be adequate or available, the existence of a sufficient cause for the detention might, we apprehend, be inquired into by a proceeding in habeas corpus." 1 1 Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (2 Am. Rep. 388). § 50 CHAPTER VI. POLICE REGULATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE. SECTION 56. Citizenship and domicile distinguished. 57. Expatriation. 58. Naturalization. 59. Prohibition of emigration. 60. Compulsory emigration. 62. The public duties of a citizen. § 56. Citizenship and domicile distinguished. - The distinction between citizenship and domicile has been so often explained in elementary treatises that only a passing reference will be needed here, in order to refresh the memory of the reader. Mr. Cooley defines a citizen to be "a member of the civil state entitled to all its privileges.' Mr. Blackstone's definition of allegiance, which is the obligation of the citizen, is "the tie which binds the subject to the sovereign, in return for that protection which the sovereign affords the subject."2 Citizenship, therefore, is that political status which supports mutual rights and obligations. The State, of which an individual is a citizen, may require of him various duties of a political character; while he is entitled to the protection of the government against all foreign attacks, and is likewise invested with political rights according to the character of the government of the State, the chief of which is the right of suffrage. Domicile is the place where one permanently resides. One's permanent residence may be, and usually is, in the country of which he is a citizen, but it need not be, and 1 Cooley on Const. Law, 77. 1 Bl. Com. *441. very often is not. One can be domiciled in a foreign land. While a domicile in a foreign State subjects the individual and his personal property to the regulation and control of the law of the domicile, i.e., creates a local or temporary allegiance on the part of the individual to the State in which he is resident, and although he can claim the protection of the laws during his residence in that State, he does not assume political obligations or acquire political rights, and can not claim the protection of the government, after he has taken his departure from the country. Only a citizen can claim protection outside of the country. There is no permanent tie binding the resident alien to the State, and there is no permanent obligation on the part of either. The individual is at liberty to abandon his domicile, whenever he so determines, without let or hindrance on the part of the State, in which he has been resident. This is certainly true of a domicile in a foreign country. The § 57. Expatriation. — But it has been persistently maintained by the European powers, until within the last twenty years, that the citizen cannot throw off his allegiance, and by naturalization become the citizen of another country. older authorities have asserted the indissolubility of the allegiance of the natural-born subject to his sovereign or State. Mr. Blackstone says, "it is a principle of universal law that the natural-born subject of one prince cannot by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former; for this natural allegiance was intrinsic and primitive, and antecedent to the other; and cannot be divested without the concurrent act of the prince to whom it was due." Although all the States of Europe have provided for the naturalization of aliens, they have uniformly denied to their own subjects the right of expatriation. But when emigration to this country became general, this right was raised to an interna 11 Bl. Com. *446. tional question of great importance, and in conformity with their own interests and their general principles of civil liberty, the United States have strongly insisted upon the natural and absolute right of expatriation. This question has been before the courts of this country,' and at an early day the Supreme Court of the United States showed an inclination to take the European view of this right.' But the question has been finally settled in favor of the right of expatriation, so far at least as the government of the United States is concerned, by an act of Congress in the following terms: "Whereas, the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas, in the recognition of this principle, this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed, that such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign States, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: therefore, be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, that any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or decision of any officer of this government, which denies, 1 See Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242; Stoughton v. Taylor, 2 Paine, 655; Jackson v. Burns, 3 Binn. 85. "In the first place, she was born under the allegiance of the British crown, and no act of the government of Great Britain has absolved her from that allegiance. Her becoming a citizen of South Carolina did not, ipso facto, work any dissolution of her original allegiance, at least so far as the rights and claims of the British crown were concerned." Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242. See Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133; Isaac William's case, 2 Cranch, 82, note; Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283; United States v Gillies, 1 Pet. C. C. 159; Ainslee v. Martin, 9 Mass. 454. |