LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON RULES, Washington, DC, December 5, 1986. Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr., DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I hereby transmit the committee report "The Item Veto: State Experience and Its Application to the Federal Situation." From time to time, Presidents have tried to expand their veto authority so that they might approve some appropriations and disapprove others in the same bill. President Reagan has proposed an item-veto statute or constitutional amendment in each of his last three State of the Union Addresses. He is the seventh President to request the item veto. To expand the veto powers of the Executive would require the Congress to alter dramatically its rules, procedures and traditional practices. The Rules Committee therefore feels compelled to consider the proposal carefully. While it is true that forty-three governors have item-veto authority, the nature of that authority and the history of its exercise are as varied and colorful as the State flags. Ten governors can reduce appropriation items or strike them entirely; seven governors can return bills to the legislature with amendments; nineteen governors are empowered to exercise a pocket item veto. One State constitution constrains the legislature in the changes it can make to the governor's budget and grants the governor item-veto authority; however, once the legislature adopts the budget bill it is enacted without crossing the governor's desk. The governor has the authority to veto items but never the opportunity. The item veto played an historic role in the anti-legislature fervor that overcame the States in the period between the Civil War and the turn of the century. Between 1861 and 1900, most of the States that now provide their governors with an item veto first granted that authority. In 1861, Georgia became the first State to adopt the proposal; Georgia amended its constitution to include a provision similar to one in the Confederate Constitution. Other Southern States revised their constitutions at that time and Texas, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana adopted the item veto. The idea was not limited to one region, however. Pennsylvania, New York, Colorado and California all adopted the item veto before 1880. In 1897, Delaware became the 30th State. By 1908 thirty-six States provided their governors with item-veto authority. The period immediately following the Civil War has been called the Age of Spoils and the item-veto was granted in response to the 1407922 excesses of the time. Citizens recoiled from the scandals and corruption in State legislatures. "The disturbing feature of these legislative mills," one author noted, "was the fact that a large majority of their products were obviously, and even blatantly. . . favors in the form of special and local legislation . . . enacted in gross negligence of public interest." Another commentator remarked that the excesses "led to constitutional, statutory, and judicial restraints designed to protect the victims of what seemed an age of greed, grab, and gain." Many States revised their constitutions during this period and expanded the powers of the executive branch at the expense of the legislature. The item veto exemplified this trend. State experience with the item veto has been contentious and litigious, further delaying an already drawn out appropriations process. The caseload has increased substantially. In fact, as many cases were heard in the last 15 years as during the entire period from 1860 to 1970. The item veto raises the prospect of extensive judicial intervention in Federal spending decisions. A review of the cases shows that certain questions appear frequently, among them: To what extent can a legislature thwart the Executive's item-veto power by the way it drafts legislation? What can a governor vetoan amount, a condition on the use of the amount, a free-standing provision, a phrase, a word, a letter? One Governor considered using the item veto to strike the word "not" from a condition on the use of an appropriation. Another Governor wanted to strike the first "t" in "thereafter" to make a tax increase immediately effective. Congress has a special constitutional responsibility for the purse which distinguishes it from State legislatures. Unlike most State legislatures, Congress drafts and considers its own budget legislation, not measures introduced by the Chief Executive. As one section of this report points out, a case can be made-on separation of powers and other grounds-for a constitutional challenge to any statute granting item-veto authority to the President. Many governors have discovered the bargaining advantage of threatening to veto an item of special interest to legislators who happen to oppose an unrelated measure of special interest to the Governor. One governor recently struck all appropriations for the House, which was controlled by the other party, because the General Assembly would not take up his proposal to raise taxes. The same governor reduced by about one-third each item for the Senate, which was controlled by the governor's party. While the item veto would shift power to the President, it may not add much to the effort to control spending even if a President happens to be more provident than Congress. The President, unlike most Governors, now enjoys significant power to transfer, reprogram, defer, and rescind funds and has broad discretion to allocate lump sum appropriations. These tools may be more effective than the item veto to reduce spending and eliminate wasteful projects. Moreover, the item veto is probably more appropriate to State spending which is largely composed of discretionary programs that can be reached by the item veto. Federal discretionary outlays represent only half the spending for any year and the item veto may not reach particular projects even in the discretionary half of Federal spending. Congress, unlike State legislatures, traditionally ap |