of their children, dying intestate and without lineal descendants, is by no means universal in the country, and is received in different states, under various modifications. The above argument, in favor of law lectures and law schools, is founded in ignorance of the real cause of the differences existing between our law and that of England, and also of the history of legal education in this country. These changes have grown out of the character of the people, nurtured from the first settlement of the country, to examine boldly the institutions and laws over them, and to refuse to adopt, or—if imprudently adopted-afterwards to throw off such parts of the old common law, as were not consistent with the present stage of society. Our position has enabled us to view the law, and all its antiquated peculiarities, free from the strong partiality, which every Englishman proudly feels for the establishments which have come down from his ancestors, coeval, perhaps, with the constitution of his country. Our history, from the first day on which the puritans bade their native England good night,' leaving its institutions, just beginning to rock under those efforts, which afterwards prostrated the throne, in order to enjoy their own laws, down to the period of the revolution, which forcibly severed our connexion with the mother country, bears constant testimony to the operation of that spirit, which has produced the alterations in our laws of which Professor Spurrier has spoken. The cause goes back, far beyond law schools and their beneficial influence. mistake, however, of Professor Spurrier is not uncommon in its kind. He was anxious to press the claims of a systematic legal education upon his hearers. In his exertions in this behalf, he will ever have our cordial good wishes; but the cause is endangered, rather than benefited, by a falsely founded argument. This is one of many instances, in which foreigners have made the United States, the seat of such changes and institutions, as they wished to recommend in their own country, either mainly relying on the ignorance of those whom they addressed, or perhaps, in their imperfect knowledge of the real state of things here, imagining that they spoke according to truth. The We hope the time will come, when what we have done in the cause of civilization and law will be correctly cited, and when our country will not exist as a sort of terra incognita, like the mysterious regions of Ethiopia in ancient times, to be peopled with all things good and bad, according to the fancy of a writer,- as Geographers on pathless downs, Place elephants instead of towns; to be made the scene of the peculiar operation of principles, which have not operated here as asserted; and to have institutions and laws attributed to it, which, however creditable, do not exist. DIGEST OF RECENT DECISIONS. Principal Cases in 8 PETERS'S REPORTS of Cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. 11 WENDELL'S REPORTS of Cases in the Supreme Court, and Court of Impeachment and Correction of Errors in New York. ADMIRALTY AND ADMIRALTY PRACTICE. 1. (Several claims for salvage.) A libel was filed in the district court of Maryland, for a salvage service performed by the libellant, the master and owner of the sloop Liberty, and by his crew, in saving certain goods and merchandises on board of the brig Spark, while aground on the bar at Thomas' Point, in the Chesapeake Bay. The goods were owned by a number of persons, in several and distinct rights; and a general claim and answer were interposed in behalf of all of them, by Jarvis and Brown, (the owners of a part of them ;) without naming who, in particular, the owners were, or distinguishing their separate proprietary interests. This proceeding was doubtless irregular in both respects. Jarvis and Brown had no authority, merely as co-shippers, to interpose any claim for other shippers with whom they had no privity of interest or consignment: and several claims should have been interposed by the several owners, or by other persons authorized to act for them in the premises; each intervening in his own name for his proprietary interest, and specifying it. If any owner should not appear to claim any particular parcel of the property, the habit of courts of admiralty is, to retain such property, or its proceeds, after deducting the salvage, until a claim is made, or a year and a day have elapsed from the time of the institution of the proceedings. And when separate claims are interposed, although the libel is joint against the whole property, each claim is treated as a distinct and independent proceeding, in the nature of a several suit, upon which there may be a several independent hearing, decree and appeal. This is very familiar in practice in prize causes and seizures in rem for forfeitures; and is equally applicable to all other proceedings in rem, whenever there are distinct and independent claimants. Stratton v. Jarvis et al., 8 Peters, 4. 2. (Conclusiveness of decree of district court upon party in a salvage case, who does not appeal.) The district court decreed a salvage of one-fifth of the gross proceeds of the sales of the goods and merchandises, and directed the same to be sold accordingly. The salvage thus decreed was afterwards ascertained, upon the sales, to be, in the aggregate, two thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight dollars and thirty-eight cents; but no formal apportionment thereof was made. From this decree an appeal was interposed in behalf of all the owners of the goods and merchandises to the circuit court; but no appeal was interposed by the libellant. The consequence is, that the decree of the district court is conclusive upon him as to the amount of salvage in his favor. He cannot, in the appellate court, claim any thing beyond that amount; since he has not, by any appeal on his part, controverted its sufficiency. Ib. 3. (Apportionment of salvage.) Although no apportionment of the salvage among the various claimants was formally directed to be made by any interlocutory order of the district court, an apportionment appears to have been in fact made under its authority. A schedule is found in the record containing the names of all the owners and claimants, the gross sales of their property, and the amount of salvage apportioned upon each of them respectively. By this schedule, the highest salvage chargeable on any distinct claimant, is nine hundred and six dollars and seventeen cents, and the lowest forty-seven dollars and sixty cents, the latter sum being below the amount for which an appeal, by the act of 3rd of March 1803, chap. 93, is allowed from a decree of the district court in admiralty and maritime caușes. Ib. 4. (Admiralty jurisdiction, original and appellate of United States courts.) In the appeal here, as in that from the district court, the case of each claimant having a separate interest, must be treated as a separate appeal, pro interesse suo, from the decree, so far as it regards that interest and the salvage chargeable on him constitutes the whole matter in dispute between him and the libellants: with the fate of the other claims, however disposed of, he has and can have nothing to do. It is true, that the salvage service was in one sense entire: but it certainly cannot be deemed entire for the purpose of founding a right against all the claimants jointly, so as to make them all jointly responsible for the whole salvage. On the contrary, each claimant is responsible only for the salvage properly due, and chargeable on the gross proceeds or sales of his own property, pro rata. It would otherwise follow, that the property of one claimant might be made chargeable with the payment of the whole salvage; which would be against the clearest principles of law on this subject. The district and circuit courts manifestly acted upon this view of the matter; and their decrees would be utterly unintelligible upon any other. Their decrees, respectively, in giving a certain proportion of the gross sales, must necessarily apportion that amount pro rata upon the whole proceeds, according to the distinct interests of each claimant. This court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal in regard to any of the claimants, and the cause must for this reason be dismissed. The district court, as a court of original jurisdiction, has general jurisdiction of all causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; without reference to the sum or value of the matter in controversy. But the appellate jurisdiction of this court and of the circuit courts, depends upon the sum or value of the matter in dispute between the parties, having independent interests. Ib. 5. (Seizure by non-commissioned cruiser.) Nothing is better settled, both in England and America, than the doctrine that a non-commissioned cruiser may seize for the benefit of the government; and if his acts are adopted by the government, the property, when condemned, becomes a droit of the government. Carrington et al. v. The Merchants' Insurance Company, 8 Peters, 495. AGREEMENT. (Rule for estimating damages.) N. stipulated in certain articles of agreement to transport and deliver by the steamboat Paragon, to R. a certain quantity of subsistence stores, supposed to amount to three thousand seven hundred barrels, for the use of the United States: in consideration whereof R. agreed to pay to N., on the delivery of the stores at St. Louis, at a certain rate per barrel, one half in specie funds, or their equivalent, and the other half to be paid in Cincinnati, in the paper of banks current there at the period of the delivery of the stores at St. Louis. Under the agreement was the following memorandum: 'It is understood, that the payment to be made in Cincinnati, is to be in paper of the Miami Exporting Company, or its equivalent.' The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, that the plaintiffs could only recover the stipulated price for the freight actually transported, and that they were entitled to no more than the specie value of the notes of the Miami Exporting Company Bank, at the time that payment should have been made at Cincinnati. The specie value of the notes, at the time they should have been paid, is the rule by which such damages are to be estimated. Robinson v. Noble's Administrators, 8 Peters, 181. APPEAL. 1. (Brought up a second time.) A party may, after an appeal has been discussed for informality, if within five years, bring up the case again. Yeaton et al. v. Lenox et al., 8 Peters, 123. 2. (Reversal on account of irregularity.) In the circuit court of Alexandria, in 1817, several suits were brought against sundry individuals, who had associated to form a bank, called the Merchants Bank of Alexandria. The proceedings were regularly carried on in one of them, brought by Romulus Riggs; and a decree was pronounced by the court, from which the defendants appealed. On a hearing, the decree was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in conformity with certain principles prescribed in the decree of reversal. It appears, that decrees were pronounced in all the causes, though regular proceedings were had only in the case of Romulus |